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MARSILIO FICINO

PLATONIC THEOLOGY

VOLUME 3 • BOOKS IX–XI

ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

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with John Warden

LATIN TEXT EDITED BY

JAMES HANKINS

with William Bowen

THE I TATTI RENAISSANCE LIBRARY
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
LONDON, ENGLAND
2003

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Printed in the United States of America

Series design by Dean Bornstein

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ficino, Marsilio, 1433–1499.
[Theologia Platonica. English & Latin]
Platonic theology / Marsilio Ficino ; English translation by Michael J.B. Allen with John Warden ; Latin text edited by James Hankins with William Bowen.
p. cm. — (The I Tatti Renaissance library ; 2)
Includes bibliographical references (v. 1, p.) and index.
Contents: v. 1. Books I–IV. v. 2. Books V–VIII. v. 3. Books IX–XI.
ISBN 0-674-00345-4 (v. 1 : alk. paper)
ISBN 0-674-00764-6 (v. 2 : alk. paper)
ISBN 0-674-01065-5 (v. 3 : alk. paper)
1. Plato. 2. Soul. 3. Immortality. I. Allen, Michael J. B.
II. Warden, John, 1936– III. Hankins, James.
IV. Bowen, William R.
V. Title. VI. Series.
B785.F433 T53 2001
186'.4—dc21 00-053491

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THEOLOGIA PLATONICA
DE IMMORTALITATE
ANIMORUM

Capitula librorum Theologiae
de immortalitate animorum
Marsilii Ficini Florentini
divisae in libros XVIII

Nonus liber. Quod sit immortalis efficacius non modo ex eo quod est indivisibilis, sed etiam ex eo quod a corpore non dependet.

Cap. I Probatur per rationalem virtutem animam non modo esse formam individuam, verumetiam a corpore non pendere, ut evidentius immortalitas demonstretur. Prima ratio: quia mens reflectitur in se ipsam.

Cap. II Secunda ratio: mens quo magis separatur a corpore, eo melius se habet.

Cap. III Tertia ratio: mens repugnat corpori.

Cap. IV Quarta ratio: anima libere operatur.

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Cap. VI Sexta ratio: anima convenit partim cum divinis, partim vero cum brutis.

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Decimus liber. Quod sit immortalis quantum ad ordinem rerum.

Cap. I Prima ratio: sicut ultimum in ordine corporum est incorruptibile, sic et ultimum in ordine mentium.

Cap. II Obiectio Epicuri et responsio de rerum serie.

The Theology on the Immortality of Souls
by Marsilio Ficino the Florentine
Divided into Eighteen Books:
Chapter Headings

Ninth Book: What is immortal is more efficacious not only because it is indivisible, but also because it is not dependent on the body.

Chapter 1 To demonstrate more clearly its immortality, the soul is proved by way of the rational power to be not only undivided but independent of the body. First proof: that the mind reflects upon itself.

Chapter 2 Second proof: the more the mind is separated from the body, the better its condition.

Chapter 3 Third proof: the mind resists the body.

Chapter 4 Fourth proof: the soul acts freely.

Chapter 5 Fifth proof: the mind operates without the body.

Chapter 6 Sixth proof: the soul conforms partly with things divine, but partly with animals.

Chapter 7 An objection from the Epicureans and its rebuttal. On the tempering of things.

Tenth Book: That the soul is immortal in respect of the natural order.

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Chapter 2 Epicurus' objection and its rebuttal. On the chain of being.

Cap. III Secunda ratio: sicut in rebus naturalibus fit resolutio[1] ad primam materiam immortalem, sic ad formam ultimam immortalem.

Cap. IV Obiectio Epicuri et responsio de formis deo simillimis.

Cap. V Responsio planior de formarum gradibus.

Cap. VI Obiectio Lucretii et responsio, quod mens potest absque corpore operari.

Cap. VII Obiectio Epicuri et responsio, quod deus non facit mentem nisi ex seipso et per seipsum.

Cap. VIII Obiectio Panaetii et responsio, quod anima sine medio est ex deo.

Cap. IX Tertia ratio: quale est obiectum, talis est potentia.

Undecimus liber. Quod sit immortalis in quantum unitur cum obiectis aeternis, et species inde accipit absolutas.

Cap. I Prima ratio: mens unitur obiecto perpetuo et species suscipit absolutas rationesque sempiternas.

Cap. II Obiectio Epicureorum[2] et responsio. De unione mentis cum speciebus absolutis et rationibus sempiternis.

Cap. III Obiectio Epicuri et responsio, quod species innatae sunt menti.

Chapter 3 Second proof: as resolution reverts in natural objects to prime immortal matter, so it reverts to ultimate immortal form.

Chapter 4 Epicurus' objection and a response to it. On the forms most resembling God.

Chapter 5 A more detailed response concerning the levels of the forms.

Chapter 6 Lucretius' objection and its refutation. That the mind can act without the body.

Chapter 7 Epicurus' objection and its rebuttal. That God does not make mind except from Himself and through Himself.

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Eleventh Book: that the soul is immortal insofar as it unites with eternal objects and receives the immaterial species from them.

Chapter 1 First proof: the mind is united with an eternal object and receives the immaterial species and the everlasting rational principles.

Chapter 2 An Epicurean objection and its rebuttal. On the union of the mind with the immaterial species and eternal rational principles.

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Cap. IV Confirmatio superiorum atque insuper de ideis.

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Cap. VII Obiectio Scepticorum et responsio, quod aliquid certum sciatur.

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Chapter 4 Confirmation of the above. Further discussion of the Ideas.

Chapter 5 Confirmation of the above by way of signs.

Chapter 6 Second proof: the mind is the subject of eternal truth.

Chapter 7 An objection from the Skeptics and its rebuttal. Knowledge of something certain is possible.

Chapter 8 An objection from the Peripatetics and its rebuttal. That the truth is at home in the soul.

LIBER NONUS[1]

: I :

Probatur per rationalem virtutem animam non modo esse formam individuam, verumetiam a corpore non pendere, ut evidentius immortalitas demonstretur. Prima ratio: quia mens reflectitur in seipsam.

1 Hactenus probavimus per virtutem rationalem animam esse formam individuam immortalemque. Deinceps probandum est eam a corpore non pendere, unde proprie concluditur immortalitas.

2 Res divisibiles in seipsas minime reflectuntur. At si quis dixerit rem aliquam divisibilem in se revolvi, sic statim interrogabimus: utrum pars huius rei alia vertatur in aliam, an pars in totam, an tota in partem, an tota potius in ipsam totam? Si datur primum, non aliquid idem vertitur in seipsum, cum inter se diversae sint partes. Si secundum conceditur aut tertium, sequitur idem. Aliud enim pars est, aliud totum. Solus restare videtur modus quartus, id est quod totum vertatur in totum. Hoc non aliter quam si omnes partes vertantur in omnes. Esto. Tandem nos, conversione huiusmodi facta, quaeremus utrum pars aliqua in ea re remaneat extra aliam vel ab alia discrepans, an nulla? Si remaneat, alia pars in hoc erit situ vel modo, in illo alia, atque ita in se invicem conversae nondum erunt; sin nulla, certe nulla in ea re pars distabit discrepabitve a parte. Quod tale est, individuum est omnino, ita ut neque ex partibus quantitatis, neque ex materia et forma

BOOK IX

: I :

To demonstrate more clearly its immortality, the soul is proved by way of the rational power to be not only undivided but independent of the body.
First proof: that the mind reflects upon itself.

By way of the rational power we have thus far proved that the soul 1
is an undivided and immortal form. We must next prove that it does not depend on the body; and from this we can properly conclude its immortality.

Divisible things do not reflect upon themselves. But if someone 2
were to argue that some divisible thing does reflect upon itself, we will immediately ask: Is one part of this object reflecting upon another, or a part upon the whole, or the whole upon a part, or the whole rather upon its whole self? If the first, then the same part is not reflecting upon itself, since parts differ among themselves. If the second or third, the same conclusion follows, for a part is one thing, the whole another. Apparently, the fourth possibility is the only one left: that the whole is reflecting upon the whole. This is tantamount to saying that all the parts are reflecting upon all the parts. Grant this. But after such reflecting is complete, let us then ask whether in the object some part remains outside another part or differs from another, or whether no part does? If a part remains, then one part will exist in this position or in this manner, another part in that, and so they will not yet be reflecting in turn upon each other. But if no part remains, then assuredly no one part in that object will be separate, or be distinguished, from another. This object is so entirely indivisible that it is constituted

constituatur. Itaque aut non reflectitur res aliqua in seipsam aut, si reflectitur, est individua.

3 Animam in se revolvi modis quatuor alias diximus, scilicet per intellectum in naturam suam, quando quaerit, invenit considerat-que seipsam, per voluntatem in naturam eandem, quando se affectat et amat, per intellectum in actum ipsum intellegendi, quando et rem intellegit et se intellegit intellegere, per voluntatem in voluntatis actum, quando et vult aliquid, et vult se velle. Atque has rotas quatuor Plato animae currui tribuit, et hunc esse fontem illum quadruplicem arbitror naturae perpetuae, quem Pythagoras inquit animae hominum ab Iove tributum. Si nulla res dividua remeat in seipsam, profecto nostra haec quadriga rationalis, quae per rotas quatuor in se recurrit, atque ipse fons intimus, qui per quatuor gurgites refluit in se ipsum, simplex est et prorsus indivisibilis. Huiusmodi vero conversio non est a corpore ad corpus, sed ab anima est ad animam, quae et[2] ex multis aliis supra, et hic ex eo probata est indivisibilis esse, quod in se redeat. Quapropter conversio talis a corpore libera est, cum neque exordiatur ab ipso, neque in ipsum regrediatur. Multo magis animae substantia libera est a corpore, si conversio, quae eius est motus, est a corpore libera. Itaque rationalis anima nullo modo pendet ex corpore in essendo, sicut neque in movendo et operando.

4 Item, si per operationem in se reflectitur, reflectitur etiam per essentiam. Ita essentia animae in se convertitur. Quo autem cuiusque rei conversio fit, illinc est et profectio atque contra. Igitur ex se est anima quae in se vertitur. Ex se, inquam, tribus praecipue modis. Primo secundum formam, quia per formam aliam non formatur; alioquin non ad se, sed ad illam recurreret. Deinde secundum fundamentum, quia non sustinetur ab alio. Non enim inniti-

neither from quantitative parts nor from matter and form. Therefore an object either does not reflect upon itself, or, if it does, it is indivisible.

3 Elsewhere we said that the soul reflects upon itself in four ways: through the intellect upon its own nature when it seeks, finds, and considers itself; through the will upon the same nature when it desires and loves itself; through the intellect upon the very act of understanding when it understands an object and understands it is understanding; and through the will upon the act of the will when it wills something and wills itself to will. Plato attributes these four wheels to the soul's chariot;[1] and I think that this is that fourfold fountain of perpetual nature, the fountain which Pythagoras says was granted by Jupiter to the soul of men.[2] If no divided thing reflects upon itself, then our rational four-horse chariot, which turns upon itself via its four wheels, and the fountain itself within, which flows back upon itself by way of its four streams, is simple and completely indivisible. But reflection of this kind does not turn back from body to body, but from soul to soul; and the soul has been proved, both by the many earlier arguments and by this argument here, to be indivisible because it reflects upon itself. So self-reflection is free of the body, since it neither begins from nor returns to it. The soul's substance is even freer of the body, if its reflection, which is its motion, is free of the body. Hence the rational soul, in being as in moving and in doing, does not depend in any way on the body.

4 Again, if the soul reflects upon itself via its operation, it also does so via its essence. So the soul's essence reflects upon itself. But each thing's turning back is linked to its setting out and the reverse. So the soul which reflects upon itself exists from itself, and exists from itself principally in three ways: firstly in terms of its form, because it is not being formed via another form (otherwise it would return not to itself but to that form); secondly in terms of its foundation, because it is not being sustained by an-

tur alteri forma haec, quae sibimet innititur, quando adnititur ad seipsam. Tertio secundum simplicitatem, quia non constat ex partibus. Nam quo pacto explicatur ea forma per partium superficiem, quae in suum centrum penitus replicatur? Quod ita est ex se, est semper, quoniam quod desinit esse, id aut quia a causa formatrice derelinquitur, aut quia a fundamento deseritur, aut quia dissolvitur in partes, esse desinit. Quod vero ad seipsam convertitur, quia individuum est, non dissolvitur, quia sui ipsius est forma, a formatrice causa non relinquitur,[3] quia in seipso manet, numquam a fundamento deseritur.

: II :

Secunda ratio: mens quo magis separatur a corpore, eo melius se habet.[4]

1 Si anima[5] originem ullam a corpore traheret, quanto coniunctius haereret corpori, tanto melius se haberet. Quaelibet enim res ab origine sua servatur atque perficitur. Nunc vero contra[6] contingit.

2 Praestantissimae animae partes[7] sunt intellectus atque voluntas. Quando circa corporalia occupamur, intellectus aut nihil cernit omnino aut non sincere discernit, sensibus et phantasia deceptus;[8] voluntas affligitur, dum multis inde vexatur curis.[9] Contra, quando corporalia despicit et, sopitis sensibus expulsisque phantasmatum nubibus,[10] animus per se aliquid speculatur, tunc intellectus sincere discernit claretque[11] maxime. Quod etiam in his apparet qui aut per somni quietem[12] aut aliam quamvis alienationem a corpore

other (for this form which is resting on itself when it strives for itself does not rest on another form); and thirdly in terms of its simplicity, because it is not compounded from parts (for how can that form be unfolding across a surface of parts when it is wholly folding back upon its own center?). What thus comes from itself exists forever, because, when something stops existing, it stops either because it is being abandoned by its forming cause, or because it is losing its foundation, or because it is being dissolved into parts. But what turns back upon itself, because it is undivided, is not dissolved; and because it is the form of itself, it is not abandoned by the forming cause; and because it remains in itself, it is never without its foundation.

: II :

Second proof: the more the mind is separated from the body, the better its condition.

If the soul took its origin in any way from the body, then the more closely it was united with the body, the better would be its condition. For every thing is preserved and perfected by its origin. But in reality the contrary happens. 1

The soul's most outstanding parts are the intellect and the will. When we are preoccupied with corporeals, the intellect either perceives nothing at all or does not discern truly, since it is deceived by the senses and by the phantasy; and the will is afflicted so long as it is vexed by many bodily cares. Contrariwise, when the soul despises corporeals and when the senses have been allayed and the clouds of phantasmata dissipated, and it perceives something on its own, then the intellect discerns truly and is at its brightest. We see this in the case of those who prophesy during the quiet of 2

vaticinantur. Ideo nonnulli, ut in *Critone* et *Apologia* inquit Plato, prope mortem cum sunt, futura praedicunt, quasi tunc illa videant in supernis numinibus[13] praescripta, quibus suapte natura iungitur animus, modo non impediatur[14] a corpore. Unde Socrates, tractus a falsis accusatoribus in iudicium, primo praedixit iudicibus futuram paenitentiam, accusatoribus ruinam, civitati seditionem, deinde in carcere mortis suae diem praesignavit, monstratum sibi a numine per quietem. Ita Theramenes, cum esset coniectus in carcerem biberetque venenum, Critiae adversario suo proximam mortem est auguratus, quae brevi consecuta est. Rhodius quidam moriens, ut scribit Posidonius Stoicus, sex aequales nominavit dixitque qui primus eorum, qui secundus, qui deinceps moriturus esset. Scribit et Aristoteles Eudemum Cyprium familiarem suum, cum venisset Pheras, Thessaliae oppidum, graviter aegrotasse, eique visum in quiete egregia facie iuvenem, qui diceret fore ut brevi convalesceret, paucisque diebus Alexander oppidi illius tyrannus interiret, ipseque Eudemus quinquennio post domum rediret; paulo post convaluisse illum, tyrannum fuisse interemptum, Eudemum peracto quinquennio obiisse atque ita eius animam in patriam remeasse. Nonne Callanus Indus iam iam moriturus citam Alexandro regi mortem praenuntiavit et Pherecides Syrus moriens Ephesiis victoriam contra Magnesios vaticinatus est? Leguntur alia multa generis eiusdem. Non solum vero intellectus, dum seorsum a corporis contagione vivimus, cernit multa perspicue, sed et voluntas impletur, neque perturbationibus ullis affligitur, sed divinis gaudet summopere tamquam sibi simillimis.

3 Hinc sequitur non esse corpus originem animi,[15] si[16] quo longius animus[17] discedit ab illo, eo se perfectius habet. Sequitur et

sleep or some other alienation from the body. Hence many, as Plato declares in the *Crito* and *Apology*,[3] as they approach death predict future events: it as if they saw at that moment those events written beforehand in the higher spirits to which the rational soul is naturally joined if only it is not impeded by the body.[4] Whence Socrates, having been brought to judgment by false accusers, first predicted to the judges their future penitence, to his accusers their downfall, and to the state sedition; and then in prison he announced beforehand that the day of his death had been shown him by a spirit during repose. Thus Theramenes, when he had been cast into prison and was drinking the poison, predicted to his adversary Critias that his death was nigh, which happened a short time later.[5] Posidonius the Stoic writes that a dying citizen of Rhodes called out the names of six contemporaries and declared who among them would die first, who second, and so on.[6] Aristotle too writes that his friend Eudemus of Cyprus, when he had arrived at the city of Phaerae in Thessaly, fell gravely ill and saw in his sleep a youth of surpassing beauty who declared that he would shortly recover; that Alexander, the tyrant of that city, would die in a few days; and that Eudemus himself would return home five years later. Aristotle says that Eudemus did improve a little afterwards, that the tyrant was killed, and that Eudemus died five years later and thus his soul returned to its native soil![7] Didn't Callanus the Indian when he was on the point of dying predict a speedy death to the king, Alexander [the Great],[8] and the dying Pherecydes of Syros prophesy to the Ephesians a victory over the Magnesians?[9] One can read many other accounts of the same kind. But not only does the intellect see many things clearly when we live apart from the body's contagion, but the will too is fulfilled: it is no longer afflicted by any disturbing passions but ardently rejoices in things divine as in things most resembling itself.

It follows that the body is not the origin of the rational soul, if 3
the further away the soul travels from it, the more perfect its con-

hoc, si quanto magis mens in hoc corpus mergitur,[18] tanto deficit magis, et quo discedit longius, eo magis et proficit, tunc fore perfectissimam mentem, quando[19] penitus[20] ab hoc corpore evolaverit. Non est autem inde interitus, unde summa perfectio, sed integra vita, usque adeo ut sit perpetua. Qua[21] enim mutatione animus umquam deficiet, quando non perit exeundo e corpore, qua[22] nulla ipsi[23] maior potest esse mutatio?

: III :

Tertia ratio: mens repugnat corpori.

1 Nulla res sponte sua potest suae origini repugnare. Alioquin sponte ad sui ipsius[24] ferretur[25] interitum qui necessario sequitur, origine perdita. Quinetiam quicquid effectus aliquis operatur,[26] suae originis vi et auxilio facit. Si ergo adversus causam pugnaret, in ea colluctatione causa illa sibi ipsi adversaretur.[27] Anima repugnat adversaturque[28] corpori nostro, immo corporibus omnibus. Igitur a nullo corpore ducit originem.

2 Duo praecipua sunt illius officia: speculari et consultare. In utroque repugnat corporibus. Primum videamus quomodo repugnat in speculando. Multis quotidie modis externa corpora varie disposita nostri corporis instrumenta sensibus assignata ita movent ut ad tempus fallant. Quam fallaciam emendat et corrigit[29] ratio, ut alias diffusius enarravimus, ubi ratio aliter iudicat quam aut externum corpus annuat, aut corpus proprium nuntiet, ac saepe iudicat modo contrario. Qua in re tam sui corporis quam

dition. It follows too that, if the more the mind is immersed in this body the more it is enfeebled, and the more distant it is the more it is perfect, then the mind will be most perfect when it has soared completely beyond this body. Total perfection, however, does not have the same origin as death: it is life in its entirety, so entire as to be perpetual. Will the rational soul become enfeebled in this change of its condition when it does not perish in exiting the body, given that no more radical change than this is possible for it?[10]

: III :

Third proof: the mind resists the body.

No thing can oppose its origin of its own accord, otherwise it would be voluntarily borne towards its own death which necessarily follows once its origin is lost. Moreover, whatever some effect achieves, it accomplishes by the force and aid of its origin. So if it fought against its cause, in the struggle the cause would be fighting against itself. The soul opposes and fights against our body, or rather against all bodies. Therefore it does not originate from any body.[11] 1

The soul's principal offices are two: to contemplate and to deliberate. In both it opposes bodies. First let us see how it opposes them in the process of contemplation. Daily and in many ways, external bodies, variously disposed as they are, so move our body's instruments, those allotted to the senses, that for the moment they beguile them. The reason amends and corrects the deception, as we have elaborated elsewhere, when it arrives at a judgment differing from that indicated by an external body or announced by its own body; and often it judges in an opposite way. In this it 2

aliorum damnat affectionem. Mittamus in praesentia ceterarum rerum speculationes, accipiamus summam summi contemplationem, ut cognoscamus quantum in ea mens naturam redarguat corporalem. Phantasia sensus externos sequitur, sensus corporis sui aliorumque corporum dispositionem. Quapropter sensuum et phantasiae iudicium corporum dispositioni tribuimus dicimusque ipsum secundum affectionem fieri corporalem. Quando animus noster, quid deus sit cupiens invenire, a magistris huiusmodi sciscitatur, phantasia praeceptor et faber nimium temerarius statuam aliquam machinatur ex quinque materiis, quas aliarum omnium pulcherrimas externi sensus ipsi obtulerint, acceptas a mundo, eo tamen pacto ut materias illas excellentiores reddat quodammodo quam a mundo per sensus acceperit.[30] Offert igitur phantasia nobis lumen adeo clarum ut nullum aliud videri possit fulgentius, adeo ingens ut nullum amplius, ac ferme per immensum inane[31] diffusum, quod innumerabilibus sit coloribus exornatum et in circulum revolvatur (ob quam revolutionem dulcissimis resonet modulis tam implentibus quam demulcentibus aures). Iucundissimis redoleat odoribus, saporibus quoque omnibus abundet, qui possint effingi omnium suavissimi, tactu molle mirum in modum, delicatum, lene et temperatum. Hunc esse deum praedicat phantasia. Nihil dat nobis pulchrius mundi corpus. Nihil corporeus sensus aut attingit melius aut nuntiat excellentius. Nihil amica sensuum phantasia effingit sublimius.

3 Sed ratio interim e summa mentis specula despiciens phantasiae ludos, ita proclamat: 'Cave animula, cave inanis istius sophistae praestigias. Deum quaeris? Accipe lumen tanto clarius lu-

condemns the affection of its own body and that of others alike. Let us dismiss for now the examination of other things and take up the supreme contemplation of what is supreme, so that we can learn how far in this the mind contradicts corporeal nature. The phantasy succeeds the external senses, and the senses follow on the disposition of their own body and of other bodies. So we attribute the judgment of the senses and the phantasy to the disposition of bodies, and we say the judgment is in accord with the corporeal affection. When our rational soul, desiring to find out what God is, inquires from such masters, then the phantasy, which is too rash a teacher and artisan, fashions a statue from five materials which the external senses have presented to it as being the most beautiful of them all. These materials it has received from the world, yet in such a way that it renders them more excellent in some measure than it has received them from the world through the senses. So the phantasy offers us a light which is so clear that nothing seems brighter, so immense that nothing seems more immense, one which is diffused as it were through the infinite void and decked with countless colors and which revolves in a circle (and on account of this revolution it echoes with the most dulcet measures filling and charming the ears). The phantasy imagines it as redolent of the most fragrant odors, abounding too with all the tastes, the sweetest of all imaginable, and as being wonderfully soft to the touch, delicate, smooth, and duly tempered. The phantasy proclaims that this is God. The world's body offers us nothing more beautiful. Corporeal sense comes into contact with nothing better and proclaims nothing more excellent. The phantasy, friend of the senses, fashions nothing more sublime.

But the reason meanwhile from the height of the mind's watch- 3
tower looks down on the phantasy's childish games and exclaims, "Be careful little soul, beware of the tricks of this idle sophist. Do you seek God? Take a light which is brighter than the sun's light

mine solis quanto lumen solis est lucidius tenebris, ad quod, si solis lumen comparetur, etiam si millies milliesque clarius sit, esse videatur umbra. Atque etiam tanto subtilius accipe ut aciem visus effugiat. Neque ipsum per inane diffundas, ne partibus constet atque ita sustentatione indigeat partium ac loco. Collige totum, si potes, in punctum, ut ex hac infinita unione infinite sit potens. Sit deinde, si lubet, ubique praesens, non sparsum loco, sed integrum loco cuilibet adstans, neque colorum multiplici varietate inficiatur (splendidius enim est lumen purum quam coloratum lumen), neque volvatur aut sonet (nolo enim moveri illud vel collidi vel frangi, et statum esse arbitror motu perfectiorem). Auferas quoque odores, sapores, mollitiemque tractabilem, ne crassiori sit natura compositum. Hic fulget quod non capit locus. Hic sonat quod non rapit tempus. Hic olet quod non spargit flatus. Hic sapit quod non minuit edacitas. Hic haeret quod satietas non divellit.'

4 'Dei[32] faciem rursus[33] intueri desideras? Mundum conspice universum, solis lumine plenum. Lumen conspice in materia mundi plenum omnibus rerum omnium formis atque volubile. Subtrahe, quaeso,[34] materiam lumini,[35] relinque cetera, subito[36] habes animam, incorporeum videlicet[37] lumen, omniforme, mutabile. Deme rursus lumini[38] huic animali[39] mutationem. Es iam intellectum angelicum consecuta, incorporeum scilicet[40] lumen, omniforme, invariabile.[41] Detrahe huic eam diversitatem per quam forma quaelibet diversa est a lumine et aliunde infusa est lumini, ita ut eadem luminis et formae cuiuslibet[42] essentia sit, atque ipsum lumen[43] sese formet perque formas suas formet omnia. Lumen hoc infinite lucet, quia natura lucet sua, neque alterius mixtione inficitur vel contrahitur. Per omnia est, quia in nullo. In nullo est, ut abunde[44] per

in the same degree that the sun's light is brighter than the shadows; if you compare it to the sun's light, the latter, even if it is a thousand thousand times clearer, appears as a shadow. Take too a light which is so much more refined that it eludes the eye's gaze. Do not extend it through emptiness, lest it be compounded from parts and so need the prop of parts and space. Gather the whole if you can into a point so that from this infinite union it can be infinitely powerful. Then let this point be everywhere present if you will, not scattered in space but wholly present in any point in space; not dyed with the endless variety of colors (for pure light is more splendid than polychrome light), and not revolving or resounding (for I do not wish this point to be moved or to be struck or to break, and I deem rest more perfect than motion). Subtract odors too and tastes and being soft to the touch, lest it be composed of too gross a nature. At this juncture we arrive at a refulgence no space contains, a resonance no time bears away, a fragrance no gust of wind dispels, a savor no gluttony deadens, an intimate softness that satiety never strips away."

"Do you want to gaze upon the face of God again? Look at the 4
universal world full of the light of the sun. Look at the light in the world's matter full of all the universal forms and forever changing. Subtract, I beg you, matter from the light and put the rest aside: suddenly you have soul, that is, incorporeal light, replete with all the forms, but changeable. Again subtract change from this soul-light. Now you have arrived at angelic intellect, at incorporeal light filled with all the forms but [now] unchanging. Subtract from this the diversity by means of which each form is different from the light and brought into the light from elsewhere, with the result that the essence of the light and of each form is now the same, and the light forms itself and through its forms forms all. This light shines out infinitely, since it is naturally radiant, and it is neither sullied nor constrained by the admixture of anything else. Because it dwells in no one thing, it is poured through all things. It dwells

omnia fulgeat. Vivit ex se et vitam praestat cunctis, quandoquidem umbra eius, qualis est lux ista solis, sola in corporibus[45] est vivifica. Sentit quaelibet sensumque largitur, si umbra eius sensus omnes omnibus excitat. Amat denique singula, si maxime sua sunt singula. Ergo quid solis est lumen? Umbra dei.[46] Ergo quid deus est? Sol solis est deus. Solis lumen est deus in corpore mundi. Deus est sol[47] super angelicos intellectus. Hic tuus est, o anima, hic tuus est deus. Huius umbram tibi ostenderat phantasia.[48] Talis umbra dei[49] est[50] ut sensibilium[51] pulcherrima sit. Qualem esse dei[52] lucem existimas? Si tantum dei[53] lucet umbra, quantum lux dei[54] fulget? Amas lucem solis[55] ubique prae ceteris, immo solam. Ama deum[56] solum, solam, o anima, lucem; infinitam[57] benefici dei[58] lucem[59] infinite[60] ama. Fulgebis iam et oblectaberis infinite. Quaere igitur, obsecro, faciem eius et gaudebis in aevum. Sed ne movearis, precor ut eam tangas, quia stabilitas ipsa est; ne distraharis per varia ut apprehendas, quia[61] unitas ipsa est. Siste motum, collige multitudinem. Deum protinus assequeris, iamdiu te penitus assecutum.'

5 In hac indagatione, pro deus immortalis! quantum repugnat mens cunctis corporibus, quantum disperdit eorum imagines et fallacias, quantum damnat phantasiam sensusque comites corporum! Profecto ipsa, sicut per se est substantia, nullam a corpore ullo ducens originem, ita per se agit quandoque proprium opus absque ullo corporum adminiculo, immo vero, quod est mirabilius, contra quaelibet corporum machinamenta. Haec certe numquam operando se ab omni secerneret labe corporea, nisi multo magis in essentia ab omni corporea stirpe esset alienissima. Et quia non potest per vim aliquam corporis universae naturae corporum

in no one thing in order that it may blaze in its fullness through all things. It lives from itself and it gives life to all, since its shadow, like the sun's light, is alone what gives rise to life in bodies. It senses all and gives sense to all if its shadow awakens all the senses in all. Finally, it loves individual things if they are preeminently its own. So what is the sun's light? God's shadow. So what is God? God is the Sun of the sun. The sun's light is God in the body of the world. [But] God is the Sun above the angelic intellects. O soul, here, here is your God! The phantasy shows you His shadow. The shadow of God is such that it is the most beautiful of sensible things. What do you think God's light is like? If God's shadow shines so dazzlingly, how much more intensely does God's light shine? You love the sun's light everywhere before all else, or rather you love it alone. Love God alone, His light alone, o soul. Love infinitely the infinite light of God in His beneficence. You will then be radiant and experience infinite joy.[12] So, I beseech you, seek His face and you will rejoice for eternity. But do not move, pray, in order to touch it, because it is stability itself. Do not perplex yourself with things various in order to apprehend it, because it is unity itself. Cease motion and take the many and bind them into one. Straightway you will comprehend God who long ago utterly comprehended you."[13]

In this quest—what a marvel, immortal God!—how much 5
does the mind shrink from all bodies, does it scatter their images and deceits, does it condemn the phantasy and the senses, the bodies' companions! Certainly, just as it is a substance through itself, taking its origin from no body, so through itself it performs its own work at various times without the assistance of any body, or rather—and this is even more wonderful—it performs it in opposition to all the apparatus of bodies. In doing its work it would never cut itself off from all corporeal blemish, unless it were in its essence still more cut off from all corporeal roots. And because it cannot oppose the universal nature of bodies through any power

repugnare, non enim surgit particula supra totum, sequitur ut per vim propriam in praesenti agat absque subsidio corporalium, ideoque multo magis in posterum id possit efficere. Quomodo repugnat mens corpori speculando, satis iam diximus. Dicamus deinceps quantum in consultando.

6 Saepe[62] esuriente[63] stomacho vel sitiente pulmone sive per somnum cerebro gravescente, sive genitalibus membris semine tumescentibus, sensus, corporis comes, ad cibum, potum, somnum invitat et coitum. Incitat, inquam, vel potius corporis incitamenta nuntiat animo. Ratio vero contemplationis honestatisve gratia ad iis iudicat abstinendum et, ut iubet, saepenumero abstinemus. Quando infertur contumelia vel iniuria circa praecordia sanguis ad vindictam accenditur. Tunc vis animae motrix, comes hospesque corporis, pedes et manus movet ad ulciscendum; ratio nonnumquam pacis et otii causa sistere iubet et cohibet. Obiectis saepe periculis cor trepidat, sed occurrere proelio ratio[64] praecipit tutandae patriae causa, unde, invito etiam corde, itur in hostes. Fines autem ad quos ratio ita deliberat incorporei[65] sunt, veritas scilicet et honestas. Cum[66] Plato noster, vir caelestis,[67] domandi corporis gratia, academiam[68] insalubrem[69] Atticae locum habitandam elegit, nonne animus eius corporis naturae[70] adversabatur? Cum Xenocrates, dilectus Platonis discipulus, et Origenes eorum sectator exusserunt sibi virilia quo libidinis incendia prorsus extinguerent, nonne invictus[71] animus bellum membris corporis indicebat?[72] Ante hos Magi Persarum, Aegyptii sacerdotes, Pythagorici philosophi, ut Venerem enervarent,[73] mero et carnibus abstinebant. Mitto priscos illos sacerdotes Magnae Matri[74] consecratos aut Saturno. Illi castrabant se, isti se excarnificabant. Mitto primitias

of the body—for a tiny part does not rebel against the whole—it follows that it operates in the present via its own power without the aid of corporeal things; and so in the future it should be able to do this even more. We have now said enough about how the mind in contemplating opposes the body. Next let us talk about how much it opposes it in deliberating.

Often when the stomach is hungry or the lung thirsty[14] or the 6
brain grows heavy with sleep or the genitalia swell with seed, then the sense, the body's companion, incites us towards food, drink, sleep, and coition—incites us, I say, or rather announces the body's excitements to the rational soul. But the reason makes a judgment that it must abstain from these for the sake of contemplation or decency, and at its behest we often do abstain. When we endure contumely or injustice, the rage for vengeance boils in our breast. Then the soul's motive power, the companion and guest of the body, moves the feet and hands to take revenge. At times, for the sake of peace and quiet, the reason orders them to desist and restrains them. Often the heart quakes in the face of perils, but to defend our native land reason orders it into battle, whence, though unwillingly, it marches out against the foe. But the ends governing the reason's deliberation are incorporeal, namely truth and honor. When our Plato, a man of heaven, chose an unhealthy place to house the Academy for the sake of mastering the body, wasn't his rational soul opposing the body's nature?[15] When Xenocrates,[16] the beloved disciple of Plato, and Origen[17] their follower burned their own genitalia in order to completely extinguish the fires of lust, wasn't the invincible soul declaring war on the body's members? And prior to them the Magi of Persia, the priests of Egypt and the Pythagorean philosophers, to weaken Venus, abstained from wine and meat.[18] I leave aside those ancient priests who were consecrated to the Great Mother or to Saturn: the former castrated themselves,[19] the latter mutilated

Christianorum, quibus nihil fortius, nihil mirabilius umquam vidit mundus.

7 Quapropter nemo nobis obiiciat vel paucos olim fuisse vel esse hodie paucissimos qui corporis[75] resistant affectibus. Immo vero resistimus omnes quotidie, alii sanitatis, alii honoris, alii pacis, alii iustitiae, contemplationis dei, beatitudinis gratia. Ac etiam si numquam corporis impetus frangeremus, satis tamen esset[76] pugna ipsa, quae est in nobis continua, ad ostendendum animam corpori repugnare. Si nulla in nobis alia esset natura quam corporea,[77] statim cum corporis affectio ad aliquid traheret, proueremus ut bruta, neque pensi quicquam haberemus consultaremusve numquid esset illud ad quod allicit corpus efficiendum. Nihil enim secum[78] pugnat. Semper tamen ferme in omnibus[79] est pugna illata nobis a corpore toto. Est igitur in nobis aliquid praeter ipsum, ab eius stirpe semotum. Semotum inquam, tum ab omni humorum elementorumque natura, quo cunctis horum inclinationibus possit obsistere easque cogitatione et affectu transcendere, tum etiam ab omni natura caelesti, ab ipso caelo humoribus his infusa ad eorumque perducta proprietatem, quo etiam caelestibus inclinationibus quandoque valeat adversari (quod astrologi nobis ipsi concedunt) atque substantiam quandam caelo longe praestantiorem excogitare semper et colere. Mitto quod quicquid per corpoream mobilemque caeli virtutem efficitur, et corporeum est et penitus mobile, neque potest corpoream mobilemque naturam exuperare. Quapropter animus tum ab elementali, tum a caelesti natura elementis infusa seorsum vivere potest. Quod si quis Platonicorum dicat eum in caelesti vehiculo semper esse, respondebimus non animum a vehiculo, sed vehiculum ab animo dependere

themselves.[20] I omit too the very first Christians, than whom the world has witnessed nothing braver, nothing more marvelous.

Wherefore nobody should object to us that in the past few have 7
resisted, and today even fewer resist the body's desires. To the contrary, we resist them all daily for various reasons: some for the sake of health, others of honor, others of peace, others of justice, the contemplation of God, [and] blessedness. But even if we can never stem the body's attack, yet the struggle, which in us is continual, would be enough to show that the soul is combating the body. If there were no other nature in us than the corporeal, as soon as the body's desire drew us towards something, we would hurtle forward like brutes, and neither care at all nor deliberate whether what the body draws us towards can be achieved. For nothing fights itself. Yet almost always and in all things we are struggling against an assault by the whole body. So there exists in us something beyond the body, something apart from its very roots,[21] apart, that is, from the whole nature of the humors and elements, something by which we can oppose all their inclinations and transcend them in thought and in desire. And it is something apart too from the whole celestial nature infused by the heavens themselves in the humors and diffused through the property of the humors, something by which we can even at times fight against their celestial inclinations (which the astrologers themselves concede to us), and perpetually think about and reverence a substance more outstanding far than the heavens. I omit the fact that whatever is produced by the heavens' corporeal and mobile power is corporeal and entirely mobile and cannot exceed corporeal and mobile nature. So the rational soul is able to live apart from both the elemental and the celestial nature infused in the elements. But if some one of the Platonists were to say that it always rides in a celestial vehicle, we would retort that the soul does not depend on the vehicle but the vehicle on the soul, and that according to the

sempiternumque animum apud Platonicos sempiternum vehiculum semper vivificare. Sed ad institutum ordinem redeamus.

8 Neque nos turbet quod anima saepe obsequitur corpori, quia non vi obsequitur, sed amore quo corpori per ipsam viventi tamquam filio et suo operi afficitur.[80] Mater filium tamquam suum opus amat. Filius parvulus[81] cibum praeter modum cupit. Abstinere iubet mater. Tacet inde quiescitque puer, si bene fuerit educatus; sin male, clamat domumque perturbat. Miseretur plangentis filii mater quem amat nimium, nondum tamen ut cibum capiat assentitur, nisi secum ipsa prius[82] consultando, iudicet posse illum gustare aliquid absque corporis detrimento, aut si quid damni illatum fuerit, per medicinam[83] facile posse succurri. Tum demum cibum accipit natus. Non cogitur mater a filio parvulo, sed operis sui dilectio matrem allicit ut filio obsequatur. Obtemperat tandem prout censet obtemperandum. Iudicat autem saepe vere, quandoque fallitur, quia obtemperandi nimium cupida non satis diligenter eventus examinat. Eadem est animae ad corpus similitudo. Proinde si naturale esset animam succumbere corpori, omnis anima ac semper sensibus cederet. Quoniam vero resistit saepenumero consultando, si quando consentit, non natura vel violentia obsequitur, sed amore. Quo summa[84] vis animae afficitur mediae, media infimae, infima vitali complexioni, vitalis complexio corpori,[85] siquidem Platonici putant ab animae rationalis substantia, tamquam sole, effundi vitam corporis irrationalem, tamquam lumen, illamque erga hanc affici quasi prolem. Ad quam prolem suscipiendam corpus, ut Timaeus docet, per caelestes animas disponatur. Quid vero dicemus ad illud, quando animus aliquis suum

Platonists the everlasting soul always gives life to the everlasting vehicle.[22] But let us return to our intended argument.

8 It should not trouble us that the soul often yields to the body, because it does not yield to force but to the love whereby it is drawn to the body (which is alive because of it) as to its son and handiwork. A mother loves her son as her handiwork. As an infant the son longs immoderately for food. The mother tells him to leave it be. If the boy has been well brought up, he then becomes quiet and sits still; but if he has been badly brought up, he kicks up a fuss and disturbs the house. The mother has pity on her wailing son whom she much loves, but she does not yet consent to his taking food, unless, having communed with herself, she first decides that he can have a snack without harming his body, or, if something harmful happens to him, that he can easily be helped by medicine. Only then does the child receive the food. The mother is not compelled to yield by the infant: delight in her handiwork rather induces the mother to yield to her son. She finally yields to the degree she decides she should yield. Often she decides correctly, but at times she is wrong because she is too eager to yield and does not examine the consequences carefully enough. The soul's relationship to the body is the same. Therefore, if it were natural for the soul to yield to the body, every soul would always surrender to the senses. But since quite often it opposes them in the process of reflecting, whenever it does consent, it yields, not because it is compelled to or because of its nature, but out of love. It is love whereby the highest power of the soul is imprinted on the middle power, the middle on the lowest, the lowest on the vital complexion,[23] the vital complexion on the body; and this is because the Platonists think that from the substance of the rational soul, as from the sun, the irrational life of the body is poured out like light, and that the soul behaves towards this life as towards a child. The body is disposed by way of the celestial souls to receive this child, as Timaeus teaches.[24] But what shall we say

corpus interimit sive consilio sive indignatione seu metu id faciat vel dolore? Quomodo id umquam aggrederetur, si corpus animi esset origo, cum non possit appetitus aliquis in natura contra ipsammet surgere? Nullum brutum sponte seipsum interimit, quia non potest in eorum animam a corpore pullulantem stimulus aliquis contra corpus oriri. Homo autem, licet sit prudentius animal, tamen id saepe facit, vaticinans, ut arbitror, se superfore post corpus ac se potius corporis sarcina exonerare quam perdere.

: IV :

Quarta ratio: anima libere operatur.

1 Maxime vero non oriri ullo modo ex corpore hominis animam cognoscemus, si quam liberum sit in ea arbitrium ratione propria comprehenderimus. Nam quod corpori, cuius natura determinata est, alligatur, operationem habere non potest liberam et solutam. Profecto a communi aliqua consideratione nulla provenit actio, nisi intercedat aliqua particularis existimatio, quia motus actionesque circa particularia fiunt, ceu cum quis communiter considerat exercitationem corporis utilem esse, licet ita consideret, nondum tamen exercetur, nisi consultet prius quot sint exercitationis modi et qui magis conducat. At quando unam quandam particularem exercitationem prae multis elegerit, tunc opus aggreditur. Si deambulationem, deambulat; si equitationem, equitat.

2 Intellectus natura sua in[86] universalium rationum conceptione versatur. Quapropter ut ex eius apprehensione aliqua proveniat ac-

when a rational soul [actually] kills its own body, whether it does so by design or out of wrath or fear or grief? How could it ever embark on such an act if the body were the origin of the soul, since a desire cannot naturally rebel against itself? No beast willingly kills itself, because an animus against the body cannot arise in the soul of beasts which itself arises from the body. But man, though he is an animal with more discretion, often kills himself, predicting, I suppose, that he will outlive the body and that, rather than destroying himself, he is discharging himself of the body's burden.

: IV :

Fourth proof: the soul acts freely.

For the most part we will know that the human soul does not 1
arise in any way from the body if we have understood on the basis of a specific argument how free in it the freedom to choose is. For what is bound to the body whose nature is determined cannot have an operation that is free and separate. Indeed, from some general consideration no one action proceeds unless some particular estimation intervenes, because motions and actions occur with regard to particulars. Take the similar case when someone considers the exercise of the body in general to be useful. Though he considers it useful, he does not take exercise yet, unless he has first debated about the number of possible ways of exercising and which way is best. And when he has elected one particular kind of exercise among the many, then he takes up the task. If it is walking, he walks, if riding, he rides.

The intellect is naturally busy with the conception of universal 2
reasons. Wherefore, in order for its apprehending to issue forth

tio, oportet universalem eius conceptionem ad particularia quaedam deduci. Universalis autem notio vi sua multa, immo infinita, singularia continet, ut exercendi commune genus modos exercitationis innumerabiles. Igitur potest universalis illa notio ad diversa pariter singularia derivari. Derivationem huiusmodi sequitur iudicium de agendis. Diversum igitur sequi potest iudicium. Itaque iudicium intellectus de rebus agendis non est natura sua ad aliquid unum determinatum. Est igitur liberum.

3 Iudicii siquidem libertate carent aliqua, quia nullum habent iudicium, ut plantae; aliqua quia, licet habeant, habent tamen a natura ad unum aliquid determinatum, ut bruta. Naturali enim existimatione iudicat ovis lupum sibi perniciosum ac fugit, neque potest non fugere, impellente natura. Naturali instinctu feruntur hirundines ad nidum conficiendum, apes ad alvearia, ad telas araneae. Ideo omnes eiusdem speciei animantes eodem modo sua fabricant semper, neque discunt aliquando, neque variant umquam, quia species naturalis qua ducuntur ab initio inest atque eadem permanet. Homines autem et discunt et opera sua variant semper: unam tamen et ab initio naturam habent. Non igitur natura trahuntur ad agendum, sed ipsi suo consilio alias aliter seipsos agunt. Unde enim contingere id putamus, quod arbores bestiaeque in suis quibusdam motibus, artibus, electionibusque numquam aberrant; homo vero saepissime. Non quidem ex eo quod intellectus insit illis perfectior, quibus nec intellectus quidem inest ullus, sed quia ab intellectu divino numquam errante trahuntur. Homo vero a suo, qui errare potest, ducitur, qui etiam si quando ab actionibus propriis otium agit ad tempus, tunc ipse quoque deo[87] ducitur, neque errat: quod ex vaticiniis et miraculis declaratur. Ac si semper duceretur sicut alia, tanto minus erraret

into some action, its universal conception must be guided towards certain particulars. But a universal notion potentially contains many, nay infinite, particulars, just as the common genus of exercise embraces countless ways of exercising. The universal notion, therefore, can be distributed into equally different particulars. A decision on what to do follows on such distribution. A different decision can hence ensue. So the intellect's judgment about things to do is not naturally confined to just one thing. It is therefore free.

3 Certain things lack liberty of judgment because they possess no judgment at all, plants for instance. Others, though they have it, have it linked to some one object, beasts for instance. Its natural canniness makes a sheep judge a wolf to be a danger to itself and it runs away: with its nature compelling it, it cannot but flee. Natural instinct leads swallows to build their nests, bees their hives, spiders their webs.[25] So all the animals in the same species always fashion their own particular works in the same way without ever learning and without ever varying, because the natural species that directs them is present from the onset and remains unchanging. But men both learn and are always doing different things, yet they have one nature and have it from the beginning. So they are not impelled to action by their nature: rather, using their judgment, they themselves do various things in various ways.[26] Whence, in our opinion, it happens that the trees and the animals never err in their particular motions, in what they make, in what they choose; but that man repeatedly errs. This is not because a more perfect intellect is present in these trees and animals—they do not possess any intellect at all—but rather because they are impelled by the divine intellect that never errs. But man is guided by his own intellect that can err. Whenever he rests from his own actions for a while, he too is guided by God and does not err, as we can see from prophecies and miracles. If he were always led like the other animals, he would err even less to the degree that he is a more per-

quam illa quanto esset[88] perfectius[89] instrumentum. Rursus, si alia seipsa ducerent sicut homo, tanto magis errarent quanto minus perfectam sortita sunt speciem. Cum igitur homo iudicium de rebus agendis non habeat a natura ad unum determinatum, est necessario liber. Quod autem iudicet libere, ex eo coniicimus quod seipsum ducit ad iudicandum. Quod seipsum ducat, ex eo quod in iudicium suum se reflectit. Quod se reflectat, ex eo quod se iudicare cognoscit iudiciumque definit. Quam quidem libertatem intellectus ipsius virtute sortitur. Intellectus enim non modo hoc[90] aut illud apprehendit bonum, sed ipsum commune bonum. Quoniam vero intellectus per apprehensam a se formam movet voluntatem atque in omnibus motor et mobile proportione invicem congruunt, voluntas rationalis non est a natura determinata, nisi ad ipsum commune bonum. Sub ipso communi bono bona singula continentur. Quicquid igitur voluntati offertur ut bonum potest in illud inclinari voluntas, nulla inclinatione naturali in contrarium prohibente. Quod quidem significatur per ea quae supra diximus, quod multa eligit contra naturae corporalis usum et voluptatem. Praescribit sibi vitae ordinem saepissime corpori noxium, odit corpus, extenuat, enecat. Quod numquam bestiae faciunt, quarum omnis impetus actioque servit corporis usui.

4 Operaepretium est considerare quaedam a philosophis necessaria, quaedam impossibilia, quaedam media, scilicet possibilia, nuncupari. Et possibilia quaedam ut plurimum evenire, quaedam rarius, quaedam vero aequaliter ferme contingere. Hunc ordinem universo congruere potissimum arbitrantur. Affirmant rursus alia quidem naturalia, alia vero voluntaria esse. Addunt insuper nusquam fore potentiam ullam ad utrumque contingentium aequaliter se habentem, nisi voluntariis agentibus insit. Naturalia enim agentia potius esse determinata quam voluntaria. Denique naturalia

fect instrument. Again, if the animals guided themselves as man does, they would err more than men in that they have been allotted a less perfect species.[27] Since in doing things man does not naturally possess a judgment confined to one action, he is therefore necessarily free.[28] That he judges freely we deduce from the fact that he guides himself to judging; that he guides himself, from the fact that he reflects on his own judgment; that he reflects, from the fact that he knows he is judging and is establishing a limit to judgment. This liberty the intellect is allotted by its own power. For the intellect apprehends not only this or that good, but the common good. Since the intellect moves the will, however, by a form apprehended by itself, and since in all things the mover and the moved are in proportional and mutual agreement, the rational will is not naturally determined except for the common good. Particular goods are contained under the general good. Therefore whatever is offered to the will as good, the will can be drawn to, as long as no natural inclination for the contrary prevents it. This is shown by what we said above, namely that the will chooses many things that are counter to the benefit and pleasure of the corporeal nature.[29] It prescribes an order of life that is frequently harmful to the body: it hates the body, enfeebles it, and torments it. And this beasts never do, whose every impulse and action is for their body's benefit.

It is worthwhile bearing in mind that certain things are said by 4
the philosophers to be necessary, other things impossible, other things in between (possible in other words); and that of the possible some usually happen, others more rarely, but others do and do not happen almost equally. They think this arrangement is suited for the most part to the universe. They also affirm that some things are natural, but others are the result of the will. They add moreover that nowhere will a potency exist that is equally disposed to each of two contingencies unless it is present in agents governed by the will. For natural agents are more determined than

speciei cuiusque officia probant vana esse non posse, officium autem hominis esse consilium. Frustra tamen illic ad opposita consultari, ubi nequeat[91] alterutrum, prout coniectura designat, eligi atque tractari.

5 Praecipue vero ex hoc invenietur animi nostri libertas, si planius quomodo moventur bestiarum animae videamus. Quando animal brutum esurit, si cibus suus oculis eius offertur, eius anima iudicat pabulum tale sibi fore conveniens, appetitus cupit movetque ad ipsum membra. Quaerimus unde sit motus ille membrorum. Proculdubio est ab appetitu. Appetitionis motus unde? A iudicio. Ex eo enim quod cibum convenire sibi iudicavit, illico concupivit. Unde iudicium? A forma tali vel tali cibi ipsius oculis apparente et ab interna talis corporis egestate. Quotiens enim tale corpus esurit, et pomum tale monstratur aspectui, totiens anima illa convenire sibi illud iudicat atque appetit. Cernis motus illius principium non esse in anima, sed in corpore: in corpore, inquam, pabuli sic dispositi, et corpore bruti sic affecto. Itaque non proprie anima illa ducit corpus, neque proprie ex seipsa movetur, sed tam cibi quam sui corporis natura trahit illam, ad cuius tractum membra etiam rapiuntur.

6 Cuius rei signa quatuor afferemus. Primum, quod tali quodam cibo monstrato et sic affecto corpore, statim ita[92] iudicat et appetit anima. Neque, postquam pabuli figuram aspexit, tempus aliquod vel brevissimum differt iudicium et cupidinem, quasi anima illa paene nihil ex sua virtute in medium afferat, sed posita illa iudicii causa, statim iudicandi sequatur effectus. Nec iniuria. Forma enim agendi principium est, ut ignis calor calefaciendi principium. For-

voluntary ones. Finally, they assert that the natural offices of each species cannot be in vain, but that man's duty is to take counsel; and yet that it is pointless to deliberate over opposites when neither of them, on the mere basis of conjecture, can be chosen or adopted.[30]

5 Our soul's freedom, however, can be principally discovered if we see more clearly how the souls of animals are moved. When a beast is hungry and if its particular food is set before its eyes, its [irrational] soul decides that this food is going to be good for it, [and] its appetite desires it and moves the limbs towards it. We want to know whence derives this movement of the limbs? Doubtless from the appetite. The appetite's motion, whence does that come? From a decision: because it decided the food was good for itself, it desired it. Whence the decision? From the form of one food or another appearing before the animal's eyes and from its body's inner hunger. For whenever an animal's body is hungry and this particular food comes into view, the irrational soul decides whether it is good for it and desires it. You can see that the principle of the movement is not in this soul but in the body: in the body of the food provided and in the body of the animal affected. Therefore this soul does not properly guide the body nor is it properly moved by itself; rather the nature alike of the food and of its body attracts this soul, and the limbs too are subject to the attraction.

6 We will adduce four proofs of this. The first proof is that, when a special food appears and its body is thus affected, the irrational soul immediately decides and desires. After it has seen the shape of the food, it does not delay its decision or desire for a length of time, even the briefest. It is as if this soul were bringing almost nothing to bear from its own power: rather, once the particular reason for a decision has been set before it, then the effect of deciding immediately follows. And this is not inappropriate. For a form is the principle of doing just as the heat of fire is the

marum vero aliqua est a natura impressa, ut igni calor et levitas, aliqua est apprehensa, ut species cibi per visum. Appetitio ignis ac motus formam impressam sequitur. Iudicium et appetitio bestiae sic affectae formam illam cibi sequitur apprehensam. Huius ergo motus principium est cibus eiusque forma. Et sicut ignis non per se movetur, quia non potest non ascendere cum nihil obstat, non potest non urere cum aliquid adest urendum, sic bestia non per se movetur, quia non potest non ferri in ea quae sic aut sic offeruntur.

7 Secundum signum est quod irrationalis anima numquam aliter iudicat, cupit, prosequitur, quam ad corporis pertineat usum. In omni eius actione finis est corporis commodum. Finis autem in rebus ultimus idem est ferme quod et principium. Principium ignis est lunae concavum, concavum lunae ignei motus est finis, quia causa quaeque ad sui finem agit et movet. Ergo in bruto principium actionum est corporis natura sive anima. Non anima mera,[93] sed corporalis, et ut servit toti naturae vitaeque artifici naturalium, postquam in natura vitaque corporea conservanda est finis agendi.

8 Tertium, quod bestia numquam paenitet sic aut sic egisse, neque retractat quicquam neque emendat. Quod significat unicum ibi esse agendi principium, postquam nulla est repugnantia. Corporea certe vita movet, tamquam finis proprius. Ergo nihil aliud proprium inest ibi praeter corpoream vitam quod moveat.

9 Quartum, quod, ut supra diximus, in operibus brutorum eiusdem speciei non est diversitas. Non aliter aranea alia telam texit quam alia. Omnes quoque hirundines nidum similiter faciunt, et singulae singulis annis eodem pacto, quemadmodum omnis ignis

principle of heating. But with forms, one has been imprinted by nature, as heat and levity in fire, while another has been apprehended, like the species of food via the sight. Fire's appetite and motion is the result of the imprinted form. The decision and desire of the animal affected [by the sight of food] is the result of the apprehended form of the food. Therefore the principle of this motion is the food and its form. Just as fire is not moved of itself because it cannot not ascend as long as nothing stops it, and cannot not burn as long as something combustible is there, so the animal is not moved of itself, because it cannot not be drawn towards those things which are variously offered to it.

7 The second proof is that the irrational soul never decides, desires, or pursues except in response to the body's need. In all its action the end is what is best for the body. But universally the ultimate end is virtually the same as the beginning. The beginning of fire is the moon's concavity and the moon's concavity is the end of the motion of fire because each cause acts for and moves towards its own end. So in an animal the principle of [its] actions is the body's nature or soul, not the pure soul but the corporeal soul, the one that preserves the nature and life, the artificer of natural things, in its entirety, since in nature and corporeal life preserving things corporeal is the end of acting.

8 The third proof is that an animal never regrets having done this or that, nor does it retract or correct anything. This shows that in the animal there is just one principle of action inasmuch as no conflict is ever present. As its proper end, certainly, corporeal life moves. So nothing else is properly present in the animal except the corporeal life because it moves.

9 The fourth proof is that, as we said above, in the works of animals of the same species no diversity occurs. One spider does not weave a web any differently from another. Swallows too all make similar nests, and individual swallows in successive years make them in the same way, just as all fire heats in the same way, every

similiter calefacit, omnis lapis descendit similiter, omnis planta pro sua specie similiter pullulat. Natura siquidem rei cuiusque una quaedam est affixa sibi forma et certa vis ab initio insita, per quam unam similemque semper unum opus fit semper et simile. Idcirco bestiarum anima, instinctum secuta naturae, tenorem servat speciei suae familiarem. Idem et nobis accidit quotiens torpet ratio et ad nutum sensuum phantasiaeque vivimus. Verum expergefacta et intenta ratione, consultamus in rebus agendis diu et nutum phantasiae damnamus, et aliter facimus quam vel externorum corporum vel membrorum nostrorum poscat natura. Ac si quando iis indulgemus, paenitet nos, atque emendare conamur domamusque saepe naturam corporis et subiicimus. Agimus enim non modo per imagines illas obiectu corporum acceptas sive conceptas, sed etiam per universales rerum species et rationes, quae partim insunt animo, partim eius peculiari vi pariuntur. Ubi agendi principium nostra forma est, non corporis: a nobis parta, non accepta a corpore, ad animi modum potius quam ad modum corporum procreata, communis ad infinitos agendi modos. Ideo non uni agendi modo adstringimur, sed per omnes libere pervagamur. Habemus enim in mente commune quoddam bonorum exemplar, ad quod singula comparantes, sive reiicimus, sive magis minusve probamus, non ipsi quidem tracti a rebus ipsis vel corpore, sed trahentes res ipsas potius ad exemplar et corpus ad mentem. Ideo etiam dum similis permanet rerum corporisque affectio, saepe eligimus dissimiliter, alias scilicet aliter. Et dum fit dissimilis, eligimus saepe similiter, immo in eodem paene momento propter varias coniecturas a ratione propositas, etiam dum corporalia manent similia, variae

stone descends in the same way, and every plant sprouts alike according to its species. Each thing's nature indeed is a certain form attached to it and a certain power planted in it from the onset; and by way of this nature that is always one and the same issues an action that is always one and the same. Therefore the soul of animals, having followed nature's instinct, preserves the familiar tenor of their species. The same happens to us whenever the reason is lulled asleep and we live at the whim of the senses and the phantasy. But when the reason has been roused and quickened we take time to deliberate about what needs doing and we condemn the pull of the phantasy; and we act otherwise than the nature of external bodies or of our members demands. And whenever we indulge them we are sorry and we try to remedy it; and often we master and subject the body's nature. For we act not only through those images accepted or conceived from the objective presence of bodies, but also through things' universal species and rational principles which are partly present in our thinking soul and partly produced by its peculiar force. Here the principle of acting is our form, not the body's: it has been produced by us, not accepted from the body, and procreated according to the measure of the soul rather than of bodies, and it is common to infinite modes of activity. Therefore we are not constrained by one mode of acting but rove freely through all modes. For we have in our mind a certain universal model of things good, and when we compare individual instances to it, whether we reject them or approve them more or less, it is not because we ourselves have been drawn by things themselves or by the body, but rather because we are drawing things themselves to the model and the body to the mind. Thus even when the condition of things and of the body stays [unchangingly] the same, we often choose differently, now in one way, now in another; and when it changes to something different, we often choose in the same way. Or rather, in the same moment, almost, and on account of the various options proffered by the

contrariaeque quodammodo fiunt electiones. Consultatione namque fit, ut non animam rebus, sed res animae nostrae subiiciamus.

10 Profecto ut saepe Plotinus ait Proclusque confirmat, huius indicium habemus in scientiis et moribus. In scientiis hoc pacto: quando sola veritatis speculatione contenti sumus, nihil prorsus communicantes cum corpore, neque agere aliquid extra nos affectantes, quis non videat contemplationem illam nostram esse penitus nullo modo a corpore dependentem? In moribus iterum hoc modo: cum omnia vitae studia ad animum nostrum dirigimus moribus exornandum, quis non intellegat tunc officiorum nostrorum finem esse animam, atque ideo eorundem animam esse principium? Harum actionum non humores principia sunt, quoniam humores non invitant ad aliquid contra corpus eorum et supra corpora; non caelum, quod per humores movet; corpus quippe caeli longe remotum, neque prius movet quatuor humores nostros quam moveat quatuor elementa, neque movebit animam nisi humoribus agitatis. Humorum vero agitationi animus adversatur, dum illorum impetus speculationis intentione contemnit; morum studio cohibet; artium industria frangit. Nemo aut Socrate ad amorem, aut Alciphrone Megarico ad libidinem ebrietatemque natura proclivior fuit, nemo iis evasit studio continentior. Nonne Xenocrates, Demosthenes et Cleanthes naturae impedimenta diligentia repulerunt? Si humoribus resistimus, obsistimus et elementis et caelo; immo etiam si non subiicimur caelo, multo minus ceteris corporibus subdimur.

reason, and even as the corporeal conditions remain the same, we arrive at various and in a way contrary choices. For we deliberate in order to subjugate, not our soul to things, but things to our soul.

Certainly, as Plotinus often says and Proclus reaffirms, we have proof of this matter in the sciences and in morals.[31] In the sciences as follows. When we are content with meditating alone on the truth, having no contact at all with the body and not yearning to do anything external, is there anyone who cannot see that our contemplation is utterly independent of the body? And in morals in this respect. When we direct all our life's attention to adorning our rational soul with virtues, is there anyone then who cannot grasp that the goal of our duties and offices is the soul, and thus that the principle of these same offices is the soul? The principles of these actions are not the humors, because the humors never induce [us] to do anything contrary to the body they are in, or anything over and beyond bodies; and they are not the heavens which move the body, far removed as it is from the heavens, through the humors. The heavens do not move our four humors until they have first moved the four elements, and they will not move our soul unless they have first agitated the humors. But the rational soul is opposed to the agitation of the humors: intent on meditation, it scorns their onslaughts; it hems them in by its devotion to ethical behavior; and it shatters them by its art and industry. No one was naturally more inclined to love than Socrates,[32] or to lust and drunkenness than Alciphron of Megara,[33] but no one emerged more continent than they as a result of study. Didn't Xenocrates, Demosthenes and Cleanthes overcome with their diligence their natural impediments?[34] If we resist the humors, we are opposing both the elements and the heavens, or rather if we are not subject to the heavens, much less are we subject to other bodies.

11 Caelo vero non subiici hominis animum, hinc apparet quod futuros casus primo scientia praevidet, deinde aut prudentia vitat, aut magnanimitate nihili pendit, quasi non ad ipsum hominem, qui ipse est animus, pertineant quicquam, sed ad animi carcerem. Accedit quod prospera fortuna propter temperantiam feliciter utitur, adversa propter tolerantiam optime, ita ut utraque sibi aeque ad virtutem proficiat et salutem. Quo autem pacto aut sequitur casus qui praecedit, aut suscipit necessario qui diligentia vitat, aut horret natura qui saepe despicit? Aut bonis vincitur qui ad felicitatem propriam illa dirigit, aut superatur malis qui mala convertit in bona, aut necessitate aliqua cogitur qui dum propter pietatem libenter cum divina voluntate consentit, illa etiam quae necessaria sunt terribiliaque videntur, voluntaria efficit atque levia?

12 Idem rursus ita per intellectum monstramus et voluntatem. Primo sic per intellectum. Caeleste corpus formam habet corporalem, singularem, localem et temporalem. Forma per quam mens omnis intellegit est incorporalis, universalis et absoluta. Haec ergo a caelo non nascitur. Forma enim quae alicubi clauditur formam non generat absolutam; ideoque caelum formam aliquam in intellectu non generat. Num forte in eo gignit intellegentiam? Nequaquam. Haec enim formam sequitur intellectus. Quod ergo dare formam nequit, non dabit intellegentiam. Omnino vero nullum corpus per suam formam quicquam intellegit. Talis enim forma singularis est omnino. Multo minus in alio intellegentiam generabit. Quoniam igitur intellectus neque actionem propriam neque actionis principium habet a caelo, corpori caelesti non subditur,

That man's thinking soul is not subject to the heavens is obvi- 11
ous from the fact that he uses knowledge in the first instance to foresee future events, and then either prudence to avoid them or magnanimity to account them as nothing (as though they pertained, not to man himself at all, who is rational soul, but to that soul's prison). Moreover, through temperance man makes happy use of a prosperous fortune, and through endurance best use of an adverse fortune, to the extent that he can profit from both equally to live virtuously in health and safety. But how can he who stands above misfortunes either follow them, or endure them by necessity when he deploys diligence to avoid them, or naturally dread them when frequently he spurns them? How is he shackled by good things when he turns them to his own happiness, or vanquished by bad things when he converts the bad into the good, or constrained by some necessity, when, living freely by virtue of his piety in accord with the divine will, he takes even those things which are necessary and apparently terrifying and renders them voluntary and of little import?

The same point can be demonstrated by way of the intellect 12
and the will. First by way of the intellect. The heavens' body has a single corporeal form in space and time. But the form by which all mind understands is incorporeal, universal, and absolute. So this does not derive from the heavens. For a form confined to a particular place does not generate an absolute form. Thus the heavens do not beget any form in the intellect. Do they perhaps beget understanding in it? Not at all. For understanding follows the form of the intellect. Therefore what cannot bestow form will not bestow understanding. But no body through its own form ever understands anything at all. For such a form is entirely particular. Much less will it generate understanding in another. Since, therefore, intellect derives from the heavens neither its own action nor its principle of action, it is not subject to the heavens' body. This is especially because our rational soul, by virtue of the power by

praesertim quia noster animus secundum eam vim qua iungitur his quae supra caelum esse dicuntur, non modo non subest caelo, sed praeest. Hic autem, quatenus intellegit veritatem, angelis qui praesunt caelo coniungitur. Eatenus enim intellegit, quatenus intellectuale lumen inde sortitur.

13 Sic ergo constat intellectum caelo non subiici. Sic rursus constabit non subiici voluntatem. Ea profecto quae natura fiunt, determinatis mediis, perducuntur ad finem, unde semper eodem paene modo proveniunt. Natura enim ad aliquid unum determinatur. Electiones autem hominis diversis viis tendunt ad finem tam in moribus quam artificiis.

14 Praeterea, quae in eadem specie sunt in naturalibus actionibus, quae sequuntur speciem ipsam, inter se minime discrepant. Sicut enim omnis hirundo, ut diximus, similiter construit nidum, sic omnis intellectus similiter intellegit prima illa artium morumque principia, quae nota sunt cuique per naturam. Et omnis voluntas similiter appetit ipsum bonum, quia bonum secundum naturam voluntas desiderat. Ea siquidem hominis natura est, ut sicut se intellectus habet ad speculandi principium, quale est id quod ubique est manifeste verum, ita voluntas ad agendi principium, quale est ipsum bonum, ac necessario utrisque omnes assentiamur. Electio vero est actio quaedam sequens humanam speciem, sicut discursio rationis. Haec enim duo sunt hominis propria. Sicut ergo si homines naturae instinctu ratiocinarentur, eadem omnium hominum in singulis rebus esset opinio, ita si ducente natura eligerent, una omnium esset electio. Nunc autem alii modis aliis eligunt alia, sicut et ratiocinando iudicant varie. Quamobrem caeli voluntatem nostram

which it is united with those things that are said to be above the heavens, not only is not subject to the heavens but holds sway over them. But this soul, inasmuch as it understands the truth, is united with the angels who rule over the heavens. For it understands to the degree it has been allotted an intellectual light by them.

13 Agreed then that the intellect is not subject to the heavens. That the will is not subject will be agreed for the following reason. Those things that are made by nature are led by pre-determined means towards their end; hence it is that they always proceed in virtually the same way. For nature is pre-determined towards some one goal. But man's choices opt for various ways to reach their end whether in the practice of ethical behavior or in that of the arts.

14 Moreover, the members of the same species do not differ among themselves in the natural actions that are the result of the species. For just as every swallow makes its nest in the same way, as we said, so every intellect understands in the same way the first principles of the arts and of moral behavior which are naturally known to each person. Every will similarly desires the good because the will naturally desires the good itself. For the nature of man is such that, just as the intellect concerns itself with the principle of contemplating, that is, with what everywhere is manifestly true, so the will concerns itself with the principle of doing, that is, with the good itself; and all of us necessarily assent to both. But choosing is a certain action tied to the human species like discursive reasoning. For these two are proper to man.[35] So, if men by natural instinct were to reason discursively, they would all have the same opinion in individual matters. In the same way, if they were to choose under the guidance of nature, the choice of all would be one and the same. But in actuality various men choose various things in various ways just as in discursive reasoning they come to various judgments. So the heavens do not move our will by natural instinct, though they do so move the body. The sense follows

instinctu naturae non movent, movent tamen corpus. Corporis motum sequitur sive nuntiat sensus. Hinc saepe voluntas allicitur. Non est autem incitamentum hoc electionis causa necessaria, quia illi alias assentitur, alias minime. Neque tamen a caelestibus dumtaxat corporibus humanum corpus sensusve[94] movetur. Nam et Ptolomaeus ipse concedit particulares effectus circa materiam haudquaquam absolute sequi caelestia, quae universales remotaeque causae sunt, sed quatenus causae mediae tribuunt, et mobilis dispositio materiae contrariis subditae causis alias et alibi aliter accipit. Quod quidem quotidie experientia ipsa probamus in his praesertim quae, cum simul nascantur, naturam potius speciei et individui, loci quoque et nutrimenti, consuetudinisque sequuntur, ut diverso modo se habeant, quam idem nascendi momentum, ut se omnino similiter habeant. Merito igitur praecipit Ptolomaeus astrologis ut communem potius atque possibilem, quam distinctam necessariamque sententiam ferant. Addit sapientem astris vel minantibus repugnare vel pollicentibus posse favere.

15 Non igitur credendum est assertoribus fati, dicentibus singula a determinatis causis proficisci, causaque posita effectum necessario sequi. Primum quidem a causa remota, quamvis necessaria, effectus non necessario provenit, nisi causa insuper media fit necessaria, quemadmodum in argumentationibus ex maiori propositione necessaria atque minori contingenti necessaria conclusio sequi non solet. Sed inter caelestes causas atque terrenos effectus mediae causae sunt virtutes elementales, sive simplices sive mixtae, sive activae sive passivae, quae quidem contingentes mutabilesque sunt et impediri invicem saepissime possunt. Deinde non est necessarium, posita hac vel illa effectus causa determinata atque etiam sufficienti, statim effectum sequi, cum possit ex concursu causae alte-

or announces the body's motion. Hence the will is often tempted. But this incitement is not the necessary cause of choice, because the will surrenders to it at some times, but not at others. Yet neither the human body nor the sense is moved only by the celestial bodies. For even Ptolemy himself concedes that particular effects in matter do not follow without mediation on [the motion of] the celestials (which are universal and remote causes), but insofar only as intermediate causes bestow them and as matter's mobile disposition, having submitted to contrary causes, receives them, some in one way and others in another.[36] Daily our experience proves this, and especially in the case of those things which, though they are born at the same time, develop instead according to the nature of the species, of the individual, of the locality too and the means of nourishment, and of custom, so that they comport themselves in a different way rather than being tied to the same birth moment and consequently comporting themselves in an entirely similar way. So Ptolemy is right to tell the astrologers to deliver an opinion that is common and possible rather than particular and necessary. He adds that the wise man can repel the stars that threaten him and favor those that hold out promises.[37]

So we should not believe those who assert the power of fate, 15
arguing that individual events proceed from necessary causes and that, given the cause, the effect necessarily follows. In the first place, an effect does not necessarily proceed from a remote cause, even if it is necessary, unless the immediate cause becomes necessary too. In syllogistic arguments likewise a necessary conclusion does not usually proceed from a major necessary proposition and a minor contingent one. But midway between celestial causes and earthly effects are intermediate causes, the elemental powers, whether simple or compound, active or passive, which are contingent and mutable and which can frequently impede each other. Next, given this or that determined and even sufficient cause of an effect, it is not necessary that the effect should follow immediately,

rius impediri. Saepe enim sufficiens hinc causa est ad bilem, sed inde causa quaedam sufficiens ad pituitam, atque invicem impedire se possunt. Postremo non omnium determinatas causas possumus designare. Quod enim sis albus causam habes propriam; item propriam alteram quod sis grammaticus. Quod autem albedo grammaticaque concurrant, propriam non habes causam. Si enim duorum quae dixi concursus ex communi quadam determinataque causa proveniret, aliquem certe ordinem inter se haberent. De quolibet ergo effectu dicemus non necessario apud nos ex sua causa proficisci, quoniam impediri poterat ex alia quadam causa per accidens concurrente. Et quamvis causam concurrentem aliquis in causam reduxerit altiorem, ipsum tamen concursum qui impedit in causam quandam reducere nemo potest, ut inde convincat impedimentum huiusmodi ex aliquo caelesti principio proficisci. Quapropter si quae ad corpus pertinent non necessario sequuntur astra, multo minus animi eorumque actiones stellis subiiciuntur.

16 Neque audeat quisquam dicere mentes hominum a supernis mentibus moveri per caelum, tamquam per instrumentum aliquod atque medium. Magis enim conveniunt mentes cum mentibus quam cum corporibus, ideo inter illas mentes ac nostras caelum non interponitur, sed potius inter mentes illas ac caelum nostrae mentes medium obtinent. Proptereaque caeli a numinibus per mentes hominum movendi essent potius quam nostrae inde per caelos.

17 Dixerit forte quispiam, mentes nostras a mentibus illis absque medio agitari. Agitent ergo, si placet, nos immo ducant.[95] Sic enim divinae erunt hominum mentes, si moventur proxime a divinis. Erunt namque illis proximae per naturam, alioquin per naturam aliam illis propinquiorem quasi per medium moverentur. Erunt

since it can be impeded by the concurrence of another cause. For often a cause sufficient for the bile derives from A and a cause sufficient for the pituitary derives from B, and they are able mutually to impede each other. Finally, we cannot trace out the determined causes of all things. You have your own cause for being pale; you have another cause likewise for being a teacher of grammar and literature. But you do not have a cause of your own for the fact that paleness and philology concur in you. For if this aforesaid concurrence of the two came from some common and determined cause, the two would surely have some order among themselves. So concerning any effect we will say that it does not necessarily proceed in us from its cause, because it could be impeded by some other cause concurring accidentally. And however much someone has traced the concurrent cause back to the higher cause, yet nobody can trace the intervening concurrence itself back to some cause in order to prove from it that the impediment proceeded from some celestial principle. So if the things that pertain to the body do not necessarily depend on the stars, still less are rational souls and their actions subject to the stars.

16 No one should dare to say that men's minds are moved by supernal minds by way of the heavens as though the heavens were some instrument and medium. For minds accord more with minds than with bodies and so between those minds and our minds the heavens are not interposed: rather, our minds occupy a middle place between those minds and the heavens. By this account the heavenly beings should move the heavens via men's minds rather than move our minds via the heavens.

17 Perhaps someone has declared that our minds are moved by the supernal minds without an intermediary. Let the supernal minds move us, if you will, or rather lead us. For men's minds will be divine if they are moved directly by the divine minds. For by nature they will be closest to the divine minds, otherwise they would be moved as by some mean by another nature still closer to them.

certe illis propinquiores quam caeli globus, postquam inde moventur sine caelo. Quod si caelum putant fore perpetuum, cur non etiam hominis animum sempiternum esse, cum sit divinis propinquior? Proinde infusio, quae in mentes inferiores a superioribus angelicisque[96] transit, illuminatio potius est dicenda quam motus. Illae siquidem suo modo tradunt, hae quoque suscipiunt suo modo. Utrique vero sunt intellectus. Ergo intellectuale lumen est, et quod datur et quod accipitur. Munus huiusmodi non prohibet animum nostrum ad lumen illud suo modo converti, pro natura sua uti, ac per illud libere ratiocinari atque eligere, praesertim quia noster animus interdum ad deteriorem partem in consiliis sese confert, instinctus autem mentium divinarum traheret semper ad optimum. Quapropter humanus animus inspirationem numinum in naturam suam trahit. Illinc quippe descendit stabilis. Ipse mobilem reddit, cum ipse sit mobilis, ac deinde mobiliter agit. Itaque nihil obstat quo minus libera sit animi actio, cum nulli proprio moventi[97] subiiciatur.

18 Plotinus, Proclusque et Avicenna disputant caelestes motus non esse inferiorum causas, sed instrumenta potius divinis motoribus velut artificibus obsequentia, quorum varias cogitationes caelestibus corporibus figurisque et motibus, tamquam oculis nutibusque suis, indicari nobis et futura portendere. Addunt divinorum notiones caelestibus dispositionibus quasi litteris explicari, et sicut aves volatu atque garritu auspicibus auguribusque non quae agant ipsae, sed quae significent, creduntur ostendere, ita caelos figuris et motibus, quae aliunde fiant, quotidie nobis significare. Quod quidem ostendunt astrologi, quando in alicuius genesi iudicanda plurima proferunt quae ad patres avosque et fratres, uxores, amicos inimicosque pertinent, quorum fortuna ab alterius genesi non de-

Certainly they will be closer to the divine minds than the heavens' sphere, since they are moved by them without the heavens. But if they believe the heavens to be perpetual, then why too isn't the soul of man everlasting, since it is closer to the divine? Consequently, the influence that crosses over from higher and angelic minds to lower minds should be called an illumination rather than a motion. The former bestow in their own way, and the latter also receive in their own way. But both are intellects. So the light that is given and that which is received is intellectual. Such a gift does not stop our thinking soul from being turned towards the light in its own way, to use it according to its nature, and through it to reason and to choose freely (especially since our thinking soul occasionally turns aside in its decisions towards the worse part); but the instinct of the divine minds would always draw [it] up towards the best. So our human soul drags the inspiration of the divine spirits down into its own nature. It thence descends as something stable. But the soul makes it mobile, since the soul is mobile itself, and then it acts in a mobile way. So nothing prevents the soul's action, since it is not subject to any mover of its own, from being free.

18 Plotinus, Proclus, and Avicenna argue that the celestial motions are not the causes of lower things, but rather instruments obedient to the divine movers and craftsmen whose various thoughts are shown to us by the celestial bodies, their figures, and motions, like winks and nods, portending future events.[38] They add that the thoughts of the divine movers are unfolded, like letters, by celestial dispositions, and that, just as birds are believed to disclose to soothsayers and augurs by their flight and chattering not what they themselves are doing but the things they signify, so the heavens daily signify to us by their figures and motions what is being enacted elsewhere. The astrologers demonstrate this when in reading the birth chart of someone they adduce a number of things we must take into consideration which pertain to fathers, uncles,

pendet, sed tantum significatur. Si ergo corporea, quod etiam supra probavimus, neque proprie neque omnino caelestibus superiorum motorum instrumentis subiiciuntur, multo minus mens ipsa subiicitur, cuius mores et artes, si quando ab astrologis praedicuntur, tamquam per signa potius quam per causas proferuntur. Siquidem superni motores non solum illa quorum ipsi sunt causae, sed etiam quorum mentes nostrae futurae causae sunt, et excogitant ipsi secum et caelestibus nutibus saepe demonstrant. Non subiici autem tunc declarat maxime mens nostra voluntasque, quando usque adeo effertur ut pene<s> se velit solam. Tunc enim se quodammodo a ceteris liberat creaturis, seque ipsa ferme contenta est. Rursus, quando in suum actum circulo se reflectit. Circuitus enim spiritalis termino non servit extraneo. Praeterea, quando non modo propter aliam coniecturam vult, propter aliam non vult, sed etiam vult quod possit velle pariter atque nolle. Qua in re videtur indifferens ad volendum pariter et nolendum, ac nulli prorsus astricta. Item, quando eligit summam desiderii cuiusque vacationem, nam tunc tractum proprii obiecti cuiusque dissolvit. Potentia haec quae actum omnem interimit, proprio nulli servit obiecto. Sed totum hoc ita planius explicemus.

19 Quotiens aliquod nobis bonum proponitur, totiens potest animus ita ratiocinari. 'Quia maximum bonum est libertas, volo eam in me experiri quandoque. Itaque malo nunc eligendi actum retinendo mei iuris esse quam huic vel illi servire volendo.' Eligit tamen libertatem tamquam bonam, quam saepe alias propter alia bona postponit. Nullum igitur bonorum eligimus necessario, quamvis necessario velimus ipsum bonum. Denique aut nusquam motus est liber, aut liber est ubi primus. Primus in anima. Oportet

brothers, wives, friends, and enemies, those whose fortune does not depend on, but is only signified by, the birth chart of another. So if corporeals, as we also showed above, are neither properly nor entirely subject to the celestial instruments of higher movers, still less subject is the mind itself whose behavior and skills, whenever astrologers predict them, are set forth by way of signs rather than causes. This is because the supernal movers consider within themselves those things of which not only are they themselves the causes but our minds are the future causes, and often they declare them by means of celestial signs. But our mind [along with] the will declares it is not subject principally when it reaches the point of wanting to be alone and under its own control. For then it liberates itself in a way from the rest of creatures and is quite content just with itself. And it does so again: (a) when it bends itself in a circle round on its own act—for a spiritual circuit is not subject to an external end; (b) when it not only wills in response to one inference and not another, but also wills the fact that it can equally will and not will—in this event it seems to be indifferent equally to willing and not willing and totally bound to neither; and (c) when it chooses the total emptying of every desire—for then it releases itself from the attraction of every special object. This power which destroys all act is subject to no object of its own. But let us explain the whole matter more clearly.

Whenever some good is set before us, the thinking soul is able 19
to reason as follows: "Because the greatest good is liberty, I wish to experience liberty at some point in myself. Therefore at present I prefer by retaining the act of choosing to be independent rather than by willing [some particular action] to be subject to what I choose." Yet the soul is choosing liberty as the good, liberty that it often puts aside in other instances because it chooses other goods. So we do not necessarily choose any goods, although we necessarily want the good itself. Finally, motion is either nowhere free or free where it is first. The first motion is in the soul. But the first

autem primum esse liberum, si modo quicquid primo tale est, per se est tale. Quid enim dubitet actionis motum inde incipere descendendo quo quaestionis motus desinit ascendendo? Desinit vero in animi ipsius imperium, ceu cum dico me agere hoc propter istud, istud propter illud, illud quia volo. Velle, quia placet. Placere autem mihi et insuper velle, quod placeat. Addo quinetiam quod si forte nollem, nolle vellem. Id saepe appellat Plato per se moveri, id est per se ac libere agere. Hinc effici vult ut liber vivat qui agit et libere; ut nullius particularis sive boni sive mali subiiciatur impulsui[98] qui vivit liber; ut non perdatur umquam qui violentia non pulsatur.

: V :

Quinta ratio: mens absque corpore operatur.

1 Operandi modus modum sequitur existendi. Quare si anima modo aliquo per corpus existit, nihil sine corpore umquam vel auxilio corporis agit. Nunc autem contra contingit. Non igitur est per corpus.

2 Audiamus primum Platonis mentem de modo quo cognoscendo hominis anima operatur. Quoniam anima multo est praestantior corpore, et quod assidue format aliquid, est formato praestantius, ideo nulla corpora, sive extra nos sint sive intra, formas vel imagines suas pingunt in anima, sed suis quibusdam qualitatibus sive viribus sive imaginibus vaporem illum pulsant calentem atque vitalem, qui quodammodo corporis est nodus et animae, et

motion must be free if only [because] what is first as such is first through itself. For who doubts that the motion of action begins by descending from the exact place where the motion of questioning halts in its ascent? But it halts at the command of the soul: for instance when I say I am doing this because of that, and that because of something else, and the latter because I want to, and I want to because it pleases me, and it pleases me to want to because it pleases me. Furthermore, I add that if perhaps I do not want to, I want not to want to. Plato often calls this being self-moved,[39] that is, acting through oneself and freely. Hence he intends it to come about: (a) that he who also acts freely might live as a free man; (b) that he who lives as a free man might be free from the violent impulse of any particular thing whether good or bad; and (c) that he who is not shaken by violence might never be destroyed.

: V :

Fifth proof: the mind operates without the body.

The mode of operating follows on the mode of existing. So if the soul exists in any way through the body, it never acts without the body or the body's help. But in fact the opposite happens. So it does not exist through the body. 1

First let us listen to Plato's view on how man's soul operates in knowing.[40] Since the soul is far more excellent than the body and what continually forms something is more outstanding than what is formed, bodies, whether outside us or within, do not embroider their forms or images at all on the soul. Rather, with their particular qualities or powers or images, they strike upon that warm living vapor which is in a sense the knot of the soul and body and called the "spirit" by the natural philosophers. For if those bodies 2

spiritus a physicis appellatur. Si enim corpora illa cum spiritu hoc conveniunt in materia, cum anima vero non conveniunt, rationalius est spiritum ab illis formari quam animam. Quae tam longe abest quod formetur a corpore, ut ipsa potius revera sit et forma corporis et formatrix: formatrix quidem sui corporis per naturam; aliorum vero per artem.[99] Anima igitur rationalis, quae fons est corporalium motionum, movet quidem ipsa corpora, a corporibus non movetur. Moveretur autem ab illis, si formaretur inde. Sed spiritus qui est animae currus, a corporibus quibusque pulsatur. Pulsatio huiusmodi non latet animam. Ut talis quaedam passio sive agitatio spiritus animam non latet, sentire dicimur. Statim vero ex hoc subito sentiendi actu vis interior animi ad opus aliud huic persimile excitatur. Nam ubi per oculi spiritum colores, per aurium spiritus sonos, perque alios alia attingit, ipsa sua quadam vi, per quam praeest corporibus eorumque semina possidet non minus in cognoscendi quam in alendi virtute, mox colorum sonorumque et reliquorum simulacra penitus spiritalia vel denuo concipit in seipsa, vel olim concepta parturit colligitque in unum. Hanc imaginationem in superioribus nuncupavimus. Posuimus postea phantasiam paulo hac superiorem, per corporum imagines ferme similiter pervagantem; intellectum denique longo intervallo eminentiorem, quemadmodum declaravimus.

3 Quando anima sentit quippiam, apud Platonicos dicitur operari per corpus, non quia ipsa simul et corpus sentiat. Sicut enim anima fons est vivendi (ut Plato ait), ita et sentiendi. Praeterea oculis auribusve saepe obiecta sua praesentia sunt. Si tamen animus attentius quicquam intra se secum agitat, non prius sentiuntur quam animus ad talia revertatur, quasi non membra haec, sed

make contact with this spirit in matter, but do not make contact with the soul, it is more reasonable for the spirit, not the soul, to be formed by them. The soul is so far from being formed by body that it is rather in truth both the form of, and the formgiver to, the body, the giver of form to its own body naturally and to other bodies by way of art and skill. So the rational soul, the source of all corporeal motions, does indeed move the bodies themselves but is not moved by them. It would be moved by them, however, if it were formed by them. But the spirit which is the soul's chariot is assailed by every body. These blows are not hidden from the soul. Insofar as this particular passion or agitation of the spirit is not concealed from the soul, we say it feels. As a result of this sudden action of feeling, the soul's internal power is immediately aroused to perform another action similar to this one. For the soul comes into contact with colors through the spirit in the eye, and with sounds through the spirits in the ears, and with other sensations through the other senses, and does so with the particular power which gives it control over bodies and possession of their seeds in its cognitive no less than in its nutritive capacity. When it does so, either it conceives in itself anew the entirely spiritual images of colors, of sounds, and of the rest; or it gives birth to old conceptions and gathers them into one. In the above we called this power the imagination. Afterwards we posited the phantasy as a little higher than the imagination, wandering as it does in the same way almost through the images of bodies. Finally, there is intellect, which is vastly superior, as we have shown.

When the soul senses something, the Platonists say that it is 3
operating through the body, but not because it and the body perceive simultaneously. For just as the soul is the fount of living, as Plato says,[41] so too is it the fount of sensation. Moreover, its objects are often present to its eyes or ears. Yet if the thinking soul is more attentive to something it is mulling over inside itself, then such objects are not perceived until the soul reverts to them. It is

interior ipsa animi nostri natura vim habeat sentiendi. Quae tamen vis sentiendi non sentit, nisi dum corporalis spiritus a corporibus agitatur. Quando per imaginationem vel phantasiam agit, dicitur per corporis auxilium operari, quia revolvitur per imagines singulas, quae singula referunt corpora et per impulsum corporalis spiritus a corporibus factum conceptae fuerunt. Ac etiam quia tanta est inter has internas imagines spiritumque cognatio, ut revolutionem imaginum factam intrinsecus sequatur semper spiritus ipsius vibratio, atque vicissim spiritus huius vibrationem comitetur ut plurimum imaginum revolutio. Quando per intellegentiam aliquid speculatur et eligit, dicitur et sine corpore et sine auxilio corporis operari, quoniam etiam absque impulsu illo spiritus et absque imaginibus inde collectis aliquid videt eligitque ab illis prorsus alienissimum. Mitto in praesentia quod Peripatetici vires sentiendi omnes in anima quidem secundum originem, in composito vero secundum formam ponunt; intellegendi autem in sola anima collocant. Atque hoc pacto illas per corpus agere, hanc vero etiam sine corpore arbitrantur, verumtamen naturaliter se ad imagines corporalis sensus tamdiu convertere, quamdiu animus corpus naturaliter habitat. Quod autem postrema haec operatio quandoque sine corporali subsidio fiat et priores illae semper per corporis auxilium, haec quae subiiciam signa nobis ostendent.

4 Primum. Vis ipsa animae quae corpore utitur,[100] quaecumque illa sit, instrumentum suum non percipit. Quis enim gustu linguam suam gustat? Quis per imaginationem vel phantasiam cognovit spirituum imaginumque naturam, quae vix post diuturnas

as though it were not the sense instruments but the inner nature of our rational soul that has the power of sensation. Yet this power of sensation does not perceive except when the bodily spirit is set in motion by bodies. When it acts by way of the imagination or the phantasy, we say it is acting with the body's help, (a) because it is cycled through the individual images (which refer to individual bodies and were conceived through the impact made by bodies on the corporeal spirit); and (b) because the bond between these internal images and the spirit is so close that a vibration of the spirit always follows on the cycling of the images enacted within, and in turn the cycling of the images usually accompanies the vibration of this spirit. When the soul contemplates or elects something through the intelligence, we say that it is acting without the body or the body's help, because even without that impulse of the spirit, and without the images collected from it, it sees and chooses something totally different from them. At the moment I will ignore the fact that the Aristotelians put all the powers of sensation in the soul in terms of their origin, but in the soul compounded [with body] in terms of their form; but they put the power of understanding in the soul alone.[42] For this reason they suppose that the powers of sensation operate through the body, but the power of understanding operates even without the body, and yet that it naturally turns itself back towards the images of bodily sense as long as the rational soul naturally inhabits the body. Several proofs I am about to present will show us that the last operation does on occasion take place without the help of the body, while the prior operations always require the body's assistance.

First proof. The power of the soul that uses the body, whatever 4
that power might be, does not perceive its own instrument. For who in tasting tastes his own tongue? Who knows the nature of spirits and images by using the imagination or the phantasy, when that nature can scarcely be known even after the mind's long in-

mentis discussiones agnoscitur? Pateret autem cuique et facillime, si per imaginationem et phantasiam cognosceretur.

5 Secundum signum. Vis talis quam uti diximus corpore neque seipsam noscit neque propriam actionem. Si visus proprie[101] ex eo quod videt perciperet se videre, semper dum videmus aliquid, videre adverteremus. Quod minime fit. Saepe namque praesentem hominem patentibus oculis videmus; quoniam vero tunc vis interior animae ad aliud intenta est, videre nos nequaquam animadvertimus, quasi actus huiusmodi non a visu, sed a vi quadam interiori, quando expedita est, percipiatur. Praeterea, actus videndi ac similes quodammodo incorporales sunt; sensus autem illi sola corporalia noscunt. Si actiones suas hae vires ignorant, ignorant quoque seipsas. Quid enim aliud certa quaedam vis est, nisi principium certo modo quodam et proprio operandi? Ergo qui operationem nescit, nescit et operandi modum. Nescit quoque proprium sic operandi principium. Itaque sensus quinque seipsos ignorant. Sed neque etiam imaginatio et phantasia se noscunt. Nam cum omnes duabus his animae viribus semper utantur, omnes facillime quam naturam hae vires habent cognoscerent. Nunc vero vix illi ista noverunt, qui diuturno mentis examine quaesivere.

6 Tertium signum. Quando vehemens aliquid viribus iis obiicitur quod nos violentius agitet, ita eas occupat ut res debiliores non bene percipiantur, neque ipso eodem tempore, neque postea ad tempus. Oculus noster adversis quandoque solis radiis obrutus, colores alios neque tunc neque postea per aliquod temporis spatium dispicit.[102] Idem accidit auribus ex strepitu et tonitru vehementi; idem quoque sensibus ceteris. Idem imaginationi et phan-

quiry? But the nature would be obvious to everyone and very easily so, if it could be known through the imagination and the phantasy.

Second proof. Such a power as we have described using the 5
body does not know itself or its own activity. If sight perceived that it was seeing specifically from the fact that it was seeing, we would always realize that we were seeing whenever we saw anything. This does not happen. Often we see a man present in front of our eyes, but because the soul's inner power is concentrating on something else, we do not realize we are seeing at all. This suggests that this act of seeing is perceived not by the sight but by an inner power when it is not otherwise occupied. Furthermore, the act of seeing and similar acts are in a way incorporeal; but the senses know only the corporeal. If the [sensory] powers do not know their own actions, then they also do not know themselves. For what is a particular power other than the principle of acting in a fixed and peculiar way? So a sense that does not know [its] action does not know its mode of acting and also does not know its own principle of acting. So the five senses do not know themselves. But neither do the imagination and the phantasy know themselves. For, since all men always use these two powers of the soul, they should all know, and know with the utmost ease, what nature these powers possess. In point of fact however, those who have spent long periods turning such matters over carefully in their minds hardly know about them.

Third proof. When something powerful enough to set up a vio- 6
lent disturbance in us confronts these [sensory] powers, it seizes hold of them to the point that they cannot well perceive weaker objects either at the same moment or for some time afterwards. When our eye has been blinded at some point by the direct rays of the sun, it cannot distinguish various colors clearly either then or for some interval of time afterwards. The same thing happens to the ears deafened by excessive noise or violent thunder; and to the

tasiae, quotiens horrendis quibusdam imaginibus occupantur. Quod ostendit huiusmodi virium actum cum spiritus vibratione concurrere atque e converso. Quemadmodum sensus motusque araneae in media tela manentis, tensis undique filis et advolantibus muscis, tremorem telae undique sequitur atque contra, telae tremor araneae motum. Profecto hoc monstrat eas vires materiae esse propinquas, cum saepe ab obiecto quasi vincantur et corporalium passionum reliquiae[103] in spiritu remanentes ad tempus eas confundant.[104]

7 Quartum signum. Ab obiecto potentiori non modo actus discernendi confunditur, sed laesio fit in nobis atque molestia, quasi laeso spiritu corporali; his quoque a viribus ex mutuo quodam usu nonnulla contingat offensio.

8 Quintum. Qualitatem imaginemque sibi familiarem non apprehendunt. Candorem suum vel imaginem per quam intuetur, non videt oculus. Calorem suum tactus non iudicat, ac etiam si calor aliquis alienus evadat ipsi familiaris, non sentit. Quod fieri solet in iis qui ethica febre laborant, quorum tactus nequaquam persentit febrem. Vim suam et habitum et conceptas imagines imaginatio quoque et phantasia prorsus ignorant. Vix enim ratio talia reperit.

9 Sextum. Post aetatis septimum vel octavum septenarium, quando complexio corporis ad terrestrem qualitatem paulatim incipit declinare, resolutis aut nimium densatis tepefactisque spiritibus, hebescit visus, auditus obtunditur, olfactus obstruitur, riget gustus, tactus arescit, imaginationis phantasiaeque solita velocitas retardatur.

10 Septimum. Quanto diutius laborant sensus, tanto magis debilitati sentiunt peius atque confusius. Si enim per horam aliquid

other senses also. The same happens to the imagination and the phantasy whenever they are seized by particularly frightening images. This shows that the action of such powers coincides with the vibration of the spirit and vice versa. It is as though a spider were lurking at the center of its web when the threads are drawn tight and flies fly into it; its feelings and movements respond to the web's every tremor and likewise the web trembles in response to the movement of the spider. This shows without question that these powers are close to matter, since they are often overwhelmed as it were by an object, and the remnants of corporeal passions lingering in the spirit for a while confound them.

Fourth proof. Not only is the act of perceiving confounded by a more powerful object, but hurt and annoyance trouble us, as though our bodily spirit were hurt. We incur some injury from these [sensory] powers too because of a shared use of the spirit. 7

Fifth proof. The senses do not apprehend a quality and image that is their own. The eye does not see its own brightness or the image that enables it to see. The sense of touch does not judge its own warmth, and even if some other warmth becomes its own, it does not feel it. This usually happens to people suffering from hectic fever[43] whose sense of touch does not feel the fever at all. The imagination and the phantasy too have no knowledge of their power, their habitual condition, or the images they have conceived. For the reason scarcely considers these things. 8

Sixth proof. After the age of seventy-seven or seventy-eight, when the [humoral] complexion of the body begins gradually to tip toward the terrestrial quality, and when the spirits become dispersed or else too concentrated and overheated, then our sight grows dim, our hearing impaired, our sense of smell dulled, our ability to taste less sharp, our touch less sensitive, and our imagination and phantasy lose their customary speed. 9

Seventh proof. The senses, the longer they have to work, the weaker they become and the more imperfectly and confusedly they 10

fixus inspexeris, caligabis, quia resolutis spiritibus vel obscuratis, non clarent in eis rerum sensibilium qualitates imaginesque quas sentias.

11 Octavum. Certum quoddam rerum genus attingunt, non omnia genera. Quinque sensus sua quisque, ut patet, genera qualitatum, imaginatio phantasiaque proprias harum qualitatum conditiones. Haec et huiusmodi alia viribus animae utentibus corpore solent accidere; contraria vero accidunt intellectui. Ergo intellectus non utitur corpore. Quod autem contraria menti contingant, animadverte.[105] Vires illae seipsas ignorant; mens autem se novit. Invenit enim se esse, et in qua rerum specie sit, et quam vim habeat. Vires illae instrumenta quaedam habent atque illa ignorant. Intellectus instrumentum habet nullum, et si quod haberet, cognosceret, postquam et seipsum cognoscit et alia, ac inter se et alia instrumentum illud collocaretur.

12 Quod si quis mentem habere dixerit instrumentum, percontabimur numquid illud corporale sit an se aliter habeat. Si corporale responderit, ita per argumentationem peripateticam refelletur. Omne instrumentum corporale in aliqua specie corporum continetur per formam aliquam sibi propriam. Si tali quodam instrumento intellectus utatur, non sincere de rebus corporalibus feret sententiam. Nam quicquid per tale instrumentum percipietur, qualitate illius infectum, non tale penitus apparebit quale revera ipsum fuerit, sed quale fuerit instrumentum, ut per rubentes oculos apparet aer rubens, per croceos vero croceus. Quo factum est ut pupilla omni careat colore, quo possit omnes colores pure suscipere. Sic omni corporea qualitate carere oporteret mentis instrumentum, ut sincere per ipsum discerneret omnes. Non tamen ca-

perceive. If you look at something steadily for an hour, your sight will blur because the spirits are dispersed or lose their brightness, and the qualities and images of the sensible objects you perceive will no longer stand out so distinctly in them.

Eighth proof. The senses do not come into contact with every 11
kind of object, but only with a particular kind. Each of the five senses obviously has contact with its own kinds of qualities; and the imagination and the phantasy [each] perceives the proper conditions of these qualities. These and the like customarily happen to the soul's powers using the body, but the opposite happens to the intellect. Thus the intellect does not use the body; but note that the opposite happens to the intellect. The powers do not know themselves, but the mind does know itself. For it discovers that it exists, in what species it exists, and what power it has. The powers make use of certain instruments yet do not know them. The intellect has no instrument at all, but if it did, it would know it, since it knows itself and others; and that instrument would be located between itself and others.

If anyone were to claim that the mind has an instrument [as in 12
the first proof above], we would ask him whether it is corporeal or in some other condition. If the answer is that it is corporeal, we would use the Peripatetic argument to prove him wrong as follows. Every corporeal instrument is contained in some species of body through some form proper to it. If the intellect uses such an instrument, it will be unable to make unbiased judgments about corporeal objects. For anything which is perceived by means of such an instrument will be infected by its quality and so it will not appear as it really is, but rather as the instrument is, just as air looks red through red eyes and yellow through yellow eyes. Accordingly, the pupil lacks all color, so that it can simply and purely receive all colors. Thus the mind's instrument would have to lack every corporeal quality in order for the mind to use it truly to discern all things. Yet it would not lack every quality if it were a

reret omni, si corpus esset, haberet igitur aliquam. Quam vero haberet, non acciperet. Itaque illius similes qualitates per illud mens non cognosceret, quemadmodum tactus, cuius instrumentum certam habet caliditatem, similem omnino caliditatem non sentit. Sed neque etiam qualitates illius dissimiles pure discerneret, quia illae per illius qualitatem prius inficerentur, quam mens adverteret. Denique per instrumentum quod esset corpus, quod esset in certo aliquo genere corporum, quod esset aliquid singulare loco ac tempore circumscriptum, non cognosceret mens praestantius aliquid quam corpora, neque illa quidem omnia, sed certum quoddam genus rerum corporearum, quemadmodum singuli quinque sensus per singula instrumenta singula sentiunt genera corporalium. Postremo universale aliquid per singulare instrumentum non comprehenderet.

13 Experimur tamen nos per mentem universalia nosse, quando quae diversa videntur convenire simul in natura aliqua reperimus, quando singula quaeque in unam reducimus speciem, quando rem singularem ac propriam cum communi comparantes, differre universale a particulari censemus. Comparare autem invicem duo haec non possumus aliter quam per virtutem unam quae utraque comprehendat. Quotiens recta ratione genus quoddam rerum verissimarum ab omni corporum genere ita secernimus, ut in illo nihil corporale cernamus, totiens quicquid dici potest corporale reiicimus. Non tamen possumus per corporeum instrumentum cuncta reiicere corporalia, quia ipsum saltem instrumentum per ipsummet instrumentum repelli non potest. Et quando abstractam conspicimus speciem perque illam unimus, tum nos formis rationibusque abstractis, tum nobis easdem, tunc corporeum instrumentum iis interpositum impedimento esset potius quam adiu-

body: thus it would have some one quality. But the quality it would have, it would not itself interpret. So the mind would not know the qualities like the instrument through the instrument, just as the sense of touch, whose instrument possesses a kind of warmth, does not feel a like warmth at all. The mind would not even perceive clearly the qualities that were unlike the instrument's quality, because they would be infected by the instrument's quality before the mind could discern them. Finally, if it were using an instrument, (a) which was a body, (b) which was in a particular class of bodies, and (c) which was something confined to a particular place and time, then the mind would not know anything higher than bodies. It would not even know all bodies, but just one particular class of bodies, just as the five senses each perceive the individual classes of body through their individual instruments. Eventually the mind would not grasp anything universal through its particular instrument.

Nevertheless, we do attempt through the mind to know universals when we discover that apparently diverse objects coincide simultaneously in some nature, or when we reduce a number of particulars to a single species, or when we compare what is specific and individual with what is general and thus move to separate the universal from the particular. We could not compare these two together except by way of some one power that comprehended both. Every time, using right reasoning, we distinguish a class of truly existent entities from every class of body in such a way that we perceive nothing corporeal in the former, we are at the same time rejecting whatever can be called corporeal. But we cannot reject everything corporeal by way of a corporeal instrument because the instrument at least cannot be rejected by itself. When we contemplate an abstract species and through it try either to unite ourselves with the abstract forms and principles or them with us, then any corporeal instrument interposed between us and them would be a hindrance rather than a help. It would be totally different 13

mento. Nam et diversissimum est ab illis et inferius admodum et distantiam affert multo magis quam unionem.

14 Cum haec ita se habeant, mens uti non potest instrumento aliquo corporali. Sed numquid alio? Prorsus nullo. Nam si quis illi aliud quodvis instrumentum adiunxerit, sciscitabimur utrum possit absque ipso intellegere aliquid an nihil? Si potest, instrumento non eget. Sed dicet aliquis non posse; nos contra posse asseverabimus. Iam enim quisque fatebitur intellectum nosse seipsum, in qua cognitione nullo utitur instrumento. Nam si aliquo uteretur ad se capiendum, illud certe caderet medium inter mentem et mentis ipsius essentiam, quae ab ipsa per illud comprehenderetur. Ubi extraneum aliquid esset menti propinquius quam essentia mentis. Et quando potentia mentis reflectitur in potentiam sive actus in actum, nullum ibi interponitur instrumentum. Medium enim assumi solet propter convenientiam cum extremis. Nullum vero instrumentum cum potentia et actu magis quam potentia actusque convenit. Quisque etiam confitebitur intellectum, si habeat instrumentum, ipsum non ignorare. Nam ob id in primis videmur ipsum non ignorare,[106] quod esse ipsum asseveramus, et tale esse addimus ut intellectui serviat. Quinetiam, si intellectus noscit seipsum ac etiam externa[107] obiecta, necesse est ut instrumentum quoque nonnunquam noverit per quod a se transit in obiecta intellegendo. Praeterea, quando per obiecta iam nota in actum suum se vertit, perque actum in virtutem atque substantiam, nonne cogitur in hac ipsa regressione etiam in instrumentum suum, si quod habet, incurrere, cum illud inter actum mentis et virtutem sit medium? Ubi instrumentum suum agnoscere cogitur. Sed utrum

from them and very much inferior, and produce separation rather than union.

Given this situation, the mind cannot use any corporeal instru- 14
ment. But what about some other kind? Absolutely not. For if somebody were to attach some other instrument to the mind, we would ask whether without it the mind can understand anything or nothing. If it can understand something, then it does not need the instrument. But were someone to argue it cannot, we would maintain to the contrary that it can. For everyone acknowledges that the intellect knows itself and in this knowing does not use an instrument at all. For if the mind did use an instrument to know itself, then that instrument would inevitably intervene between the mind and the mind's essence that was comprehended by the mind through the instrument. In that case, something external to the mind would be closer to the mind than the mind's essence. But when the mind's potentiality reflects on its potentiality or its act on its act, no instrument intervenes. Ordinarily, the reason for positing an intermediary is that it is compatible with the two extremes. But no instrument is more compatible with potentiality and act than potentiality and act. Everyone also admits that if the intellect had an instrument it would not be ignorant of it. For we are obviously not ignorant of the instrument in that our main assertion is that it exists and additionally that it exists to serve the intellect. Moreover, if the intellect knows both itself and external objects, it must of necessity at some point know the instrument too by means of which, in the process of understanding, it passes out of itself into the objects. Furthermore, when the mind reverts to its act by way of the objects it now knows, and then by way of the act reverts to its power and substance, is it not compelled in this process of reflection to come into contact with its instrument too if it has one, since it would be the intermediary between the act of the mind and its power? In which case it is compelled to know its instrument. But does the mind know or not know its

mens agnoscit instrumentum suum per instrumentum aliquod necne? Si per aliquod, quaero de alio atque alio rursus in infinitum. Si per nullum, ergo non eget instrumento ad cognoscendum, postquam ipsum sine instrumento cognoscit. Ibi sane quod instrumentum dicitur obiectum quiddam potius est quam medium. Ac si ab hoc in aliud transeat cognoscendo, non de medio in obiectum, sed de obiecto priori in posterius currit obiectum.

15 Sed dixerit forte quispiam instrumentum a mente cognosci, non per instrumentum aliquod, sed per ipsummet instrumentum. Ego autem quaeram utrum per ipsam essentiam instrumenti an per ipsius imaginem? Non primum, quia mens semper illud cognosceret, cum semper ad illud similiter comparetur. Quod si per imaginem fiat, iam illud quod instrumentum appellabatur obiectum est potius quod cognoscitur quam instrumentum per quod aliquid cognoscatur. Atque imago ipsa cognosci potest nullo instrumento intercedente, cum ipsum necessario antecedat, prout inter ipsum animamque est media. Iam igitur intellectus tam seipsum quam quod extra ipsum est absque aliquo instrumento cognoscit. Proinde eo ipso quod vere simplicia veramque simplicitatem excogitamus, concludunt Platonici, id quod ita in nobis excogitat, neque ex intellectu et instrumento constitui, neque ex anima corporeque componi, sed mentem simplicem solamque existere. Per se igitur mens operatur, et hoc etiam pacto nuncupat Plato per se moveri. Ergo per se vivit vivitque semper.

16 Pergamus ad signum tertium. Vires illae a vehementi obiecto confunduntur ut non discernant debiliora. Mens contra quando magnifica et ardua videt, tum in illis, tum post illa clarius et faci-

own instrument through some instrument? If it is through another instrument, then I shall inquire about that other and about another *ad infinitum*. If it is not through one at all, then it does not need an instrument for knowing, since it [now] knows the instrument without an instrument. What is called an instrument is in fact an object rather than a means. And if, in the process of knowing, the mind were to proceed from one instrument to another, then it is moving, not from a means to an object, but from a prior object to a posterior one.

But perhaps someone will argue that the mind gets to know the 15
instrument not through some other instrument but through the instrument itself [as in the second proof above]? But I will ask whether it does so through the instrument's essence or its image? Not the first, because the mind would always know it, since it is always linked with it in the same way. But if it occurs through the image, then that which was called the instrument is itself the object which is known rather than the instrument through which something else is known. And the image itself can be known without any mediating instrument because it would necessarily precede it insofar as it is the mean between the instrument and the soul. So the intellect knows both itself and what lies outside itself without the use of any instrument. Consequently, because we think about things which are truly simple and about true simplicity, that which thinks in us, the Platonists conclude, is neither constituted from the intellect and an instrument, nor compounded from the soul and a body, but exists as pure and simple mind. So the mind acts through itself, and this is also why Plato calls it a self-mover.[44] Thus it lives through itself and lives forever.

Let us take up the third proof [above]. The sensory powers are 16
so confounded by a powerful object that they cannot make out weaker objects. Contrariwise, the mind, when it sees things that are noble and sublime, discerns lesser and more trivial objects

lius minora et leviora discernit, utpote quae magna sit, magnisque pascatur et crescat.

17 Pergamus ad quartum et reliqua. Vires aliae potenti offenduntur obiecto, mens nullius rei vel immensae consideratione offenditur, quasi certae cuidam humorum commensurationi non sit obnoxia. Tardius quidem maxima reperit, quoniam alienis implicata non indagat. Expedita invenit ocius,[108] et inventis tum clarescit mirifice tamquam parata prorsus ad illa, tum incomparabili voluptate completur, tamquam illis quam proxima. Quis hic non videat infinitam quodammodo esse vim mentis quae nullo finito superetur obiecto?

18 Aliae praeterea vires, qualitates imaginesque sibi familiares ignorant; mens autem quidnam familiarium nesciat? Quae et familiaritatem ipsam definit, et semetipsam videt, actum suum intellegendo, ac speciem per quam intellegit, et habitum et virtutem. Secum igitur habitat mens. Sui ergo ipsius est domicilium. Res quaelibet loco naturali servatur, ideo servatur a seipsa mens manetque inde semper incolumis. Accedit quod robustiores, quantum spectat ad operationes naturales, semper sensualesque saepe aliis se melius habent; quantum vero ad intellegentiam, neque semper neque saepe, quasi intellegentia corporis non sit comes. Adde quod sensuum naturae per senectutem in operatione deficiunt; mentis vero oculus tunc cernit clarius, fugatis nebulis iuvenilium vitiorum. Divine enim Plato: 'Non florescit, inquit, virtus animi, nisi virtus corpore deflorescat.' Non acuitur mentis acies, nisi corporis acies hebetetur. Tunc divinarum rerum sapientia vi-

more distinctly and easily both in and subsequent to the powers: being mighty itself, it feasts and waxes on mighty things.[45]

17 Let us proceed to the fourth proof and the remaining proofs [above]. Other powers are shaken by a powerful object. But the mind is not shaken by the consideration of anything, however vast: it is as though it were not subject to a particular balancing of the humors. Admittedly, it discovers the greatest objects more slowly because it is not looking for them, being immersed in unrelated matters; but once freed, it finds them rapidly. Having found them, it shines with a wonderful brilliance as if totally prepared for them; and it is filled with an incomparable joy as if it were as close to them as possible. Who cannot see in this that the power of the mind is in a way infinite since a finite object never overcomes it?

18 Moreover, the other powers ignore the qualities and images that are part and parcel of them, but does the mind not know something of its own? It defines the very state of having as one's own; it sees itself when it understands its own act; it sees the form by which it understands; and it sees its own habitual condition and power. So the mind dwells within itself. So it is its own domicile. Any object is protected in its natural location, so the mind is protected by itself and remains there always unharmed. Moreover, with regard to natural activities the physically strong always, and the sensual often, are better off than others; but with regard to understanding they are neither always nor often so: it is as if understanding were not the body's companion. Then too, with age the natures of the senses grow weaker in their operation, but the mind's eye sees more distinctly after the clouds of youthful vices have been put to flight. Plato puts it in his divine manner: "The power of the rational soul does not blossom until the power in the body decays."[46] The mind's edge is not sharp until the body's edge is blunted. Then wisdom concerning matters divine is at its most resilient, prudence in human affairs attains its peak, and modera-

get, humanarum prudentia consumatur, aequitas pollet atque constantia. Et quod maius est, neque vis etiam ipsa proprie sentiendi, quae est in anima, senio vel morbo deperditur, quamvis oculo laeso actus eius intermittatur, ex eo quod non satis sincere repraesentantur obiecta. Nam et calamo fracto cessat actus scribendi; ars vero scribendi in animo remanet integra. Quod ars detrimentum inde nullum susceperit, hinc patet, quod interim in seipso scribit et calamo restituto arbitratu scribit suo. Idem fieret si elingui curaretur lingua, et si pes claudo; idem si caeco vel lippo oculus curaretur, quasi in corpore damnum fuerit, non in anima. Saepe enim purgato oculo mox videmus. Quod aut non fieret, aut iam, etiam sanato corpore, fieret sero, si ipsa videndi[109] vis defecisset, quae certum restitutionis suae tempus exigeret, postquam corpus exegit suae. Scite Aristoteles: 'Si praestes,' inquit, 'seni iuvenis oculum, videbit penitus sicut iuvenis. Si sensus, qui certis partibus corporis adscribuntur, neque laesis partibus ipsis neque senio vim amittunt, mens, quae adscribitur nullis, neque laeso toto corpore neque umquam deficiet.'

19 Hic succurrit nobis ratio illa quam affert in decimo *De republica* Socrates apud Platonem, quod per nullum corporis morbum rationalis animus moriatur. 'Quo enim pacto,' inquit, 'corporis morbo peribit qui proprio morbo non deficit?' Corpus siquidem nostrum non alieno perit morbo, sed suo. Quod si cibi vitio et aeris putredine interit, non prius per hoc perit quam ex hoc in proprium incidat morbum, quo proprie morbo dissolvitur. Ac si morbo proprio non periret, numquam etiam alieno. Nam si non

tion and constancy prevail. More importantly, even the power of perceiving, being in the soul, is not strictly speaking destroyed by old age or disease, although, if the eye is injured, its activity may be interrupted because objects are not being represented distinctly enough. For, if the pen breaks, the act of writing stops; but the writing skill remains intact in the soul. It is obvious that this skill suffers no harm at all because, within itself, it continues to write meanwhile; and once the pen has been restored, it writes at will. The same thing would happen if the tongue of a mute or a lame man's leg were healed; and the same if the eyesight of a blind or half-blind man were restored. It is as if the damage were in the body, not in the soul. Often after the eye has been bathed we see immediately. Either this would not happen, or it would happen much later after the body too had been healed, if the actual power of seeing had failed: it would need a certain period of time to recover, since the body needs to recover. Aristotle shrewdly observes: "If you give an old man a young man's eye, he will see just like a young man. If the senses which are allocated to specific parts of the body do not lose their power because of damage to those parts or through old age, then the mind, which belongs to no particular part, will not fail either when the whole body is damaged or at any time."[47]

At this point we can avail ourselves of the argument that Socrates, in Plato's account, sets forth in the tenth book of the *Republic*, to the effect that the rational soul does not die because of any disease of the body. "How will it die of a disease of the body," he asks, "when it does not succumb to its own disease?"[48] Our body does not indeed die of any alien disease, but of its own. If it dies from contaminated food and putrid air, it does not do so until through them it has first succumbed to its own disease: strictly speaking, it is destroyed by its own disease. If it did not perish from its own disease, it would never do so from an external disease. If it were not laid low by a fever, it would not be laid low by

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laedatur febre, insalubri cibo vel aere non laedetur. Animus autem propria labe, id est iniquitate, non perit. Iniquus enim animus non minus est animus et vitalis quam sit aequus. Ergo non perit corporis[110] morbo. Accedit quod corporis morbus animo non infert vitium ipsius animi proprium, quoniam animus, corpore aegrotante, non fit iniquior, sed emendatur saepe et morum studio proficit.

Quapropter morbus corporis non modo non perdit, sed neque vitiat animum. Ac si quandoque, aegrotante corpore, laedi mens videatur, non tamen est ita. Otiatur mens ibi forte etiam vel in seipsa agit vel circa humana negotiatur; non laeditur. Socrates quando vel ludebat cum liberis vel eos curabat languentes, philosophiae sublimioris habitum quidem non amittebat, licet vel[111] non philosopharetur tunc ullo modo, vel non philosopharetur egregie, dum scientiae actum ad viliora consideranda distraheret. Animus noster in corporis oblectamentis ludit cum ipso saepe; in eius languoribus regit et curat. In utroque statu intermittitur vel remittitur sublimis illa rationis consideratio, quia vel otiatur ad tempus, vel anxie nimium circa viliora negotiatur; re vero pacata resurgit. Ita natura comparatum est, ut ad diversa simul opera quantum ad humanas vires attinet, non satis sufficiamus. Convivae epulis intenti non bene lyrae modulos audiunt. Dum anima multum concoquit cibum in stomacho, humanae contemplationis munus remittit, ideo tunc hebetari videmur. Dum attentius speculatur, aegre cibus concoquitur. Hinc saepe corpore languent philosophantes, non languent animo, sed intellegentia tantum excellunt, quantum deficiunt corpore.

bad food or air. The soul, however, does not perish from its own harm, that is, from iniquity or injustice; for an unjust soul is no less a soul and no less alive than a just one. So it does not perish from a disease of the body. Furthermore, a disease of the body does not introduce into the rational soul a vice that is the soul's own, because the soul does not become any more unjust when the body is sick: often it is corrected rather and studies to improve morally.

So a bodily disease does not destroy the soul or even corrupt it. 20
But if the mind seems on occasion to be afflicted when the body is sick, it is not really so. The mind is resting at that moment perchance or is active within or tending to human affairs, but it is not afflicted. When Socrates played with children or tended them when they were sick, he did not give up his habitual engagement with higher philosophy, even though he was not at that moment philosophizing in any way, or not philosophizing at a very high level when he was distracted from the act of knowing by the consideration of more trivial matters. Our rational soul often sports with itself in the body's pleasures: in the body's sicknesses it governs and cures. In either condition the sublime philosophizing of the reason is suspended or relaxed, since it is either resting for a while or dealing too anxiously with lesser matters. When calm is restored, it is revived. It has been established by nature that whatever human power we possess is not enough for us to do several things at the same time. Banquet guests intent on their food do not hear well the measured strains of the lyre. When the soul is digesting a large meal in the belly, it abandons the duty we have of contemplation and so we then seem to be dimwitted. When it contemplates with heightened attention, its food is digested with difficulty. Hence philosophers often fall sick in body, but not in soul; the weaker they become in body, however, the more they excel in understanding.

21 Ergo quid mirum si corpore febricitante, anima sustinendo curandoque aegroto intentissima cessat a contemplando, et in pueri corpore fabricando, in decrepiti quoque corpore sustinendo occupatissima minus utitur intellectu? Et cum vapores atri cerebri spiritum occupaverint atque eo vibrato moverint horribiles in phantasia species, unde tetri spectaculi novitate tota fere vis animae in phantasiam intenditur, mirabere si interim opus intermiserit contemplandi, quod tandem vaporibus resolutis instaurat? Saepe etiam vaporibus fervescentibus ratio ipsa pervigil imaginum illusiones redarguit; quod in his accidit qui cerebri vertiginem patiuntur, quorum ratio negat caelum aut terram ruere, licet sensus id asserat. Rursus, qui propter morsum canis concitantur rabie aut furore daemonis instigantur, nonnumquam etiam in ipsa furoris incursione imminentem insaniam animadverterunt. Et qui in somniis terrentur horrendis reclamant adversus phantasiam, saepe se somniare dicentes. Ergo mens non semper indiget inferioribus viribus, quae saepe illis vigentibus otiatur, otiantibus autem viget, garritum earum damnat iubetque silere.

22 Si quis autem dixerit mentem illis egere ut excitetur, ideo sine ipsis nihil penitus operari, ita respondebo.[112] Quoniam anima, dum corpus habitat, eius sustentatione semper est occupata atque circa plurima a divinis remota distrahitur, ideo[113] ad divinorum intuitum non convertitur, nisi quantum expressiores aliquas eorum similitudines per vires eius pedissequas (quibus plurimum utitur) comprehendens excitatur ad ipsa. Postquam vero satis conversa est, et per crebram conversionem apte parata divinorum infusioni, non amplius ad eam contemplationem illarum obsequio indiget,

So what wonder if, when the body has a fever, the soul aban- 21
dons its contemplating, totally intent instead on ministering to and curing the sick body; or if, when it is preoccupied in developing a child's body or in keeping an old man's body alive, it makes less use of the intellect? And when the brain's black vapors have filled the spirit and, with the spirit vibrating, have set into motion horrible forms in the phantasy so that very nearly the soul's entire power is struck by the novelty of the hideous spectacle and is concentrated in the phantasy, are you surprised if it interrupts its work of contemplating for a while and resumes it only when the vapors have finally dispersed? Often the reason stays alert even when the vapors are boiling, and refutes the images' illusions. This happens with people who suffer from dizziness of the brain: their reason tells them that the sky or the earth is not falling down, even though the senses say it is. Contrariwise, people who are shaken by rabies from a dogbite or goaded by the frenzy of a demon sometimes notice insanity coming on even as the frenzy is rushing upon them. And people who are terrified in nightmares cry out against the phantasy, often declaring that they are dreaming. So the mind does not always need the lower powers: often it rests when they are active and is active when they are at rest; it reproves their chattering and commands their silence.

Were someone to suggest that the mind needs the [sensory] 22
powers to be aroused and therefore does absolutely nothing without them, my reply would be as follows. Because the soul, while it inhabits the body, is always preoccupied with sustaining the body and is distracted by a whole host of matters far removed from things divine, accordingly it does not turn its gaze back to the divine except insofar as, comprehending certain particularly expressive images of them through the subordinate powers it uses most often, it is roused to do so. Once the soul has been sufficiently converted to things divine, and become through repeated conversion suitably prepared for the infusion of the divine, for that con-

immo eas sopit pro viribus, ne ab ipsis impediatur. Ac semper libens in eo statu perseveraret, nisi curandi corporis urgeret necessitas. Quod significat mentem posse per se speculationem continuare et, quando ab hoc non amplius propter curam corporis retrahetur,[114] libere speculaturam per se sine aliarum virium ministerio, cui satis fuerit ante ab illis minime impediri. Sed quamdiu corpore clauditur, propter illud sensuum ministerium quo paratur conversioni, accidit ut—laeso corpore spirituque obnubilato, quia neque perspicue obiecta repraesentantur[115] neque fit clara in sensibus et phantasia perceptio—mens inde ad veram speculationem non facile excitetur.

23 Fit etiam ut alii aliis ingeniosiores appareant propter spirituum diversitatem, quamquam differentiam hominum in artibus addiscendis non tam ingenii quam voluntatis diversitati[116] censeo tribuendam. Quilibet enim maxima quaeque, si studiose contendit, assequitur. Fit insuper, ut quidam dicantur amentes, quia vel non utantur mente vel abutantur, quippe cum omnis intentio animi in his[117] sit circa vehementiores phantasiae illusiones nimium occupata. Sed vacuata bile vel atra vel crocea, quae causam praebet illusionis, resipiscunt[118] subito, utpote qui mentem non amiserunt. Mitto quod Origenes Plotinusque disputant, animas humanas esse quodammodo mentes ex sua puritate delapsas, quando videlicet ab intentione mentis circa ideas ad intentionem potentiae vivificae corporum prolapsae in corpora deciderunt. Et quanto aliae magis aliis intentius profundiusque ad materiam conversae[119] sunt, tanto minus (ut aiunt) intellectualis retinent luminis. Unde magna

templation it no longer needs the service of those powers. Rather, it lulls them to sleep as best it can in order not to be hindered by them. It would gladly remain in that condition forever except that the necessity of looking after the body oppresses it. This means that the mind can continue contemplating by itself, and when it is no longer hindered from contemplation by the need to look after the body, it will contemplate freely by itself and without the ministry of the other powers (it was enough beforehand not to be impeded by them). However, as long as it is encased in the body, and because of the senses' ministry which prepares it for conversion, then it happens—when the body has been injured and the spirit clouded, and since the objects are not represented distinctly and no clear perception exists in the senses and phantasy—that the mind is not easily aroused thence to true contemplation.

It also happens that some people seem more clever than others 23
because of the diversity of their spirits, although I think the difference in learning skills between people should be attributed to the diversity not so much of the intellect as of the will. For every person can achieve the things which matter most if he tries diligently. Moreover, it happens that some people are called mindless because they do not use or they abuse their mind, since in them the soul's whole attention is totally preoccupied with the more violent illusions of the phantasy. But once they have voided their black or yellow bile (which supplies the cause of illusions), they immediately come to their senses inasmuch as they have not yet lost their mind. I pass over the fact that Origen and Plotinus argue[49] that human souls are in a way minds that have somehow lapsed from their purity: having fallen from their mind's concentration on the ideas down towards a concentration on the life-giving power of bodies, they have descended into bodies. And to the extent some have been converted towards matter more attentively and profoundly than others, the less, they say, they retain of the intellectual light. Hence arises the huge diversity of intellectual

in ingeniis moribusque inter animas diversitas provenit. Ad quam etiam conducunt aetherea corpora animarum diversis caeli figuris sideribusque accommodata. Denique varietas geniorum varietatem adducit ingeniorum.

24 Si quis autem animas exstitisse per tempus ante corpora non concesserit, voluerit tamen ex parte quadam Platonicos imitari, poterit forsitan dicere animas saltem eo ipso momento quo creantur corporique iunguntur ita, ut Origenes Plotinusque disputant, ferme affici atque disponi. Profecto, mentes angelicas alias ad inferiora prolapsas, alias minime, et earum quae ceciderunt, alias quidem magis, alias vero minus. Sed mentes hominum tamquam infimas omnes naturali instinctu cum primum creantur ad naturalem partem et corpora vergere, aliasque aliis profundius sese[120] in Lethaeum flumen, id est materiam, mergere. Atque hoc quidem pacto Pamphilus Origenem, quoad potuit, emendavisse videtur. Sed de his alias. Iam igitur ad propositum revertamur.

25 Si quis parte capitis quadam laesa memoriam videatur amittere, respondebunt Peripatetici confundi rerum imagines quae in cerebri spiritu retinentur, sed species quae in mente sunt non laedi proprie, immo, ut ita dixerim, otiari. Oportere enim mentem quamdiu corpus habitat, incorporalium species non sine corporalium imaginibus contueri. Addent Platonici, quatenus animae intentio circa laesi curationem membri vehementius occupatur, eatenus cognitionem memoriamve remitti atque intermitti. Avicenna et Algazeles dicent mentem ad inferiora conversam a divina quadam mente diverti, unde omnem intellegentiae actum putant continue dependere.

26 Quoniam vero Lucretius immortalitati ob eam causam diffidit maxime, quod imminente morte vires animi deficere videantur,

ability and moral virtue among souls; and contributing to this diversity is the fact that the aethereal bodies of souls are adapted to the different figures and constellations of the heavens. Lastly, the variety of guardian spirits leads to the variety of intellectual abilities.[50]

But if someone refused to concede that souls existed for a time 24
before bodies, yet wanted partially to follow the Platonists, perhaps he could say that souls, at the moment at least when they are created and attached to the body, are affected and disposed towards it or almost so, just as Origen and Plotinus argue.[51] Unquestionably he might say that [whereas] some angelic minds fell towards lower things, while others did not, and of those who fell, some plunged further and others less so, yet men's minds, as the lowest, all incline by a natural instinct and directly they are created towards the natural part and bodies, and some immerse themselves more deeply than others in Lethe's stream, that is, in matter. In this regard Pamphilus seems to have corrected Origen insofar as he could.[52] But I shall deal with this matter elsewhere. Let us return to the subject in hand.

If someone appears to lose his memory from a head injury, the 25
Peripatetics will respond that the images kept in the cerebral spirit are thrown into confusion, but that the species themselves that are in the mind are not really damaged; rather, one might say they are at rest. For as long as the mind inhabits the body, of necessity it does not gaze upon the species of incorporeals without the images of corporeals. Platonists will add that, to the extent the soul's attention is fiercely preoccupied with the cure of the injured part, then cognition and memory are relaxed or suspended. Avicenna and Algazel will maintain that a mind turned towards lower matters is turning away from some divine mind upon which, in their view, every act of understanding continuously depends.[53]

Since Lucretius does not believe in immortality, however, 26
mainly on the grounds that, with the approach of death, the ratio-

animadvertendum est vitam corporis in humoris et caloris temperatione consistere, ideoque mori corpus quando vel calor resolvit humorem vel calorem humor extinguit. Quoniam autem humor caloris[121] pabulum est, calor vehiculum spiritus, spiritus est animae ad corpus conciliator, fit ut quando resolvitur humor in membris corporis paulatim, anima quoque membra deserat paulatim. Et quia[122] tunc regendo corpore minus quam soleat occupatur, in mentem suam se colligit, cernit arcana praesagitque futura. Absit a nobis Lucretiana suspicio, animam scilicet cum corpore morituram, quae debilitato corpore roboratur. Et cum unio dissolutioni opposita sit, longissime tunc abesse a dissolutione putandus est animus, quando se maxime colligit in seipsum ac deposita animali natura surgit in mentem. Atque id in morte quae propter resolutionem fit manifeste contingit. In morte vero quae fit propter extinctionem vitalis animae vis humoribus tumoribusque curandis intenta est, sensus doloribus iudicandis, phantasia spectandis simulacris quae ab humorum vaporibus concitantur. Quapropter ratio ad tempus remittit officium, sicut solet in somno nonnumquam, quod resumat post mortis strepitum, sicuti consuevit post insomnia vigilare.

27 Quod autem in eo ipso tempore vires dotesque suas nequaquam amittat, illud nobis argumento est quod multi qui diligentia medicorum ab imminente morte revocantur ad vitam, corporis quidem vires vel numquam vel sero recipiunt, animi vero mox humore purgato, quasi corporis vires extinctae fuerint, animi autem lumen latuerit potius, tamquam sub cineribus ignis, quam evanuerit. Quis dixerit eundem fore a vita exitum corporis atque animae, cum non sit idem reditus? Redit enim corpus vix seroque; redit

nal soul's powers seem to fail,[54] we must note that the life of the body consists of a tempering of moisture and of heat, and that the body dies when either the heat disperses the moisture or the moisture extinguishes the heat. Now since moisture is the food of heat, and heat the vehicle of spirit, and spirit the reconciler of soul to body, it follows that when moisture gradually dissipates in the body's limbs, the soul too will gradually abandon them. At that time, since it is less occupied than usual with governing the body, it gathers itself into its own mind and perceives mysteries and foretells future events. So let us not share Lucretius' suspicion that the soul will die with the body, the soul which gets stronger when the body weakens. Since union is the opposite of dissolution, the soul must be considered most distant from dissolution at the time when it most gathers itself into itself, and, having cast off its animal nature, ascends into its mind. This is clearly what happens in the death that occurs because of release. But during the death that occurs because of extinction, the soul's life-giving power is intent on curing the humors and [their] commotions,[55] the senses in assessing pains, and the phantasy in gazing on the images excited by the humors' vapors. For a while, therefore, reason does not do its duty, as is sometimes the case in sleep. But after the din and tumult[56] of death, it resumes its office, just as it customarily awakes after dreams.

A proof that at that moment it does not lose its powers and 27
mental gifts comes to us from the fact that many people who have been restored to life from the brink of death by the effort of doctors never recover their body's powers, or only after a long time; but they do recover their soul's powers as soon as the [excess] humor has been purged. It is as if the body's powers have been extinguished, but the light of the rational soul has merely been hidden, like fire under the ashes, instead of vanishing away. Who would claim that the exit of body and soul from life is the same when their return to life is not the same? The body returns with diffi-

animus facile atque subito. Neque quicquam eo tempore amisit sui, cum et naturales et acquisitas dotes subito rursus edat in lucem, non minus quam antea consueverit, utpote qui sua tunc collegerat supellectilia, non disperserat, paratusque fuerat tamquam serpens ad exuvias exuendas, non aliter iis claustris egressurus in lucem vivens et integer, quam olim materno utero cum est emissus in lucem. Putat[123] autem sapiens quando relinquit corpus, se non parte privari sua, sed molestissimo onere liberari. Ac de sexto signo iam satis.

28 Accipe septimum illud signum. Sensus diuturno opere fatigantur; mens vero numquam. Quanto diutius inspexeris, eo cernes obtusius. Quanto diutius indagaveris intellectu, eo intelleges clarius. Omne corporis sensusque opus usu defatigatur; mentis vero corroboratur. Solet tamen diuturna cogitatione gravari caput, et oculus caligare, quia mentis exercitium comitantur saepenumero phantasia motus, hos autem vibratio spiritus, hanc laesio cerebri aut oculi; ipsa vero mentis acies fit levior et acutior. Quae certe sine intermissione ulla[124] sursum directa maneret, nisi miserata corpus hoc ipsi commendatum, eius recreandi gratia opus proprium intermitteret. Quod in iis[125] plane conspicitur, qui dum[126] speculantur attentius aliquid, fatigari corpus aegre ferunt, in quibus mens invita quodammodo cessat ab opere; corpus autem sensusque cessant quam libentissime, quasi non mens fatigetur operando, sed illa. Quod vero indefessum est, est etiam immortale.

29 Octavum signum est quod vires aliae[127] alicui rerum generi sunt adscriptae, mens nulli. Quid est enim in eorum numero quae esse

culty and tardily; the soul returns easily and at once. At that time the soul has lost nothing of itself, since it brings its talents, natural and acquired, immediately back into the light again; and no less so than it used to beforehand, inasmuch as it had then gathered its goods and possessions together, not dispersed them. It had made itself ready, like a snake, to slough its skin and to emerge from its prison-house into the light, alive and unharmed, as when it emerged into the light from its mother's womb. But the wise man, when he leaves his body, does not suppose he is losing part of himself, but rather that he is being set free from an extremely heavy burden. Enough concerning the sixth proof.

Now to the seventh proof. The senses get tired when they 28
work for a long time, but never the mind. The longer you look at something, the less distinctly you see it. The longer you study something with your intellect, the more clearly you understand it. All the work of the body and the senses becomes exhausted with use, but the mind's work is strengthened. Nevertheless, the head usually becomes heavy with prolonged thinking and the eye is dimmed, because movements in the phantasy very often accompany mental exercise, vibration of the spirit accompanies these movements, and injury of the brain or eye accompanies this vibration. But the cutting edge of the mind becomes quicker and sharper; and it would certainly continue uninterruptedly to direct its thoughts upward if, out of pity for this body entrusted to it, it did not interrupt its proper task for the sake of reviving the body. This is very obvious with people who, when they are contemplating something particularly intently, become annoyed that the body is tiring. In them the mind is unwilling in a way to halt its work, but the body and the senses are very glad to. It is as if the mind were not exhausted by working, but that they were. But what is never wearied is also immortal.

The eighth proof is that the other powers are appointed to a 29
particular class of objects, but the mind to none. For in the num-

dicuntur, ad quod mentis acies dirigi nequeat? Quae ipsius quod dicitur ens, essentia, esse, naturam et vim descriptione comprehendit; sub iis vero ea quae sunt omnia continentur. Reperit quoque differentiam inter esse atque non esse, itaque novit utrumque et esse dividit quodammodo in partes suas atque particulas, dum quaelibet rerum genera speciesque sub esse disponit. Et quod maius est, super esse ipsum ascendit et sub esse descendit, quando ipsum unum ipsumque[128] bonum statuit super esse, et materiam sive privationes rerum sub esse locat. Nulli rerum generi mens astringitur, si ambit omnia. Nihil extra se habet a quo perimatur, quod intra se quadammodo claudit omnia.

30 Concludamus disputationem hoc pacto. Animus hominis, si per corpus esset aliquo modo, nihil ageret umquam sine corporis instrumento vel auxilio. Agit autem sine corporis usu intellegendo atque volendo, ut per octo signa exposuimus. Non igitur est per corpus. Ergo est aut per se aut per divina. Si per se, numquam se deserit. Si per divina, ergo per aeternas causas est aeternus.

: VI :

Sexta ratio: anima convenit partim cum divinis, partim vero cum brutis.

1 Si anima hominis ex materia quam fluvium vocant Lethaeum scaturiret, numquam cum divinis, quae ex eo fluvio non scaturiunt, in

ber of those things purported to exist what cannot be the object of the mind's eye? The mind comprehends in a description the essence, being, nature, and power of that which is called an entity. But all that exist are contained under these. It discovers the difference too between being and not-being, and so has knowledge of both; and in a way it divides being into its parts and sub-parts when it establishes all classes and species of entities under being. What is more, it ascends above and descends below being itself when it puts the One and the Good itself above being, and locates matter or universal privation below being. The mind is confined to no one class if it embraces all. It has nothing outside itself by which it can be destroyed, because in a way it includes all things within itself.

Let us end this discussion as follows. If the human soul existed 30
in any way through the body, it would never do anything without the instrument or aid of the body. But it does act without using the body in understanding and in willing, as we have shown by way of the eight proofs. Therefore it does not exist through the body. It exists either through itself, therefore, or through things divine. If it exists through itself, it never abandons itself. If it exists through things divine, then through eternal causes it is eternal.

: VI :

Sixth proof: the soul conforms partly with things divine, but partly with animals.

If man's soul gushed out of matter, which they call the river Lethe, 1
it would never in its activity be joined with things divine that do not flow out of this river. But we will now demonstrate that it is

operatione coniungeretur. Congruere vero cum illis in operatione, immo etiam in essentia et vita, sic ostendemus.

2 Quoniam videmus omnia tunc maxime aliquid operari, quando in sua specie adulta sunt atque perfecta, cogimur asserere Deum, quia est omnium perfectissimus, non otiosum esse, sed aliquid agere, postquam operatio perfectionis est signum. Immo vero neque nos aliquid ageremus, nisi ageret ille, quo movente movemur, sicut quo faciente sumus, et quo afflante vivimus et spiramus.[129] Sed quaenam[130] est operatio dei? Non quae aliunde incipiat aut alio quopiam tendat, ne cogatur deus aliunde pendere. Est igitur operatio dei perpetua quaedam in seipsum conversio, per quam seipso fruatur et gaudeat. Itaque contemplatur seipsum; se contemplando suam videt potentiam; hanc intuens quaecumque potest discernit. Ergo et seipsum simul et universum, opus suum, actu unico speculatur; speculando in *se concipit* cuncta; concipiendo extra se quaecumque vult parit.

3 Similis ferme est in sanctis ministris eius caelestibusque spiritibus operatio. Se namque ipsos illi quoque et sua opera speculantur; speculantur et deum operaque divina. Speculatio certe illis sola conveniens est, quia operationum omnium perfectissima. Quod etiam in nobis apparet. Haec non externa eget materia ut fabricatio, neque corporalibus instrumentis ut sensus, neque aliunde movetur aut alio tendit ut operationes aliae, neque figurat materiam alienam, sed colit ornatque mentem. Quando non alio terminatur, sed desinit in seipsam, neque fatigatur cito ut aliae, sed permanet indefessa, neque molesta est vel indiga ut sunt illae, sed facilis plenaque et gaudio perfusa incomparabili.[131] Si qua igi-

joined with the divine in its activity, and even in its essence and life.

2 Since we see that all things perform most effectively when they are fully grown and perfect in their species, we must affirm that God, being the most perfect of all, is not at rest but active, since activity is a sign of perfection. Or rather, we would not do anything ourselves unless God acted: because He moves, we move; similarly, because He creates, we exist; and because He breathes upon [us], we live and breathe.[57] What then is the activity of God? It cannot start from elsewhere or be directed towards another, otherwise God would be forced to depend on something other than Himself. So God's activity is a kind of perpetual turning back upon Himself: through this conversion He takes pleasure and delight in Himself. So He contemplates Himself; and in contemplating Himself, He sees His own power; and in gazing upon it, He discerns everything it can do. So in a single act He simultaneously contemplates Himself and the universe, His creation. In contemplating, He conceives all things within Himself; and in conceiving, He gives birth outside Himself to whatever He wishes.

3 Activity for His sacred ministers and celestial spirits is more or less similar. They too contemplate themselves and their works; they also contemplate God and [His] divine works. Certainly, contemplation alone is appropriate to them, since it is the most perfect of all activities. This is clear even in our own case. Contemplation does not need either any external material, as making something does, or bodily instruments as the senses do. Nor is it initiated from without or directed towards another like other activities; nor does it give shape to alien material, but cultivates and embellishes the mind. Since it is not determined by another, but comes to rest in itself, contemplation is not rapidly exhausted like other activities, but remains unwearied. Nor does it become irksome and wanting as the other activities do, but is effortless and

tur ex iis operationibus quae nobis insunt, supernis est numinibus tribuenda, contemplatio certe tribuenda est, operationum omnium felicissima. Ex iis patet hominis animam in contemplatione cum divinis congruere.

4 Congruere quoque cum bestiis in nutritione sensuque et corporis affectu non dubitamus. Certae autem operationes ad convenientia sibi directae[132] obiecta certas convenientesque requirunt virtutes atque substantias, et quae proportio est obiecti unius ad alterum, eadem operationis unius ad alteram. Eadem quoque virtutis est et essentiae ad virtutem et essentiam comparatio. Itaque sicut in nobis, quoad corporis usum pertinet, est operatio cum brutis communis ad commune cum illis obiectum, ita natura cum illis communis apparet. Haec est nutriendi sentiendique operatio, et potentia atque complexio corporis, quae in nobis ferme sicut in bestiis sunt caduca. Oportet quinetiam reperiri in nobis potentiam et substantiam cum caelestibus illis communem, ex qua nascatur operatio illa quam habemus cum illis communem, ad commune nobis illisque obiectum. Quamobrem sicut in nobis quodammodo caducae sunt nutriendi sentiendique natura et complexio corporalis, quae circa caduca versantur et cum caducis animalibus sunt communes, ita immortalis erit contemplandi potestas quae circa immortalia versatur et cum immortalibus est communis, quia non potest operatio eadem nisi ab eadem natura et potentia proficisci. Quis autem dubitet contemplationem nostram supernis esse persimilem, cum per eam animus, ut caelestes illi, seipsum et opera sua consideret, investiget quoque supernas causas earumque effectus, item ab effectibus inferioribus per medias causas usque ad causam supremam ascendat, atque vicissim a suprema causa usque ad infi-

abundant and filled with incomparable joy. If any one activity from those present in us should be conceded, therefore, to the powers above, assuredly contemplation, the most blessed of all activities, should be granted them. Hence it is obvious that in contemplation man's soul is in harmony with things divine.

We are not in doubt either that in nutrition and sensation and 4
in our body's feeling we are also in harmony with the animals. But specific activities directed at objects in harmony with themselves require particularly harmonious powers and substances. The proportion of one object to another is the same as the proportion of one activity to another. This goes too for the comparison of power and essence to power and essence. So just as with us, insofar as it pertains to the use of the body, we have an activity in common with the animals, one directed towards a common object, so obviously we share a common nature with them. This nature is the activity of nourishing and sensing, and it and the power and complexion of the body, which exist in us as they do in the animals or almost so, are perishable. But in us a power and substance has to be found which is also common with things divine. From it is born the activity which we have in common with them and which is directed towards an object common to us and to them. Therefore, just as in us, in a way, the nature of nourishing and sensing and the corporeal complexion are perishable, being concerned with perishable things and shared in common with mortal animals, so the power of contemplating will be immortal, being concerned with immortal things and shared in common with the immortals. This is because the same activity cannot begin unless it proceeds from the same nature and power. For who can doubt that our contemplation is very similar to that of divine beings, since through it the rational soul, like the souls above, considers both itself and its works, and also examines the higher causes and their effects, and ascends from the lower effects up through the intermediary causes all the way to the supreme cause, and returns in a circle from the

mos eventus circulo remeet? Ubi videtur universam divini operis seriem non alia virtute quam divina complecti, et tamquam deus aliquis circumlustrare. Non solum vero intellegentiam cum numinibus communem habet, sed etiam voluntatem, cum illorum affectet beatitudinem. Habet praeterea similem actionem, quatenus agit libere et suo imperat corpori ferme sicut illa. Ex omnibus iis colligitur animum nostrum cum caelestibus essentia convenire. Si essentiam habet cum illis communem et proximam, et illa nullam habent originem a materia, sequitur ut nullam quoque animus noster talem originem habeat.

5 Praeterea, si numina illa sempiterna sunt, quia mundi sphaeras eodem semper movent ordine, neque fatigantur[133] umquam, sequitur ut sit mentis essentia sempiterna, quoniam terminata mobilisque vita nullo modo interminatae immobilique vitae est proxima. Tanto autem magis convenit cum illis immortalitate vitae quam intellegentia veritatis et beatitudinis desiderio, quanto vita ipsa prior est quam intellegentia vel voluntas. Ac si voluntas est nixus intellegentiae, intellegentia vero summum adolescentis vitae fastigium, animus non aliter dirigitur ad voluntatem rectam quam per veram intellegentiam. Ad hanc quoque non aliter quam per veram adultamque vitam. Voluntatem habet rectam, quia ad primum totumque bonum sese confert. Intellegentiam veram, tum quia quatenus intellegentia est non fallitur, tum quia veras omnium intus possidet rationes, quod alias ostendemus. Habeat ergo necesse est veram adultamque vitam. Talis est quae non est obnoxia morti.

6 Huic nostrae argumentationi illa Origenis favet summopere, ubi inquit: 'Omnes naturae quae eiusdem principii participes sunt, inter se sunt similes, ceu oculi, quia omnes lucis participes sunt,[134] cum ad lucem natura sua similiter convertantur, omnes sunt simi-

supreme cause down to the lowest effects? In this it seems to embrace the whole sequence of the divine creation with a power one can only call divine: it ranges across it like some god. The soul shares not only understanding but the will as well with the divine spirits, for it aims at their blessedness. It has moreover a similar activity in that it acts freely and gives commands to its own body almost as they do. The conclusion from all this is that our rational soul is proximate to the divine beings in essence. If it has an essence in common with and closest to theirs, and they never originate from matter, it follows that our soul too does not derive from a material origin at all.

Furthermore, if those spirits are eternal, since they move the 5
world's spheres always in the same order and never tire, it follows that the mind's essence must be everlasting, because a life that is limited and changeable is in no way akin to the unlimited and unchanging life. But the mind accords with these spirits more in the immortality of life than in the understanding of truth or the longing for blessedness; and it does so to the degree that life itself is prior to understanding or the will. If the will is the striving of understanding, but understanding the topmost summit of the mature life, then the rational soul cannot be directed to right willing except through true understanding, and not directed to this understanding except through the true, the already matured life. It has right will because it sets its course for the prime and universal good; and it has true understanding both because, as understanding, it cannot err, and because it possesses within itself the true rational principles of all things (as I will show elsewhere). Therefore it necessarily possesses the true, the fully developed life. Such a life is not exposed to death.

Origen offers valuable support to this argument of ours when 6
he says: "All natures which are participants of the same principle are mutually alike, just as eyes, because they are all participants of light (as they all naturally turn towards the light in a similar way),

les, sed tamen pro diversa lucis participatione alius alio est acutior.' Omnes rationales substantiae dei participes sunt, cum omnes convertantur ad deum, ergo similes sunt tum inter se, tum illi. Itaque sicut supremae sunt immortales ut angeli, sic et inferiores ut animae. Immortales vero sunt omnes, quia deo persimiles immortali. Quam similitudinem ostendit illa ipsa in deum conversio, in quem quidem velut in solem tamquam stellae superiores convertuntur angeli, anima vero in eundem ceu luna, quae quamvis vicissitudine quadam divini luminis permutetur, ideoque modo quodam mutabili capiat; inextinguibili tamen percipit ratione, siquidem et inextinguibile ipsum esse, et qua ratione sit inextinguibile, certis rationibus comprehendit.

: VII :

Obiectio Epicureorum et responsio de rerum temperatione.

1 Reluctabitur iis Dicaearchus aut Epicureus aliquis, quasi monstro id simile sit, rem scilicet aliquam partim incorruptibilem esse, partim corruptioni obnoxiam. At nos affirmabimus naturae ordinem sine hoc servari non posse.

2 Sunt aliqua corpora ab omni penitus corruptione semota ut caeli, quorum neque sphaera ipsa, neque particula ulla corrumpitur. Sunt et corpora iis prorsus opposita, scilicet omnino caduca, puta ligna, lapides, metalla, ceteraque ex quatuor elementis composita. Ligni siquidem particulae nonnullae quandoque putrescunt, deinde etiam totum lignum ipsum desinit esse lignum (quamvis quicquid ita compositum est, ob id saltem ex incorrupti-

are all alike; and yet one may be sharper than another because it participates in the light differently."[58] All rational substances participate in God since they all turn towards God, and thus they are similar both to each other and to Him. Thus, just as the highest rational substances, like angels, are immortal, so too are the lower ones like souls. They are all immortal because they are all most similar to immortal God. The conversion itself to God manifests this likeness: angels turn back towards Him like the higher stars towards the sun, but the soul turns like the moon towards the same sun. Though the soul may change with the particular changing of the divine light and so receive it in a changeable manner, nonetheless it perceives it with its imperishable reason, since it comprehends both imperishable being itself and why it is imperishable with reasons that do not change.

: VII :

An objection from the Epicureans and its rebuttal. On the tempering of things.

Dicaearchus[59] or some Epicurean will battle these arguments as 1
though the view that anything is partly incorruptible and partly subject to corruption is a kind of monster. But we will affirm that without this [duality] the order of nature cannot be preserved.

Some bodies are totally free from all corruption, like the heav- 2
ens, of which neither the sphere itself nor any lesser part is corruptible. Other bodies are the exact opposite, that is to say, they are completely perishable, like wood, stones, metals, and the rest compounded of the four elements. Various bits of timber will eventually rot and then the whole thing will cease to be a piece of wood (although any such compound does at least consist of the

bili constet et corruptibili, quod primam in se materiam habet perpetuam, formam vero mortalem, quapropter coniunctio mortalium cum immortalibus neque impossibilis est, neque rara; sed redeamus ad ordinem institutum). Sunt etiam corpora media, elementorum videlicet quatuor sphaerae partim incorruptibilia, partim corruptibilia. Ipsa quidem tota elementi sphaera suam speciem, suum situm, suum servat tenorem; particulae vero eius nonnullae quandoque hinc perduntur, inde instaurantur. Cum vero corpora vel a spiritibus vel spirituum gratia fuerint constituta, ordinem corporum oportet ab ordine spirituum proficisci aut saltem spirituum ordinem imitari. Sunt ergo spiritus aliqui penitus immortales ut angeli, quorum neque tota ipsa substantia commutatur, neque ulla vis, neque etiam operatio. Sunt alii mortales omnino, ut communis fert opinio, brutorum scilicet animae, quarum permutatur vis operatioque, permutatur et tota substantia. Sint insuper oportet spiritus utrorumque medii, ut unus sit absque intermissione totius naturae contextus. Hi per totam substantiam permanebunt, per particulas aliquas[135] mutabuntur. Tales erunt animae nostrae praecipue, quarum substantias cogit esse perpetuas communis illa cum caelestibus contemplatio voluntasque et actio. Potentias vero aliquas sive operationes quandoque cessaturas indicat nobis illa communis cum brutis mortalibus operatio, cultui mortalis corporis penitus mancipata.[136] Quippe cum naturales affectus in naturis propriis fundentur diversique affectus in diversis naturis, videamus autem nostras animas affectum ad aeterna habere, affectum quoque ad temporalia, merito dicimus eas ex naturis duabus, aeterna videlicet et temporali, compositas esse. Quemadmodum si videremus corpus aliquod natura sua quasi aequaliter sursum deorsumve moveri, diceremus ipsum ferme aequaliter ex gravitate et levitate componi.

corruptible and the incorruptible precisely because it contains in itself prime eternal matter but perishable form; so the combination of mortal and immortal is neither impossible nor unusual—but let us return to our line of argument). There are also intermediary bodies, namely the four elemental spheres, that are partly corruptible and partly incorruptible. The sphere of an element taken as a whole preserves its form or species, its position, and its steadfast course. But various parts of it at any given moment are being destroyed here and restored there. Since bodies have been constructed by spirits or for the benefit of spirits, their order should proceed from the order of spirits or at least imitate the spirits' order. Some spirits are completely immortal like the angels, whose entire substance itself does not change and neither does any [of its] power or even activity. Other spirits are completely mortal, it is commonly believed; namely the souls of animals, whose powers and activity changes, and whose entire substance changes. Moreover, there have to be spirits that come in between the two so that the fabric of all nature may be uninterruptedly one. These will remain the same in their substance as a whole, but particular parts will be changed. Such, preeminently, will be our souls: the contemplation, will, and action they share with the heavenly spirits demand that their substances be eternal. But the activity they have in common with the animals, entirely enslaved as it is to the care of the mortal body, tells us that at some point some of their powers or activities will cease. Since natural desires are rooted in their own natures, and diverse desires rooted in diverse natures, but since we see that our souls have a desire for things eternal and a desire for things temporal as well, then properly we declare that they are compounded from two natures, the eternal and the temporal. Analogously, were we to see some body naturally moved upward and downward in almost equal measure, we would say that it is compounded almost equally of gravity and levity.

3 Tria vidimus corpora, tres quoque spiritus. Tres nunc accipiamus species animalium. Animalia utrinque tam ex anima quam ex corpore sempiterna, ceu mundi sphaeras stellasque, ita ut Plato existimat, animatas, ut tam corpus earum quam anima sit procul a morte. Item animalia utrinque mortalia, ceu bruta. Interponamus homines ex anima immortales, mortales ex corpore. Multi vero etiam multos daemones heroesque similes interponunt. Neque servari aliter ordo naturae potest, nisi caelesti animae ferme penitus immutabili corpus omnino incorruptibile tribuatur, atque bruti animae penitus corruptibili corpus omnino mortale. Animae autem hominis, et immortali simul et quadam ex parte mutabili, corpus detur utrumque: aethereum unum secundum Platonem, elementale alterum, ut hominis anima aethereo immortalique corpore, qua parte immortalis est, caelitus induta descendat; in terris vero, qua parte mutabilis,[137] mutabili elementorum corpore vestiatur.

4 Ac merito hominis animae, licet immortali, corpus corruptibile congruit, propter eam sui partem, qua esse mutabilis demonstratur. Nihil igitur obstat quin possit animal unum in naturae ordine reperiri ex anima immortale, ex corpore corruptibile, idque manifestius homo sit, ut et superior ratio demonstravit et Anaxagorae sententia comprobat, quatuor rerum gradus inducens, immortalem aeternitatem, immortale tempus, mortalem aeternitatem, mortale tempus. Primum esse arbitror mentem, secundum caelum, tertium rationalem animam, quartum irrationalem. Ideo de homine dixit divinum illud:

θνητὸς αἰὼν μέρος ἔχει θεοῦ τίνος

id est: 'Mortalis aeternitas dei partem habet.' Hominem aeternitatem quidem vocat, tum propter animae substantiam, tum propter

We see three bodies then and three spirits. Let us now accept 3
three species of living creatures: (a) creatures that are everlasting in soul and body alike, like the spheres of the world and the stars animated, so Plato believes,[60] in such a way that their body and soul are both remote from death; (b) creatures that are subject to death, in soul as in body, like the animals; and (c) let us interpose between them men who are immortal because of their soul, but mortal because of their body. Many people would also interpose a host of demons and of heroes like them. The order of nature cannot be maintained unless we grant a completely incorruptible body to the celestial soul, which is well-nigh completely immutable, and a completely mortal body to the animal soul, which is entirely corruptible. But to the soul of man, which is simultaneously both immortal and partially mutable, can be given a twin body, one aethereal according to Plato,[61] and the other elemental, so that man's soul (the part of it which is immortal) can descend from heaven clothed in the aethereal and immortal body, but that the soul on earth (the part that is mutable) can be dressed in the mutable body of the elements.

Harmonizing with man's soul, although immortal, there is 4
properly then a corruptible body: it harmonizes by way of that part of it wherein it is demonstrably mutable. So nothing stands in the way of the possibility of our finding a single creature in the order of nature that is compounded from an immortal soul and a corruptible body. Clearly man is such a creature as the proof above has demonstrated. Anaxagoras's opinion confirms it: he posits four universal levels: immortal eternity, immortal time, mortal eternity, and mortal time. I think the first is mind, the second heaven, the third rational soul, and the fourth irrational soul. Hence that divine saying about man: "Mortal eternity, he possesses a part of God."[62] It calls man "eternity" because of the soul's substance and because of understanding, and yet "mortal" because of the mutable part or action of the soul and because the body is

intellegentiam; mortalem vero tum propter mutabilem animae partem vel actionem, tum propter corpus elementis[138] compositum. Neque absurdum esse Platonici putant, ut in anima actionis motio una cum substantiae immutabilitate concurrat, quandoquidem et in caelo, quod animae fert imaginem, haec duo manifeste concurrunt; nihil enim inter corporea caelo mutabilius, nihil contra stabilius invenitur. Talem quoque putant esse primam mundi materiam, quae sic naturalibus subest formis, quemadmodum mens nostra divinis. Putant autem mutationem rebus ex ipsarum multiplicitate contingere, ita ut quae essentiam habent multiplicem, motionem in essentia sortiantur, quae vero virtutem actionemque solam, in iis dumtaxat mutationem aliquam sustinere.

5 Sed ut capitulum concludamus, nihil prohibet quo minus animae quamvis indissolubili corpus dissolubile congruat, praesertim cum etiam caeli corpus ex eo dissolubile nominent, quod partibus constet extensis, proptereaque se ipsum continere non possit, sed virtute animae connectatur. Idem contigisset et nobis, si animae nostrae similiter atque caelestes a divina unitate[139] non recessissent.

compounded of elements. Platonists do not think it absurd that mobility of action occurs in the soul along with immutability of substance, since these two do manifestly occur together also in the heavens, which bear the image of soul; for among bodies we find nothing more subject to change than the heavens and yet nothing more stable. They think that the world's prime matter is also like this, being subject to natural forms as our mind to divine forms. However, they hold that change in things is contingent upon their plurality in that those that have a multiple essence are allotted mobility in [that] essence, while those that have power and action alone [not multiplicity] sustain some mutation only in them.

But to conclude this chapter. Nothing prevents a destructible 5
body from according with a soul although it is indestructible, particularly since they call even the heavens' body destructible in that it consists of extended parts and so cannot keep itself together but is linked by the power of [its] soul. The same would have befallen us, if, like the celestial souls, our souls had not departed from the unity divine.

LIBER DECIMUS[1]

: I :

Prima ratio: sicut ultimum in ordine corporum est incorruptibile, sic et ultimum in ordine mentium.

1 Quoniam ordo corporum sub ordine intellectuum collocatur pendetque inde, ideo corporum ordo non aliter ordinem sequitur intellectuum quam pedis vestigium ipsum pedem, et umbra corpus. Itaque qualem videmus ordinem in corporibus, talem paene debemus in mentibus coniectari.

2 Videmus in corporum ordine sublime corpus, videlicet supremum caelum, in natura sua cunctas vires formarum omnium efficiendarum continere, per quas utique vires, tamquam activas et efficaces, inferiora corpora ad varias formas suscipiendas disponit. Quapropter variis naturae suae viribus et variis motionis suae configurationibus corpora inferiora varie movet et format, ut[2] merito dici possit sublime caelum formas corporum reliquorum vel actu vel activa virtute complecti. Corpora vero sequentia affirmare possumus illi adeo subiici ut ipsa quidem in potentia quadam susceptiva, ut dicitur, et passiva easdem habeant formas atque actu ab illo suscipiant. Verum talis ordo servatur, ut quo sublimius sub illo corpus est, eo magis activam potentiam habeat minusque passivam. Quod enim primo est proximum, ab unico primo suscipit atque patitur, agit in multa. Quod sequenti ponitur gradu patitur etiam magis, agit minus, quoniam a duobus iam, primo videlicet et secundo, patitur; in sequentia quae accepit effundit, quousque[3] ad infimam quandam materiam veniatur, quae cum a superioribus

BOOK X

: I :

First proof: as the last in the order of bodies is incorruptible so is the last in the order of minds.

Since the order of bodies is subordinate to and depends on the order of intellects, the order of bodies therefore follows the order of intellects exactly as the footprint follows the foot and the shadow its body. So whatever order we witness among bodies such, or nearly so, we must suppose among intellects. 1

We see that the highest body in the order of bodies, namely heaven on high, naturally contains all the powers for producing all the forms, and uses these powers, which are active and productive, to prepare the lower bodies to receive various forms. So it variously moves and forms the lower bodies by the various powers of its own nature and by the various configurations of its own motion. Consequently one could fairly say that the highest heaven encompasses the forms of the rest of the bodies either in act or in its active power. We can maintain, however, that subsequent bodies are subject to that heaven insofar as they possess those same forms in a power that is, so to speak, receptive or passive; and they receive them from that heaven in act. But the enduring order is such that the higher a subcelestial body is, the more it has of the active power and the less of the passive. For what is closest to the first is sustained by and submits to the first alone [but] acts on the many. What is located on the level following submits still more and acts less because it is now subject to the two, the first and the second. It showers what it has received upon those succeeding it, until one comes to the lowest kind of matter, which, since it receives from 2

omnibus capiat, ipsa tribuat[4] nulli. Itaque in potentia passiva habet quidem formas omnes, quas per successionem a superioribus suscipit patiendo. In virtute autem effectiva habet nullam.

3 Idem in mentibus cogita, quarum principium deus omnes intellegibiles species uno et proprio habet actu, distribuit omnibus, capit a nullo. Sequentes illum mentes inde omnes accipiunt et invicem ita se habent, ut superior inferiori ideas illas lumenque quasi distribuat. Ergo quo altior mens est, eo paucioribus subiecta pluribus praesidet. A paucioribus igitur patitur capiendo, agit in plures distribuendo. Infima denique mens talis debet esse, ut primo illarum principio sit opposita: capiat ab omnibus, tribuat nulli, secundum naturam suam ideas illas in potentia quidem habeat passiva, nullas activa, postquam ideas non transfundit in aliquem ipsi subditum intellectum. Quippe in primo potentia sola activa est idearum; in sequentibus activa per ordinem et passiva; in infima mente passiva. Ordinem igitur primi caeli obtinet deus; vicem sequentium corporum mediae tenent mentes; locum materiae infimae infimus intellectus. Qui per naturam suam successione quadam omnes intellegibiles rationes accipiat actu sive videat, neque omnes actu simul intueatur, quemadmodum corporum formas materia suscipit ab alia in aliam succedendo.

4 Materia haec, quia ex nulla antecedente materia fit, unde creatore indiget infinito, idcirco a solo creatur sive manat deo. Par est enim ut potentia simplex a simplici fiat actu, qui quoniam actionem suam ultra agentium reliquorum actiones protendit, solus facit materiam, quae gradum tenet ultimum in natura. Si solus deus creat materiam quae est infimum corporalium, solus creat eam mentem quae est infimum intellectuum. Si materia opus est om-

all above it, gives to none. So it possesses all forms in the passive power, receiving them passively, one after another, from those above it. But it possesses none in the active power.

3 Suppose the same in minds. Their principle, God, has all the intelligible species in one act proper to Himself: He gives them to all, and He receives them from none. The minds that succeed Him receive them all from Him and are mutually disposed in such a way that a higher mind distributes, as it were, the ideas and the [accompanying] light to the lower. So the higher the mind is, the more minds it presides over and the fewer it is subject to. So in receiving it is acted upon by fewer minds, and in distributing it acts on more. The lowest mind must be such that it is the opposite of the first principle of minds: it receives from all and gives to none and according to its nature possesses the ideas in the passive power but has none in the active power, since it does not transmit the ideas to any intellect subordinate to itself. In the first [intellect] the power of ideas is active only; in the minds that follow, it is both active and passive in turn; in the lowest mind, it is passive. So God governs the order of the first heaven, the intermediary minds the alternation of the succeeding bodies, and the lowest intellect the position of the lowest matter. Through its nature the lowest intellect receives in act or sees all the intelligible reasons in succession: it cannot gaze upon all of them in act simultaneously, just as matter receives the forms of bodies one upon the other in succession.

4 This matter, because it is not created from any preceding matter, therefore requires an infinite creator, and so is created by or proceeds from God alone. It is proper for simple potency to come from simple act, which, since it extends its action beyond the actions of all other agents, alone makes the matter that is on the lowest rung in nature. If God alone creates the matter that is the lowest of bodies, He alone creates the mind that is the lowest of intellects. If of all the divine works matter is the one most re-

nium divinorum operum a deo[5] remotissimum, intellectuale vero genus est proximum, et illa fit seorsum a mente, multo magis potest mens seorsum fieri a materia. Si talem ordinem habet intellectus ultimus in rerum intellectualium genere qualem materia in genere naturalium, et materia a nulla re naturali potest fieri, sequitur ut postremus intellectus a nulla specie intellectus, quae in eo sit genere, possit fieri. Quod si intellectus huiusmodi a nullo generis eiusdem intellectu vel multo praestantiore dependet, multo minus putandus est a genere naturalium, multo insuper minus a materia dependere.

5 Hinc sequitur postremam mentem e materia non educi, sequitur etiam esse incorruptibilem. Nam cum mentium ordo sit ordine corporali praestantior atque ordo rerum corporalium tandem descendat in materiam sempiternam, siquidem materia illa numquam corrumpitur, quis usque adeo demens erit ut concedat mentium ordinem, qui stabilior est diviniorque corporibus, in mentem postremo desinere corruptibilem? Sit ergo perpetuus oportet ultimus intellectus, qui ita comparatur ad intellegibiles formas, quemadmodum ad sensibiles prima materia. Materia vero neque per aliquam sensibilem formam corporali corruptione corrumpitur—per has enim formatur—neque per aliquam intellegibilem speciem—ab his enim perficitur. Ergo mens ultima neque per aliquam intellegibilem speciem spiritali corruptione destruitur—his namque perficitur—neque per aliquam sensibilem formam corporali perit corruptione—praeest enim mens, non subest, corporalibus speciebus. Neque transit in mentem corruptio corporalis, sicut non transit in materiam corruptio spiritalis. Immo vero, si non transit in mentem violentia spiritalis, multo minus propter corporum crassitudinem transibit in eam violentia corporalis. Immo

moved from God, and the intellectual class is the one that is closest, and if matter is made separately from mind, then *a fortiori* mind can be made separately from matter. If the lowest intellect occupies the same rank in the class of intellectual entities as matter does in the class of natural entities, and if matter cannot be produced by any natural object, it follows that the lowest intellect cannot be made by any species of intellect which is in the intellectual class. But if this intellect does not depend on any intellect either of the same class or even greatly superior to it, much less can we suppose that it depends on the class of natural objects and still less so on matter.

It follows that the lowest mind does not emerge from matter 5
and it follows too that it is incorruptible. For, since the order of minds is superior to the corporeal order and the corporeal order eventually descends to everlasting matter, and since that matter is never corrupted, who would be stupid enough to concede that the order of minds, which is more stable and divine than bodies, ends eventually in a corruptible mind? So the lowest intellect must be everlasting as it stands in the same relationship to the intelligible forms as prime matter does to the sensible forms. But matter is subject to bodily corruption neither through any sensible form, for through them it is formed, nor through any intelligible form, for by them it is perfected. The lowest mind, therefore, is not destroyed by corruption in the spirit[1] by way of any intelligible species, for it is perfected by the species; nor does it perish by corruption in the body through any sensible form, for the mind rules over corporeal forms and is not subject to them. Nor does corporeal corruption cross over into the mind anymore than corruption in the spirit crosses over into matter. Or rather, if violence in the spirit does not cross over into the mind, much less will corporeal violence cross over into the mind given the grossness of bodies. Or rather, if the corruption of bodies does not impinge on the matter

etiam, si corruptio corporalium subiectam illis materiam non attingit, multo minus altiorem illis mentem coinquinabit.

6 Esto perpetuus intellectus ultimus. Sed quis iste? Iste inquam, est intellectus humanus. Quod intellectus in nobis sit, quis dubitat, cum non possimus nisi per vim intellectus de intellectibus disputare? Et sicut oculus solis lumen non capit, nisi per proprium quoddam sui lumen internum, ita anima nostra divinos intellectus nec investigat nec intuetur, nisi per proprium intellectum. Sed qualis hic noster est intellectus? Hoc ego non curo amplius; qualiscumque enim sit, sempiternis erit. Intellectus namque superiores proculdubio perpetui sunt, si infimus est perpetuus. Ego vero arbitror nostram mentem idcirco esse postremam, sicut et pluribus placuit antiquorum, quoniam non simul agit sua, sed versat in se vicissim tamquam Proteus formas atque intelleget succedendo, quemadmodum luna, quae ultima stellarum est, vicissim mutat lumen ceteris non mutantibus.

7 Sit ergo nostra mens ultima, sit etiam sempiterna. Quia sempiterna est, semper inhiat sempiternis, et illa, quotiens a corpore non turbatur, attingit illico solisque gaudet ut suis atque[6] domesticis. Motus autem cuiusque rei ille est naturalis, qui fit statim, impedimento subtracto. Fit autem ad simillimum terminum. Quia vero est ultima, amat corporum naturam; quasi propinquam accedit, vivificat et gubernat.

subject to them, still less will it defile the mind that is superior to bodies.

So let the lowest intellect be everlasting. But what is it? It is, I 6
claim, the human intellect. Who doubts that an intellect exists in us, since we cannot argue about intellects except through the intellect's power? The eye does not perceive sunlight except through its own inner light. Similarly, our soul does not search out or gaze upon the divine intellects except through its own intellect. What is this intellect of ours like? I do not need to pursue this further because whatever it is like it will be eternal. For the higher intellects are undoubtedly eternal if the lowest is eternal. I therefore believe that our mind is the lowest (and it is a view shared by many of the ancients) because it does not perform all its actions at the same time but in itself turns from one to another, as Proteus changes forms, and understands them in succession. The moon, the lowest of the stars, similarly changes its light in turn while the other stars do not change.

Let our mind then be the lowest and be everlasting. Being ever- 7
lasting, it always covets everlasting things and as long as it is not troubled by the body it attains them instantly and rejoices in them alone as though they were all members of its own family. But the movement of each thing is natural if it occurs instantly once any obstacle has been removed, and our mind is directed towards the goal most like itself. Since it is the lowest mind, however, it loves the nature of bodies: it approaches it as kin, fills it with life, and takes it under its rule.

: II :

Obiectio Epicuri[7] *et responsio de rerum serie.*

1 Temere hic rursus Epicurus exclamat portentum esse hoc, ut divina mortalibus haereant, utpote qui non videat absque divinorum stabiliumque consortio non posse constare mortalia. Latuisse illum puto oportere rerum seriem ita in suis partibus digeri, ut cum multi variique sint rerum ordines in natura, semper superioris cuiusque ordinis infimae partes supremis partibus ordinis inferioris proxime subsequentis quodammodo copulentur. Hoc nos docet aetheris cum elementorum natura cognatio. Siquidem luna, pars aetheris infima proxima elementis, elementale[8] nonnihil habere videtur, tum crebra illa mutatione figurae, tum ipsa lucidi fuscique corporis sui varietate. Rursus, ignis altissimum elementum caelum proximum imitatur, quoniam caeli instar movetur et fulget. Idem ostendit et ipsa inter se naturalis elementorum quatuor dispositio, ubi pars infima ignis tumidior est et quasi tepescit ut aer. Suprema regio aeris tenuatur et quasi fervet ut ignis. Ibi ignis aereus est, igneus aer, atque ita in unam compagem copulantur. Idem infima plaga aeris et aquae suprema faciunt, ubi aer obnubilatus liquescit ut aqua, aqua item extenuata vaporibus exhalat ut aer. Terra rursus altior pinguis et lubrica fit instar aquae. Aquae imum turgescit in terram et saepe glaciatur ut terra.

2 Ultra elementa, vapores ipsi crassi fumique, corpora iam composita sunt, sed proxima elementis. Postea paulo solidius glutinan-

: II :

Epicurus' objection and its rebuttal. On the chain of being.

Here Epicurus rashly exclaims, to the contrary, that to have things 1
divine attached to things mortal is monstrous,[2] inasmuch as he does not see that mortal things cannot endure without the participation of the divine and the unchanging. I believe he is unaware that the chain of being has to be so arranged in its parts that, since many different orders of things occur in nature, the lowest parts of each higher order must always be linked in some way to the highest parts of the lower order immediately subsequent.[3] The relationship between the aether and the nature of the elements teaches us this.[4] The moon, which is the lowest part of the aether and closest to the elements, seems to possess something elemental both in the frequent changing of its shape and in the variety of its body's brightness and darkness. Likewise fire, which is the highest element, imitates the heaven it is closest to because it moves and blazes like that heaven. The point is further illustrated by the natural and mutual disposition of the four elements where the lowest region of fire becomes increasingly damper and cooler as if it were air. The highest region of air becomes thinner and hot as though it were fire. Fire is airy there and air fiery, and they are thus seamlessly joined. The same thing happens with the lowest region of air and the highest region of water where air turns to cloud and liquefies into water, and water becomes less dense and rises in vapors like air. Again the higher level of earth becomes oozy and muddy like water, while the lowest level of water thickens into earth and often freezes like earth.

Below these elements, dense vapors, and smokes are bodies al- 2
ready composite but still very close to the elements. After a while they become more solid and compress into sponge-like and porous

tur fiuntque lapides aliqui spongiosi et rari, propinqui vaporibus. Postmodum lapides reperiuntur duri ferme speciosique sicut metalla. Ex metallis ferrum plumbumque sunt propinqua lapidibus, argentum et aurum propinquiora sunt plantis, quoniam horum nitor et splendor flores referunt candidos et purpureos. In plantis tuber excedit metalla, quia manifestius nutritur et augetur, paulum tamen, quia non habet varium partium ordinem. Nobilissimae arbores propinquae sunt brutis, radices oris loco habent, ramos et crura, brachia et similia. Sexum habent utrumque nonnullae arbores, masculinum et femininum,[9] unde prope sitae uberius pullulant. In brutis ostrea uno tantum superant plantas, quod sensum habent tactus, sed fixa[10] terrae paene nutriuntur ut arbores. Multae quoque bestiolae sine coitu sponte[11] nascuntur, ut herbae. Sunt et simiae, canes, equi et elephantes et aliae bestiae hominibus in quibusdam figuris, gestibus, artificiisque persimiles. Sunt stolidi homines et ignavi, ut apparet, his quoque quam proximi. Sunt heroici homines, aliorum duces, supernis numinibus cognatissimi.

3 Esse rursus oportet spiritus hominibus familiaritate coniunctos, quorum instructione magicae artis Plato vult reperta fuisse miracula, quemadmodum et[12] instructione hominum bestiae nonnullae nobis propinquiores mira saepe supra suam speciem operantur. Atque hos[13] daemones heroesve ita esse nobis affectu proximos, sicut natura atque situ, adeo ut quibusdam perturbationibus afficiantur humanis atque alii aliis faveant personis et locis, alii insuper aliis adversentur. Siquidem Egyptii, quos sequuntur Origenes et Numenius et Porphyrius, multos aiunt esse daemones qui ad superiora animos erigunt, multos etiam qui ad inferiora detorquent, pessimos autem in occidente daemones esse, in septentrio-

rocks closely allied to vapors. Next come rocks that are almost impenetrable and glitter like metals. Among metals, iron and lead are closest to rocks, while silver and gold are more akin to plants, their luster and brilliance reminding us of white and purple flowers. Among plants, the tuber is clearly superior to metals because it shows more obvious signs of nutrition and growth, but it does not exceed them by much because it has no order of various parts. The noblest trees are close to animals: they have roots instead of a mouth and branches as arms, legs, and the like. Some trees have both sexes, male and female, and when planted side by side they reproduce more abundantly. Among animals, the oysters are superior to plants only in that they have a sense of touch, but they stay rooted to the bottom and are nourished more or less like trees. Many tiny creatures too come to life spontaneously, without intercourse, like plants. There are also monkeys, dogs, horses, elephants, and other beasts that resemble men in their various shapes, gestures, and accomplishments. There are dullwitted, lazy men too who obviously closely approximate to these animals; [and] there are heroic men, leaders of others, who are next of kin to the divine spirits.

3 In return there must be spirits who are familiarly linked to men and under whose instruction, says Plato, we have discovered the miracles of the art of magic[5] (just as certain animals, having learned from men's instruction and being particularly close to us, do remarkable things, often beyond the scope of their species). These daemons or heroes are so close to us in their feeling, as in their nature and location, that they are affected by particular turbulent human emotions, and some favor some people and places, while others are hostile to others. Indeed, the Egyptians maintain—and they are followed by Origen, Numenius, and Porphyry[6]—that there are many daemons who lift their rational souls towards higher things and many others who deflect them towards lower things. They assert that the worst daemons are in the

nali etiam plaga[14] malos, bonos in meridionali, optimos orientalem colere regionem. Daemonibus autem apud illos inferioribus superiores praesunt, his quoque alii, quos angelos nominant. Item angelis archangelos, archangelis principatus Platonici praeferunt, principatibus autem intellectus quosdam qui dii iam participatione quadam denominentur, summo semper deo pleni divinoque nectare ebrii.

4 Si in omnibus rerum generibus confitemur infima quaeque antecedentis ordinis cum supremis ordinis succedentis esse coniuncta et invicem quoquo modo confundi, cur non fateamur infimum intellectum cum suprema animarum sensitivarum ita esse coniunctum ut cum haec, quamvis mortalis, imaginem aliquam habeat intellectus (quod est in bestiis sagacissimis manifestum), intellectus quoque postremus licet divinus sit, sensitivam tamen quandam habeat brutamque naturam, per quam convenienter ad corpora terrena declinet? Praesertim cum deceat non humanam modo mentem, sed alias quoque omnes, quaecumque impurae quodammodo sunt, cum purioribus corporibus conspirare. Impurae vero mentes animae omnes rationales sunt, quae licet purae animae sint, ideo tamen sunt mentes impurae, quia mentes sunt animales. Mentes inquam, ita movendis corporibus deditae, ut vestigia sua vitalia animaliaque corporibus imprimant. Purae vero mentes sunt quae mentes sunt solum, neque animalia ex se fundunt simulacra, regendis immersa corporibus.

5 Pura vero corpora sunt apud Platonem duodecim ipsae mundi sphaerae, caeli octo et elementa sub caelo quatuor. Quinetiam partes quaedam in iis sphaeris singulis pretiosissimae. Animae itaque rationales sphaeris omnibus insunt, gradatim pro sua dignitate dispositae. Sed ipsam unam unius machinae animam Iovem nuncupat Plato, animas autem duodecim sphaerarum duodecim vocat

west; that those in the north are bad too; that the good are in the south; and that the very best inhabit the east. Higher daemons rule over the lower ones among them, and over these rule others whom they call angels. Above angels likewise the Platonists locate archangels and above archangels principalities and above principalities certain intellects, who, by way of a certain participation, are now called gods, filled as they always are with God on high and drunk with His nectar divine.[7]

4 If we agree that in all the classes of things the lowest individuals of the preceding order are linked with and in a way become in turn mingled with the highest of the order that follows, why can we not accept that the lowest intellect is linked with the highest of the sensitive souls; and linked in such a way that, since the soul (though mortal) has an image of the intellect (as is obvious in the most intelligent animals), yet the lowest intellect too (though divine) has a sensitive and animal nature, through which it bends in an appropriate manner towards earthly bodies? This is especially so in that it is appropriate not only for the human mind but for all other minds which are in some manner impure to unite with purer bodies. But all rational souls are impure minds. Though they may be pure souls, yet they are impure minds in that they are animate minds, that is to say are minds so dedicated to moving bodies that they leave their vital and animate imprints on them. But pure minds are those that are minds alone: they do not produce animate replicas from themselves and imprint them in the bodies they have to govern.

5 According to Plato, however, the bodies that are pure are the twelve spheres of the world, that is, the eight spheres of heaven and the four elements below heaven.[8] Moreover, in these individual spheres are certain superlatively precious parts. So rational souls are present in all the spheres arranged step by step in order of their dignity. But Plato calls the one soul of the one machine Jupiter, but the twelve souls of the twelve spheres he calls the gods

deos Iovis pedissequos. Sphaerarum partibus purioribus similiter attribuit animas mentis participes, stellis scilicet et planetis, quos etiam vocat deos. Ignis partibus daemones heroesque igneos, aeris clari aereos, aeris caliginosi aquaticos daemones atque heroes. Purioribus postremo terrae[15] partibus mentes copulat, quae humi habitantes homines appellantur. Interdum etiam daemones heroesque in terra ponuntur. Neque sub luna tantum, sed etiam in caelis ultra stellas daemonum heroumque turbas quamplurimas collocat. Sed in omnibus sphaeris ultra daemones heroesque principes animas ponit particulares, sive daemonicas heroicasque sive humanas. Quae non semper aeterna sequantur ut principes illi, sed aeterna temporaliaque vicissim et corpora vitamque mutent, tum ascendendo in melius, tum in deterius descendendo. Proinde quot stellae sunt, totidem subesse daemonum heroum animarumque turbas. Sub Saturno Saturnias, sub Iove Iovias, Martias vero sub Marte, similiterque deinceps. Mitto quod omnia putat in omnibus esse, sed in terra modo terreno, in aqua aquatico, similiterque in aere atque igne, in caelo quoque pro caelesti natura. Omnia in luna pro natura lunari, in sphaerisque aliis eodem pacto, adeo ut sphaera quaelibet suo modo et propria qualitate totus sit mundus.

6 Sed ut iam propositum concludamus. Sic erunt aliqui spiritus extra corpus atque perpetui, item aliqui iis oppositi in corpore atque mortales. Sint ergo oportet medii, qui vel extra corpus sint et mortales, quod fieri nequit, vel in corpore quidem, sed immortales. Primi illi sunt supernae mentes, quos vocant purissimos angelos, qui et gradibus inter se quamplurimis distinguuntur. Illis oppositae sunt animae bestiarum. Medium obtinebunt rationales

in Jupiter's train.[9] To the purer parts of the spheres, that is, the stars and planets, he similarly attributes souls that participate in mind, and these too he calls gods. To the parts of fire he allocates fiery daemons and heroes, to those of the clear air airy ones, and to those of the misty air watery daemons and heroes. Finally, to the purer parts of earth he attaches minds, which are called human because they dwell on the humid ground.[10] Occasionally too, daemons and heroes are located on earth. He puts countless throngs of daemons and heroes not only under the moon but also in the heavens beyond the stars. But in all the spheres, besides the daemons and heroes, who are the princes, he places individual souls, whether daemonic, heroic, or human, who do not always pursue things eternal like the princes, but switch back and forth between things eternal and things temporal and change [their] bodies and life, now rising towards the better, now sinking towards the worse. Consequently, the number of the throngs of daemons, heroes, and souls is equal to the stars above them. Under Saturn, they are Saturnian, under Jupiter Jovian, under Mars Martian, and so on. I set aside the fact that Plato thinks that things are all in all, but in earth in an earthly way, in water in a watery way, and in air and fire similarly, and in heaven according to the nature of heaven; and that all are in the moon according to the nature of the moon, and in the other spheres similarly such that each sphere, in its own way and according to its own quality, is the whole world.

But let us now conclude the argument. There are going to be 6
spirits outside the body who are everlasting and likewise spirits opposed to them inside the body who are mortal. So intermediate spirits have to exist who would be either outside the body and mortal (which is impossible) or inside the body but immortal. The first are supernal minds, whom they call the angels in their utmost purity, and they are distinguished in many degrees among themselves. Opposed to them are the souls of animals. Rational souls

animae, quae sunt quasi angeli quidam inferiores. Neque absurdum est esse spiritum in corpore aliquo immortalem, cum etiam reperiatur corpus aliquod immortale, quod est caelum (et tota ipsa quaelibet universi sphaera). Immo decet omnibus praecipuis mundi corporibus spiritus adesse perpetuos,[16] quasi formas, siquidem omnibus, ut plerique putant, perpetua inest materia. Oportet autem a formis quibusdam ubique materiam superari.

7 Conducit ad idem Aegyptiorum opinio illa a Platonicis quidem omnibus, praesertim a Proclo confirmata, videlicet ad consonantiam mundi perfectam esse oportere non solum animalia quaedam rationalia immortaliaque atque contra animalia irrationalia et mortalia simul, verumetiam multa inter haec media rationalia quidem, sed mortalia, non in terra solum, sed etiam in ceteris elementis. Non tantum igitur homines in corpore mortali habere animos sempiternos, verumetiam multos daemones, partim propinquos nobis, partim longe sublimiores, quorum corpora gignantur atque intereant, quamvis diutius quam nostra gradatim ditiusque[17] vivant. Non enim decere putant, ut a caelestibus animalibus, rationalibus, sempiternis, felicissimis ad animalia terrena rationalia quidem, sed infelicissima vitaque brevissima, subito descendatur, immo per gradus quosdam animalium rationalium, quae feliciora quidem sint et diuturniora quam homines, non tamen sempiterna, corpore vel animo beatissima.

8 Idem quoque Plutarchus et familiares eius, Demetrius philosophus, Emilianusque rhetor affirmant. Testantur enim ex multis prodigiis quae suis temporibus[18] contigerunt, Pana, magnum daemonem aliosque multos daemones eiulasse primum, deinde etiam obiise. Itaque sempiternae mentis cum corpore humano quamvis caduco consortium haud ita absurdum est, ut Epicurus Lucretiusque existimant, praesertim cum nostra mens ita sit ultima mentium, sicut stellarum est ultima luna, atque ut luna ad solem, sic nostra mens referatur ad Deum. Luna circa solem ita revolvitur

are going to hold the middle position, being as it were certain lower angels. There is nothing absurd about an immortal spirit being in a body, since we have even found an immortal body, namely the sky (and each entire sphere of the universe). Or rather, it seems appropriate that everlasting spirits, in the role of forms, should be present to all the principal bodies of the world, since everlasting matter, most people suppose, is present in them all. But everywhere matter has to be ruled by particular forms.

7 The Egyptians' theory, supported by all the Platonists, especially Proclus,[11] leads to the same conclusion. They say that not only must rational immortal creatures and at the same time irrational mortal creatures exist for the world's perfect harmony, but also many rational but mortal creatures in between them, not only in earth, but also in the other elements. So not only do men have eternal souls in a mortal body, but many daemons do as well, some of them close to us, others far superior to us, whose bodies come into being and gradually pass away although they live longer than our bodies and more splendidly. The Egyptians suppose that a sudden descent from creatures that are celestial, rational, eternal, and utterly blessed to creatures that are earthly, rational, yes, but without happiness and with the briefest of lives, would be inappropriate. Rather one should descend by way of the levels of rational souls who are happier and far longer-lived than men, but not yet eternal or totally blessed in body and soul.

8 Plutarch, and his friends Demetrius the philosopher and Aemilianus the rhetorician, assert the same: among the many prodigies which occurred in their day, they bear witness that Pan, the great daemon, along with many other daemons, first broke into lamentation and then died.[12] So the companionship of an eternal mind with a human body though perishable is not the absurdity Epicurus and Lucretius suppose,[13] especially since our mind is the lowest of minds, just as the moon is the lowest of stars; and just as the moon looks to the sun so does our mind look

ut alias luceat aliter et varie figuretur, numquam tota luminis recipiendi facultate privetur. Habet insuper nitidum in se quiddam; habet et fuscum. Habet denique opacum quiddam, quod impedit ne tota refulgeat. Mens humana similiter divini solis radio fulget quidem semper, sed alias aliter, mutatque figuram, numquam[19] tota resplendet. Neque quod in ea splendet, splendet aequaliter: praeter divinam eius rationalemque virtutem subest pars quaedam opaca et vacua ratione, quae tamquam lunaris illa opacitas ad elementa, sic ipsa ad naturam corpusque declinans, relinquitur luminis expers.

9 Ergo naturali rerum ordini consentaneum esse videtur, mentem ultimam, quamvis sempiterna sit, cum corpore quodam licet caduco posse coniungi. Mitto quod Xenocrates et Speusippus, Iamblichus et Plutarchus putant ab ipsa sempiternitate vim procedere sempiternam, non solum usque ad mentes ultimas quae reflectuntur in ipsam, sed etiam usque ad animas bestiarum. Numenius insuper ad plantas usque producit. Plotinus denique etiam ad naturam. Nos autem Porphyrium Proclumque sequamur, eatenus putantes vitam cognitionemque procedere sempiternam, quatenus propria in eandem conversio reperitur. Illa enim quandam in se aeternitatis retinent rationem, quae in ipsam ipsius tum ratione tum gratia, nec solum motu alieno atque communi, sed etiam suo et proprio reflectuntur.

10 Sed numquid humanum corpus ea est dignitate donatum ut mentem perpetuam excipere hospitem mereatur? Proculdubio. Neque turbari ex hoc debemus quod natura variis propugnaculis instruxit corpora bestiarum et adiumenta suppeditavit ad victum, nobis nihil tribuit tale. Non enim voluit delicatam aequalitatem nostri corporis deformare, neque potuit infinitis actionibus hominis, quae infinitam sequuntur cogitationem, innumerabilia vel pro-

to God. The moon circles the sun so that it variously shines out at different times and alters its shape, but it is never totally deprived of its ability to receive light. It has a sort of brightness within and also a darkness. And it has a sort of cloudiness that prevents it from being all ablaze. Similarly, the human mind always shines with the ray of the divine sun, but in varying ways; it changes its shape and is never totally resplendent. What shines in it does not shine out equally; in addition to its divine and rational power, part of it is subject to a cloudiness that is devoid of reason. Like the opacity of the moon declining towards the elements, this part declines towards nature and the body and is left deprived of light.

9 It seems then to be consistent with the natural order of things that the lowest mind, though it is eternal, can be joined with a body, though it is perishable. I shall pass over the theory of Xenocrates, Speusippus, Iamblichus, and Plutarch that eternal power proceeds from eternity itself, not only as far as the lowest minds, who turn back to this eternity, but as far as the souls of animals too.[14] Numenius extends it as far as plants besides[15] and Plotinus as far even as nature.[16] But we follow Porphyry and Proclus, who believe that eternal life and cognition proceed as far as one can find conversion proper to them.[17] For those things retain in themselves a kind of rational principle of eternity that are converted to this principle by its reason and its grace, not only by an outside and common motion but also by their own particular motion.

10 Is not the human body worthily endowed with enough dignity to deserve to receive an eternal mind as its guest? Undoubtedly so. We should not be upset by the fact that nature has equipped the bodies of animals with every kind of defense and supplied them with special means for feeding themselves but has not given them to us. She did not wish to mar the delicate balance of our body; nor for man's infinite activities (which attend his infinite process of thinking) could she provide a limitless number of defenses or in-

pugnacula vel instrumenta suppeditare. Sed, ut inquit Aristoteles, dum mentem manumque dedit, artes omnes atque omnia instrumenta concessit. Bestias autem facile finitis munimentis instruxit, quibus determinatas actiones phantasiae ad certum quiddam natura directae exsequerentur. Arbitramur vero corpora nostra esse idonea mentis hospitia, tum propter figuram erectam, non humi sed superne spectantem et caelum quasi patriam suam proprius agnoscentem, tum propter membrorum variorum decorem omnino mirabilem, tum quia ignis et aer elementa purissima in nobis valent quamplurimum, quod etiam indicat agilitas corporis, procerus habitus et erectus aspectus. Maxime vero propter complexionem temperatissimam, quae significatur ex delicata, leni, firma et nitida carnis mollitie, quae non fit nisi exactissima elementorum temperatione.

11 Aquila visu hominem superat, multae aves auditu, canis olfactu, nullum vero animalium gustu vel tactu. Quod plane perspicitur ex eo quod homines in epulis, poculis et venereis immoderatius profunduntur quam bruta, licet ratione nonnumquam cohibeantur. Par est enim ut avidius quam bestiae eas voluptates asciscant, quas sentiunt et acutius. Tres illi sensus superiores tunc expeditissimi sunt, quando siccum est cerebrum. Quam siccitatem non tradidit deus homini, cuius cerebrum quiescit numquam, ne forte si esset natura siccum, etiam continua agitatione arescens,[20] citius quam decet exsiccaretur. Gustus nihil aliud est quam tactus aliquis linguae. Tactus cum universalis sit sensus, tum omnis animalis, tum corporis universi, ubi acutissimus est, declarat optimam inesse corporis complexionem, ob id potissimum, quod cum fiat in nervis

struments. However, as Aristotle says, when she gave us a mind and a hand, she gave us all the skills and all the instruments.[18] But it was easy for her to equip the animals with finite means of protection in order for them to pursue the actions determined by their phantasy (which is naturally directed towards a particular end). But we consider that our bodies are suitable lodgings for the mind, (a) because of their upright shape with the eyes gazing not at the ground but up to heaven as if recognizing it more particularly as their native land; (b) because of the utterly marvelous beauty of the body's different parts; (c) because the purest elements, fire and air, mightily prevail in us, as the body's agility, its tall and slender build, and its erect appearance indicate; and (d) most importantly, because of its superlatively well-tempered complexion, which is revealed by the skin's delicate, smooth, firm, and glowing softness impossible without the most exact tempering of the elements.

The eagle excels man with its sight, and so do many birds with II
their hearing and the dog with its sense of smell; but no animal is superior to man in taste or touch. This is quite obvious from the fact that men immoderately give way to eating, drinking, and making love much more than animals do, even though they are restrained at times by reason. It is not surprising that they indulge more avidly than animals in the pleasures they feel more keenly. The three superior senses are at their sharpest when the brain is dry. God has not given dryness of the brain to man whose brain is never at rest, lest if it were naturally dry, or even drying up from continuous agitation, it would dry out faster than perhaps it should. Taste is nothing other than a sort of touch of the tongue. Since touch is the universal sense both of every creature and of the universal body, then where it is keenest it indicates the presence of the body's complexion at its best; and especially because, since it occurs in the nerves, which sense poorly when they are too dry, it

qui, quando aridiores sunt, sentiunt male, ubi acutus est tactus, significatur inesse mollitiem, quae temperet nervorum ariditatem.

12 Praeterea, sensuum instrumenta numquam actu eas qualitates habere debent, quas sensus est percepturus. Pupilla enim coloribus, auditus sonis, olfactus odoribus caret, lingua saporibus. Cum vero tactus versetur circa quatuor qualitates[21] elementorum, oportet ut vel careat illis omnino, quod fieri nequit in composito corpore, vel ab earum excessu procul absit, ita ut in eius instrumento nulla videatur qualitas dominari, sed quasi quaedam expulsis qualitatibus harmonia. Opus fuit tamen multum terrae et aquae secundum molem nobis inesse, ut vim ignis aerisque longe vehementiorem aqua et terra molis abundantia[22] temperaret. Datum quoque nobis est maius cerebrum et cor calidius quam ceteris animantibus. Illud quidem ut per varia instrumenta speculationi suppeditet, hoc autem ut et multi et clari spiritus adsint cerebro. Suspensum etiam caput est, ne gravium humorum sordes descendant ad cerebrum et inquinent spirituum puritatem. Vehemens quoque tum cerebri frigiditas humiditasque, tum cordis caliditas atque siccitas tam se invicem quam membra omnia temperant. Ideo in homine videtur esse complexio omnium temperatissima. Quae si terrea esset, ut bestiarum fere omnium, cornibus, dentibus, unguibus, rostrisque durioribus, aspera et hirsuta pelle, squamis essemus obducti. Nunc vero contra ita affectum est corpus humanum ut neque caloris et siccitatis excessu sit asperum, neque frigore nimio rigidum aut pigrum, neque humore superfluo fluxum et lubricum, sed delicatum pariter atque solidum. Quod etiam intellegitur ex alimentis quibus assidue vescimur, aereis, dulcibus, attritis, tenuatis, liquefactis, concoctis, temperatissimis; bestiae vero contrariis. Qualis autem complexio est, talia alimenta cupit, et qualibus utitur alimentis, talis evadit.

signifies when it is keen the presence of the moist softness[19] which tempers the nerves' dryness.

Moreover, the instruments of the senses should never possess 12
in act the qualities that a sense is about to perceive. The pupil of the eye lacks colors, the hearing sounds, the smell odors, and the tongue tastes. But since touch is concerned with the four qualities of the elements, it must either lack them completely, which is impossible in a composite body, or else be so far from having them in excess that in an instrument of touch no quality obviously dominates, but a kind of harmony prevails with the qualities suppressed. Yet it proved necessary for much earth and water to be present in us as a mass: the abundance of its bulk could then temper the far more vehement force of fire and air. We were also given a larger brain and a hotter heart than other creatures: the brain so that via our various instruments it might further speculation; the heart so that many vivid spirits would be present in the brain. And the head was put on top to prevent the dregs of the heavy humors from descending into the brain and polluting the purity of the spirits. Also the intense cold and dampness of the brain and the heat and dryness of the heart temper each other and all the limbs alike. In man there seems to be the most tempered complexion of all. If it were earthy, like that of most animals, we would be enveloped by horns, teeth, hooves or claws, hard beaks, rough and shaggy hair, or scales. But in fact the human body is so endowed that it is neither prickly from too much heat and dryness, nor stiff or torpid from too much cold, nor wet and slimy from too much moisture; rather it is delicate and sturdy equally. The same lesson is learned from the foods we eat continually, whether they be light, sweet, ground up, chopped, pulped, cooked, carefully blended. Animals consume quite the opposite foods. A certain complexion desires certain foods, and whatever kind of foods it enjoys it becomes that kind.

13 Concludamus igitur hominem ad contemplandum esse natum, ut Anaxagoras inquit, postquam ita in eo tam cerebrum quam reliquum corpus constitutum est, ut continuo contemplationis officio serviat. Quod et cerebri requirit mollitiem et complexionem corporis temperatam: illam ne speculando nimium exsiccetur, hanc ne humorum tumultu a contemplando detorqueatur. Cum vero tanta sit et tam sublimis nostri corporis moderatio ut caeli temperantiam imitetur, nihil mirum est si caelestis animus hanc ad tempus aedem habitat caelo simillimam. Neque tamen carni infunditur primum, sed mediis ducitur competentibus, ut Magi Persarum docent. Primo quidem in ipso descensu caelesti aereoque involvitur corpore,[23] deinde spiritu ex corde genito, qui in nobis caeli instar temperatissimus est et lucidissimus. His[24] mediis corpore clauditur crassiore. Atque iis omnibus aeque fit proximus, licet per aliud in aliud se transfuderit, sicut calor ignis aeri et aquae haeret proxime, quamvis per aerem trahatur ad aquam. Ac merito immortalis anima per immortale corpus illud aethereum mortalibus corporibus iungitur. Perpetuum quidem illud colit semper, haec ad breve tempus mortalia, ut merito appellari animus debeat deus quidam[25] sive stella circumfusa nube sive daemon: non incola terrae, sed hospes.

14 Hospes, nosce teipsum; scito te esse caelestis patriae civem, civem natum ad caelestia contemplanda. Memento, si finis tuus est contemplatio, vitam tuam augeri ac perfici contemplando. Cum vero ex hoc ipso vita corporis quodammodo remittatur, sequitur[26] ut in ipso vitae corporeae[27] detrimento atque interitu non decrescat tua vita, sed crescat.

Let us conclude, then, that man is born for contemplation, as 13
Anaxagoras says,[20] since in him both the brain and the rest of the body are so constituted as to serve continually the office of contemplation. This requires a moist softness of the brain and a tempered complexion of the body: the former so that man does not become desiccated from too much thinking, the latter so that he is not distracted from contemplating by the tumult of the humors. But since the moderation of our body is so remarkable and elevated that it imitates the tempering of heaven, we should not be surprised if the heavenly soul lives for a while in this lodging that most resembles heaven. Yet the soul does not at first mingle with the flesh: it is brought down through the appropriate intermediate stages, as the Persian Magi teach.[21] First, in the actual descent, it is enveloped in a celestial body of air and afterwards in a spirit generated from the heart, which in us is perfectly tempered and dazzlingly bright like heaven. With these as intermediaries, it is enclosed in the coarser body. It becomes equally close to all three, although it transfers itself through one to another; similarly the heat of fire is drawn most closely to air and water, though it is drawn to the water through the air. Appropriately then, the immortal soul is joined to mortal bodies by means of that immortal aethereal body. It lives in that everlasting home always, while it lives in these mortal bodies for a brief time. In justice, the rational soul should be called a kind of god, or a star ringed with cloud, or a daemon: not an inhabitant of earth, but a guest.

Guest, know yourself, know you are a citizen of a heavenly 14
country, a citizen born to contemplate things celestial. Remember, if your end is contemplation, that your life should be enriched and perfected by contemplating. But since from this contemplating the body's life in a way loosens its hold, it follows that in this very weakening and death of the corporeal life, your [authentic] life grows not fainter but stronger.

: III :

Secunda ratio: sicut in rebus naturalibus fit resolutio ad primam materiam immortalem, sic ad formam ultimam immortalem.

1 Ordo naturalium corporum ita est institutus ut in primam descendat materiam et in ultimam ascendat formam, et quo magis materia quaevis ad materiam primam accedit, eo potior materia sit, id est verior puriorque materia. Quo magis aliqua forma ad ultimam formam, eo sit forma perfectior. Materia enim prima materiarum materia est. Forma ultima est forma formarum.

2 Accipe hoc exemplo quod volumus. Corpus animalis in membra quasi materiam suam dividimus, membrum quodlibet in humores quatuor, qui sunt quaedam membri materia; similiter humorem quemlibet in quatuor elementa. Elementum vero in materiam simplicem ad quam devenire tandem oportet, ne descendamus in infinitum neve compellamur e converso ascendere sine fine. Nusquam enim erit actus mixtus, si nusquam mixta potentia fuerit; nusquam rursus actus purus invenietur, si nusquam potentia pura valeat reperiri. Et cum actio ab actu puro exordium habeat, passio a pura potentia, actiones passionesque nusquam erunt. Sit ergo oportet materia simplex. Haec utique materia simplex, quae subiecta est elementi formae, prima materia nominatur, quoniam ipse naturae artifex in corporibus fabricandis principio hanc materiam suscipit[28] nudam, mox elementorum vestit qualitatibus atque formis, tum elementa in speciem producit humorum, deinde humores in formas membrorum digerit. Membris addit speciem nutriendi; huic sentiendi formam; huic tandem intellegendi.

3 Intellectiva vero natura est duplex. Una quae adeo est a corporibus aliena ut nullam illis vitam praestet. Haec ideo materiae vel

: III :

Second proof: as resolution reverts in natural objects to prime immortal matter, so it reverts to ultimate immortal form.

The order of natural bodies is so disposed that it descends to prime matter and ascends to ultimate form, and the closer some matter approaches to prime matter, the better, the truer, the purer matter it is. The closer a form is to ultimate form, the more perfect it is as form. For prime matter is the matter of matters, ultimate form the form of forms. 1

Here is an example of what we mean. We divide the animate body into its limbs as its matter; then each limb into the four humors that serve as the limb's matter; then likewise each humor into the four elements. But [each] element we divide into simple matter, which we have to reach eventually lest we descend *ad infinitum*, or conversely are forced endlessly to ascend. For nowhere will mixed act exist if mixed potency nowhere exists. Contrariwise, nowhere will pure act be found, if pure potency can nowhere be found; and since action takes its origin from pure act and passion takes its origin from pure potency, actions and passions will nowhere exist. Therefore simple matter must exist. This simple matter, which underlies an element's form, is called prime matter, because the Artificer of nature, in creating bodies, first takes this naked matter, and clothes it with the qualities and forms of the elements. Then He introduces the elements into the species of the humors, and distributes the humors into the forms of the limbs. To the limbs He then adds the nutritive species, and to this the form of feeling, and to this the form of understanding. 2

The intellectual nature is twofold. One nature is so remote from bodies that it does not provide them with life at all. It is not 3

corporis forma non dicitur et ordo ille corporum in hanc mentis naturam ceu propriam formam non desinit. Hunc gradum apud Platonem sublimes obtinent angeli. Sed est altera natura mentis, quae corpori iuncta, quodam quasi foedere cum ipso conspirat, in quam velut ultimam materiae formam ascendit progressio corporum. Progressionis huius duo sunt termini: materia[29] infimus, mens ista supremus. Si longissime inter se distant, conditiones inter se oppositas habent. Ergo sicut materia prima, mera materia est, natura sua expers omnino formae, omnibus subiecta formis atque materiis, ita ultima illa forma, scilicet mens, mera forma est, scilicet expers omnino materiae, formis omnibus earumque materiis praesidens. Item, sicut materia prima a primo esse distat longissime atque est proxima nihilo, unde inter esse et nihil ponitur a Platone, ita ultima forma longissime distat a nihilo atque est primo esse quam[30] proxima.

4 Hinc tria sequuntur: primum, quod ultima forma nulla ex parte pullulat a materia; secundum, quod a solo fit deo; tertium, quod permanere poterit immortalis. Primum horum concluditur ex prima comparatione quam hic induximus, secundum ex secunda, tertium ex prima sequitur et secunda. Ex prima sic: si est expers omnino materiae corporalis, quae perniciosae mutationis initium est, procul est a pernicie, ac si mutabilium rerum caput est, neque mutabilibus rebus succumbit, neque mutationem suscipit aliquam, nisi vitalem. Ex secunda vero sic: si terminus nihilo proximus non tendit in nihilum, quid mirum terminum a nihilo remotissimum et primo esse proximum neque ab esse extrudi umquam neque trudi in nihilum? Rursus, perfectior est formae quam materiae natura, cum materia a forma perficiatur atque ornetur. Ergo quemadmodum de materia in materiam descendentes gradatim ad materiam primam corporum devenimus sempiternam, ita etiam de forma ascendentes in formam, paulatim in ultimam cor-

called the form of matter or of body; and the order of bodies does not culminate in this, the nature or proper form of mind. In Plato the higher angels occupy this level.[22] But a second intellectual nature exists which is joined to the body and collaborates closely with it in a kind of league. The progression of bodies ascends to it as to the ultimate form of matter. There are two termini for this progression, matter at the bottom and this kind of mind at the top. If they are very far apart, they possess mutually opposite conditions. Just as prime matter is pure matter and by its very nature is entirely devoid of form though subject to all forms and matters, so the ultimate form, or mind, is pure form, entirely devoid of matter but ruling over all forms and their matters. Again, just as prime matter is as far distant as possible from prime being and closest to non-being (whence Plato puts it between being and nothing[23]), so ultimate form is as far distant as possible from nothing and closest to prime being.

Three consequences follow from this: (1) that that ultimate 4
form in no way springs from matter, (2) that it is made by God alone, and (3) that it could remain immortal. The first of these results from the first comparison we introduced here, and the second from the second; the third follows from the first and the second. It follows from the first thus: if ultimate form is entirely devoid of corporeal matter, which is the origin of ruinous change, it is far distant from destruction; and if it presides over mutable things, it does not yield to them, nor does it sustain any but vital change. It follows from the second thus: if the terminus closest to nothing does not proceed to nothing, is it surprising that the terminus most distant from nothing and closest to prime being is never expelled from being or driven into nothing? Again, the nature of form is more perfect than that of matter, because matter is made perfect and adorned by form. Just as we descend step by step, therefore, from matter to matter until we reach the prime eternal matter of bodies, so too do we ascend from form to form until we

porum formam sempiternam provehimur, ne ascensus sit imperfectior quam descensus ac supremus terminus imperfectior sit quam infimus. Decet eam intellectualem formam ad quam tamquam finem totus universae naturae tendit conatus, usque adeo absolutam consummatamque esse ut sit procul a morte. Medias vero formas immortales esse non est necessarium. Eas enim parvifacere natura videtur, cum illas non tam propter ipsas quam propter ultimam eligat. In quo sane videntur praeparationes quaedam materiae ad formam ultimam capiendam potius quam formae principales existere. Per illas quasi vias transit ipse motus impetusque naturae. In illa sistit natura motum. Merito igitur illae ab esse in non esse transibunt, illa quiescet in esse, ut naturae finis maneat sine fine. Dicimus autem totum universae naturae conatum ad id potissimum dirigi, ut animal intellectuale sit, ex eo quod intellectus adsit corpori. Ut autem intellectus ipse in se sit, actionem dumtaxat divinam posse conferre, et cum ab ipsa dumtaxat aeternitate dependeat, aeternum fore.

5 De intellectuali autem animali quidnam dicemus? Magi non dubitant id quoque in sua temperantia permansurum fuisse: ut Plato in *Charmide* scribit, si modo animus in sua, id est divina, temperantia permansisset. Ab ipso enim omnem tum consonantiam, tum dissonantiam corporis proficisci. Idem prorsus lex Mosaica Christianaque docet. Verum quod universus ordo ob inordinatum animi motum olim amisit, ipso tandem ordine praevalente rursus in ordinem redigendum, non Moyses solum, sed Zoroaster, Mercurius, Plato consentiunt.

6 Sed de his alias. Nunc iam quod erat propositum concludamus. Sint igitur termini corporalis ordinis utrique perpetui, et infimus et supremus. Supremum vero terminum ultimamque formam esse rationalem animam prisci theologi putaverunt, quibus cum Aristo-

are gradually brought to the ultimate eternal form of bodies, lest the ascent be less perfect than the descent and the upper terminus less perfect than the lowest. It is fitting that the intellectual form towards which the whole endeavor of universal nature is striving as its goal should be so perfect and complete that it is far removed from death. But it is not necessary for the intermediate forms to be immortal. Nature deems them apparently of little value, since she does not choose them for their own sakes but for the ultimate form. They seem to be matter's particular preparations for receiving the ultimate form rather than existing themselves as the principal forms. The movement and impulse of nature passes through them as conduits. But in the ultimate form nature arrests [its] motion. Rightly therefore, in order that nature's end may endlessly endure, they will pass from being to non-being while the form will rest in being. However, we assert that the whole endeavor of universal nature is directed above all to the goal of being an intellectual animal, in that intellect is present in [its] body. Only divine action makes it possible for the intellect to exist in itself, and since this intellect depends only on eternity itself, it will be eternal.

What are we to say then about some living creature possessing 5
intellect? The Magi are in no doubt that it too would have survived in its tempered state—as Plato puts it in the *Charmides*,[24] if only the rational soul had persisted in its original, its divine, temperance. For all the harmony or disharmony of the body stems from it. The Mosaic and Christian law teaches exactly the same. However what the universal order once lost because of the inordinate motion of the soul must be restored to it again when order eventually prevails [in the soul]. Not just Moses,[25] but Zoroaster,[26] Hermes Trismegistus,[27] and Plato too,[28] agree on this.

But of these matters, more elsewhere. Let us now conclude the 6
theme under discussion. Let the termini of the corporeal order both be eternal, the lowest and the highest. The ancient theologians supposed that the highest terminus and ultimate form is the

teles consentit in libro *De divinis* duodecimo, ubi de causis efficientibus et formalibus disputans, inquit causas quidem moventes materiam praecedere, formas minime. 'Si autem post materiam forma aliqua maneat, esse perscrutandum. Nam in quibusdam nihil prohibere, ut si est anima tale—non omnis, sed intellectus.' Idem in libro *De naturalibus* secundo inquit philosophi naturalis investigationem usque ad illam formam protendi, quae separata quidem sit simul et in materia. Quam esse hominis animam ipse ibi significat et ita Peripatetici omnes exponunt. Nos autem putamus tum priscos theologos, tum Aristotelem tali quadam ratione in hanc sententiam concurrisse, quod sicut complexio temperata est finis ad quem diriguntur omnes motiones complexionesque naturales, ita rationalis anima, cui subest temperata complexio, finis est formarum omnium naturalium.

7 Rursus, illa est ultimae formae conditio, ut neque omnino sit absoluta, neque omnino immersa corporibus. Si omnino esset libera neque quicquam per corpus operaretur, corporis forma non esset. Si obrueretur omnino, neque ageret aliquid absque corpore, non esset ultima forma. Esset enim hac ulterior illa, quaecumque talis esse reperiretur ut partim quidem iungeretur corpori, partim non iungeretur. Qualem profecto esse aliquam oportet, ut inter substantiam illam angelicam a corpore omnino seiunctam perque illud nihil agentem, atque formam aliam omnino coniunctam corpori perque corpus agentem omnia (qualis est anima bestiarum), forma quaedam sit media, partim iuncta corpori, partim etiam separata, ut aliquid per corpus efficiat, aliquid per seipsam. Talis est autem rationalis anima omnis, quia et regit corpus et speculatur. Humana quoque talis est proculdubio, quae nutriendi et sentiendi opera per corporis exsequitur instrumenta, intellegendi autem et

rational soul, and Aristotle agrees with them in book twelve of his work *On Things Divine* [the *Metaphysics*], where, in discussing the efficient and formal causes, he says that the moving causes are prior to matter, but the forms are not: "But we must examine whether any form can survive after matter. Now in some cases nothing prevents it, for instance, if soul—not all soul, but the intellective part—is such a form."[29] In book two of his work *On Things Natural* [the *Physics*], he says that the study of natural philosophy should extend as far as the form that is separate and yet simultaneously in matter.[30] He means this to be the human soul, and all the Peripatetics have interpreted it in this way. But we believe that the ancient theologians and Aristotle (deploying this kind of argument) agreed with the opinion that, just as a tempered complexion is the end towards which all motions and natural complexions are directed, so the rational soul, to which the tempered complexion is subject, is the end of all natural forms.

Again, the condition of the ultimate form is such that it is neither completely independent of, nor completely immersed in, bodies. If it were completely free and never acted through the body, it would not be the form of the body. If it were completely engulfed [in the body], it would never do anything without the body and would not be the ultimate form. For if a form could be discovered such that it were partly joined and partly not joined to the body, it would be higher than this engulfed form. Some form must exist such that, between the angelic substance completely separate from the body and never acting through it, and another form completely attached to the body and doing all things through it (like the soul of animals), there has to be an intermediate form partly attached to the body and partly separate from it, so that it can do one thing through the body and another on its own. All rational soul is such a form, because it rules over the body and contemplates alike. Undoubtedly the human soul is also such: it performs the functions of nutrition and sensation using the organs of the body, but it ac- 7

eligendi actum perficit per seipsam. Sic angelus tam per substantiam quam per operationem est a materia separatus et in aeternitate totus, quia totus in statu. Brutorum animae per utrumque coniunctae et totae in tempore, quia per utrumque mutantur. Rationales animae, quia partim coniunctae esse debent,[31] partim etiam separatae, neque esse possent per aliquid separatae, si coniunctae per substantiam essent, necessario sunt per substantiam separatae sive separabiles, quia scilicet nullam habent originem a materia vel ab agentibus instrumentisque corporeis. Sunt autem coniunctae per operationes, non quidem per omnes operationes sed infimas, et id quidem non violentia sed amore. Unde secundum Chaldaeos in confinio sunt aeternitatis et temporis. Per substantiam quidem in aeternitate sunt, per operationes in tempore, siquidem illa manet, istae mutantur. Decet enim inter id quod omnino est aeternum atque id quod[32] penitus temporale, esse aliquid partim aeternum, partim etiam temporale. Et inter id quod semper est atque id quod fit aliquando, esse aliquid quod fiat semper. Tale quidem est caelum, et permanens substantia semper et mobile. Rursus, talis ipsa[33] mundi materia atque ipsa etiam (ut ita dixerim) corporeitas. Praeterea, ferme talis est anima, quae fluit semper affectu et actu, quamvis substantia maneat. Unde declinat ad corpora quae fluunt insuper per substantiam.

8 Talis profecto anima ideo forma est corporis ultima, quia format quidem regitque corpus, verum ita paene excedit naturam corporis, ut in ipso sit limine, ac paulum quid praetergressa, limites corporis sit penitus relictura.[34] Nempe multo magis separata est quam coniuncta. Communicat namque illi partem sui sive potentiam inferiorem, quam habet cum brutis plantisve communem. Partem vero praecipuam, divinis persimilem, in qua tota consistit

complishes on its own the act of understanding and choosing. Thus the angel is separate from matter both in substance and activity, and is completely in eternity because it is completely at rest. The souls of animals are attached to body in both respects and are completely in time, because they change in both respects. Rational souls, because they have to be partly attached and partly separate, and if they are attached through their substance cannot be separated through something else, necessarily are separated or are separable through substance, because, as we know, they do not originate from matter or from bodily agents or instruments. However they are attached through their activities, not through all activities but the lowest ones, and not by force but by love. That is why, according to the Chaldaeans, they are on the borderline of eternity and time.[31] Through their substance they are in eternity, through their activities in time, because their substance is unchanging while their activities are subject to change. Between what is completely eternal and what is utterly temporal it behooves there to be something partly eternal and partly temporal; and between what always exists and what sometimes comes into being, there has to be something that is always coming into being. Such are the heavens, always permanent in substance, yet mobile. Such too is the world's matter and its corporeity if I may use the term. And such in a sense is soul, which is always flowing in its being affected and in its act, though its substance is unchanging. So it sinks towards bodies, which by reason of their substance are also in flux.

Clearly then such a soul is the ultimate form of the body be- 8
cause it forms and rules over the body, but it well-nigh exceeds the body's nature in that it is on the very threshold; and if it went just a little further, it would leave the limits of the body entirely. Certainly it is much more separated from than attached to the body. It imparts to the body the lower part or power of itself it has in common with animals and plants. But its most important part, which resembles the divine and in which consists the entire rational prin-

rationalis animae ratio, semotam[35] habet a corpore in essentia, quia etiam in actione. Et quotiens operatur per intellectum, primo naturalique instinctu ad separatas rationes sese confert, quod quidem omnes Peripatetici confitentur. Ad singulas vero coniunctasque formas non primo aut recto, sed secundo et obliquo quodam actu se torquet, quatenus ad simulacra, unde species intellegibiles procreavit, se reflectit. Quis ergo non viderit vim rationalem magis separatam esse quam coniunctam, siquidem ad separata recte et primo, ad coniuncta oblique et actu sequenti se vertit? Quae tunc maxime quod vult assequitur, quando longissime discedit a corpore. Contra, quando per sensus descendit ad corpora, tunc fallitur et innumeris passionibus perturbatur. Non potest autem rerum mortalium esse similis, si illarum praesentia fallitur et turbatur. Immo vero similis est divinarum ut in *Phaedone* docet Plato, quia quo illis haeret propinquius, eo clarescit magis et gaudet. Quiescit autem in loco sibi naturali res quaelibet, angitur in alieno. Unde apud Platonicos apparet non esse in corporibus mortalibus, quatenus mortalia sunt, naturalem intellegentiae sedem. Ergo paululum quid[36] abest ut rationalis anima sit prorsus a corpore separata. Est igitur forma ultima, cum super eam non sit forma alia corporis, infra vero sint multae, ita dispositae ut gradatim huic animae propinquantes quasi super materiam eleventur.

ciple of the rational soul, it keeps separate from the body in essence, because separate too in action. Whenever it acts through the intellect, it directs itself first by a natural instinct to the separate rational principles; all the Peripatetics admit this. But it turns itself towards individual forms attached [to the body] in an act that is not primary or direct, but secondary and oblique insofar as it is turning itself towards the images from which it has procreated the intelligible species.[32] So isn't it obvious that the rational power is more separated than attached, since it turns directly and primarily towards what are separate, but indirectly and in a posterior act towards what are attached? It most achieves what it desires when it is distanced as far as possible from the body. Contrariwise, when it descends to bodies through the senses, it makes mistakes and is thrown into turmoil by numberless passions. But it cannot be like mortal things if it is deceived and confused by their presence. Rather, it resembles things divine, as Plato tells us in the *Phaedo*,[33] because the closer it clings to them, the brighter it shines and the more it rejoices. But every object is at rest when it is in its natural place, but ill at ease when it is in a strange place. From this it is clear to Platonists that the natural seat of understanding is not in mortal bodies inasmuch as they are mortal. So very little is wanting for the rational soul to be completely separate from the body. So it is the ultimate form because no other form of the body is above it, but many forms are below; and they are so disposed that, in approaching this soul step by step, they are raised as it were above matter.

: IV :

Obiectio Epicuri et responsio de formis deo simillimis.

1 Somniare nos Epicurus inquit quando formas excedere ullo modo materiam qua sustinentur asserimus. Absorberi eas usque adeo a materia putat ut impossibile sit aliquam, licet excellentissimam, formam aliquid ultra materiam operari. Nos autem omnia naturae opera, sicut Plato in *Philebo* scribit Aristotelesque confirmat, a divina quadam perfici arbitramur intellegentia, quae quidem caelos velut instrumenta sua revolvens et citans (ut Plato inquit) caelestem currum, inde inferiorem hanc elementorum format materiam. Atque ut in arte operis forma triplicem habet gradum, est enim primum in artificis animo, secundo <in>[37] instrumentis ab eo agitatis, tertio in materia inde formata,[38] ita formae rerum quas deus per caeli motus vel traducentes vel praeparantes hic generat aut creat, primum in ipso sunt deo, deinde in caelis tamquam[39] rivulis aut sedibus, postremo in hac inferiori materia. Oportet autem materiam hanc, quandoquidem a divina intellegentia sic agitatur, suscipere ac prae se ferre exactissimam aliquam divinae intellegentiae formam. Quod etiam in natura et artibus fieri cernimus. Vitalis siquidem natura animae per calorem naturalem tamquam aliquod instrumentum materiam agitat alimenti a nobis sumpti redditque vitalem. Vita haec alimento tributa non caloris illius imitatur formam, sed animae. Calor enim ex se vitam non generat. Pictor etiam per instrumentum suum penicillum formam aliquam signat in pariete non penicilli similem, sed animi sui potius, qui eam in se prius conceperat et postea parit. Igitur tam se-

: IV :

Epicurus' objection and a response to it. On the forms most resembling God.[34]

Epicurus says that we are dreaming when we claim that forms in 1
any way exceed the matter by which they are sustained. He thinks rather that they are so totally absorbed by matter that it is impossible for any form, even the most outstanding, to do anything beyond matter. Our view, however, is that all nature's works, as Plato writes in the *Philebus*[35] and Aristotle confirms,[36] are brought to perfection by some divine understanding, which, turning the heavenly spheres as its instruments (impelling the celestial chariot forward, as Plato puts it[37]), thereby forms this lower matter of the elements. Just as in art the form of a work exists on three levels—first in the mind of the artificer, second in the instruments put into motion by him, and third in the matter formed from it—so the forms of things, which God generates or creates here on earth using the movements of the heavens as the means of transmission or preparation, exist first in God Himself, second, in the heavens as in their channels or foundations, and lastly in this inferior matter. It behooves this matter, since it is moved thus by the divine understanding, to sustain and display the most precise form of that understanding. And this in fact is what we see in nature and the arts. The vital nature of the soul, using its natural heat as an instrument, moves the matter of the food consumed by us and makes it vital again. This life imparted to the food does not imitate the form of the heat but of the soul. For heat does not produce life from itself. A painter too uses his brush as an instrument to trace some form on the wall: the form resembles not the brush but rather his soul, which first conceived it within itself and afterwards brought it forth. Both in nature and in art, therefore, the

cundum naturam quam secundum artem operis forma formam refert agentis. At enim in hoc gradum triplicem reperimus: aliam formam videmus propinquiorem materiae quam agenti, aliam agenti propinquiorem quam materiae, mediam vero nonnullam.

2 Accipe primum exemplum aliquod in natura. Anima quippe per instrumentum illud suum, calorem scilicet naturalem, cibo digesto triplicem tribuit formam. Nam crassioribus cibi partibus formam tribuit ossium, ossa namque ex illis generat atque nutrit. Tenuissimis vero partibus ut plurimum spiritus ipsius adhibet formam, quia ex illis spiritum recreat. Mediis denique formam praestat carnis atque nervorum. Haec omnia exsequitur naturalis ille calor, non sua virtute, sed animae. Ipse enim urit tantum natura sua atque dissolvit, sed ad huiusmodi opera per virtutem animae temperatur. Forma ossium remotissima est ab anima et materiae proxima; nullus enim fit sensus in ossibus. Forma carnis atque nervorum propinquior est animae quam ossium; sensus enim per haec fiunt. Sensus, inquam, hi quinque, qui nondum tamen longissime discedunt a corpore, cum nihil umquam[40] nisi praesentibus externis corporibus agant. Forma denique spirituum est animae proxima, quippe cum hi iam imaginationi et phantasiae, excellentioribus animae viribus, modo quodam subserviant. Exemplum habes in natura.

3 Accipe insuper exemplum in artibus. Instrumenta profecto quibus utuntur artifices suam quandam dumtaxat habent naturam atque figuram, non tamen habent ipsam artificis intellegentiae pulchritudinem. Verum per haec artificis animus tria quaedam exsequitur: nonnulla sibi quam proxima, remotissima alia, alia media. Omnia sane artificis opera quae ad aspectum pertinent aut auditum totum paene artificis declarant ingenium. Quae ad sensus tres reliquos, minime. Nam in odoribus saporibusque conficiendis aut stratis lavacrisque temperandis paulum aut vix artificis apparet intentio. In picturis autem aedificiisque consilium et prudentia

form of the work refers to the form of the agent. But here too we find three levels: we see one form closer to matter than to the agent, another closer to the agent than to matter, and another in between.

Consider first an example in nature. The soul uses its own in- 2
strument, natural heat, to give a triple form to digested food. For it gives to the food's coarser parts the form of bones, for from them it produces and nourishes bones. It usually gives to the finest parts the form of the spirit because from them it recreates the spirit. Finally to those in between it gives the form of flesh and sinews. This natural heat does all three, not through its own power, but through the power of soul. For in its own nature it only burns and dissolves, but it is tempered to perform such works through the power of soul. The form of bones is most distant from soul and closest to matter, for no sense quickens in bones. The forms of flesh and sinews are closer to soul than the form of bones, for via them the senses function, the five senses, that is, which are still not very far distant from the body as they can never do anything without the presence of external bodies. Finally, the form of spirits is closest to soul, because the spirits in a way already serve the imagination and phantasy, the soul's superior powers. Here you have an example in nature.

Now take an example in the arts. The instruments which 3
craftsmen or artists[38] use merely have their own nature and shape: they do not possess the beauty itself of the artificer's understanding. His rational soul uses them to make three sorts of product, some being the closest possible to it, others at the furthest remove, others in between. All the works of an artist that pertain to seeing and hearing reveal his natural genius almost entirely; but those pertaining to the other three senses not at all. In concocting fragrances and flavors or in designing couches and baths, the intention of the maker is scarcely or hardly apparent. But in paintings and buildings the artist's forethought and good sense are made

lucet[41] artificis. Dispositio praeterea et quasi figura quaedam animi ipsius inspicitur. Ita enim seipsum animus in operibus istis exprimit et figurat, ut vultus hominis intuentis in speculum seipsum figurat in speculo. Maxime vero in sermonibus, cantibus atque sonis artificiosus animus se depromit in lucem. In his enim tota mentis dispositio et voluntas planissime designatur, et qualis est affectus artificis, talem nobis affectum opera eius solent excitare, flebilis vox flere, furiosa furere, lasciva lascivire saepe compellit. Haec igitur opera cum ad visum tum ad auditum spectantia artificis menti sunt proxima; illa vero quae ad tres reliquos pertinent sensus, ut diximus, remotissima. Mediae autem illae operationes sunt, quae ad corporis exercitationes, ludicras aut bellicas pertinent.

4 Undenam ars et natura ita ad dispositionem suorum operum temperantur, nisi a deo naturae artiumque institutore? Deus itaque opera sua in corporibus similiter temperat, ita ut etiam ipse in materia sibi subiecta triplicem formarum generet gradum, videlicet sibi proximas formas, remotissimas atque medias. Et quoniam quicquid movet materiam, non alia ratione movet, quam ut eam extollat ad sui vultus imaginem, nec falli dei sententia potest, necesse est alicubi in materia diutius agitata faciem artificis[42] dei expressius relucere, ac ferme tanto expressius quam in aliis materiis aliorum moventium facies, quanto in movendo atque trahendo deus est potentior aliis. Ideo dei vultum tam similem denique in materia effulgere oportet, ut nequeat similior emicare. Quamdiu resultat mortalis, consummatam non implet imaginem. Sane similior foret, si semper esset similis, id est si surgeret immortalis. Fit ergo aliqua forma in materia immortalis. Si qua talis erit, illa erit quae est ultima, quae sicut remotissima est a materia, ex eo quod

manifest, and additionally the disposition and shape as it were of the soul itself is perceived. For in these works the rational soul expresses and delineates itself, just as a man's face gazing in a mirror forms itself in the mirror. But the soul as a maker steps most into the light in discourses, in songs, in instrumental music. Here the mind's entire disposition and will are most manifestly depicted, and the artist's works usually arouse in us the same emotional response as existed in the artist: a mournful word often forces us to weep, angry words to rage, lascivious words to yield to lust. So these works that look now to sight and now to hearing are closest to the mind of the artist; but those that pertain to the other three senses are, as we said, at the furthest remove. In between are those activities that pertain to bodily exercises, whether recreational or military.

Whence is it that art and nature are so tempered as to dispose 4
their works in this way unless it is from God who has established nature and the arts? Therefore God similarly so tempers His works in bodies that He too generates in the matter subject to Himself three levels of forms, those closest to Him, those furthest away, and those in between. Since whatever moves matter does so for no other reason than to elevate it to the point of being the image of its own countenance, and since God's judgment can never be deceived, then necessarily somewhere in matter, when it has been set into motion for a long time, the countenance of God the Artist must shine out more radiantly than the faces of other movers elsewhere in other portions of matter; and the more so because God is more potent in moving and attracting than others. Eventually then God's countenance must project its likeness so radiantly into matter that no comparable radiance can exist. As long as an image is mortal, it is not a perfect and complete image. For it will more resemble God, if it is always like Him, that is, if it emerges as immortal. So some form is made immortal in matter. Whatever this form is going to be, it will be the form which is the

ultima est, ita est proxima deo, ideoque simillima. Talem esse rationalem animam non est dubium. Sed planius rem ipsam aperiamus.

: V :

Responsio planior de formarum gradibus.

1 Principio Deus materiam primam certo modo ad rerum naturalium species producendas afficit per qualitates primas atque disponit per raritatem, densitatem, levitatem, gravitatem, caliditatem, frigiditatem, humiditatem, siccitatem. Quae quidem vocantur qualitates praeparationesque materiae potius quam formae principales et species. Propterea quod harum quaelibet pluribus competit speciebus et saepe intenduntur et remittuntur, rerum tamen species, ut placet physicis, non ita mutantur, saepe accedunt atque recedunt, dum species permanent. Quis neget multis arborum et animalium speciebus communem esse caliditatem et frigiditatem atque has qualitates in animantibus secundum magis minusve variari, dum eadem permanet species animantis? Sunt igitur materiae quam simillimae, cum instar materiae pluribus speciebus subiiciantur, neque ipsae sua dumtaxat praesentia species rerum inter se distinguant. Affectiones igitur praeparationesque materiae ad suscipiendas species nuncupentur. Ergo materia per extensionem quantitatis sibi familiarem et ad multa communem qualitatibus huiusmodi pandit sinum. Per has vero ad suscipiendas species praeparata statim a mente divina, mundi totius opifice, formas speciesque accipit elementorum. Speciem ignis, quando parata fuerit per caliditatem, siccitatem, raritatem, et levitatem; speciem terrae, quando per frigiditatem, siccitatem, spissitudinem, gravita-

highest, and which, at the furthest remove from matter, being the highest, is thus the closest to God and hence most like Him. The rational soul is undoubtedly this form. But let me explain this point more fully.

: V :

A more detailed response concerning the levels of the forms.

In the beginning God conditions prime matter in a certain way to produce the species of natural things by means of the prime qualities, and He prepares [it] by way of rarity, density, lightness, heaviness, heat, cold, wetness, and dryness. These are called the qualities or preparations of matter rather than the principal forms and species. Because they are each compatible with many species and are often intensified and remitted, and yet the natural species do not so change (according to the natural philosophers), these qualities often come and go, while the species abide. Who would deny that heat and cold are common to many species of trees and animals, and that in animals these qualities vary in intensity while the species of the animal remains the same? They are thus very similar to matter, because, like matter, they are subject to many species, and these species are not mutually distinguished only by their presence. Let them be called then the affective conditions or states of matter preparatory for receiving the species. Matter, therefore, by way of quantitative extension (which is its companion and common to many things) opens its bosom to these qualities. Prepared through them to receive the species, it immediately accepts the forms and species of the elements from the divine mind, the craftsman of the whole world. It accepts the species of fire when prepared through heat, dryness, rarity, and lightness; the 1

tem, et reliquas sua singulas ratione. Hae formae elementorum eo suas illas praeparationes superant, quod illarum sunt fines quodve proprias distinguunt species et permanent quodammodo firmiores. Citius enim aquae frigiditas permutari videtur quam species aquae similiterque in aliis. Sunt tamen materiae prorsus immersae, quia non resolvuntur in species alias formasve principales, sed mox per qualitates affecta materia inducuntur deformi materiae gremio proximae. Unde propter naturam passivam materiae vix unius sunt participes actionis. Quid agit aliud ignis, nisi quod urit? Neque aliquid operantur, nisi quatenus praeparationes illae materiae adiuvant, quia nihil agunt ultra quam possit calor, frigus, siccum et reliqua. Unicum praeterea motum habent et unum situm. Est tamen ordo aliquis inter formas elementorum. Nam forma ignis, quia a materia liberior est quam aliae propter mirabilem raritatem, efficacior est in agendo et a passionis infectione remotior.

2 Congregat deinde mens quatuor elementa haec in unum eorumque temperationibus variis varias conficit lapidum species et metallorum atque similium quae mixta dicuntur. Quorum formae in hoc excellunt formas elementorum, quod in formas alias quodammodo praecipuas resolvuntur, neque in materia nisi diligentius elaborata fiunt, et aliquid operantur ad quod elementorum formae et dispositiones illae materiae non sufficiunt. Non enim per elementorum qualitates iaspis provocat partum, phantasmata noxia pellit; zaphirus cohibet sudorem, confert ad gratiam; smaragdus extinguit libidinem; amethystus sedat ebrietatem. Nam et alia multa, quae similes habent qualitates, idem efficerent. Faciunt au-

species of earth when prepared through cold, dryness,[39] density, and weight; and the rest of the species each accordingly. The forms of the elements are superior to these their preparatory conditions in that either they are the limits of these conditions, or they distinguish the species proper and in some manner endure more stably. For it is obvious that the coldness of water changes more quickly than the species of water, and similarly with the rest. Yet these elemental forms are totally immersed in matter because they are not resolved into other species or principal forms: rather, directly matter has been affected by way of the qualities, they are drawn into its formless lap. Hence because of matter's passive nature these forms participate in barely one activity. For what else does fire do but burn? And the elemental forms do nothing except insofar as, being preparatory states, they aid matter, because they do nothing beyond what heat, cold, dryness, and the rest can do. Furthermore, they have only one movement and only one location. Yet there is a kind of ranking among these forms of the elements. For the form of fire, being more independent of matter than the others because of its remarkable rarity, is more efficacious in action and further removed from the stain of being itself acted upon.

Next, the mind brings the four elements together into one, and 2
from their differing blends makes the various species of stones, metals, and other objects referred to as composite. The forms of these composites are superior to the forms of the elements in that: (a) they are resolved into other, in a way principal, forms; (b) they do not come into being except in matter that has been carefully worked over; and (c) they do something for which the forms of the elements and those preparatory states of matter do not suffice. For it is not through the qualities of the elements that jasper stimulates childbirth and expels harmful phantasms, that sapphire stops sweating and confers grace, that emerald quenches lust, that amethyst allays drunkenness.[40] For many other things, which have similar qualities, do the same. These forms do these things, how-

tem haec ex quadam virtute speciebus talibus ab animis sphaerarum tributa. Sed a materia non longe absunt, quoniam virtus huiusmodi corporalis est atque per corpora sphaerarum traducitur. Ac licet operationem aliquam qualem diximus agant, nullum tamen opus ab illis tali virtute perfectum restat. Atque unum haec motum habent locumque unum, quantum elementum hoc aut illud[43] in eorum praevalet mixtione.[44] Omnino autem inter has formas illae efficaciores sunt, in quarum mixtione elementa puriora crassioribus dominantur.

3 Sequuntur formae plantarum, his idcirco praestantiores, quia per elementorum qualitates, ut instrumenta, opus vivum efficiunt, quod illae non possunt. Propagant similes sibi plantas in specie, quod mixtorum illorum formis non datur. Nutriendo motus peragunt in omnes locorum partes, contra naturam gravium elementorum. Quae in earum mixtione excellunt corpus nactae sunt secundum membra inter se diversa distinctum, ramos, surculos, stipitem et radices, quasi sint multae in his formis virtutes, ad quarum officia explenda multis et variis opus sit instrumentis. Similitudinem quoque prae se ferunt aliquarum tum virtutum caelestium, tum motionum. Virtutum, quatenus aliqua operantur ad quae elementorum non sufficiunt qualitates. Motionum, quia motus edunt undique, quasi in circulum, atque ab intrinseco principio caelorum instar sua movent corpora. Ordinant praeterea membra sua omnia ad principale aliquid sui, sicut mundi agitator sphaeras omnes in unum. Verum nimis adhuc vergunt in elementorum materiam, quia opus nullum peragunt, nisi elementorum formis utantur calefaciendo, frigefaciendo et in[45] reliquis eodem pacto.

4 Accedunt brutorum animae, plantarum animabus praestantiores, quoniam similes sunt caelesti naturae non in movendo solum, sed quodammodo etiam in cognoscendo. Cognoscunt omnia cae-

ever, through a power bestowed on such species as these by the souls of the spheres. Yet they are not far removed from matter, because this kind of power is corporeal and transmitted by way of the bodies of the spheres. And though they perform the sort of activity we have described, yet no work brought to completion by them using such a corporeal power remains perfect. They also have one motion and one location insofar as this or that element is dominant in their composition. But among these [elemental] forms the more effective are invariably those in whose mixture the purer elements dominate the coarser.

3 The forms of plants follow. They are superior because they perform the work of giving life using the qualities of the elements as instruments, which the composites' forms cannot do. They propagate plants like themselves in the same species, which is not granted to the forms of composites. By taking nourishment they move in every direction, contrary to the nature of the heavy elements. Those which excel in their mixture acquire a body distinguished by the diversity of its parts—branches, twigs, a trunk, roots—as though many powers were in these forms which required many different instruments to perform their functions. They also display a likeness to some celestial powers and motions: powers, insofar as they do things for which the qualities of the elements do not suffice; motions, in that they move in every direction as in a circle, and move their bodies from an internal principle just as the heavens do. Moreover, they order all their members in accordance with some principal end of their own, just as the world-mover moves all the spheres for one end. Yet they still incline too much towards the matter of the elements, because they can do nothing without using the forms of the elements in heating, cooling, and likewise with the rest.

4 The souls of animals come next. They are superior to the souls of plants as they are like the heavenly nature not only in moving but also in a way in knowing. The celestial powers know all

lestes illae virtutes, cognoscunt aliquid et animae bestiarum, operationem habent spiritalem. Sensus enim imaginationisque actus spiritalis est per has[46] ipsas obiectorum imagines spiritales. Neque peragunt sentiendi actum per aliquam qualitatem elementorum, quia cum sentiunt aliquid, neque calefaciendo, neque frigefaciendo sentiunt. Versantur autem et istae formae adhuc circa materiam, quia per corporalia instrumenta sensuum actus exercent, neque quicquam nisi corporale et particulare percipiunt, semperque obtemperant corporis usui.

5 Has omnes denique supereminet hominis anima, quae non in cognitione dumtaxat, sed in genere etiam cognitionis caelestibus fit mentibus similis. Intellegit namque haec sicut et illae. Ad quam operationem neque elementorum qualitates, neque instrumentum aliquod corporale ex illis compositum concurrit. Quod quidem significat prae ceteris mentis huius naturam a materiae vinculis exclusam esse, cum operationem sortita sit a materiae commercio liberam. Materia[47] siquidem vim impedit cognoscendi, quod ex hoc apparet, quia formae elementorum, mixtorum, plantarum, quae[48] materiae vicinae sunt, nihil noscunt. Et in animalibus illae partes sensibus pluribus serviunt, ad quas materia crassior minus ascendit, quale est caput, et ibi fit[49] sensus acutior, ubi purius instrumentum est et spiritus plurimus. Unde visus, quia est purior reliquis, sentit celerius et acutius altiusque nobis infingit rerum notas. Ideoque per ea quae ad visum spectant, clarius post longum tempus agnoscimus quaelibet quam per sensuum aliorum indicia. Atqui et in somnis saepius nobis visa sese offerunt quam audita.

6 Neque solum cognoscendi vim materia impedit, sed rem etiam cognoscendam. Idcirco quando moles ipsa rerum premit sensum aut nullo modo aut aegre sentimus. Formae quoque rerum in pri-

things; the souls of animals know something and have a spiritual operation in that the action of the sense and the imagination is spiritual by way of the spiritual images themselves of objects. They do not perform the act of sensing through some quality of the elements, because when they sense something they do not sense by heating or cooling. And yet these animal forms are still involved with matter because they use bodily instruments to perform the activities of the senses. They do not perceive anything unless it is corporeal and particular, and they always obey the needs of the body.

Finally, man's soul is superior to all of these souls, being like the 5
minds of heaven not only in knowing but even in its kind of knowing. For it understands just as they do. And neither the qualities of the elements nor any bodily instrument compounded of elements contribute to this activity. This is the clearest evidence that the nature of this mind of ours is free from the bonds of matter, since it has been allotted an activity free from any dealings with matter. For matter obstructs the power of knowing as is evident from the fact that the forms of the elements, of compounds, and of plants, which are neighbors to matter, know nothing. In animals, too, serving the many senses are those parts to which grosser matter rises least, such as the head; and the sense becomes acutest there where the instrument is purer and the spirit most present. Hence sight, which is purer than the other senses, perceives more swiftly and sharply, and impresses the marks of objects more deeply on us. And so through the evidence that comes through sight, we recognize things after the passage of time more clearly than we do via the evidence of the other senses. In dreams as well visual images more often present themselves to us than auditory ones do.

Matter not only impedes the power of knowing, but also the 6
object to be known. When the sheer bulk of things weighs on a sense, we cannot perceive at all or only with difficulty. Also the

mis sese nobis offerunt perque illas materiam quasi subintellegimus. Privationes praeterea per habitus materiamque per relationem quandam ad formam necessario coniectamur. Non omnes tamen formas per relationem ad materiam cogitamus, quod significat materiam a formarum genere dependere atque esse formas aliquas a materia liberas. Rursus, tunc res clarissime firmissimeque cognoscimus, quando rationes ipsas rerum absque materiae conditionibus cogitamus. Si materia tam virtuti quam obiecto cognitionis impedimento est, sequitur animam quae sentit quippiam imaginaturque, non esse compositam ex materia, immo neque esse formam quantitate divisam, si modo in ipsa cognitione mutua mirabilisque unio et penetratio fit inter formam apprehensam et potentiam apprehendentem. Id vero totum quantitatis dimensio prohiberet.

7 Ac si per cognitiones inferiores concludimus animam ex materia non esse, per cognitionem supremam, scilicet per intellegentiam, animam non esse a materia concludere possumus. Ut quemadmodum quod sine materia noscit, est sine ipsa, ita quod absque materiae conditionibus comprehendit, ab ipsius passionibus procul existat. Nam si anima hominis talis forma esset ut ad materiam quasi suam originem referretur, non cognosceret formas ullas, nisi per relationem aliquam ad materiam. Nunc autem tamquam materiae domina eam subiicit formis, dum ipsam refert ad formas ac, tamquam deo similis, formas sequentes ad primam refert formam ipsumque deum. Atqui in hoc ipso surgit supra materiam maxime, quod eam tollit supra seipsam. Deo quoque fit proxima, quod formas omnes reducit in deum.

8 Ex quibus liquido constat quod iamdudum quaerimus, rationalem scilicet animam ex omnibus formis corporis deo simillimam

forms of things present themselves to us first, and through them we get some inkling of matter. Furthermore, we necessarily infer privations by way of habitual conditions, and matter by way of a relationship to form. Yet we do not think of all forms by way of the relationship to matter, and this shows that matter depends on the genus of forms and that some forms are free of matter. Again, we learn about objects most clearly and most reliably when we think about their rational principles in isolation from the conditions of matter. If matter, then, is an impediment both to the power and to the object of knowing, it follows that the soul that perceives and imagines something is not composed of matter. Or rather, it is not a form divided by quantity, if only because, in the actual process of knowing, a mutual and remarkable union and penetration takes place between the apprehended form and the apprehending power. But the dimension of quantity would totally prevent this.

If we conclude, by way of inferior kinds of knowing, that soul 7
does not derive from matter, then we can conclude by way of the highest kind of knowing, namely understanding, that soul does not derive from matter. Just as what acquires knowledge without matter exists without matter, so what achieves understanding without the conditions of matter must exist far removed from its passions. For if man's soul were the kind of form that one would refer to matter as to its origin, it would not acquire knowledge of any forms except by way of a relationship to matter. But in point of fact, as the sovereign of matter the soul subjects matter to forms when it refers matter itself to them, and, like God, refers the subsequent forms to the prime form and to God Himself. It rises above matter principally in the very fact that it lifts matter above itself; and it comes closest to God because it leads the forms back to God.

Hence the answer to the question we have been asking for some 8
time becomes crystal clear. Of all the forms of body, the rational

evadere, usque adeo ut nequeat alia similior fieri, postquam non potest fieri ulterius alia in materia, cum haec in ipso extremo emineat corporis limine. Exprimi vero oportuit aliquam in natura formam deo simillimam, si modo divinus artifex materiam sit superaturus, ut Plato tradidit in *Timaeo:* talem vero esse vult mentem quae est in corpore, a mente quae est extra corpora delibatam, quasi quendam mentis illius vultum in sublimioris materiae speculo relucentem. Considera ad quantam sui similitudinem ignis materiam extollat et quibus gradibus. Sphaera ignis qualitatem triplicem possidet: calorem,[50] lumen et levitatem ad superiora vergentem. Movet sphaera illa corpora infima et crassissimis ineptissimisque corporibus calorem infundit solum, ut plerumque fit in lapidibus. Purioribus calorem atque lumen, quod facile facit in lignis. Tenuissimis denique ultra calorem atque lumen, etiam levitatem illam ad superna trahentem. Quod efficit in chartis et lino, ita ut statim in se horum assumat substantiam quasi sibi simillimam. Ideo forma ignis in lapide fusca fit et inepta, in ligno inepta quidem sed clara, in lino clara simul[51] et agilis. Eodem quasi modo divina mens corporibus inferioribus vitam praebet solam tamquam calorem, praestantioribus etiam sensum tamquam lumen, praestantissimis insuper intellectum tamquam levitatem per quam anima surgit in deum. Ita divinus ille radius omnia penetrans, in lapidibus est quidem sed non vivit, in plantis vivit quidem sed non fulget, in brutis fulget sed non replicatur in seipsum neque redit in fontem. In hominibus est, vivit, fulget, replicatur in seipsum, primo per quandam sui ipsius animadversionem, deinde in deum, fontem suum, reflectitur, originem suam feliciter cognoscendo. Ut autem ascensus ignis certum aliquem habet finem, quem consequi possit, atque hic est in sphaera sua[52] quies, ita nostrae mentis ascensus, perpetuo directus in deum, statutum finem habet cuius

soul turns out to be the most like God; and to such an extent that no other can become more like, inasmuch as no other form in matter can be further removed from matter, since this one is perched right on the extreme limit of body. But some form very like God must have been imprinted in nature if the divine artificer is going to rule in any way over matter, as Plato taught in the *Timaeus*, where he maintains that this form is the mind which is in the body but which has been plucked from the mind outside the body, as though it were a reflection of that mind blazing in the mirror of a higher matter.[41] Consider how far fire can raise matter to its own likeness and by what degrees. The sphere of fire has three kinds of quality: heat, light, and the levity that always aims at things above. This sphere sets lower bodies into motion and imparts heat alone to the coarsest and least receptive ones, as is the case for the most part with stones. But it imparts heat and light to purer bodies, as it easily does in the case of wood. Finally, in addition to heat and light, it imparts to the least material bodies the levity that lifts to things supernal. It does this with sheets of paper and with linen in such a way that it immediately assimilates their substance into itself as most like itself. So the form of fire in stone is dark and slow-moving, in wood is still slow-moving but bright, in linen is bright and at the same time nimble. In the same sort of way the divine mind bestows on lower bodies life alone like heat, on higher bodies sense [too], which is like light, and on the highest bodies intellect in addition like the levity through which the soul rises to God. Thus the divine ray penetrates everything: it exists in stones but does not live; it lives in plants but does not shine; it shines in animals but does not reflect on itself or return to its source. In men it exists, lives, shines, and first reflects on itself through a sort of observing of itself, and then returns to God, its source, blessed in coming to know its own origin. Just as the ascent of fire has a specific goal it can attain, and this is rest in its own sphere, so our mind's ascent, directed perpetually towards

quandoque fiat compos, neque aliud quicquam is finis erit, nisi quies in deo, quam non prius animus assequetur quam hinc abierit.

: VI :

Obiectio Lucretii et responsio, quod mens potest absque corpore operari.

1 Interturbabunt disputationem nostram impii duo, Lucretius et Epicurus, ut solent, non ratione aliqua, sed clamore. Nos quidem duo potissimum hic asserimus: quod Deus creat animam sibi similem; quod in materia. Contra primum Lucretius obiiciet: si tam divinus est animus, primum contra naturam eius est coniungi cum corpore ad conficiendam speciem animalis, deinde et si iungitur, cur numquam mens aliquid speculatur, phantasia non cogitante? Contra secundum sic obiiciet Epicurus: si deus creat animam in materia, ergo etiam ex materia, ideoque mortalem. Nos ad primam obiectionem respondimus, et respondebimus diffusius alias, nunc breviter hunc in modum.

2 Quoniam ultima in universo virtus intellegendi per operationes sensuum et phantasiae ad speculationem propriam expergiscitur, sensus vero et phantasia per spiritus agunt corporeos, sequitur non esse contra mentis naturam, ut corpori huic uniatur ad humanam speciem in terra complendam; praesertim cum mens nostra non simplex, sed animalis mens esse dicatur, ultima mentium corporumque vivifica. Et si in generica ratione mentis non sit ulla ad corpora inclinatio, tamen in specifica mentis ultimae ratione incli-

God, has an appointed goal it can someday attain; and this goal is nothing other than that rest in God, which the rational soul will not enjoy until it has abandoned its abode here.

: VI :

Lucretius' objection and its refutation. That the mind can act without the body.

Those two ungodly figures, Lucretius and Epicurus, will roil our current discussion not with any cogent argument, but with their usual clamor. We are advancing two principal points: that God creates the soul like Himself, and that He creates it in matter. Lucretius will object to the first (a) that, if the soul is so divine, it is contrary to its nature to be united with body for the purpose of creating a species of animal; and (b) that, if it is united, why does the mind never contemplate anything when the phantasy is not imagining? To the second Epicurus will object that, if God creates the soul in matter, He therefore creates it out of matter, and so it is mortal. We have answered the first objection, and elsewhere we will do so at greater length.[42] For the moment we will deal with it briefly in the following way. 1

Since the lowest power of understanding in the universe is aroused to its proper work of speculation by the activities of the senses and the phantasy, but the senses and the phantasy operate through the corporeal spirits, it follows that it cannot be contrary to the nature of mind for it to be united with this body for the purpose of bringing the human species to fulfillment on earth; and especially since our mind is not simple mind but what is called animated or ensouled mind, in other words the lowest of minds, what gives life to bodies. Even if in the generic rational principle of 2

natio eiusmodi quodammodo tamquam ipsi naturalis includitur, quatenus videlicet in confinio mentium animarumque creata mens animalis evasit atque inde ad proxima corpora vivificanda proclivis. Et quia res quaeque secundum modum suae substantiae operatur, substantia vero mentis humanae incorporalis quidem est omnino, sed unita materiae, hinc fit ut incorporalia intellegat quidem, sed ea, dum corpus habitat, saepe una cum aliquo quodammodo corporali conspiciat,[53] hoc est simulacro phantasiae. Ideo huiusmodi plerumque eget simulacris. Verum quando hoc deposito corpore redacta fuerit in seipsam, intelleget in seipsa. Sed nunc alio modo se habet mens haec ad phantasiae simulacra antequam ipsa in se universalem concipiat speciem, alio modo posteaquam concepit. Ante eget illis, ut eorum instigatione excitetur ad universalem speciem pariendam. Postea vero si illis eget, eget quidem, ut arbitrantur Peripatetici, tamquam fundamento vel comite aliquo speciei. Atque etiam secundum intellectus imperium formatur saepe novum in phantasia simulacrum universali illi speciei conveniens, in quo resplendet species illa mentis universalis, sicut in imagine splendet exemplar.

3 Quamquam non eget forte mens phantasiae simulacro, ut Platonici opinantur, postquam semel invitante illo speciem peperit et retinet propriam. Sed ea est oculorum geminorum natura in eadem radice fixorum sive a cardine uno pendentium, ut aperiantur simul atque claudantur, eodemque inspiciant.[54] Ita mens et phantasia, qui gemini oculi sunt eiusdem animae atque admodum proximi, simul aperiuntur atque eodem pro modo suo conspiciunt. Et dum phantasia hunc cogitat hominem, mens universalem hominem cogitat et converso. Atque haec est concursio naturalis. Po-

mind there is no inclination at all towards bodies, nevertheless in the specific rational principle of the lowest mind such an inclination is included as in a way natural to it, in that the created, ensouled mind has emerged on the border-line of minds and souls and is stooping down from it to give life to the bodies closest to it. Because each thing acts according to the manner of its substance, but the substance of the human mind is completely incorporeal though united with matter, it follows that our mind understands incorporeals, but sees them, so long as it inhabits the body, in the company often of something in a way corporeal, an image of the phantasy in other words. Accordingly it usually needs such images. But once this body has been laid aside and the mind has returned to itself, it will understand in itself. At this present time, it behaves in one way with regard to the images of the phantasy before it has conceived the universal form within itself, but in another way after it has conceived it. Beforehand, it needs the images so it can be excited by their stimulus to give birth to the universal species; if it needs them afterwards, it does so, the Peripatetics think, only as a kind of foundation or companion for the species. And in fact, following the intellect's command, a new image is often fashioned in the phantasy conforming to that universal species, an image in which the mind's universal species is blazingly reflected (just as a model is reflected in its image).

Nonetheless, perhaps the mind does not need the phantasy's 3
image, as the Platonists think, once it has given birth, at the image's prompting, to that species and retains it as its own. But the nature of the twin eyes (fixed as they are in the same root or suspended from one hinge) is that they open and shut together and look in the same direction. Thus the mind and the phantasy, the twin eyes of the same soul and next to each other, open together and look in the same direction, but each in its own way. When the phantasy thinks of this particular man, the mind thinks of the universal man, and conversely. This concurrence is natural. Yet it

test tamen, adhibita manus opera, oculus alter[55] absque altero intueri; sic et studio quodam ardentiore[56] non minus mens ad universales species flecti, cessante phantasia, quam saepe per aliquam turbationem accidat phantasiam intentius per corporalia pervagari, mente cessante. Potest insuper anima, quando seipsam considerat, tunc actum suum vimque et essentiam sine phantasiae simulacro intueri. Maxime vero quando et animadvertit se intellegere, et rursus quod animadvertat intellegit replicaturque similiter absque fine, praesertim si, ut quidam putant, speciem suam intellegibilem suumque actum per ipsammet speciem ipsumve actum animadvertat. Ubi certe neque simulacro neque instrumento egeret; potest etiam simulacri ipsius naturam sine alio simulacro iudicare.

4 Quod si quis convicerit intellegentiam, dum rerum naturalium rationes considerat, earundem simulacris indigere, hoc forsitan disputationis gratia concedemus, propterea quod sicut humanitatem ipsam communio ad singulos homines comitatur, sic humanitatis intellegentiam huius vel illius hominis cogitatio. Non tamen in rebus divinis id facile concedemus, ut quotiens angelicas essentias speculamur, totiens cogamur corporalia simulacra intueri. Quia sicut essentiae tales ad materiam hanc aut illam non declinant, ita speculationes nostrae quibus illis aequamur quodammodo cognoscendo, non necessario corporalibus imaginibus astringuntur. Earum enim cognitionem non a corporibus proprie animus mutuatur, sed ab ideis vel ingenitis quando revertitur in seipsum, vel infusis quando supra se surgit. Sed quisnam dixerit mentem in ipsa divinorum exacta contemplatione simulacrorum adminiculo indigere, cum illorum sive occursu sive interventu ab

is possible with the help of a [blocking] hand for one eye to gaze at works without the other. So too and with a more ardent zeal, it is possible for the mind to be turned towards the universal species when the phantasy is inactive; and when the mind is inactive, it is often no less possible for the phantasy via some perturbation to range more intensely through corporeals. Furthermore, when the soul contemplates itself, it can gaze at its own act and power and essence without the phantasy's image. This is especially true when it is aware that it understands, and understands that it is aware, and so on back and forth to infinity; and especially if, as some people think, it becomes aware of its own intelligible species and its own act through the said species or act. In this case certainly it would not need an image or an instrument: it is able to judge the nature of the image itself without any other image.

But if someone is convinced that the understanding, when it 4
considers the rational principles of natural things, needs their images, let us perhaps concede the point for the sake of argument; in which case just as association with particular men attends our human nature, so thinking about this or that individual person accompanies our understanding of that nature. In the case of divine objects, however, we shall not readily concede that every time we contemplate angelic essences we have to look at corporeal images. For just as angelic essences do not sink down to this or that particular matter, so our speculative thoughts, by which we are made in a way equal in knowing to the angels, are not bound by necessity to corporeal images. The rational soul does not borrow its knowledge of the angels properly from bodies, but from ideas, either innate ideas, when it reflects on itself, or ideas imparted to it when it rises above itself. But who would maintain that the mind needs the aid of images in the precise contemplation of things divine, since contact with or intervention by these images vehemently blocks the mind off from such speculation and often leads it into

eiusmodi speculatione vehementer impediatur saepeque fallatur; ac si falli non vult, illa tamquam nubes discutere[57] compellatur?

5 Forte vero quando per sensus animus a se digreditur, attingit solum sensibiles qualitates. Quando per phantasiam ad se regreditur, insensibiles intentiones imaginum sensibilium. Quando per rationem in se revertitur, insensibiles rationes ad intentiones insensibiles declinantes. Quando per mentem supra se surgit, instar angeli, insensibiles rationes iam ab imaginariis[58] intentionibus segregatas. Quid quod philosophica mens intuetur in universo et in seipsa cognitionem quandam angelicam et divinam a simulacris liberam? Primo quidem probat eiusmodi cognitionem esse debere, et cuius sit, et qualis, et quare, et quomodo fiat in seipsa describit. Ac etiam assequitur eam secundum formam experiturque describendo. Profecto, descriptio eiusmodi conceptio quaedam animae est ab omni simulacro libera. Nequit enim per simulacrum cognitionem a simulacro liberam intueri atque definire. Deinde in conceptionem eiusmodi se convertit, dum se agnoscit ita iam concepisse. Quae quidem conversio multo magis est a simulacris absoluta. Denique in conversionem hanc iterum atque iterum se convertit semperque longius gradatim a simulacris pervolat.

6 Mitto notiora illa, videlicet quando mens, dimissis individuis, non modo specialissimas species, sed subalternas et genera subalterna generalissimaque ac denique transcendentia perspicit, dividit, componit, definit, argumentatur. In iis certe simulacra praetermittere non solum nititur, sed compellitur. Operaepretium est hoc insuper animadvertere: infimam animae vim magis corpori quam mediam, mediam quam supremam coniungi. Quando suprema ratiocinandi vis per humanae intellegentiae voluntatisque actum obnixe se colligit in seipsam, tunc infima vis magna ex parte[59]

error; or if it does not want to be deceived, it has to dispel the images like clouds?

But perhaps, when the rational soul diverges from itself by way 5
of the senses, it only attains sensible qualities. When it turns back towards itself by way of the phantasy, it attains the non-sensible intentions of sensible images. When it returns into itself by way of the reason, it attains the non-sensible rational principles that reach down to the non-sensible intentions. When it rises above itself by way of the mind, like an angel, it attains the non-sensible rational principles now separated from the imagination's intentions. How is it that the philosophical mind sees in the universe and in itself an angelic and divine mode of knowing, free from images? First it proves that such a mode of knowing has to exist, and it describes whose it is and what and why and how it can be in itself. And it also attains it formally, and in describing it comes to know it. To be sure, such a description is a conception of the soul freed from any image. For it cannot by way of an image look at and define a mode of knowing free of an image. The mind then turns towards this conception while realizing it has already conceived it as image-less. This conversion indeed is even more image-less. Finally it turns itself back to this conversion again and again, and gradually flies ever farther away from images.

I will pass over briefly some rather familiar arguments, namely 6
that when the mind, having set aside individuals, perceives not only the most specialized of the species, but the middle rank ones too, next the middle rank genera, then the most generalized genera, and finally the transcendentals,[43] it divides, compounds, defines, and adduces. In all this certainly it is not only trying, but being compelled to leave images behind. It is important to note, furthermore, that the soul's lowest power is more closely linked to the body than is the intermediate power, and the intermediate more than the highest. When the highest power of reasoning, via the act of human understanding and the will, resolutely gathers itself

seiungitur ab opere corporali, quia tunc officium regendi, movendi, concoquendi, digerendi, expurgandi dimidiam sui partem, immo etiam maiorem solet amittere. Si ita fit, necesse est potentiam mediam ex parte multo maiori tunc a materia semoveri, quod patet in abstractis inter contemplandum hominibus nihil penitus sentientibus.

7 Ex hoc sequitur, ut suprema potentia quandoque in hoc ipso actu corporalia relinquat omnino, cuius virtute reliquae vires magis magisque relinquunt. Quippe quod adolescit potest aliquando penitus consummari, eo videlicet consummato quo[60] ipsum crescente crescebat. Ipsa igitur animi a corpore abstractio, quae invalescente speculationis intentione vehementius invalescit, illa quoque intentione impleta prorsus impletur. Impletur illa, quando ceteris omnino posthabitis solum primum, verum bonumque summa mentis flagrantia amatur et cogitatur. Tunc ergo consummatur abstractio finisque abstractionis huius, quae nos segregat a mortalibus. Tandem non separatio erit a vita, sed primae consecutio vitae. Quae enim se vicissim comitantur itinere, comitantur et termino. Quapropter idem portus animam a corpore fugientem excipit, qui accipit speculantem. Hic portus est ipsa veritas. Veritas aeterna est, immo est aeternitas ipsa. Haec ad Lucretium dicta sint. Pergamus ad Epicurum.

into itself, then the lowest faculty is for the most part cut off from bodily activity, because at that time it usually loses half, or even more, of its function of ruling, moving, digesting, distributing, and purging. If this is so, the intermediate power must necessarily be to a far greater extent divorced from matter, as indeed is evident from the fact that men abstracted in the midst of contemplating sense nothing at all.

It follows from this that from time to time the highest power 7
in this act [of contemplation] entirely abandons corporeals, and by virtue of this the rest of the powers abandon them more and more. For in fact what is growing up is able at some point to mature, namely when it has achieved the goal towards which it was steadily growing. So the soul's abstraction from the body, which waxes more vehemently as the intention of speculation waxes, is also totally fulfilled by the fulfillment of that intention. But that intention is fulfilled when other things have been put totally aside and only the first, the true, and the good are loved and contemplated by the incandescent yearning of the mind. For abstraction is then complete and we have attained the goal of this abstraction which sets us apart from mortal things. Eventually there will be, not separation from life, but attainment of the highest life. For those who keep company on the journey are together at its close. Wherefore the same haven receives the soul in flight from the body and the soul in contemplation. This haven is truth itself. Truth is eternal, or rather is eternity itself. So much for Lucretius. Let us turn to Epicurus.

: VII :

Obiectio Epicuri et responsio, quod deus non facit mentem nisi ex seipso et per seipsum.

1 Quonam pacto, inquit Epicurus, producit deus hanc animam in materia, nisi etiam ex materia? Nos autem interrogamus eum, quonam pacto producit sol lumen in aere, non tamen ex aere, vultus in speculo imaginem, non ex speculo, mens loquentis significationem vocis in aere, non tamen ex aere. Proinde sicut sol calorem quidem in aere gignit ex aere, lumen tamen non ex ipso aere licet in ipso, et mens loquentis ex aere gignit sonum, significationem vero soni non ex ipso aere, sed in ipso; ita deus alias formas ex materiae visceribus eruit, intellectum vero qui forma ultima est, super materiae faciem pandit, non trahit e sinu.

2 Considerare debuit Epicurus materiam ipsam nullam habere virtutem propriam formatricem sui (nihil enim informe se format). Habere tamen virtutem preparationemque formabilem, quam formarum vocamus incohationem et prisci theologi chaos antiquum. Cui deus, ut *Timaeus* docet, formatricem virtutem applicat, non tamquam materiae propriam, sed tamquam dei ipsius instrumentum; aliquod ad formandum huic virtuti influxum caelestem elementalemque accommodat. Forte vero divinus influxus ex deo manans, per caelos penetrans, descendens per elementa, in inferiorem materiam desinens, illa ipsa est formatrix virtus, quam Plato vocat divinae intellegentiae rationem. Per cuius infusionem machina mundi ex necessitate constat et mente, id est ex materia corporibus necessaria et ex formis pulcherrimo quodam ordine divinam mentem bonitatemque referentibus. Hanc virtutem Peripatetici tum instrumentum dei vocant, tum naturam, tum poten-

: VII :

Epicurus' objection and its rebuttal. That God does not make mind except from Himself and through Himself.

But how, asks Epicurus, does God produce this soul in matter un- 1
less it is also from matter? Let us ask Epicurus in return how does the sun produce light in the air but not from the air, a face its reflection in the mirror but not from the mirror, a speaker's mind the meaning of a sound in the air but not from the air? Just as the sun produces heat in the air and from the air, yet light though in the air not from it, and just as a speaker's mind produces sound from the air, but the meaning of a sound though in the air not from it, so God extracts some forms from the entrails of matter, but He extends the intellect, which is the highest form, over the face of matter without dragging it from matter's coils.

Epicurus ought to have considered the fact that matter itself 2
does not have power to give itself form (nothing that is without form can give itself form). It has the power or preparation to receive form, which we call the inchoation of forms and the ancient theologians call primeval chaos. As the *Timaeus* teaches, God applies a formative power to chaos, not as the proper power of matter, but as the instrument of God Himself.[44] To form something He takes the celestial and elemental influence and matches it to this power. Perhaps the divine influence flowing from God, penetrating the heavens, descending through the elements and halting in inferior matter is this formative power, which Plato calls the reason of the divine understanding.[45] Through its infusion, the world machine is composed of necessity and mind, composed that is from the matter necessary to bodies and from the forms which, in a most beautiful order, reproduce the divine mind and its goodness.[46] The Peripatetics variously call this power God's instrument

tiam seminariam. Huic formatrici virtuti subest formabilis illa natura materiae. Deus igitur per vim huiusmodi formatricem, per machinam mundi diffusam, formabili ipsius materiae virtuti formas illas accommodat, quas materiae proximas, et quas medias collocavimus.

3 Hic autem Platonicus quisque ordinem quendam in quatuor tam formarum quam subiecti gradibus observabit. Animae rationales per solum purumque dei radium super puram indivisibilis materiae faciem accenduntur. Animae irrationales per caelestem quoque animalemque influxum radio illi divino adhibitum e sinu materiae nondum extenso exprimuntur in lucem. Formae elementorum mixtorumque familiares per familiares etiam elementorum qualitates educuntur ex materiae gremio iam extenso—extenso, inquam, per dimensiones non terminatas. Formae eorundem peregrinae per qualitates insuper peregrinas elementorum eruuntur ex alvo materiae, extenso iam per terminatas quasdam dimensiones. Has autem formas praeter rationales animas esse materiae astrictas ideo arbitramur, quia nullam prorsus operationem habent ad quam non aliquo modo concurrat corporis vel natura vel instrumentum, et finem semper sibi proponunt corporis usum, utpote quae ex corpore pendeant, dum per instrumentum caeleste sive elementale formativum formabili virtuti materiae accommodantur. Cuius rei signum est, quia nulla illarum in deum convertitur, quasi deus non sit illarum proxima causa, sed potius aliena. Animam vero rationalem fieri a deo sine instrumentis ullis ex eo potissimum coniectamur, quod in deum proxime vertitur, quod in sequentibus declarabimus. Concurrunt igitur instrumenta non ad animae humanae productionem, sed ad materiam praeparandam, quam sit anima hominis habitatura.[61] Deus vero per se illam mate-

or nature or the seminal potency. The formable nature of matter is subject to this formative power. So God uses this formative power, which is diffused through the world machine, to accommodate to matter's own formable power both the forms we have located closest to matter and those in between.

Every Platonist will perceive an order here in the four levels of 3
forms and of substrate. Rational souls are set on fire by God's pure ray alone [shining] on the pure face of indivisible matter. Irrational souls are brought into the light from the folds, as yet unextended, of matter by both the celestial and the animate influence added to that divine ray. The familiar forms of the elements and compounds are led by way of the elements' also familiar qualities out of the lap of matter, which is now in extension (in extension yes, but undetermined by way of dimensions). The unfamiliar forms of the same elements and compounds are torn by way of the elements' unfamiliar qualities out of the womb of matter, which is now in extension by way of particular and determined dimensions. But we believe these forms (excepting the rational souls) are bound to matter because they perform absolutely no activity that does not involve in some way either the nature of the body or an instrument of it; and they always set themselves the goal of serving the needs of the body, in that they are the forms that depend on body as long as they are accommodated through the formative celestial or elemental instrument to matter's formable power. A proof of this is that none of them is turned back towards God, and this suggests that God is not their proximate cause, but a remote one. But we suppose that the rational soul has been created by God without any instruments principally on the grounds that it is turned directly back towards God, as we will argue below. So the instruments contribute, not to the production of the human soul, but to the preparation of the matter which man's soul is going to inhabit. But once the matter has been prepared, God on His own produces the soul. Plato teaches us

ria praeparata[62] producit. Quod Plato in libro *De natura* docet, ubi vult animam rationalem a solo mundi opifice[63] tribui; irrationales vero etiam a ministris eius operi huic faventibus.

4 Aristoteles quoque, in hoc secutus magistrum, in libro *De animalibus* secundo[64] inquit: 'Quando generatur homo, intellectum infundi forinsecus, ac solum esse divinum cuius operatio non expleatur per aliquid corporale.' Quasi non expromatur ex intimo materiae gremio, sicut alias formas putat expromi. Ergo hanc sine instrumento ipse deus infundit.

5 Exemplum habes in solis lumine et in anima. Lumen solis per calorem tamquam medium dissipatis nubibus serenat aerem; serenum aerem illuminat per seipsum. Anima per calorem naturalem coquendo cibum praeparat ipsum ad vitae formam. Cocto et praeparato cibo, non per calorem, sed ipsa per se vitae tribuit formam. Anima rursus per linguam tamquam instrumentum frangit aerem; fractus aer sonat; sonando significat. Sonus ille est quasi quoddam animal constitutum ex aere fracto tamquam corpore atque ex ipsa significatione tamquam anima. Quae quidem significatio instar animae latet in vocibus, et quasi vita quaedam est non audita vocis auditae. Undenam datur sono talis significatio? Ab ipsa loquentis hominis anima. Sed numquid anima significationem dat voci per linguam? Minime. Lingua enim corpus est et corporale dat munus solum atque sensibile, neque significationem dat per se ullam, quotiens animo ad rem non attendente casu quis loquitur. Significatio vero res est incorporalis et insensibilis.[65] Alioquin quicumque vocem audiret, statim quid significatur voce cognosceret. Quapropter significatio, quae insensibile quiddam est, fit tamquam anima quaedam in voce, id est aere fracto ceu corpore. Fit,

this in his book *On Nature* [the *Timaeus*] where he affirms that the rational soul is given by the demiurge alone, but that the irrational souls are given also by His ministers who assist Him with the work.[47]

Aristotle too, following his master in this respect, says, in the 4
second book of his work on animals, "When man is born, his intellect is poured into him from without; and that intellect, whose activity is not completed by way of something corporeal, is alone divine."[48] It is as though it were not brought forth from matter's inmost womb, as Aristotle believes is the case with the other forms. So God imparts this form Himself without using any instrument.

You have an example in the sun's light and in the soul. The 5
sun's light uses heat as its means of scattering the clouds and clearing the sky. But by itself it illuminates the clear air. Soul uses natural heat to digest food and to prepare it for the form of life. Once the food has been digested and made ready, the soul gives it the form of life, not through heat but through itself. Likewise the soul uses the tongue as an instrument to break up the air. The fractured air resounds and its resounding has meaning. That sound is a sort of living creature, composed of the fractured air as its body and of the meaning as its soul. This meaning, like soul, lies hidden in the words we utter: it is the particular unheard life as it were of the heard word. Whence comes the meaning in the sound? From the soul itself of the man who is speaking. Does the soul give meaning to the word through the tongue? Of course not. For the tongue is a body and only gives a corporeal and sensible gift: of itself it does not give any meaning when someone is talking at random and his soul not paying attention. But meaning is a non-corporeal and non-sensible thing. Otherwise anyone who heard a voice would immediately know what was meant by the voice. So meaning, which is something non-sensible, comes into being, like a soul in the voice, in the fractured air as its body; and

inquam, ab animae ipsius cogitatione sola, non per linguae obsequium. Atque ideo dum PLATONEM pronuntias, aer ille fractus plures in partes dividitur, PLA-TO-NEM, quae per tria temporis momenta percurrunt. Significatio vero non per partes dividitur, quia in loquentis mente indivisibili, antequam pronuntietur, momento concipitur. Et significat saepe res ingentissimas, quarum molem non potest ipsa per magnitudinem adaequare; significat etiam motum tempusque saepe sine motu vel tempore. Et quando pronuntiatur sono, soni ipsius parte pronuntiata, plurimum nondum ab audiente comprehenditur, neque percipitur paulatim, sed omnibus syllabis pronuntiatis, quid ex illis cunctis significatur, e vestigio intellegitur. Quae quidem significatio in audientis intellectu perpetua saepe remanet syllabis pereuntibus, sicut in loquentis mente fuerat antequam loqueretur. Significatio igitur ab anima loquente sine medio producta incorporalis est. Est et vocis anima simplex et quodammodo immortalis; sonus autem per linguam mediam fabricatus in partes dissipatur et interit.

6 Si sol et anima sine instrumentis aliquid efficiunt in materia, multo magis deus poterit formam aliquam, nullo intercedente instrumento, materiae tradere. Atque ea maxime erit rationalis anima, quae nonnihil sine instrumento cogitat atque eligit. Quod numquam valeret, si esset per instrumenti operam fabricata. Si per nullum medium a deo fit, non fit ab eo, nisi per deum. Deus ipsa aeternitas est. Fit ergo per ipsam aeternitatem. Quod per aeternitatem fit est aeternum. Et quod summo statui proximum est, ita est stabile ut a mutatione mortali sit remotissimum. Haec enim est summa mutatio. Merito sicut in ceteris rerum generibus praeter id quod per se tale est, sunt et alia quae per aliud talia sunt, ita in aeternitatis ordine ultra deum, qui per se est aeternus, multa sunt

it comes, I say, solely from the soul's cogitation and not through the tongue's compliance. When you pronounce the word PLATONEM, the fractured air is divided into several parts — PLA-TO-NEM — that fill three moments of time. The meaning, however, is not divided into parts, because in the mind of the speaker it is conceived in a single, indivisible moment prior to its being spoken. And often the word signifies things that are absolutely huge whose mass it cannot possibly equal in size, and often too it signifies movement and time without itself being in motion or in time. When it is pronounced aloud but only part of the word is pronounced, it is not yet understood for the most part by an auditor, nor is it understood little by little. But once all the syllables have been pronounced, he immediately grasps what they all mean. Often the meaning remains forever in the auditor's intellect when the syllables have passed away, just as it existed in the mind of the speaker before he uttered it. Meaning then is produced by a speaker's soul without an intermediary and is incorporeal. It is the word's simple and in a way immortal soul. But the sound made by means of the tongue dissipates and dies.

If the sun and the soul can make something in matter without 6
instruments, still more can God give a form to matter without the intervention of any instrument. And that form will principally be the rational soul, which can consider and choose without an instrument. It could never do this if it were fashioned by the work of an instrument. If it is created by God without any intermediary, it is not created by Him unless it is through Him. God is eternity itself. So the soul is created through this eternity. What is created through eternity is eternal. And what is closest to the highest state is so stable as to be furthest removed from mortal change. For that is the most extreme form of change. Properly then, just as in the remaining classes of things beyond that class which is such through itself, other classes exist that are such through another, so in the order of eternity beneath God, who is eternal through

quae per illum aeterna fiunt. Talia vero esse illa *Timaeus* docet, quae a deo absque medio procreantur. Erit igitur hominis anima et immortalis, et huic corpori tamquam significatio aeri[66] a loquente deo inserta. Quam significationem si quis animadverterit, dei loquentis intellegit mentem.

: VIII :

Obiectio Panaetii et responsio, quod anima sine medio est ex deo.

1 Dabit forsitan Panaetius nobis posse aliquid a deo in materia sine materia et instrumento creari, sed animam nostram ita fieri non concedet, nisi manifestatiori aliquo signo hoc iterum ostendamus. Arbitratur[67] enim tam animam nascentis ab anima parentum, quam corpus a corpore generari, quia et corpore et ingenio similes genitoribus[68] filii saepe nascantur. Sed coniectura Panaetii parum momenti habere videtur quia saepe dissimiles corpore nascuntur, saepissime animo. Et qui mores sequuntur paternos, consuetudine eos imbibunt potius quam genitura. Et si qui eos usu non acquirunt, imitantur tamen, non ideo imitantur, quia animus nascatur ab animo, sed quia animus a tenera aetate blanditur proprio corpori, in quo propter genitorum complexionem similia quaedam fiunt incitamenta. Sed procedente aetate arbitratu suo et in peius et in melius mutant mores. Itaque abiicienda est coniectura Panaetii.

2 Quoniam vero signum a nobis exposceret, per quod anima a deo venire clarius ostendatur, signum nobis erit huiusmodi.

Himself, many things exist which are made eternal through Him. The *Timaeus* says that these are the things created by God without an intermediary.[49] The human soul will be immortal, then, and it has been inserted in this body, like meaning in the air, by God speaking. Whoever attends to this meaning understands the mind of God speaking.

: VIII :

Panaetius' objection and its rebuttal. That the soul comes from God without any intermediary.

Panaetius will grant us perhaps that God could create something 1
in matter without the use of matter or an instrument, but will not concede that our soul is created like this unless we can provide a clearer proof. For he thinks that the soul of a newborn child is produced from the soul of its parents as a body from a body, because children are often born resembling their parents both in body and in natural ability.[50] However Panaetius' view seems of little moment, because children differ from their parents often in body and most often in soul. Those who do succeed to their parents' behavior patterns acquire them by habituation rather than by birth. If those who do not acquire these patterns by upbringing, nonetheless copy them, they do not copy them because soul is born from soul, but because the soul from an early age pampers its own body, and in this body certain similar inducements occur owing to the parents' complexion. However, as they grow older, they use their own judgments, and they change their behavior patterns for better or for worse. So we should reject Panaetius' view.

However, since he asked us for a clearer proof of the fact that 2
the soul comes from God, our proof is as follows. Whenever

Anima rationalis, quotiens aliqua sibi res occurrit, perscrutatur non modo quid res illa sit et qualis, sed etiam quae sit eius origo. Neque cessat umquam nisi causam eius invenerit. Neque tamen in quavis causa sistit gradum, sed indagat semper causae causam, ita ut non prius quiescat quam supremam causam fuerit consecuta. Unaquaeque res in proprio sui fine quiescit. Proprius finis rei est eius causa propria. Ibi enim perficitur; perfectionem vero naturalem appetunt omnia tamquam finem. Quod si communem finem expetere videantur, non tamen ipsum asciscunt nisi quantum ipsis congruit et accommodatur propriusque evadit. Talis evadit, quando suscipitur in causa proxima, sufficiente, superius ordinata. Non petit aer Venerem aut Iovem, licet etiam inde ducat originem, sed appetit ignis concavum, ubi principium eius proprium est locusque domesticus. Cetera quoque similiter non quamlibet sui causam expetunt. Nullae enim res prius cessarent quam in deum transformarentur, qui primum omnium est principium, aut si numquam transformarentur in deum, frustra et temere moverentur. Non igitur quamlibet quaerunt causam, sed propinquam. Sufficit enim cuique speciem suam incorruptam integramque servare. Haec autem servatur a causa propria, quae sufficiens sit et superius ordinata. Causa vero altissima speciem rei a se remotioris mutaret in naturam sublimiorem, ubi cessaret res illa esse quod erat atque periret.[69] Non autem res id appetunt, sed incolumes in suo statu manere. In quo quatenus permanent, eatenus primae quoque causae similitudinem assequuntur.

3 Quorsum haec? Ut intellegas rem quamlibet solum cum proximam attigerit causam, quiescere protinus neque ultra perquirere. Atque ideo mentem quae in re nulla quiescit nisi in prima, nullam habere propriam causam nisi primam. Cuius rei signum est quod

something comes its way, the rational soul examines not only what it is and what it is like, but what is its origin. And it never stops until it has found its cause. Nor does it stop at any cause but it so keeps on hunting for the cause of the cause that it does not rest until it has reached the supreme cause. Everything comes to rest in its proper end. Its proper end is its proper cause. For there it is made perfect. But all things strive towards natural perfection as their end. If they appear to be seeking a common end, yet they do not adopt it except to the extent that it suits them, is adapted to them, and becomes more properly theirs. A common end becomes theirs when it is received in a cause that is proximate to them, sufficient, and ordered from on high. Air does not seek Venus or Jupiter even though it originates [ultimately] from them. It seeks the [nearer] concave vault of fire where its own rational principle exists and its own home. Similarly, other things do not seek just any cause of themselves. Otherwise they would either never stop until they were transformed into God, who is the first principle of everything; or, if they were never transformed into God, they would keep moving pointlessly and at random. So they do not seek just any cause, but the proximate one. For it suffices for each thing to preserve its own species uncorrupted and whole. But the proximate cause is preserved by its own cause, which must be sufficient and ordered from on high. But the highest cause would change the species of something far removed from itself into a higher nature, and there the thing would cease to be what it was and perish. This is not what things seek for: rather they seek to remain secure in their own state. To the extent that they remain in this state, they acquire a likeness too to the first cause.

All this is to what end? That you might understand that only 3
when each thing reaches its proximate cause does it come to a complete rest and not seek further. And so the mind, which comes to rest in no one thing unless it is the first, has no cause of its own except the first. A proof of this is that man's mind is turned to-

hominis mens in deum convertitur sine medio. Sic enim res convertuntur in causam ut procedunt. Quae per medium processere, per medium convertuntur; quae sine medio processerunt, convertuntur etiam sine medio. Anima sine medio in Deum reflectitur, quando deum neque in aliqua creatura, neque imagine sensus et phantasiae, sed super omnia creata absolutum nudumque suspicit. Suspicit vero talem, quando argumentatur deum esse adeo infinitum ut omnia, quae cadere in cogitationem possunt, infinito superemineat intervallo, ubi nihil creatum inter deum et animam interponitur. Quo autem modo intuitus animae in deum absque medio figeretur, nisi etiam intuendi virtus ab illo absque medio processisset?

4 Quod si videatur anima quibusdam ad id mediis indigere ex eo quod per mundi dispositionem et ordines angelorum ascendit ad deum, scito non uti his[70] mediis animam ut deum in his aut per haec, quasi solem in aqua aut per vitrum intueatur, sed quasi quibusdam gradibus, ut ipsa quae infra se olim delapsa est, per hos gradus in arcem suam redeat. Quo regressa, deum absque medio videt. Porro per mundi dispositionem invitatur ut, dimisso corporis cultu, in suam redeat rationem; per angelorum indagationem sive inspirationem admonetur ut, dimisso consueto rationis discursu, ad lumen sibi quondam divinitus infusum sese recipiat. Quo reflexa per ipsum iam dei lumen suspicit deum, ut ille qui per solis radium, non colores amplius corporum, sed ipsum suspicit solem. De quo inquit Zoroaster:

> Χρή σε σπεύδειν πρὸς τὸ φάος καὶ πρὸς πατρὸς αὐγάς,
> ἔνθεν ἐπέμφθη σοι ψυχὴ πολὺν ἐσσαμένη νοῦν.

id est: 'Ascendendum tibi est ad lumen ipsum et patris radios. Unde infusa est tibi anima multo mentis lumine circumfusa.'

wards God without an intermediary. For things are converted towards their cause in the same way as they proceed from it. Those that proceed through an intermediary are converted through an intermediary, and those that proceed without an intermediary are converted too without an intermediary. The soul reflects on God without an intermediary when it sees God, not in any creature or in any image of the sense or phantasy, but above all created things as absolute and unadorned. It sees Him like this when it proves that God is so infinite that He surpasses everything we can think of by an infinite distance and where no created thing is interposed between God and the soul. But how can the soul's gaze be fixed on God without an intermediary unless the power of gazing also comes from God without an intermediary?

4 Should it appear, however, that the soul does need certain intermediaries for this in that it ascends to God through the structure of the world and the orders of the angels, then be aware that the soul does not use these intermediaries in order to see God in them or through them like seeing the sun in water or through glass. It uses them rather like steps in order that, having once fallen below its own level, it might return to its own citadel via these steps. Having returned there, it sees God without an intermediary. Through the world's order, moreover, and having set aside the cultivation of the body, it is induced to return to its reason, and then through the searching out or inspiration of the angels, and having set aside its customary discourse of reason, it is admonished to return again to the light formerly bestowed on it from on high. Having returned thither, it sees God through what is now the very light of God like someone who uses the sun's ray to look at the sun itself and no longer at the colors of bodies. Zoroaster puts it like this: "You must ascend to the light itself and to the rays of the father, whence soul, enveloped in the ample light of the mind, flowed into you."[51]

5 Quod autem animus ad hunc quandoque statum perveniat, inde coniicimus, quod usque adeo se ab omni rei creatae cogitatione secernit, ut super omnem rei cuiusque creandae conceptum quantumcumque sublimem extare divinum verticem per infinitum asserat spatium. Dum vero deum ita describit, pro viribus capit deum. Habet ergo vim aliquam absque medio dei capacem. Haec autem a solo tributa est deo. Qui enim format solus, ipse solus disponit. Qui implet, ipse amplificat, sicut et visus radium illum intimum et insitum ab origine, quo solis lumen proxime videt, quotidie ab ipso eodem lumine solis accepit. Atque ita vis illa dei capax medio indiget nullo ultra deum ad deum suscipiendum, sicut neque visivus radius ad radium solarem accipiendum ullo indiget medio, quia et radius a radio, et vis dei capax a deo nullo medio interposito.

6 Probavimus hactenus propositum nostrum praecipue per intellectum. Rursus ita probamus idem praecipue per voluntatem. Omnis appetitus causae suae impletur possessione. Sitim enim appetitionis extinguit perficiendo res eadem quae accendit efficiendo. Voluntas solius infiniti boni possessione potest impleri. Eousque enim affectat bonum quousque ipsi bonum porrigit intellectus. Intellectus communem boni ipsius rationem invenit ab omnibus rei participantis angustiis segregatam, quae propter hoc ipsum infinita permanet in seipsa. Diffunditur quoque in infinitum, cum possit bonitas rebus innumerabilibus per infinitos modos communicari. Si voluntas eousque affectat bonum quousque intellectus offert, hic autem offert infinitum bonum et infinita bona, sequitur ut totidem voluntas affectet. Ergo solius infiniti boni impletur possessione. Ad haec, sicut obiectum intellectus est ens ipsum sub ra-

We deduce that the rational soul at some point attains this 5
state from the fact that it divorces itself from all consideration of what is created so far as to assert that beyond every conception, however sublime, of each thing to be created there rises through the infinite distance the peak divine. When it describes God like this, the soul apprehends God to the best of its ability. It has, then, a power capable of apprehending God without an intermediary. This power has been granted by God alone. He alone who gives form is He alone who disposes form. He who fills is He who magnifies. Similarly the sight daily receives from the same light of the sun the ray by which it sees the light of the sun directly—that ray which is internal to it and implanted in it from the beginning. And thus the power of apprehending God needs no intermediary other than God in order to receive God, just as the visual ray needs no intermediary in order to receive the solar ray. For the one ray comes from the other without an intermediary and so does the power of apprehending God come from God.

Till now we have pursued our proposition largely by way of the 6
intellect. Now for some proofs based mainly on the will. All appetite is satisfied by possession of its cause. The same thing that arouses the appetite's thirst by creating it, allays it by satisfying it. The will can only be satisfied by the possession of the infinite good alone. It continues to desire the good so long as the intellect continues to offer it the good. The intellect discovers the common rational principle of the good itself, which set apart from all the confines of a participating object remains forever infinite in itself on account of this good. It is also infinitely diffused, because goodness can be communicated to innumerable objects in infinite ways. If the will desires the good as long as the intellect offers it, and the intellect offers the infinite good and infinite goods, then it follows that the will must desire it infinitely. So it is perfected by the possession of the infinite good alone. Moreover, just as the object of the intellect is being itself considered in terms of the truth, so the

tione veri, ita voluntatis obiectum ens ipsum sub ratione boni. Quia vero vis quaeque eo solo contenta esse potest in quo integra obiecti sui ratio reperitur, sequitur ut intellectus et voluntas solo deo satiari possint, in quo solo est integra veritatis bonitatisque ratio. Et quia ille ab aliis veris semper discurrit ad alia, haec ab aliis bonis fertur in alia, satis constat quietem his ex eo solo obtingere posse quod talia cuncta complectitur. Habitus enim sistit motum et motum quodammodo interminatum habitus infinitus.

7 Postremo legitimus intellectus est ille qui res intelligit sicuti sunt, legitima voluntas illa quae res appetit sicuti sunt appetibiles. Sunt autem res ut ordinantur a deo, appetibiles vero sunt ut ordinantur ad deum. Ergo neque intellectus, neque voluntas in rebus ipsis quiescere potest. Sed ille resolvit in deum, haec refert ad deum. Illi solus deus conspiciendus naturali instinctu proponitur, huic solus deus amandus. Si sola infinita bonitas implere voluntatis capacitatem valet, nimirum sola[71] infinita bonitas naturam procreat voluntatis, praesertim cum ipsa quoque voluntas in bonitatem infinitam quandoque se conferat sine medio. Quod tunc facit evidentissime, quando intellectus voluntati non amplius bonum hoc proponit aut illud, sed aut cunctorum simul bonorum ostendit cumulum aut bonitatis ipsius fomitem, unde talis cumuli segetes pullularunt.[72]

8 Denique nullus effectus ultra suam causam se extendit. Humanus animus rem quamlibet finitam transgreditur, quia quodcumque finitum verum bonumve obtuleris, intellectus magis intellegere potest, voluntas ulterius affectare. Nulla ergo finita res est animi causa. Quod hinc potissimum confirmari videtur, quia causa motorque particularis virtutem inclinationemque ad universale tendentem non potest efficere. Et quia in intellectu[73] virtus est ad

object of the will is being itself considered in terms of the good. But because each power can rest content only in that in which its object's entire rational principle is found, it follows that the intellect and the will can be satisfied by God alone; for in Him alone is the entire rational principle of truth and of goodness. And because the intellect races from truths to truths and the will is borne from goods to goods, it is sufficiently clear that they can obtain rest only from that which embraces all such things. For possession puts a stop to motion, and infinite possession puts a stop to motion that is in a sense endless.

Finally, the proper intellect is that which understands things as 7
they truly exist, and the proper will is that which desires things as they are desirable. But things exist as they are set in order by God, but they are desirable as they are ordered towards God. So neither the intellect nor the will can come to rest in things themselves. But the intellect resolves into God, the will gives back to God.[52] To the intellect God alone is presented by natural instinct as the due object of contemplating, and to the will God alone is presented as the due object of loving. If infinite goodness alone can satisfy the capacity of the will, certainly infinite goodness alone procreates the nature of the will, especially since the will on occasions also betakes itself to infinite goodness without an intermediary. This is most evident when the intellect no longer presents the will with this good or that good, but displays either the harvest of all the goods together or the shoots of goodness itself whence sprouts the corn of such a harvest.

Finally, no effect extends beyond its cause. The rational human 8
soul transcends each finite object, because whatever finite true or good thing you offer, the intellect can understand more and the will can desire further. So no finite thing is the cause of soul. The best proof of this seems to be that a particular cause and source of motion cannot produce a power and inclination directed towards the universal. And since power in the intellect exists for the uni-

universale verum, in voluntate inclinatio ad universale bonum, constat plane intellectum et voluntatem a nulla re creata fieri vel moveri. Quicquid enim creatum est, verum bonumque est dumtaxat particulare. Nonne animus quodlibet particulare bonum respuere potest, licet bonum universale non possit? Quidnam hoc significat, nisi ipsum solius universalis boni actioni et imperio subiici?

9 Concludamus igitur per intellectus et voluntatis actus conversionesque hominis animam a deo nullo medio interiecto in lucem ex nihilo prodiisse, atque eam dei vim infinitam, qua ita producta est, ipsi animae ita quodammodo inseri ut ipsi quasi propria et naturalis evadat, per quam ipsa, quotiens vult, in deum se vertit. Non minus ferme[74] infinita virtute opus esse putant Platonici, ut quis ad deum se conferat infinitum atque infinitum esse sub certa ratione infinitatis agnoscat et amet, quam ad hoc ut aliquid fiat ex nihilo. Infinita virtute sua deus animam creavit ex nihilo, infinita dei virtute anima dei virtutem eandem infinitam attingit, quae ipsam ex nihilo procreavit. Quae quidem infinita virtus, sive semel animae sit infusa, sive potius iugiter infundatur serveturque a deo, demonstrat eam virtutis infinitae participem et (ut ita loquar) capacem ita esse, ut per hanc ipsam dei attingat infinitatem. Infinitatem dei esse scimus totam simul et integram; infinitatem temporis, quia evanescit continue, continue quoque instaurari: fluxisse partim, partim quoque fluxuram, neque habere umquam in praesentia nisi momentum. Momentum ab integra infinitate innumere superatur. Quo fit ut infinitas dei infinitatem temporis innumerabiliter per distantiam superet infinitam. Anima illam attingit. Hanc ergo longissime supereminet. Quamobrem omnes excedit terminos temporis vivitque perpetua. Quod hinc maxime confirmatur, quod

versal truth, and inclination in the will for the universal good, obviously the intellect and the will cannot be brought into being or set into motion by any created thing. For what has been created is only a particular truth or good. But surely the rational soul can reject a particular good, although it cannot reject the universal good? What does this mean except that it is subject to the action and command of the universal good alone?

Let us conclude, then, from the acts and the conversions of the 9
intellect and the will that from nothing and without any intermediary man's soul was brought into the light by God, and that the infinite power of God which thus produced it has in a way been so implanted in the soul that it has become virtually part of its own nature. It is this that enables the soul to turn to God whenever it wills. Platonists believe that infinite power is needed to make one's way to the infinite God, to recognize Him as infinite under the precise rational principle of infinity, and to love Him—a power no less infinite, almost, than the power needed to create something out of nothing. By His infinite power God created the soul out of nothing, and by God's infinite power the soul attains the same infinite power of God that created it out of nothing. This infinite power it possesses, whether it is imparted to the soul only once, or whether rather it is continuously being imparted and sustained by God, proves that the soul participates in infinite power, and is so capacious, if I may use the word, that it attains God's infinity through that power. We know that God's infinity is simultaneously complete and absolute, while the infinity of time, because it is continuously fading away, is also being continuously restored: partly it has flowed away, partly it is still to come, and it never has but a moment in the present. A moment is exceeded times without number by absolute infinity. Hence it is that the infinity of God measurelessly exceeds the infinity of time by an infinite distance. The soul attains God's infinity. So it surpasses time's infinity to the greatest possible extent. So it exceeds all the bound-

si deus eam non facit per angelicas caelestesque virtutes, multo minus per materialia semina; ideoque pestiferam non subit mutationem.

10 Si ergo tuum colere parentem desideras, ipsum solummodo cole bonum. Parentem quaeris? Non[75] corporis natura parens est tibi, o Anima.[76] Tanto enim melior es, quanto parenti magis obtemperas; es autem tanto praestantior, quanto magis corpori adversaris. Bonum tibi omnino[77] est esse cum patre; malum tibi quodammodo[78] est esse cum corpore. Non animus aliquis te genuit, Anima.[79] Animi operatio mobilis est. Si ergo per eam facta fuisses, substantiam omnino haberes mutabilem; ideoque in ipsa animi mutabilitate sisteres gradum, neque stabilem prorsus naturam exigeres, neque quicquam super animum cogitares.[80] Non intellectus aliquis multiplex te creavit, non enim simplicitatem summam attingeres atque[81] intellectus ipsius tibi sufficeret consecutio. Nunc autem ad ipsam vitam, ad ipsam essentiam, ad ipsum esse absolutum intellegendo amandoque[82] ascendis super quemlibet intellectum. Neque satis tibi intellegentia est, nisi et bene et bonum intellegas. Bonum vero ipsum tibi satis est absque dubio: non enim alia ratione[83] requiris quodlibet, nisi qua bonum. Bonum igitur ipsum procreator tuus est, Anima; non bonum corpus, non bonus animus, non bonus intellectus, sed bonum ipsum, bonum inquam,[84] quod[85] in seipso consistit extra subiecti cuiusque[86] limites infinitum, infinitamque tibi tribuit vitam, vel ab aevo in aevum, vel saltem ab initio quodam in sempiternum.

aries of time and lives forever. The clearest proof of this is that if God did not use angelic or celestial powers to make the soul, much less did He use material seeds; and therefore the soul is not subject to pestilential change.

If you wish to respect your father, honor the good, and the 10
good alone. Are you searching for your father? The[53] body's nature is no father to you, o soul. The more you obey your father, the better you are, but the more you struggle against the body, the nobler you are. To be with your father is in all respects good; to be with your body is in some respects bad. Some rational soul did not beget you, o soul. The soul's activity is one of movement; so if you had been made through this activity, you would have an entirely mobile substance. You would have come to a halt in the soul's own mutability, not demanded a nature that was wholly at rest; and you would not have considered anything above the rational soul. Nor did some manifold intellect create you, for then you would not attain the highest simplicity, and attaining the intellect alone would have been enough for you. But in fact you ascend by understanding and by loving beyond any intellect to life itself, to essence itself, to absolute being. Nor does understanding suffice for you unless you understand well and understand the good. Indubitably, however, the good itself does suffice, for you desire whatever you desire for no other reason than that it is the good. So the good itself is what begat you, o soul: not a good body, not a good soul, not a good intellect, but the good itself, the good that dwells in itself beyond the boundaries of any substrate and is infinite. And the life it bestows on you is infinite, either from everlasting to everlasting, or at least from some beginning to eternity.

: IX :

Tertia ratio: quale est obiectum, talis est potentia.

1 Quatuor haec: essentia, virtus, operatio, obiectum, hunc habent ordinem, ut ab essentia profluat virtus, ab hac operatio, operatio obiectum petat, et talis quaedam essentia per talem quandam virtutem, id est virtutem propriam, certo modo circa obiectum sibi conveniens operetur. Non est putandum ab essentia aliam virtutem fluere quam sibi familiarem, neque a virtute aliam edi operationem quam naturalem, neque operationem versari circa obiectum aliquod, nisi simile, commodum et conveniens. Nam cur naturalis illa essentiae virtus operando appetit obiectum aliquod tale potius quam tale, nisi quia tale aliquid ipsi familiarius est, aptius et commodius? Nisi enim conveniret magis cum tali quodam quam cum aliis, vel appeteret nullum, vel aeque omnia peteret. Sic intimus virtutis visivae radius per radium solis coloratos radios aspicit. Intimus aurium aer, per externum aerem, aerem[87] haurit fractum, id est sonos. Olfactus in vapore aeris caliginoso genitus per vaporem talem in aere crasso a pomo diffusum vaporem in pomo odoriferum percipit. Gustus in salivae humore submersus per liquefactionem cibi in ore, sapores vel natura liquidos vel ibi iam liquefactos attingit. Tactus terrenis nervis accommodatus terrena et solida sentit facile et corporales admodum qualitates.

2 Vides obiecta semper cum operationibus et virtutibus naturalibus convenire. Idem in mente cogeris confiteri, ut mens libera sit a

: IX :

Third proof: as is the object, so is the power.

Essence, power, activity, and object, these four are ordered in such 1
a manner that power flows from essence, activity from power, and activity aims at an object; and that such an essence acts by means of such a power—its own proper power, in other words—and does so in a specific way with regards to an object which is congruent with it. It must not be supposed that from essence flows any power other than the one akin to it, nor from the power any activity other than the one natural to it, or that the activity is directed towards any object other than one that is similar, suitable, and congruent. For in its activity why should the essence's natural power seek as an object one sort of thing rather than another, unless such a thing were more closely related to it, more apt, and better suited? If it were not suited better to it than to others, either it would desire none of them, or it would seek them all equally. Thus the inner ray of the power of sight perceives colored rays by means of the ray of the sun. The inner air within the ears takes in fractured air, or sounds, by means of the external air. The sense of smell, which is generated in the air's misty vapor, detects the fragrance in fruit by means of this misty vapor diffused in the heavy air by the fruit. Taste, which immerses itself in the moisture of the saliva, detects flavors through the liquefying of the food in the mouth, the flavors being either naturally liquid or liquefied at that point. Touch, which is connected with nerves that are earthy, easily perceives solid earthy objects and qualities that are particularly corporeal.

So you can see how the objects always conform to the activities 2
and the natural powers. And you have to admit that the same is true with mind: to wit, that a mind whose object is free from mat-

materia, cuius obiectum est a materia liberum. Talis est autem rei cuiusque universalis ratio et idea. Obiectum eiusmodi primum Platonici vocant atque Peripatetici, quia primo rectoque aspectu se obiicit. Obiectum vero adaequatum esse totam entis[88] ipsius latitudinem arbitrantur, quia per universum ens intellectus abstrahendo, dividendo, componendo, definiendo percurrit. Ens autem tam incorporeis omnibus quam corporeis est commune atque infinitum. Ac ne quis ita fallatur, ut dicat intellectum forte in alia quadam re cum universali ratione potius quam in ipsa separatione congruere, considerare debemus in eo congruere maxime, quod necessario ipse facit ad hoc, ut intellegat. Quid autem facit potissimum? Certe et seipsum, et ipsam a materiae passionibus segregat. Neque quicquam magis impedit vel hunc intellegere, vel hanc intellegi, quam materiae passivae coniunctio. Proinde si non modo talis potentia tale petit obiectum, sed etiam obiectum tale potentiam suo accessu multo magis efficit talem (quemadmodum visus natura lucidus et lucem petit et accedente luce fit lucidior), sequitur ut mens non solum ex eo remota sit a materia atque ampla, quia naturaliter assidueque ad remota et ampla se confert, verumetiam ut multo etiam inde fiat remotior ampliorque, quod quae remota amplaque sunt, illam pulsant, rapiunt, occupant. Sed quantum potest a materia segregari? Tantum videlicet, ut effugiat materiae passiones. Rationem namque ideamque tum rei cuiusque, tum entis ab his absolutam naturaliter avet. Potest autem per eandem naturam ipsam consequi per quam movetur ad ipsam. Et ipsa denique idealis ratio quae in aeternitate est omnino, cum sit in deo, mentem sese ad eam pro viribus elevantem potest omnino supra limites loci temporisque extollere.

ter is free from matter. But such an object is each thing's universal rational principle or idea. Platonists and Peripatetics call this the first object, because it presents itself directly and at first glance. But they suppose the mind's adequate object is the whole breadth of being itself, because the intellect traverses the whole of being by abstracting, dividing, compounding, and defining. Being, however, is common to all incorporeal and corporeal objects alike, and it is infinite. And should someone be so mistaken as to claim that the intellect agrees perchance with a universal rational principle in some other thing rather than in absolute separation, we should ponder the fact that agreeing occurs most when the intellect necessarily does what it does in order to understand. And what does it do most? Above all, it separates itself and the universal rational principle from the passions of matter. Nothing more prevents the intellect from understanding and the rational principle from being understood than conjunction with passive matter. Accordingly, if such a power not only seeks for such a [rational] object, but this object enhances the power by its approach (just as sight which is naturally bright both seeks light and becomes brighter when light approaches), then it follows not only that the mind is remote from matter and sublime precisely because it naturally and continually turns towards remote and sublime objects, but also that it becomes even more remote and still more sublime because remote and sublime objects strike, enrapture, and occupy it. How much can it be separated from matter? To the degree it can escape the passions of matter. For it naturally longs for the rational principle and idea both of each object and of being, the idea that is totally free from these passions. But it can use the same nature that moves it towards the idea to attain the idea. Finally, the ideal rational principle that is entirely in eternity, since it is in God, can lift the mind completely beyond the boundaries of time and space as long as the mind is lifting itself, to the best of its powers, towards that principle.

LIBER UNDECIMUS[1]

: I :

Prima ratio: mens unitur obiecto perpetuo et species suscipit absolutas rationesque sempiternas.

1 Ratio ipsa rei penitus absoluta illud ipsum est quod actu a nobis primo rectoque et proprie intellegitur. Quod intellegitur actu, magis fit unum per intellectualem speciem cum intellectu, quam quod videtur actu per visibilem speciem cum visu, et tanto magis quanto ex purioribus arctior provenit copula. Copula haec augetur rursus ex eo quod visibile quidem est extra visum; ratio vero ipsa intellegibilis, quae adest et omni mundi materiae ab ipsa formabili et omni loco (cum situm proprium non respiciat), proculdubio inest mentium penetralibus, ipsi per naturam quam proximis. Unde et ab illa[2] et ad illam semper afficiuntur. Si ex intellectu intellegente et specie illa intellectuali sive ratione per speciem significata fit unum, ac species illa et ratio, ut talis est, est a loco et tempore et ceteris materiae passionibus separata, intellectus in hoc ipso actu ab iisdem semotus erit. Actus huiusmodi intellectus ipsius est proprius. Proprius actus essentiam propriam comitatur atque e converso. Itaque intellectus non per actum modo proprium, verumetiam per essentiam propriam erit ab omni materiae contagione seiunctus. Et sicut ratio illa communis, quantum in se est, universum locum tempusque ambit, quamvis ut materiam respicit ad lo-

BOOK XI

: I :

First proof: the mind is united with an eternal object and receives the immaterial species and the everlasting rational principles.[1]

The entirely immaterial rational principle of a thing is that which 1
in act is primarily, directly, and properly understood by us. What is understood in act is more at one, by way of the intellectual species, with the intellect than what is seen in act is at one, by way of the visible species, with the sight; and the more so to the extent that a stronger bond exists between purer things. This bond is strengthened still more in that what is visible is external to vision whereas the intelligible rational principle itself, which is present both to all the world's matter that is formable by it and to every place (since it does not look to a location of its own), is undoubtedly present in the inmost recesses of minds, which are by nature as close to itself as possible. Hence minds are always affected by the rational principle and drawn towards it. If a union occurs between the understanding intellect and the intellectual species or the rational principle signified through the species, but if that species and rational principle as such is separated from space, time, and the other passions matter endures, then in this act of understanding the intellect will be far removed from the same passions. Such an act is proper to the intellect. The proper act accompanies the proper essence and the reverse. So the intellect will be isolated from all of matter's contagion not only through its own act but also through its own essence. And just as that universal rational principle, insofar as it is able, encircles universal space and time—

cum tempusque declinet, ita mens illi per naturam accommodata,[3] quamquam ut respicit corpus sese ad partes loci ac temporis cohibet, tamen quantum in se est quodammodo totum ambit utrumque. Praesertim quia non potest species secundum significandi virtutem esse absoluta, si mens, quae eius tum subiectum tum fons est, absoluta non sit, cum omne subiectum pro natura sua suscipiat qualitates et fons saporem suum infundat rivulis inde manantibus. Hinc duo sequuntur: unum, quod substantia mentis non editur ex materiae latebris; alterum, quod est immortalis ex eo quod fit unum cum specie illa rationeque universali, quae prout universalis est, locum fugit et tempus.

2 Ad idem vero sic rursus argumentemur. Ipsum intellegibile propria est intellectus perfectio, unde intellectus in actu et intellegibile in actu sunt unum. Intellectus[4] siquidem quamdiu potentia est intellecturus[5] nondum cum re potentia intellegenda coniungitur, sed quando actu intellegens est cum re actu iam intellecta. Coniungitur autem cum ea, ut volunt Peripatetici, quoniam rei illius forma inhaeret menti. Quorum vero una forma est, ipsa sunt unum. Unum ergo fit ex mente intellegente ac re intellecta, quandoquidem rei huius forma, ut talis est, format mentem. Quod ergo convenit intellegibili, quantum intellegibile est, convenit intellectui, quantum intellectus, quia perfectio et quod perficitur unius sunt generis et semper invicem proportione mutua vinciuntur. Intellegibile vero quantum tale est necessarium et perpetuum. Quippe in speculando nullius existimamus corruptibilia, quia nos scire non arbitramur quicquam nisi certam rei rationem et necessariam teneamus. Et quae necessaria sunt, ea perfecte intellectu comprehenduntur; contigentia vero quantum huiusmodi, imper-

though in its relationship to matter it inclines towards space and time—so mind, which naturally conforms to that principle, even though with regard to the body it is confined to the parts of space and time, nevertheless insofar as it is able it encircles both in their entirety in some manner. This is particularly because the species could not be independent in its power to signify, if mind, which is both its subject and its source, were not independent. For every subject receives qualities according to its nature, and every spring imparts its own taste to the rills flowing out of it. We can draw two conclusions: one, that the substance of mind is not produced from the hidden recesses of matter; and two, that it is immortal because it is made one with the species, the universal rational principle, which, being universal, shuns space and time.

Let us argue the same point again as follows. The intelligible is 2
the proper perfection of the intellect whence the intellect in act and the intelligible in act are one. For the intellect as long as it is about to understand potentially is not yet joined with the object that is potentially to be understood, but when it understands actually it is joined with the object now actually understood. But it is joined with it, in the Aristotelians' view, because the form of that object adheres to the mind. But those that share a single form are themselves one. So from the understanding mind and the object understood one thing emerges, because the form as such of this object forms the mind. So what conforms to the intelligible, to the extent that it is intelligible, conforms to the intellect, to the extent that it is intellect. For perfection and what is perfected are one in genus and are always bound together in mutual proportion. But the intelligible, to the extent that it is such, is necessary and everlasting. In contemplating we are not thinking of anything perishable, because we do not believe we know a thing unless we possess its rational principle, which is definite and necessary. Necessities are grasped by the intellect perfectly but contingencies, to the extent they are such, imperfectly. For when the intellect affirms

fecte. Quando enim contingentia intellectus affirmat, saepe fallitur. Si falli non vult, ambigit. Uterque actus imperfectus est: et falli et ambigere. Merito quando contingentia cogitat, dubitare solet, ne interim permutentur, et aliter de illis atque aliter momentis aliis sit iudicandum, momentis namque singulis permutantur. Puta, dum dicimus 'Platonem sedere,' potest enim interim surrexisse.

3 Definitiones autem rerum universales perpetuae sunt, ut homo est animal rationale. Proprietates quoque specierum, quae proprie definiuntur sunt sempiternae, ut omne rationale potest ratiocinari. Semper enim definitiones proprietatesque tales aeque sunt verae, etiam si nullus in terris homo spiret. Has intellectus perspicue cernit tenetque firmiter et asserit sine errore vel dubio. Et si qua contingentia intellegit, maxime sub his rationibus universalibus comprehendit, ubi corruptibilia cogitat non ut talia, sed ut aeterna. Intellectus ergo perpetuus est, qui rationibus sempiternis unitur solisque perficitur. Si intellectus eas capit et quod capit proportionem aliquam habet cum eo quod capitur, congruentiam certe cum his rationibus intellectus habebit. Hae neque principium habent neque finem. At si mens habet utrumque, nullam cum his habebit proportionem, quoniam ab eis omnino per conditiones oppositas distinguetur. Quapropter mens aut fuit semper et erit ut ipsae, aut si esse coepit quandoque, non tamen desinet umquam.

contingencies, it often errs. If it does not wish to err, it remains undecided. Each act, making a mistake or failing to decide, is imperfect. Appropriately then, in thinking about contingent things the intellect is accustomed to doubting lest they change in the meantime and require different judgments about different matters at different moments; for they alter moment by moment. For example, while we are saying "Plato is sitting down," it is possible in the meantime he has risen to his feet.

3 Universal definitions of things, however, are everlasting: man, for instance, is always a rational animal. The properties of the species too, properly defined, are unchanging: for example, every rational creature is able to reason. For such definitions and properties are equally true even if no one man is living on earth. The intellect sees these clearly, grasps them firmly, and asserts them without error or hesitation. And whatever contingencies it understands, it comprehends in the main under these universal rational principles, where it thinks about perishable things not insofar as they are perishable but as they are eternal. So that intellect is everlasting which is united with the everlasting rational principles and perfected by them alone. If the intellect grasps them, and if what grasps bears some proportion to what is grasped, then the intellect will certainly be congruent with these rational principles. They have neither beginning nor end; were the mind to have both, however, then it would bear no proportion to the principles, because by way of these contrary conditions it would be completely separated from them. Therefore either the mind has existed and will exist always, like the principles, or, if it began to exist at some point, it will never come to an end.[2]

: II :

Obiectio Epicureorum et responsio. De unione mentis cum speciebus absolutis et[6] rationibus sempiternis.

1 Neque nos hic obtundat Epicureus aliquis, obiiciens lumen quidem solis ab oculo suscipi, oculum interire, lumen vero solis incolume[7] superesse, similiter speciem illam universalem, id est universaliter significantem, rationemque sempiternam capi ab intellectu, intellectum perire quandoque, speciem vel rationem remanere.

2 Respondemus solis lumen ab oculo minime suscipi, quoniam ab eo ne momentum quidem tenetur et, occidente sole, visus momento lumen amittit. Qui si quid luminis suscepisset, retineret utique illius aliquid vel parumper, sicut aqua calorem retinet aliquantisper igne subtracto. Itaque adesse oculis lumen possumus affirmare; inesse vero et suscipi minime. Mens vero speciem illam rationemque universalem hominis et aliorum ideo suscipere dicitur, quoniam absente etiam homine memoriter retinet. Adde quod lumen hoc ipsum, quod lumen est et quod visibile, ab oculis non sortitur. Est enim suapte natura tale et oculi inde ut clarescant et videant assequuntur. Species autem illa hominis universalis, hoc ipsum quod universalis est, non ab ipsis singulis hominum habet personis, in quibus quicquid est, particulare est. In mente tamen est illa universalis. Igitur ut universalis sit, habet[8] a mente. Sed quonam pacto? Hoc maxime, ut Aristoteli placet. Duas nostra mens habet vires: agentem unam, alteram vero capacem. Agens est quae species agit universales; capax quae eas capit ab agente

: II :

An Epicurean objection and its rebuttal. On the union of the mind with the immaterial species and eternal rational principles.

Let no Epicurean come dinning our ears here, objecting that sun- 1
light is received by the eye, but that the eye perishes while the sunlight survives unharmed; and that similarly the universal species (that is, the species that signifies universally) and the everlasting rational principle is grasped by the intellect, but that the intellect perishes at some point while the species or rational principle remains.

Our retort is that the sunlight is not received by the eye, for it 2
is not retained by it even for a moment; and, once the sun sets, the sight loses the light in a twinkling. If the eye had taken in any part of the light, it would surely have retained something of it at least for a while, just as water retains heat for a while after the fire has been removed. So we can say that the light is present to the eyes, but not that it is inside them or received by them. But the mind is said to take in the species and universal rational principle of man and of other things precisely because it retains it in the memory even when a man is not present. Furthermore, the fact that it is light and it is visible it does not owe to the eyes. For light is such by its own nature, and the eyes acquire from it their ability to illuminate and to see. But the universal species of man does not derive the fact that it is universal from the individual human beings in whom whatever exists is particular. Yet that universal species is in the mind. So it acquires from the mind the fact that it is universal. How can this happen? According to Aristotle chiefly in the following way: Our mind has two powers, one active, the other receptive. The active power is what conceives the universal species;

conceptas. Quando igitur phantasia in se hominis huius, ut Socratis, hoc tale simulacrum contuetur, mox lumen virtutis illius agentis simulacrum istud pulsat, non aliter quam solis radius aquam. Atque ut radius hic solis ab aqua repercussus in oppositum parietem ibi circulum procreat splendidum atque tremulum, ita lumen ipsum virtutis agentis pulsans particulare simulacrum hominis phantasia conceptum atque ex eo simulacro in vim intellectus capacem reflexum, in hac ipsa inde speciem quandam parit, quae non amplius Socratem hunc in hoc loco et tempore positum refert, sed hominis naturam singulis personis aeque communem, a certis loci et temporis limitibus absolutam. Ubi et species ipsa universalis est et natura quae per eam refertur universalis. In hoc mirabilis vis intellectus apparet.

3 Nempe qui speciem creat a materia, loco et tempore absolutam atque ideo quodammodo sempiternam et creatam recipit in seipso, per quam etiam naturam similem apprehendit, cur non et ipse ab iisdem absolutus sit atque perpetuus? Denique ea quae intellectus attingit ita separata, si natura sua sunt talia, talis quoque est intellectus, nam cum attingit separata, ibi tunc est ubi sunt ipsa; igitur et ipse est[9] separatus. Sin autem natura illis passionibus mancipata sunt, sed intellectus sua vi illa liberat, multo prius ac magis ipse est liber, ut cetera liberet. Dic age: cur forma rei cuiusque non potest unum quiddam fieri cum intellectu, antequam omnino a materia separetur, nisi quia intellectus ipse multo prius magisque est a materia separatus?

4 Quo autem modo fiat unum ex illa specie et intellectu docet comparatio illa quam de radio induximus atque aqua. Quippe circulus, ille inde natus splendidus ac tremulus, parieti non satis uni-

the receptive power is what receives them after they have been conceived by the active power. So when the phantasy observes within itself the image or likeness[3] of a particular man, say Socrates, the light of the active power immediately strikes on this image, like the ray of the sun hitting water. And just as the sun's ray reflected off the water creates on the opposite wall a splendid quivering circle, so the light of the active power, striking a particular image of a man conceived in the phantasy and reflected off that image onto the receptive power of the intellect, then gives birth within this power to a species which no longer refers to this particular Socrates located in this place at this time, but to the nature of man which is common equally to all individual human beings, independent of fixed limits of place and time. Here is the universal species and the nature that is referred to because of it as universal. In this the wondrous power of the intellect is manifest.

Now the intellect, which creates the species absolutely free from 3
matter, space, and time, and so in a way receives the eternal and created species in itself, and also apprehends through it the like nature, why may it not be absolutely free itself from these same passions and everlasting? Finally, if the objects that the intellect attains are thus separated and naturally so, then separate too is the intellect, for, when it attains the separate objects, it is there where they are and so is separate itself. But if they are naturally subject to these passions, but the intellect frees them by its power, then the intellect is itself free for it to be able to set them free, and free at a far earlier stage and to a much greater degree. Tell me, why it is that the form of each object cannot become united with the intellect prior to its having been completely separated from matter, unless it is because the intellect itself has been separated from matter at a far earlier stage and to a much greater degree?

The comparison we made to the sun's ray off the water teaches 4
us how the unification of the species and the intellect may occur. The circle of quivering reflection they produce is not sufficiently

tur, quia splendoris illius et parietis est nimium diversa natura. At si in speculum inciderit, arctius unietur. Tandem si in lumen solis idem redierit, unde radius ille demissus fuerat, qui splendidum circulum procreaverat, coibit prorsus in unum. Quid autem illa[10] species est apud Peripateticos quam peperit intellectus, nisi scintilla quaedam, tum simulacri illius quod a rebus collegerat phantasia, tum virtutis illius agentis per quam mens illam peperit? Quid autem nostra mens est, nisi scintilla quaedam mentis superioris? Ergo species illa ita nostrae menti infunditur, ut scintilla rerum scintillae mentis superioris, et ut circulus ille splendidus solis lumini cuius radio fuerat procreatus. Quapropter ex mente atque specie ita fit unum, ut ex duabus scintillis una coniunctis flamma una, sive duarum candelarum radiis unum lumen, sive ex circulo illo splendido et lumine solis fulgor unus. Quod autem per speciem ita sempiternis unitur, fit sine controversia sempiternum, ea praesertim ratione quod intellectus forsitan intelligendo non modo cum re aeterna intellecta coniungitur, sed ille quoque res ipsa est aeterna quae intellegitur. Idem enim radius est quodammodo qui ab alto verberat aquam, qui fulget in aqua, qui in aerem repercutitur, ubi in seipsum refusus, si videndi vim nanciscatur, videbit statim fulgorem illum suum qui redundavit ab aqua. Idem faciet si ab auro resultaverit vel argento. Semper enim fulgorem suum videbit, licet variis modis affectum pro obiectorum varietate a quibus fuerit repercussus.

5 Si exemplum convenientius de duabus illis viribus intellectus et hac unione desideramus, consideremus muscipulae[11] oculum, in quo paene sicut in mente nostra duae sunt vires. Est in eo vitrea

united with the wall, because the nature of the reflected light is too different from that of the wall. But if the reflection strikes a mirror, it will be more intimately united with the mirror. Finally, if it darts back to the light of the sun, which had dispatched the ray creating the circle of light, then it will be completely united to it. For the Peripatetics what is the species that the intellect has given birth to but a spark both of that image the phantasy has culled from physical objects, and of the active power via which the mind produced it? And what is our mind but a spark of a higher mind? So the species is imparted to our mind just as the spark of objects is imparted to the spark of the higher mind, or the circle of light to the light of the sun by whose ray it had been created. So from the mind and the species comes a union, just as one flame results from two sparks joined together, or a single light from the rays of two tapers, or one splendor from the circle of reflected light and the light of the sun. No one can dispute that what is united through the species with things eternal is made itself eternal, especially when you consider that the intellect, in the act of understanding perhaps, is not only united with the eternal understood object, but is itself too the eternal object which is being understood. For in a sense it is the same ray which strikes the water from above, which sparkles on the water, and which is reflected back into the air; and there, having been poured back into itself, and if it could acquire the power of seeing, it would immediately see its own dazzling brightness which has bounced off the water. It would do the same, if it reflected off gold or silver. For it will always be seeing its own brightness, even though that brightness has been affected in various ways in accordance with the variety of objects from which it has been reflected.

If we wish for an example that is more appropriate for the two powers of the intellect and this union, let us consider the eye of a mousing cat in which two powers are present more or less as is the case in our mind. The eye has the transparency of glass and it has

perspicuitas, est et scintilla. Illa vis capax; haec agens. Scintilla nocte emicat foras, trahit coloris[12] huius aut illius imaginem a corporibus ipsi oppositis, imprimit eam virtuti perspicuae,[13] quae per eam corpus obiectum perspicit. Immo fortasse non tam corpus oppositum perspicit quam sui ipsius radium, qui explicatus fuit et replicatus, et quando replicabatur, resilivit in oculum, iam pictus imagine corporis. Ideo licet cernere videatur modo hunc colorem, modo illum, semper tamen seipsum cernit quodammodo, sed vario modo a variis coloribus refulgentem. Quid prohibet virtutem illam agentem, quae nostrae mentis est radius, in aliis et aliis phantasiae simulacris aliter et aliter emicantem, inde reflecti in semetipsam, seque videre diverso modo affectam pro diversitate simulacrorum? Ubi species illa sive ratio, quam intellegimus absolutam atque perpetuam, nihil est forte aliud quam radius intellectus reflexus in semetipsum. Qui tunc facile seipsum animadvertit quando in simulacra sese dirigit, sicut vultus se non videt nisi intueatur in speculum, unde etiam varius repercutitur pro speculorum ipsorum varietate, quemadmodum et mentis radius a simulacris pro diversitate simulacrorum divers<i>us reverberatur in mentem. Sed de his[14] absolutius in sequentibus.

: III :

Obiectio Epicuri et responsio, quod species innatae sunt menti.

1 Negabit fortisan Epicurus species illas quas quotidie concipit intellectus esse perpetuas, quia et esse incipiant quando pariuntur, et desinant quando mandantur oblivioni. Nos autem ex Platonis nos-

a spark. The first is its receptive power, the second its active. At night the spark shoots out of the eye, selects the image of one color or another from the bodies in front of it, and imprints the image on the transparent receptive power, which through it perceives the body in front of it. Or rather, it perceives not the body in front so much as its own ray, which was beamed out and then retracted, and, as it was being retracted, it leaped, adorned now with a body's image, back into the eye. So though it seems to be seeing now this color and now that, yet it is in a sense seeing itself, but itself blazing in a varying way and in various colors. What prevents that active power which is our mind's ray from shining out in different ways in the phantasy's different images and thence, having been reflected onto itself, from seeing itself variously affected according to the diversity of the images? Here that species or rational principle, which we understand as being immaterial and everlasting, is nothing other perhaps than the ray of the intellect reflected on itself. It easily recognizes itself [only] at the moment when it directs its attention to images, just as a face does not see itself unless it gazes into a mirror, and it is also variously reflected according to the variety of the mirrors. Similarly, the mind's ray is diversely reflected back into the mind from images and likenesses and in accordance with their diversity. I shall give a fuller account of these matters in the following pages.

: III :

Epicurus' objection and its rebuttal. The species are innate in the mind.

Perhaps Epicurus will deny that these species which the intellect 1
daily conceives are everlasting on the grounds that they come into being when they are brought to birth and cease to exist when they

tri sententia satis in hoc habere putamus, quod species illae, si nascuntur, a rationibus animi perpetuis pariuntur et ideas super animum referunt sempiternas.

2 Ratio prima. Profecto sentire et intellegere, quia vitales operationes sunt, a principio vitali intrinsecoque proficiscuntur, principio inquam activo. Sunt enim operationes quaedam viventibus et carentibus vita communes, ut generatio, alteratio, mutatio loci. Ea quae vita carent operationes huiusmodi patiuntur potius quam agant. Non enim se ullo modo generant aut alterant aut mutant loco. Viventia vero eas in seipsis agunt, quia sese nutriendo augendoque alterant et generant aliquid in seipis, et iudicando appetendoque locum mutant. Si natura viventia ad proprias actiones melius instruere debet quam ad communes (melius autem instructum est quod est agens quam quod patiens) atque ad communes operationes eis activum principium tradidit, multo magis ad proprias actiones, sensum videlicet intellegentiamque, sic illa disposuit ut agerent per eas magis quam paterentur. Quapropter neque mens neque etiam sensus, ut pluribus placet Platonicorum, ut percipiat quicquam ab extrinsecis formatur corporibus. Sed quemadmodum pars vivifica per insita semina alterat, generat, nutrit et auget, ita interior sensus et mens per formulas innatas quidem et ab extrinsecis excitatas omnia iudicant. Neque aliud quicquam est hoc iudicium quam transitus formulae a potentia quadam in actum. Non enim debet operatio ulla agentis transcendere limites. Vitalis igitur et intus permanens operatio non est ab extrinseco principio vita carente, sed ab intrinseco et vitali. Signum vero quod sensus interior est admodum efficax, inde capitur

are given over to oblivion.[4] I believe a sufficient retort to this, following our Plato's view,[5] is that, if these species are born, they are produced by the soul's eternal rational principles and refer indeed to the eternal ideas above the soul.

2 The first proof. Sensation and understanding, being vital operations, surely proceed from a vital and internal principle—from an active principle that is. For certain activities are common to both living beings and to objects wanting life, such as generation, change of state, and change of place. Lifeless objects are subject to these activities; they do not perform them. For in no way do they generate themselves or change their state or place. But living creatures do perform them in themselves, since they change their state by nourishing and growing themselves, and they generate something in themselves, and change place by choosing and desiring. If nature ought to equip living creatures better for their own particular than for common activities (and an agent is better equipped than a patient), and if nature has given them an active principle for their shared activities, *a fortiori* it must have designed them for their own activities, namely sensation and understanding, in order that through them they might act more than be acted upon. Wherefore neither the mind, nor even the sense as most Platonists believe, in order to perceive anything is formed by external bodies. But just as the life-giving part [of the soul] brings about change, generates, nourishes, and causes growth by means of inborn seeds, so the internal sense and the mind make all their judgments by means of innate formulae, and yet aroused by external objects. Judgment indeed is nothing other than the formula's passage from some potency into act. For no activity should exceed the limits of its agent. Thus a vital activity that remains internal does not proceed from a principle that is external and lacking life, but from one that is internal and vital. The proof that the inner sense is a more effective agent derives from the fact that it compounds, divides, proceeds discursively, and at will directs the body

quod componit, dividit, discurrit, suoque affectu vertit corpus in contrarias qualitates. Signum quod mens sit maxime efficax, a Boetio contra Stoicos hinc accipitur, quod ultra illa quae facit sensus, ipsa praeter obiectorum naturam[15] universales excogitat regulas, descendit componendo, ascendit et resolvendo, ac sese referens sibi veris falsa redarguit. Denique cum rem eandem aliae vires animae aliter iudicent (aliter enim imaginatio sive phantasia, aliter ratio iudicat), consentaneum est ut iudicium ipsum iudicantis formam naturamque sequatur, non iudicati. Et quia iudicium iudicantis actus existit, probabile est ut quisque iudex operam suam non ex aliena, sed ex propria potestate perficiat.

3 Ratio secunda. Sed ut revertamur ad mentem: sicut simulacra singularium a corporibus phantasiae non inuruntur, ut etiam probavimus alias, ita universalium species a simulacris non signantur in mente, sed ita mens illas per vim suam efficit, sicut phantasia fingit simulacra per seipsam. Quo enim pacto simulacrum (quod etiam phantasma vocatur) rem aliquam procreabit seipso liberiorem et ampliorem? Ipsum quidem singulare est et materiae conditionibus est astrictum; species vero, quia universalis est, ideo liberior est et amplior. Si non fit species haec (quae etiam universale nuncupatur) a simulacris, multo minus fit a rebus externis, quae non possunt per aliud medium formare mentem, quam per simulacra. Rursus unius spiritalisque speciei unam esse oportet causam spiritalem vel saltem unitam et spiritali modo ordinatam. Singula vero quae extrinsecus sunt, plurima sunt et corporea. Atqui nullum illorum, per se acceptum, cum propriae[16] solum corporalisque naturae sit, speciem procreabit incorpoream et naturae communis significatricem. Sed neque etiam omnia singularia simul iuncta istud efficient (sparsa enim sunt), neque ordinem aliquem talem

towards contrary qualities. And the proof that the mind is the most effective agent is provided by Boethius in his argument against the Stoics[6] to the effect that, over and beyond what the sense does, the mind formulates general rules which transcend the nature of objects: it moves downwards in compounding and upwards in resolving, and by referring to itself uses the true to reject the false. Lastly, given that the soul's different powers judge the same thing in different ways (for the imagination or phantasy judges in one way, the reason in another), we can agree that judgment itself follows the form and nature of the power judging not of the thing being judged. And because judgment is an act of the power judging, the probability is that each judge performs his task not through someone else's power but through his own.

3 The second proof. Let us return to the subject of mind. Just as the images of individual objects are not branded on the phantasy by bodies, as we have also shown elsewhere, so the species of universals are not imprinted on the mind by images. The mind makes them through its own power, just as the phantasy fashions images through itself. For how will an image (which is also called a phantasm)[7] create something that is freer and more extensive than itself? It is singular itself and limited by the conditions of matter; but a species, being universal, is accordingly freer and more extensive. If a species (which is also called a universal) does not derive from images, much less does it derive from external objects, which cannot inform the mind through any other means except through images. Again the cause of a species, which is one and consists of spirit, must itself be one and consist of spirit, or at least must be united and ordered in a spiritual way. But individual, externally derived objects are a corporeal multitude. And yet not one of them taken in itself, since it is of a particular only and of a corporeal nature, will beget an incorporeal species, the signifier of a common nature. Nor will they even do so if they are all individually joined together (for they are separate from each other); and they do not

habent, ut talia subnexa aliis unam seriem digerant causarum. Idcirco sicut lapidum coniunctione unum quiddam simplex non fit, sed cumulus, ita per singularium turbam fiet forte quaedam simulacrorum confusio potius quam una species atque simplex.

4 Praeterea, in quolibet singulari tria reperiuntur, natura speciei, accidentia quae non sunt necessaria speciei, et ipsum ex utrisque compositum, ut in Socrate est humanitas quae natura speciei vocatur, est albedo talis talisque figura, quae forte accidunt speciei et adventitia nominantur; ex utrisque Socratis persona componitur. Numquid ab his personis imprimitur in mente species illa communis, quae est omnium hominum aequalis similitudo? Certe ex accidentibus personarum non imprimetur; referret enim hominis accidentia, non substantiam. Neque etiam ex ipsa natura quae subiicitur accidentibus; illa enim non tota persona alicuius est hominis, sed pars eius. Ideo[17] natura talis de nullo homine enuntiatur. Quis dixerit: Socrates est humanitas? Dicimus autem Socratem esse hominem. Homo igitur enuntiatur de Socrate, de Socrate inquam toto, non de humanitate solum vel accidentibus. De Platone toto similiter atque aliis omnibus. Ubi apparet hominem ipsum quem mens nostra communiter enuntiat de integris quibusque personis, in seipsa conceptum multo ampliorem esse hac vel illa personae cuiusque natura. Quod vero comprehendit aliud et amplius est, non fit ab eo quod et comprehenditur et est angustius, praesertim cum natura illa fiat in singulis hominibus singularis. Quod autem singulare factum est, non creat universale.

5 Sed numquid ab integris cunctisque personis species illa nobis infertur? Nequaquam. Quippe innumerabiles personas aeque illa

possess any order such that so joined to others they may constitute a single chain of causes. Wherefore, just as no one simple entity emerges from the piling up of stones, merely a heap, so the result of a crowd of individual objects will be a chance jumble of images and likenesses rather than one simple species.

Furthermore, in every individual object we discover three 4
things: the nature of the species, the accidents that are not necessary to the species, and the object itself compounded from both. For instance, in Socrates dwells human nature which we call the nature of the species; there is his whiteness and such and such a shape which are chance additions to the species and called accidentals; and the person of Socrates is compounded from the two together. Can we really believe that from such individual persons the common species, which is the shared likeness of all men, is imprinted on the mind? It will certainly not be imprinted from these persons' accidents, for then it would refer to a man's accidents, not his substance. Nor will it be imprinted from the nature itself that is subject to the accidents; for that is not the whole person of some man, but a part of him. That is why such a nature tells us nothing about any one particular man at all. [For] who would declare Socrates is human nature? But we do say, Socrates is a man. Hence the term "man" points to Socrates, the whole of Socrates, not just to his human nature or his accidents. The same applies to the whole of Plato and all the others. This shows that the term "man," which our mind uses as a general term for all complete persons, conceived in itself is much broader than a given person's particular nature. What comprehends another and is broader is not fashioned by that which is itself comprehended and narrower, especially since human nature is made singular in individual human beings. But what has been made singular does not create the universal.

But do we derive the species from all persons taken as a whole? 5
The answer is no; for the species refers equally to an unlimited

species respicit. Innumerabiles vero nusquam inspeximus, neque ex quibusdam personis accepimus eam, quae infinitas insuper alias comprehendit. Neque potest ullus satis tuto a quibusdam singularibus regulam communem perscribere;[18] falleretur enim quisquis id tentaret. Perinde ac si quis cum sola terrae animalia consideraret atque illa videret spirare, animal omne spirare concluderet. Cum igitur species neque a singularibus personis neque ab earum simulacris generetur, reliquum est ut fiat ab intellectu. Intellectus eam non generat ex phantasmate vel in phantasmate. Phantasma enim, quia et in essendo et in significando singulare est, si fieret materia locusve speciei, eam redderet similiter singularem. Ceterum dubium est, num ipsam generet per phantasma tamquam per causam mediam inter intellectum et speciem generandam. Quod quidem fieri non posse ex hoc opinamur quod causa media et effectui proxima cum effectu magis quam remotior causa convenit, ut in hominis generatione, quia sol per hominem medium generat hominem, magis homo generans cum homine genito quam ipse sol congruit. Si igitur phantasma esset proxima causa speciei, species phantasmati similior quam intellectui nasceretur. Hinc duo sequerentur absurda. Unum, quod species huiusmodi statim nata, phantasma ipsum et phantasiam,[19] utpote sibi propinquiora, asciscceret tamquam naturalem sedem potius quam intellectum. Alterum, quod et si eam intellectus acciperet, per talem speciem intellegeret singulare aliquid et magis et prius quam universale. Illa siquidem singulare nuntiaret in primis, quia esset phantasmati singulari cognatior.

6 Neque audiendi sunt illi qui phantasma inter intellectum et speciem quasi instrumentum aliquod interponunt. Nonne virtus

number of persons. But we have never seen an unlimited number of persons, nor have we derived from particular people the species which includes numberless others besides. Nobody can with tolerable safety lay down a general rule on the basis of particular instances; for anyone who tried to do so would be in error. For instance, if someone were to consider terrestrial animals alone and saw them breathe, he would conclude that every animal breathed. Since then the species is not generated from individual persons nor from their images, the only remaining possibility is that it comes from the intellect. The intellect does not generate it from a phantasm or in a phantasm. For a phantasm, since it is singular in its being and signifying, would similarly make the species singular were it to become matter or the seat of the species. There is still the question whether the intellect generates the species through the phantasm as through a cause midway between itself and the species to be generated. In my view this cannot be, given that a cause that is intermediate and proximate to the effect must have more in common with the effect than a cause that is more remote. In human generation for instance, because the sun generates man through the medium of a man, the begetting man has more in common with the begotten man than the sun does. So if the phantasm were the proximate cause of the species, the species would be born more like the phantasm than like the intellect. Two absurd consequences would follow: one, that such a species directly it was born would claim the phantasm itself and the phantasy as its natural seat, rather than the intellect, because they would be closer to it; and two, that even if the intellect did receive the species, then it would understand some singular thing through this species better than and prior to a universal. For the species, because it would be more closely related to the singular phantasm, would announce the singular first.

Nor should we lend an ear to those who interpose the phan- 6
tasm as a kind of instrument between the intellect and the species.

mentis agens cum capace magis congruit quam phantasma? Quo igitur pacto agens capacem per extraneum phantasma formabit, cum oporteat instrumentum formationis inter formatorem atque formabile interponi; phantasma vero extraneum inter duas illas vires invicem germanas nequeat interponi? Quamobrem intellectus, quando formam illam creat, neque ex simulacro neque in simulacro neque per simulacrum procreat. Forte vero radium aliquem seu vim inserit simulacro phantasiae, per quam ipsum simulacrum tamquam formator mentis formam huiusmodi generat (quam speciem vocamus intellegibilem)? Sed neque hoc fieri posse putamus. Nempe vis illa suscepta simulacro iisdem[20] materiae conditionibus astringetur quibus simulacrum. Itaque formam intellegibilem quae ab illis conditionibus est absoluta non generabit. Ac si quis dixerit formam illam modo absoluto capi ab intellectu, quamvis phantasma ipsam non creaverit absolutam, ex hoc ipso nos concludemus quod exoptamus in primis: intellectum non subiici phantasiae tamquam formabile formatori, postquam praestantiore modo formas habet quam ipsa tribuere valeat. Quo fit ut forma intellectualis, si nascitur, a solo intellectu nascatur et sine medio. Si enim mens formam illam generat et generando eam in se absque medio suscipit, certe per se gignit illam et gignit alio nullo intercedente. Ex omnibus his concluditur intellectum formare seipsum. Et quoniam si esset prorsus informis, seipsum formare non posset, necesse est ante eas formas vel notiones, quas per omnem aetatem paene momentis singulis in se parit, latere in animi penetralibus formas alias animo naturales, totidem numero quot sunt in mundo

Surely the active power of the mind has more in common with its receptive power than a phantasm has. How then will the active power use an extraneous phantasm to form the receptive power, since that would require the instrument of forming being interposed between what forms and the formable, and the extraneous phantasm cannot be interposed between two such twin powers? It follows that the intellect, when it creates the form, produces it neither from an image nor in an image nor through an image. Perhaps it sows some ray or power in the phantasy's image, which enables the image as the mind's form-giver to generate a form of this kind (which we call the intelligible species)? But we think this too is impossible. For the power received by the image would be constrained by the same material conditions as the image itself. So it would not generate the intelligible form that is totally free from these conditions. And if anyone suggests that the form is received by the intellect absolutely, even though the phantasm did not create it as absolute, we shall then conclude what we were intending to prove in the first place: namely, that the intellect is not subject to the phantasy, as the formable to what bestows form, since it possesses forms in a manner superior to that in which the phantasy is able to confer them. Consequently the intellectual form, if it is born, is born from the intellect alone without an intermediary. For if the mind generates the intellectual form and in doing so receives it in itself without an intermediary, then it certainly gives birth to it on its own and gives birth without any intermediary at all. The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that the intellect forms itself. And since if it were entirely formless it could not form itself, then, prior to these forms or conceptions which it gives birth to in itself throughout its existence almost minute by minute, there must necessarily lie hidden within the recesses of the rational soul other forms that are natural to this soul; and they must be equal in number to the species of created objects

rerum species creatarum, quibus possit formas illarum specierum intellegibiles parere.

7 Ratio tertia. Certae namque res certis egent seminibus. Non facit natura ex quolibet quaelibet; non facit ex nihilo aliquid. Idcirco non potest essentia animae, quae et una est ac ferme omnia respicit aeque, multas et varias specie formas producere et alias aliis temporibus, nisi per plures formulas insitas specie differentes, quibus aliis temporibus alias potius quam alias procreet[21] aut promat.

8 Ratio quarta. Has enim saepenumero, etiam nulla consultatione vel voluntate antecedente, solo quodam naturali instinctu repente promit in lucem. Effectus vero qui naturali fiunt ordine, formam praeferunt talem qualem causae possident. Calida enim ab igne fiunt calente, quia causa quae ex suo esse aliquid efficit naturaliter, talem (licet inferiori modo) effectum facit qualis est ipsa. Mens igitur, quae per suum esse naturaliter generat universales rerum omnium species, in ipsa quoque sua essentia ab origine nacta videtur universales species omnium, ut similia similibus generentur. Nam si illarum specierum una est efficiens causa, scilicet intellectus, et subiectum unum, intellectus scilicet idem, nulla ratio assignari potest cur multae et differentes fiant secundum speciem, nisi quia intellectus per diversas rationes sibi naturales eas promit diversas. Non enim sufficit ad hanc varietatem efficiendam[22] simulacrorum diversitas, quae nihil ad hanc fabricam aliud afferunt, quam occasionem aliquam operandi, dum per illorum praesentiam mens ad promendas species excitatur. Hoc autem nihil aliud est quam rationes illas otiosas reddere promptiores.

9 Ratio quinta. Proinde si divina mens, idearum omnium plena, per essentiam suam adeo plenam absque medio animam procreat,

that exist in the world, and by them the soul must be able to give birth to the intelligible forms of those species.

7 The third proof. Particular entities require particular seeds. Nature does not make anything from just anything, and it does not make something from nothing. The essence of soul, which is one and looks to all things almost equally, cannot therefore produce multiple forms varying in species some at one time, others at another, except by means of the many innate formulae, which vary in species and by which it may create or produce various forms at various times.

8 The fourth proof. [Soul] often suddenly brings these forms to light even without any preceding deliberation or act of will but merely through some kind of natural instinct. But effects that come about in the natural order of things display the same form as that possessed by their causes. Things are made hot by fire heating them, since a cause that produces an effect naturally as a result of its own being produces an effect (though in an inferior manner) that is like itself. Mind, therefore, which naturally generates the universal species of all things through its own being, in its own essence too seems to have originally possessed the universal species of all things in order for it to generate like from like. For if there is one efficient cause of these species, namely the intellect, and one subject, again the intellect, then we can assign no reason why they become plural and different as species, unless it is because the intellect produces them as different species by means of the different rational principles that are natural to it. For the diversity of images is not sufficient to produce this variety, as they bring nothing to the production other than an occasion for operating, when the mind is stimulated through the presence of the images into producing the species. But this is nothing else but rousing those quiet rational principles to greater readiness.

9 The fifth proof. If the divine mind, which is filled with all the Ideas, through this fullness of its essence begets the soul without

oportet animam inde idearum plenam effluere. Nempe Deus cum in efficienda anima a nullo prorsus impediatur, tam perfectam efficit, quam perfecta in tali genere illa effici potest. Perfectior certe prodit, si in provinciam tam difficilem notionum plena descendat quam si vacua. Est autem notionum capax ab initio ex ea parte qua cum angelis convenit. Sicut enim ex parte sua temporali habet ut continue quaerendo discurrat, sic ex aeterna ut possederit <notiones> ab initio, praesertim cum ipsa propinquior Deo sit quam prima materia. Ideoque si materia omnes inde species accipit et, cum primum parata est, capit, necesse est animam quoque omnes suscipere. Parata vero est anima ad omnes suscipiendas cum primum a Deo accipit esse. Siquidem eius essentia simplex est et[23] stabilis supra tempus, ideoque[24] non potest augeri aut per tempora paratior fieri. Quod ita cecinit Zoroaster:

Σύμβολα πατρικὸς νόος ἔσπειρεν ταῖς ψυχαῖς[25]

id est: 'Paterna mens inseruit animabus coniecturalia signa.' Et Orpheus ita:

Πάντα γὰρ Πρωτεῖ πρώτη φύσις ἐγκατέθηκεν

ita est: 'Omnia enim Proteo prima natura indidit.' Theologia orphica Proteum appellat essentiam tertiam, animarum rationalium sedem. Archytas quoque Tarentinus in libro *De sapientia*: 'Hominem,' inquit, 'sapientissimum cunctorum animantium esse natum, quippe cui Deus rerum omnium ideas infuderit, per quas mente valeat notiones rerum non aliter procreare quam ore per linguam rerum nomina fingere.' Haec ille.

10 Ratio sexta. Profecto (ut platonice loquar) in materia formarum omnium suscipiendarum latent inchoationes. In natura quoque per quam ad formas movetur materia, formarum semina delitescunt. Unde in complexione arboris naturali clauditur semen ad arborem similem propagandam. In semine arbor generanda tota concluditur. Idem accidit in complexione naturali et semine ani-

an intermediary, then the soul must issue from the divine mind full of the Ideas. Of course, since God is impeded by absolutely no one in creating the soul, He makes it as perfect as anything in this kind can be. The soul certainly issues with greater perfection if it descends laden with rather than empty of conceptions into its exceedingly difficult sphere of action. From the beginning it is capable of conceptions that issue from the part it has in common with the angels. For just as it owes to its temporal part its unending search via discursive reasoning, so it owes to its eternal part its possession from the onset [of conceptions], especially since it is closer to God than prime matter is. And so, if matter receives all the species from God, and accepts them as soon as it has been prepared for them, it must follow that the soul can receive them all too. But the soul is prepared to receive them all as soon as it receives its being from God. For its essence is simple and at rest and outside time, so it cannot grow or become better prepared over time. Zoroaster sang to this effect, "The paternal mind sowed the inferential signs in souls,"[8] and Orpheus intoned, "Prime nature imparted all things to Proteus."[9] Orphic theology calls Proteus the third essence, the seat of rational souls. Archytas of Tarentum too, in his book *On Wisdom*, says: "Man was born the wisest of all creatures, because God implanted in him the ideas of all things, and he can use them to create the conceptions of things in [his] mind in the same way as he uses his tongue to fashion the names of things in his mouth."[10] Thus Archytas.

The sixth proof. To put it Platonically, in matter the inchoate origins for receiving all the forms lie hidden. In nature too, by means of which matter is moved towards the forms, the seeds of the forms lie hidden away. Hence in the natural composition or temperament of a tree is hidden the seed for propagating another similar tree. In the seed is enclosed the whole of the tree to be generated. The same happens in the natural temperament and seed of an animal. So in the part of the soul which nourishes the body,

malis. Igitur in ea parte animae quae alit corpus et natura utitur velut instrumento ad movendam formandamque materiam, insunt (et multo quidem praestantius) formarum omnium rationes, ut ex ratione capitis quae in anima est, exoriatur semen illud capitis quod est in natura; ex hoc autem semine pullulet forma haec capitis quae conspicitur in materia, atque idem fiat in pectore, brachiis membrisque ceteris. Si pars haec infima animae fecunda[26] est formatque ipsa corpora et a corporibus non formatur et formarum generandarum continet rationes, numquid mens, quae pars est animae summa, sterilis erit? Aut solum formabitur a corporibus? Aut carebit rationibus ad species producendas? Nullo pacto. Immo vero sicut pars infima quae singulis corporibus proxima est, per insitas sibi ab origine rationes singula gignit et corporalia, ita mens, quae incorporalibus ac penitus absolutis mentibus proxima est, rationes inde insertas habet, per quas producat species illas a corporum passionibus absolutas.

11 Septima ratio. Sic enim anima inter divina et corporalia medium obtinebit, si utrorumque particeps apparebit habebitque intus utrarumque formarum, et intellegibilium et sensibilium, rationes.

12 Octava ratio. Neque decet eam corporibus esse deteriorem. Ergo si corpora ante adventitias qualitates qualitates possident naturales, multo magis animus formulas habet in mente proprias antequam excipiat peregrinas.[27] Duplex materiae communitas convenit: naturalis et adventitia. Naturalis est natura illa in qua singula sub eadem specie invicem congruunt, sicut humanitas in qua singuli congruunt homines, quae communitas, ut plerique putant, perpetua est et singulis quibusque praestantior. Adventitia est no-

and which uses nature as an instrument for setting matter in motion and giving it form, are present in a much superior way the rational principles of all the forms. From the rational principle of the head that is in the soul, for instance, comes the seed of the head that is in nature. From this seed, however, springs the form of the head that is seen in matter; and the same thing happens in the case of the chest, arms, and other parts of the body. If this lowest part of the soul is productive and forms the bodies and is not formed by them, and if it contains the rational principles for generating forms, are we to suppose that mind, which is the highest part of the soul, will be barren? Or will it only be formed by bodies? Or will it lack the rational principles for producing the species? Quite the reverse. Or rather, just as the lowest part, which is closest to individual bodies, uses the rational principles innate in itself from the beginning to bring forth individuals and corporeals, so the mind, which is closest to the incorporeal and absolutely free minds, has rational principles implanted in it from the beginning, and through them it can produce from the passive conditions of bodies the species which are absolutely free.

The seventh proof. The soul will occupy a midway position be- 11
tween the divine and the corporeal if it is going to appear a participant of both and have within itself the rational principles of both types of form, the intelligible and the sensible.

The eighth proof. It is not fitting for the soul to be worse than 12
bodies. So if bodies possess natural qualities prior to adventitious qualities, then *a fortiori* the rational soul must have its own proper formulae in its mind before receiving external ones. The community or universality proper to [corporeal] matter is twofold: natural and adventitious. The natural consists of that nature whereby individuals in the same species are in accord with each other, as with human nature whereby individual men are in accord; and this natural universality is, in the view of most, everlasting and superior to the individual instances. But the adventitious universality is

tio illa universalis, quam de naturali communitate mens cogitat, singulis quibuscumque seclusis. Quae non modo quoad materiam spectat[28] adventitia est, sed quoad mentem. Si ante hanc adventitiam communitatem materia possidet alteram naturalem, mens quoque materia melior ante hanc alteram similiter possidet. Oportet enim communem formam in mente aliquam praestantiorem esse quam in materia. Est autem naturalis perfectior quam contingens. Igitur oportet inesse menti communes formas ante illas quas corporalium rerum fingit occursu. Saepe vero dum ingenitas formas inspicimus, putamus propter inscitiam nos adventitias vel externas prospicere, non aliter atque illi qui vel somno vel morbo quodam cerebri oculorumve affecti arbitrantur se videre quaedam extra suos oculos huc et illuc saepe volantia, quae tamen et versantur et videntur intrinsecus.

13 Nona ratio. Cur bruta rebus singulis inspectis communem non excogitant notionem, homo autem ex natura sua rationali qua differt a brutis, id agit, nisi quia ipsa sua natura sigillum possidet talium figurarum? Si enim formas procreat per naturam speciemque propriam, eas profecto per naturam procreat formatricem. Naturam vero talem carere quis dixerit characteribus?

14 Decima ratio. Praeterea, quando in scientiis perfectas demonstrationes conteximus, ex principiis quibusdam praestantioribus et latioribus solemus de speciebus proprietates aliquas demonstrare. In illis autem notionibus quae denuo finguntur ab animo, quae latior est, ea est remotior a substantia. Proptereaque speciei notio ad substantiam accedit propinquius quam notio generis. Quo fit ut quae in illis minus communis est, ea praestantior iudicetur. Aliae igitur notiones sunt in animo praeter istas quae latiores sunt simul

that universal conception which derives from the natural universality and which the mind ponders after it has excluded all individuals whatsoever; and it is adventitious not only as regards matter, but also as regards the mind. If matter possesses prior to this adventitious universality the other, the natural universality, then the mind too, being superior to matter, likewise has the natural prior to the adventitious universality. For any universal form in the mind has to be superior to the form in matter. But the natural [form] is more perfect than the contingent. So there must be universal forms present in the mind prior to those it fashions from contact with corporeal objects. When we look at the innate forms, we often think, through ignorance, that we see adventitious or external forms, just as people who are asleep or suffering from some disease of the brain or eyes think they see objects often flitting hither and thither in front of their eyes, when in fact they are flitting about within and being seen within.

The ninth proof. Having looked at individual objects, why do 13
animals not think of a common conception, but man by virtue of his rational nature (by which he differs from the animals) does think of it, unless it is because his very own nature possesses the imprint or stamp of such figures [or conceptions]? For if he creates forms through his own nature and species, then he creates them through an informing nature. But who would assert that such a nature lacks the stamps or characters [of the forms]?

The tenth proof. Furthermore, when we weave perfect demon- 14
strations together in the branches of learning, we normally demonstrate particular properties with regard to the species by starting from principles that are superior and more embracing. But with the conceptions fashioned anew by the rational soul, the broader the conception, the further removed it is from the substance. Consequently the conception of the species is closer to the substance than the conception of the genus. The result is that the less universal conception in these instances is adjudged the superior. So

atque praestantiores, ex quibus demonstratio vera conficitur. Quoniam vero demonstratio non ab universalibus tantum, sed ab universalibus causis proficiscitur, notiones autem quae menti innatae sunt, non sunt demonstrati effectus causae, rursusque formae in corporibus universales esse non possunt, sequitur ut super formas, et quae in corporibus et quae in nostris mentibus sunt, quaerendae sint formae aliae in mente divina omnium conditrice, quae universales omnium causae sint. Quarum formulas humana mens habet, ut per has tamquam causarum similitudines ad illas tamquam effectuum causas conclusiones referat demonstrando. Sed alias de ideis.

15 Undecima ratio. Atque haec ipsa demonstratio semper aliqua nobis ignotiora ex propositionibus notioribus infert, illas rursus ex aliis, quousque ad principia quaedam menti per se nota perveniat, ne aut irritus fiat in infinitum progressus, aut ab eisdem ad eadem retexatur circulus temerarius. Quae vero per se nota sunt menti, per naturam mentis effulgent mentis aspectui. De singulis autem speciebus rerum ex propriis earum principiis propriae fiunt demonstrationes, et in variis facultatibus variae. Igitur secundum varias species et varias facultates adsunt menti diversa doctrinae principia ex naturali mentis lumine cognita. In ipsis vero principiis cuncta sequentia continentur. Hinc efficitur ut animus per naturam omnibus doctrinis abundet.

16 Duodecima ratio. Ut quemadmodum et arbores et animantes earumque membra ex propriis seminibus pullulant, ita scientiae ex intimis initiis oriantur, ne mens sit sterilior quam natura, quae ex seminibus insitis suos foetus educit, non casus effundit impulsibus.

other conceptions besides those that are simultaneously more embracing and superior dwell in the soul, and out of them a valid demonstration is constructed. But since a demonstration proceeds, not just from universals, but from universal causes, and yet the conceptions which are innate in the mind are not the causes of the effect being demonstrated, and since no universal forms can exist in bodies, it follows that we must seek above the forms that exist in bodies and in our minds for other forms existing in the divine mind, the author of all things, forms which are the universal causes of all. The human mind possesses their formulae so that through these, the causes' likenesses so to speak, it can (in demonstrating) refer conclusions to the universal causes as the causes of effects. But I will discuss the Ideas elsewhere.

The eleventh proof. Scientific demonstration itself always infers 15
things less known to us from better known propositions, and these in turn from others until we reach certain principles which are self-evident to the mind; otherwise we would vainly proceed *ad infinitum*, or circle thoughtlessly round and round through the same things. Things known per se to the mind are set ablaze in the mind's sight by the mind's nature. With regard to the individual species of things, demonstrations proper to them derive from their own principles and various ones from their various capabilities. So in accordance with the various species and their various capabilities different disciplinary principles, known from the mind's natural light, are present in the mind. But all subsequents are contained within these principles. Hence it comes about that the mind naturally abounds in all branches of knowledge.

The twelfth proof. As trees and living creatures and their parts 16
grow from their own seeds, so too the branches of learning arise from inner origins, otherwise the mind would be more sterile than nature which produces its offspring from inborn seeds, and does not toss them out on a chance impulse.

17 Tertia decima ratio. Quando inter nos verum quaerimus interrogando et respondendo, quomodo posset ad summam pervenire quae concluditur ratio, nisi aliquid prius concederetur? Concedi autem recte quid posset, quod nesciretur? Ita ista ratio, ut Augustinus Aurelius inquit, nisi inveniret in nobis aliquid cognitum quo innitens ad incognitum duceret, nihil omnino per illam discerneremus. Inest ergo nobis ante ratiocinationem intellegentia quaedam, unde ratiocinatio sumat exordium.

18 Quarta decima ratio. Nonne ratiocinatio nostra mobilis est, et dum veritatem[29] inquirit, ab alio descendit[30] in aliud, et quando aliquid inventum examinat, in aliud ascendit ab alio? Motus vero omnis a quiete sive stabili aliquo exorditur ac tendit ad stabile. Motus autem huiusmodi notionum complexio est. Res vero quaelibet principium habet proprium suumque finem. Quapropter ratiocinatio, quia notionum[31] progressio est, in notiones reducitur, quia mobilis, in aliquas stabiles notiones, quarum impulsu quaerat quod cupit, indiciis inveniat quod quaesivit, luce examinet quod invenit, firmitate quiescat inventis. Inde ergo coepit quaerendo, in idem redit examinando. Sunt ergo in mente stabiles quaedam et perpetuae notiones, quae et principia sunt et fines ratiocinandi.

19 Quinta decima ratio. Neque ratiocinandi solum, verumetiam quomodocumque intellegendi. Nam sicut sensus qui per adventitias formas, quae dicuntur accidentales, cognoscit semper, accidentia quoque semper attingit, ut Platonici putant, ita converso mens, quae essentias rerum definit, per essentiales formas intellegit. Et quia sensus, qui fallacibus confidit rerum imaginibus et subito vanescentibus, saepe fallitur neque imaginem a re vera discernit, sed

The thirteenth proof. When we search for the truth amongst 17
ourselves by asking questions and answering them, how could reason reach any final conclusion unless something prior was granted? But what, if it were unknown, could be granted correctly? As Augustine tells us, unless this reason found something in us already known, and used it as a basis to lead us towards the unknown, we would learn nothing at all through reason.[11] Present in us, therefore, prior to reasoning, is an understanding which reasoning takes as its point of departure.

The fourteenth proof. Our reasoning is mobile, isn't it, and 18
when seeking truth, doesn't it descend from one thing to another, and when examining what it has found, ascend from one thing to another? All movement starts from a state of rest or from something at rest and moves towards what is at rest. But reasoning's movement is a comprehending of conceptions. Now everything has its own proper principle or starting point and its own end or goal. So reasoning, because it is a progression out of conceptions, is led back into conceptions; and, being mobile, it is led back to certain stable conceptions through whose impulse it seeks what it desires, through whose evidence it finds what it has been seeking, through whose light it examines what it has found, and through whose stability it comes to rest in things found. So whence it started its search, thence it returns in its examination. Thus there are certain stable and everlasting conceptions in the mind that are the principles and goals of reasoning.

The fifteenth proof. This is not only true of reasoning, but of 19
any kind of understanding. For just as the sense always acquires knowledge through adventitious forms called "accidentals," and always makes contact with accidents too, as the Platonists believe, so conversely the mind, which defines things' essences, acquires knowledge by means of essential forms. Because the sense, which puts its trust in things' images, which are deceptive and totally ephemeral, is often deceived and does not distinguish between the

opus est ad hoc iudicio rationis. Idcirco mentem oportet essentialibus, ut ita dixerim, rationibus inniti, ne ipsa quoque fallatur et iudicio virtutis alicuius superioris indigeat.

20 Sexta decima ratio. Praeterea, si cognoscimus angelos, neque eos nosse valemus per species a sensibus haustas (quae cum pendeant a corporibus, non referunt angelicas formas quae ad corpora non declinant), sequitur ut eos per insitas species cognoscamus. Quo enim pacto iudicamus angelos esse naturas non vergentes ad corpora, nisi per species a corporibus minime dependentes?

21 Decima septima ratio. Denique inter cognitionem divinam et sensitivam cognitio intellectualis est media, ergo et medias habet conditiones. Deus cognoscit per essentiam suam immobilem, sensus per mobiles qualitates, id est species peregrinas. Quapropter mens cognoscet per qualitates immobiles, quae species innatae vocantur. Ordo denique universi requirit ut quemadmodum purae mentes in se respiciunt, sensus autem in alia solum, sic anima, mentis sensusque particeps, non modo extra se formas, sed in se quoque respiciat. Ubi autem Aristotelis more mentem dicere solemus novas species procreare, possumus etiam proprius more platonico dicere innatas species ex mentis penetralibus erui. Germanarum virium ea est natura ut se mutuo comitentur in operando, sicut in existendo, et se vicissim suscitent ad agendum. Germanae vires sunt olfactus et gustus, unde saepe animus per odoratum invitatur ad gustum. Germanae concupiscendi virtus et irascendi natura; facile igitur ex libidine irritamur ad iram. Germanitas etiam oculorum facit ut ambo simul vertantur ad idem. Germanitas sensus et phantasiae efficit ut operante sensu ad aliquid, ad idem operetur et phantasia. Propter similem germanitatem, quando phanta-

image and the authentic object (for to do so needs the judgment of the reason), so the mind needs to rely on what we might call the essential rational principles, or else it too would be deceived and need the judgment of some superior power.

The sixteenth proof. Furthermore, if we know the angels but 20
cannot know them via species derived from the senses (which, being dependent on bodies, do not refer to the angelic forms which do not descend to bodies), then it follows that we know the angels through innate species. For how could we adjudge that angels are natures that do not descend into bodies except through species that do not themselves depend on bodies?

The seventeenth proof. Next, half-way between divine and sen- 21
sory knowledge is intellectual knowledge; so it possesses the intermediary conditions. God knows through His own unmoving essence; the senses know through mobile qualities, that is, through external species. So the mind will acquire knowledge through immobile qualities that are called innate species. The ordering of the universe requires finally that just as pure minds look only to themselves, but the senses look only to other things, so soul, which shares in both mind and sense, should look not only to forms outside itself but to those too inside itself. When we normally say, in the Aristotelian way, that the mind creates new species,[12] we could also say more properly, in the Platonic way, that innate forms are sparked from the innermost recesses of the mind.[13] It is the nature of sister powers to accompany each other in doing something just as they do in existing together, and to arouse each other to action. The smell and the taste are sister powers whence the soul through the smell is often drawn towards the taste. The power of desiring and the nature of being angry are sister powers; so we are easily roused from desire to anger. That the eyes are twins means they both turn together towards the same object. That the sense and phantasy are sisters means that when the sense is working to some end the phantasy is working for the same end. Because of a like

sia species suas profert in actum, mens quoque suas educit in lucem. Non generantur proprie tunc mentis species, sed quae angustius coarctabantur, patent latius et florescunt; quae tepebant, fervent; quae in solo mentis vertice per se lucebant, rutilant eminus et in ratione quae mentem sequitur, iam facta sereniore, refulgent. Itaque quam Aristoteles creationem vocaret in speciebus, Plato coruscationem cognominabit, per quam expergefactus oculus rationis speciebus mentis irradiatur. Prima illa in mente coruscatio intellegentia ipsa est; sequens irradiatio est ipsa rationis[32] discursio. Per intellegentiam essentiae rerum definiuntur. Per rationem componuntur essentiae definitae et argumentationes conficiuntur. Veras autem definitiones essentiarum non potest mens per accidentalia rerum simulacra fabricare, sed eas construit per infusas ab origine rerum omnium rationes.

22 Decima octava ratio. Infusas, inquam, a rationibus rerum quas habet deus. Quae quidem in deo sunt ipsa dei essentia ab ipso deo sub variis rationibus intellecta. Formae igitur omnium in deo sunt, ibique nihil aliud sunt quam essentia ipsa dei, atque omnes habitu simul et actu. Omnes quoque formae sunt in angelo. Non quidem essentia ipsa sunt angeli, sed rationes quaedam essentiales, id est quae semper essentiam comitantur. Ubi vigent habitu, simul omnes et actu, quia, secundum omnes actu, omnia simul intellegit. Praeterea sunt omnes in hominis intellectu, in quo etiam essentiales rationes cognominantur; habitu cunctae simul sicut in angelo, non simul actu, quia non simul utitur universis. Propterea intellectus infimus appellatur et materiae quodammodo similis, quia tamen est praestantior quam materia, ideo effectivo habitu formas

sisterly bond, when the phantasy brings its species into act, the mind too brings its species into the light. Strictly speaking the mind's species are not generated at that moment; rather those that were narrowly constrained open out and blossom, those that were luke-warm grow hot, and those that of themselves were only glowing in the summit of the mind now blaze up as from afar, and are reflected in the reason, rendered now more tranquil, that attends the mind. So what Aristotle would call in the case of the species "creation"[14] Plato will call "coruscation"[15]; and through it the eye of reason is roused and irradiated with the mind's species. The prime coruscation in the mind is understanding itself, the subsequent radiation is the discursive movement of the reason. Through understanding things' essences are defined. Through the reason the defined essences are woven together and arguments assembled. But the mind cannot fashion true definitions of essences using the accidental images of things: it fashions them using the universal rational principles infused in it from the beginning.

The eighteenth proof. {If they are} infused, I say, by the univer- 22
sal rational principles which God Himself possesses, [then] the essences in God are God's essence itself understood under various rational principles by God Himself. Thus the forms of all things are in God, and they are nothing there other than God's very essence and all are simultaneously in habit[16] and in act. All the forms are also in the angel; they are not the essence itself of the angel, but certain essential rational principles, in other words, which always accompany the essence. In the angel they all flourish simultaneously in habit and in act, because, in that they are all in act, the angel understands all things simultaneously. Moreover, all the forms are in man's intellect wherein too they are called the essential rational principles; they are all simultaneously in habit as in the angel, but not simultaneously in act, because the intellect does not use them all at once. That is why the intellect is called "the lowest" and like matter in some respects; yet being superior to

habet, quod materiae[33] non conceditur. Qui habitus appellatur vis mentis agens, quia sese confert ad actum; vis quoque capax, quia suscipit actus perfectionem. Postremo omnes formae sunt in materia. Ubi etiam rationes essentiales ideo nominantur, quia sunt fomites sive habitudines quaedam sive respectus ad formas, essentiam materiae perpetuo comitantes. Quae quidem formarum potentiae sunt, potentiae inquam, capaces formarum, non efficaces, et formae quodammodo ipsae, sed imperfectae. Unde omnes quoque sunt in materia modo perpetuo, secundum quidem potentiam, non tamen secundum efficacem habitum aut actum.[34]

23 Decima nona ratio. Quis neget animum statim a tenera aetate vera, bona, honesta, utilia exoptare? Optat autem intellectus nullus incognita. Ergo insunt[35] istorum aliquae etiam antequam appetat in animo notiones per quas, ceu formas rationesque ipsorum, ea iudicat appetenda. Idem ab inquisitione et inventione probatur. Si in turba hominum quaerat Socrates Alcibiadem, sitque illum aliquando inventurus, necesse est Socratis menti aliquam Alcibiadis figuram inesse, ut sciat quem hominum quaerat prae ceteris atque inventum in coetu multorum Alcibiadem ab aliis discernere valeat. Ita neque indagaret ea quatuor animus, neque aliquando inveniret, nisi haberet illorum (id est veritatis, bonitatis, honestatis, utilitatis) aliquam notionem, per quam illa quaereret inventurus, ut quotiens invenit quae investigaverat, agnoscat atque ab eorum discernat contrariis.

24 Neque solum ab appetitu, indagatione, inventione, sed etiam a iudicio id probamus. Quicumque enim aliquem sibi amicum iudicat vel inimicum, quid amicitia quidve malivolentia sit non igno-

matter, it possesses the forms "in effective habit,"[17] and this is not granted to matter. This habit is called the mind's active power, because it concerns itself with action; it is also called its receptive power, because it receives the act's completion. Lastly, the forms are all in matter. Here too they are called the essential rational principles because they are like kindling awaiting the forms, or like particular pre-dispositions for, or glances back towards, the forms; and they perpetually accompany the essence of matter. They are the potentialities for forms, by which I mean they are capable of receiving the forms, but not of producing them: they are forms in a way but imperfect forms. So all the forms always exist in matter too, but potentially, not habitually or actually.

The nineteenth proof. Who would deny that the soul, from a 23
very early age, immediately desires the things that are true, good, noble, and useful? But no intellect elects the unknown. So some conceptions of these desiderata prior even to its desiring them are present in the soul by means of which (as via their forms and rational principles) it judges them desirable. The same point is proved in searching out and finding. If Socrates is looking for Alcibiades in a crowd of men, and if he is ever going to find him, then some shape of Alcibiades must be present in Socrates' mind, so that he may know the man he is looking for from all the rest and having found him in the press of the throng be able to distinguish Alcibiades from the others. The soul would never search for those four [desiderata], and never find them, therefore, unless (a) it possessed some conception of them, that is, of truth, goodness, honor, and utility; and (b) it could use this conception to look for them in the future, so that whenever it found the ideals it was looking for it might recognize them and distinguish them from their opposites.

We can prove the point not only from desire, searching, and 24
discovery, but from judgment as well. For whoever judges someone a friend or enemy to himself, cannot be ignorant of what

rat. Quonam igitur pacto multa vera vel falsa, bona vel mala, ut solemus, quotidie iudicaremus et recte iudicaremus, nisi esset nobis veritas quodammodo bonitasque ab initio cognita? Quomodo rursus structurae, musicae, picturae et artium ceterarum opera, necnon inventa philosophorum multi etiam in iis artibus non versati probarent saepenumero recte et reprobarent, nisi illarum rerum forma quaedam esset et ratio illis a natura tributa? Comparatio quoque idem nobis ostendit. Quicumque enim mel vino comparans alterum altero pronuntiat dulcius, quis dulcis sit sapor agnoscit; et qui Speusippum et Xenocratem conferens ad Platonem, Xenocratem censet Platonis similiorem quam Speusippum, Platonis figuram proculdubio novit. Eodem modo cum e multis bonis aliud alio melius recte existimemus, et maiori minorive bonitatis ipsius participatione aliud alio melius deteriusve appareat, necesse est bonitatem non ignorare. Praeterea, cum e multis et diversis philosophorum aut etiam aliorum opinionibus, quae veri sit similior et probabilior, saepe optime iudicemus, oportet non deesse nobis aliquem veritatis intuitum, ut quae sint illius similiora non nesciamus. Quapropter nonnulli in adolescentia, aliqui etiam sine praeceptore plerique ex paucissimis doctrinae rudimentis a praeceptoribus demonstratis, doctissimi evasisse traduntur. Quod numquam nisi multum, ut diximus, iuvante natura fieri potuisset. Hoc abunde Socrates Phaedoni, Menoni, Theaeteto adolescentibus demonstravit, docuitque posse pueros recte in singulis artibus respondere, si quis prudenter eos interroget, cum a natura sint artium disciplinarumque omnium rationibus praediti.

friendship or enmity is. So how, as we usually do, could we daily judge, and correctly judge, many things as true or false, good or bad, unless truth and goodness were in a way known to us from the beginning? And how with the works of architecture, music, painting, and the rest of the arts, and even with the findings of the philosophers, could many people even with no experience in these arts both judge (often correctly) and censure, unless nature had given them a form and rational principle of such works? Comparison too shows us the same thing. For whoever in comparing honey to wine pronounces the one sweeter than the other is recognizing which is the sweet taste; and he who compares Speusippus and Xenocrates to Plato, and decides Xenocrates looks more like Plato than Speusippus does, obviously knows what Plato looks like. In the same way, when we estimate correctly that one good, out of a whole number, is better than another, and that one thing appears better or worse than another because it participates to a greater or lesser extent in goodness itself, then we must not be ignorant of goodness. Furthermore, since out of a number of different philosophical or even other views we often judge quite correctly which view is more like the truth and more probable, then some intuition of truth must not be wanting in us in order for us not to be ignorant of what resembles it. That is why some people when they are still young, even though, in some cases, they are completely untutored, or for the most part have received only the barest rudiments of instruction from their teachers, are said to have ended up very learned. This could never have happened unless nature, as we said, was aiding them. Socrates abundantly demonstrated this to Phaedo, Meno and Theaetetus in their youth, and taught that children can answer correctly in the case of specific arts if someone questions them carefully, since they are by nature endowed with the rational principles of all the arts and disciplines.[18]

: IV :

Confirmatio superiorum atque insuper de ideis.

1 Possumus autem ex tribus illis Platonis libris, *Phaedone*, *Menone*, *Theaeteto* atque insuper ex *Parmenide*, *Timaeo* et *Convivio* sic rursus argumentari. Si capite proprie atque praecipue alter quidem maior, alter vero minor denominetur, absurdum id quidem. Primo, quoniam per idem et maior erit et minor. Deinde per aliam speciem in alia specie aliquid collocabitur, puta per capitis speciem in maioris minorisve specie. Praestat autem capite 'capitatum' quam maius aut minus denominare. Denique absurdum est per aliquid parvum maius aliquid dicere. Igitur si formalis afferenda causa est, maioritate maius, minoritate minus cognominabitur. Similiter denarium numerum novenario plurem non unitate proprie appellabimus, siquidem ab unitate proprie unum denominamus, immo pluralitate plurem et alium paucitate pauciorem esse dicemus. Item dualem numerum fieri asseremus non divisione unius in duo, quia etiam coniunctione interdum huius rei atque illius fieri contendetur. Et omnino idem proprie oppositis effici causis non est dicendum. Ergo dualem numerum dualitatis ipsius participatione fieri secundum formam potius asseremus. Sed haec tamquam leviora mittamus; pergamus ad graviora.

2 Si color vel figura est ipsum pulchrum, quonam pacto erit color aliquis vel figura deformis? Item, quanam ratione multa subiecta pulchritudinis unius tamquam communis participarent, nisi una quaedam pulchritudinis natura communis et inesset singulis et

: IV :

Confirmation of the above. Further discussion of the Ideas.

From three books of Plato, the *Phaedo*, the *Meno* and the *Theaetetus*, and also from the *Parmenides*, the *Timaeus* and the *Symposium*,[19] we can also argue as follows. If someone were said to be taller and another shorter by a head in the proper and principal sense of the word, it would be absurd: first because someone would be both taller and shorter via the same thing; and next because something would be located in one species via another species—in this case, in the species of taller or shorter via the species of the head. One should say that he is "headed" or "ahead" by a head, not is taller or shorter by a head. In short, it is absurd by way of something small to call something taller. So if the formal cause is brought to bear, something will be denominated taller by tallness, shorter by shortness. Similarly we call the number ten more than the number nine not strictly speaking by oneness—for one properly comes from oneness—but rather by moreness; and we will say that the nine is less by lessness. Likewise we will say that the number two does not come into being by the division of the one into two; because we could also maintain that the two is produced every now and then by the addition of this and that thing, and what is entirely the same cannot be said to result, strictly speaking, from two opposite causes. So in terms of form, the number two results from the participation in twoness itself. But let us leave these as trivial matters and turn to more weighty ones. 1

If the beautiful itself is color or shape, how will any color or shape be ugly? Or again, why would many subjects participate in a single beauty as the universal beauty, unless the nature of some beauty, which is single and universal, were present in individual 2

praeesset, ut ab ea quae praeest dependeat et quae inest? Proinde aliud est ipsa bonitas quam res quae bonitatis participatione fiunt bonae, aliud pulchritudo quam res pulchrae similiterque de ceteris speciebus quas Plato vocat ideas. Corpora enim pulchra multa sunt, ipsa vero pulchritudo una est; nam omne primum summumque in aliquo rerum[36] genere unum est solummodo. Rursus haec pulchra duas habent naturas, tum materiam[37] corporalem, quae fit particeps pulchritudinis, tum pulchritudinis qualitatem; ipsa vero pulchritudo nihil est aliud quam pulchritudo, quoniam quicquid est in genere aliquo primum tale nihil aliud est quam tale. Item, corpora haec partim pulchra sunt, partim etiam turpia, nam ex ipsa sua materia, quae aliud aliquid est quam pulchritudo, deformia iudicantur; ipsa vero pulchritudo turpitudinem non admittit, si modo opposita vicissim se fugiunt. Corpora quoque pulchra mutantur[38] et modo pulchra sunt, modo contra. Pulchritudo vero ideo immutabilis[39] est, quia et nihil est aliud quam pulchritudo, et quantum pulchritudo est, non mutatur, quia sic neque vertitur in contrarium, neque privatur quandoque fundamento et sustentaculo, cum seipsa sustineat. Adde quod corporalia quaeque aliis pulchra videri possunt, aliis vero non pulchra; ipsa vero pulchritudo carere pulchritudine cogitari non potest. Praeterea corpora formosa divisibilia sunt, pulchritudo autem indivisibilis. Non parva est, quia magna corpora non formaret; non magna, quia parvis corporibus non congrueret. Denique non est corporea, quoniam rebus spiritalibus[40] non competeret. Non est etiam temporalis, quia rebus non inesset aeternis. Inest autem multo magis animabus et mentibus quam corporibus. Sed neque in illis est prima, tum quia illae secundum se deformes sunt, nisi formentur a bono cuius splendor est pulchritudo, tum quia illae veritatem appetunt tamquam pulchram, pulchritudo vero non expetit semetip-

objects and at the same time preeminent; and this in order that the beauty which is present may depend on the beauty which is preeminent? So goodness itself is other than the objects which become good by participation in goodness; beauty is other than beautiful objects, and so on for the rest of the species which Plato calls Ideas. For there are many beautiful bodies, but only one beauty itself; for everything that is first and highest in some universal genus is one in one way alone. Again, beautiful things have two natures, the corporeal nature which becomes a participant in beauty, and the quality of beauty. But beauty itself is nothing other than beauty, because whatever is first in some genus is nothing else but such. Again, bodies are partly beautiful and partly ugly; for they are adjudged ugly because of their matter, which is something other than beauty; but beauty itself does not admit of ugliness if only [because] opposites in turn shun each other. Beautiful bodies also change: they are beautiful at one moment and not at another. But beauty is unchangeable precisely because it is nothing other than beauty, and to the extent that it is beauty, it does not change because it neither turns towards its opposite, nor is ever deprived of its basis and support since it sustains itself. Moreover, some corporeal objects can seem beautiful to some people but not to others; but beauty itself cannot be conceived of as lacking beauty. Beautiful bodies are divisible, beauty is indivisible: it is not small, because then it would not form large bodies; it is not large, because then it would not accord with small bodies; and it is not corporeal, because it would not accord with things spiritual. It is not temporal even, because it would not be present in things eternal. Yet it is in fact present to a far greater extent in souls and minds than it is in bodies. But even in them it is not prime beauty, (a) because in themselves souls and minds are ugly, unless they are formed by the good whose splendor is beauty; (b) because they desire truth for its beauty, but beauty does not desire itself; and (c) because what we yearn for as worthy of love, absolutely and uni-

sam, tum denique quia simpliciter et communiter amabile est non esse quidem animale vel intellectuale, sed bene bonumque esse. Cum vero bonum summe alliciat, summa est pulchritudo. Itaque idea ipsa pulchrorum est super corpora, animas, mentes. Est una, simplex, pura, immutabilis, indivisibilis, incorporea[41] et aeterna. Atque eadem idearum omnium est natura, quod hinc quoque alio[42] exemplo probamus.

3 Hic homo quando illum generat hominem, non proprie specificam humanitatem ipsam, quae communiter in utroque consideratur, gignit. Gigneret enim et seipsum, qui per humanitatem extat. Praeterea, terminata natura, naturam interminatam generare non potest. Non ergo causa est hic homo ut simpliciter humanitas sit, sed ut in illa materia propagetur. Oportet autem naturae humanae communis esse communem causam atque etiam per se agentem, quod ostendit ordinatissima eius et stabilis compositio. Quamobrem super agentia in speciebus particularia extare oportet universale agens, speciem respiciens atque dirigens. Quod etiam apparet in iis quae absque manifestis seminibus generantur, ut alias demonstravimus.

4 Argumentantur rursus multi Platonicorum a mentis obiectis hunc in modum. Cum intellectus noster naturaliter formas capiat rationesque intellegat vel separatas vel separando, sequitur ut communes ipsae rerum separataeque a materia rationes naturalia sint eius obiecta. Quoniam vero obiecta eiusmodi movent, formant, perficiunt intellectum, ideo in praestantiori veriorique universi gradu sunt constitutae; longissimeque a figmentis absunt, ne mens, et veritatis iudex et sensuum emendatrix, a veritate remotior sit quam sensus. Quamobrem rationes illae merito[43] sublimiores, veriores, efficaciores naturae existimantur quam intellectus qui inde formantur. Sed numquid illae rursus intellectuales sunt appellandae? Non quidem proprie. Siquidem rationales animae se-

versally, is not ensouled or intellectual being, but rather well-being and being good. But since the good attracts in the highest degree, it is the highest beauty. The Idea itself of beautiful things is therefore above bodies, souls, and minds. It is one, simple, unmixed, unchanging, indivisible, incorporeal, and eternal. And this is the identical nature of all the Ideas, as we will also prove from another example.

3 When this man begets that man, he does not, in the strict sense, beget the specific human nature that is contemplated as common to them both. For in that case he would beget himself because he exists through human nature. Moreover, the finite nature cannot generate the infinite nature. So this man is not the cause of human nature simply being but rather of its being propagated in that particular matter. The cause of universal human nature has to be universal and also self-acting as its highly ordered and stable composition demonstrates. Wherefore above the particular agents in the species there must be a universal agent that watches over and directs the species. The point is also evident in the case of those things that are generated without any apparent seeds, as I have shown elsewhere.[20]

4 Many of the Platonists argue also from the objects of the mind in the following way. Since our intellect naturally receives forms and understands rational principles either as separate or by separating them, it follows that these universal [forms] of things and the rational principles separated from matter are its natural objects. But since these objects move and form and perfect the intellect, they are placed at a higher and truer level of the universe and are as far away as possible from illusory images, lest the mind, the judge of truth, the rectifier of the senses, be further away from the truth than the senses. Wherefore the rational principles are with good reason considered to be natures that are more sublime, more true, and more powerful than the intellects that are formed from them. Should they in turn be called intellectual? Strictly, no! For

cundum participationem intellectuales sunt; angeli vero intellectuales secundum formam; rationes denique illae atque ideae intellectuales quidem secundum causam, intellegibiles vero secundum formam. Intellectuale enim ad intellegibile ita ferme se habet, ut appetens et mobile atque formabile ad appetibilem motorem atque formatorem. Sed ubinam sunt?

5 Sane ideas minus communes in ideis communioribus generatim Platonici collocant ac demum[44] omnia idearum genera in ipso ente primo, communissimo entium atque perfectissimo, quod summum intellegibile vocant—intellegibile quidem[45] secundum formam, intellectuale vero secundum causam, cui proxime subdunt mentes quam plurimas intellectuales secundum formam, intellegibiles vero secundum participationem. His autem rationales subiiciunt animas, intellectuales iam participatione quadam, intellegibiles vero nequaquam. Proinde censent ens ipsum ipsumque intellegibile idem esse, quoniam ens sit naturale et adaequatum intellectus ipsius qua ratione est intellectus obiectum. Praeterea, intellegibile ipsum sub primo rerum principio collocant. Illud enim tale est, ut comprehendi quodammodo possit; hoc vero nequaquam. Principium primum appellant proprie unitatem ipsam atque bonitatem. Et quia unitas eminentiam lucemque procul ab omnibus segregatam refert, intellegibile vero refert lumen quoddam iam intellectibus proportione quadam accommodatum, ideo unitatem et aliud et superius quam intellegibile esse putant. Rursus, quia mentes tam intellegere quam intellegibile appetunt, non simpliciter sed et bene et bonum; bonum vero simpliciter appetunt, idcirco hac etiam ratione bonum, id est deum summum, ipsi enti, quod et intellegibile est, praeponunt. Mitto quod intellegibile respicit intellectum; bonum vero respicit voluntatem. Itaque non solum hoc ab illo est differens, sed praestantius, quippe cum

rational souls are intellectual in terms of participation, angels are intellectual in terms of form, and the rational principles and Ideas finally are intellectual in terms of cause but intelligible in terms of form. For the intellectual has more or less the same relationship to the intelligible as something that feels desire, is mobile, and receives form to what is desired, is a mover, and is what forms. But where are they located?

Platonists generally place the less universal within the more universal Ideas, and ultimately all the genera of Ideas in the prime being itself, the most universal and perfect of all beings, which they call the highest intelligible—intelligible at any rate in terms of form though intellectual in terms of cause. Directly below it, they place minds, which are to the highest degree intellectual in terms of form but intelligible in terms of participation. And below them they place rational souls, which are intellectual by a sort of participation, but are in no sense intelligible. The Platonists also suppose that being itself and the intelligible itself are the same, since being is the natural and sufficient object of the intellect itself qua intellect. Moreover, they subordinate the intelligible itself to the first principle of things. For the intelligible is such that it can in a sense be comprehended, whereas the first principle cannot. Properly they call the first principle unity itself and goodness. And since unity refers to a preeminence, a light far removed from everything, while the intelligible refers to a light already adapted in a certain proportion to intellects, they believe that unity is different from and superior to the intelligible. Again, because minds desire understanding and the intelligible alike, not absolutely but to understand well and to understand the good, but they desire the good absolutely, they accordingly prefer the good, that is, God on high, to being itself which is the intelligible. I need hardly mention that the intelligible concerns the intellect, but the good the will. So not only does the good differ from the intellect but it is superior, insofar as what seizes hold of the will is more eminent than

praestantius sit quod voluntatem rapit, quam quod ab intellectu comprehenditur. Quapropter ens ipsum ab intellectu pro viribus percipi opinantur; bonum vero per voluntatem potius ad seipsum animam trahere atque tractam in se quoque transfundere. Et si quo pacto ab anima iam occupata suo modo tangitur, tangi proprie per unitatem mentis caput, quam ab initio nobis deus, qui est unitas universi princeps, inseruit.

6 Ceterum, ut ad propositum revertamur, in ipso quidem bono ideas per causae modum esse solum relativis quibusdam rationibus tantum inter se distinctas; in ipso vero intellegibili per formam proprie atque absolutis insuper formis invicem differentes; in sequentibus mentibus, sive a corpore separatis sive coniunctis, participatione iam quadam et gradatim magis magisque distinctas; in natura vero semina quaedam infima formarum ab ideis infusa; in materia denique umbras. Ipsum quidem bonum Plato in *Epistolis* deum patrem nominat, ipsum vero intellegibile deum filium. Plotinus quoque et deum de deo, et de luce lumen, et rationem verbumque dei. Rursus, Plato in *Epinomide* per rationem huiusmodi divinam sive verbum, quem mundum vocat intellegibilem, affirmat mundum fuisse sensibilem exornatum. Quoniam vero ideae in primo quidem una forma sunt, in secundo vero multae formae (non enim putant in prima forma absolutam diversitatem esse formarum), ideo Plato contemplatus et colores in lumine circa lucem et lineas in circulo circa centrum, inquit in *Epistolis* multiformes ideas absolute distinctas circa primum rerum principium esse potius quam in primo. Similiter in libro *De republica* septimo ideam inquit boni, id est ipsum bonum, in cuius forma omnes ideae una forma sunt, pulchrarum esse causam idearum, videlicet illarum

what is understood by the intellect. Wherefore they opine that being itself is perceived by the intellect with all its power, whereas the good draws the soul to itself through the will, and also takes the soul thus drawn and brings it into itself. And if in some manner the good is touched by the soul it has already possessed in its own way, then it is touched, strictly speaking, by way of the unity which is the mind's head, and which God, who is the prime unity of the universe, implanted in us from the beginning.

But to return to the subject in hand. We declare that in the 6
good itself the Ideas are only distinguished from each other by way of cause and solely for particular, relative reasons. But in the intelligible they differ both properly by way of form and mutually besides as absolute forms. In the subsequent minds, whether separated from a body or joined, they are now rendered different by a certain participation, and gradually more and more so. In nature they become the lowest, the particular seeds of forms, seeds infused in her by the Ideas. Lastly, in matter they are shadows. Plato in his *Letters* calls the good itself God the father, but the intelligible, God the son.[21] Plotinus calls the intelligible both the God from God, and the light from light, and the reason and word of God.[22] Again in the *Epinomis* Plato affirms that the sensible world was adorned through this divine reason or word, which he calls the intelligible world.[23] But because in the first [hypostasis] the Ideas are one single form, but in the second are multiple forms (for Plato and Plotinus do not believe an absolutely independent diversity of forms dwells in the first form), so Plato, having contemplated both the colors in the light around a light and the lines in a circle around a circle, says in his *Letters* that the multiform, absolutely distinct Ideas are "around" the first universal principle rather than in it.[24] Likewise in the *Republic* book seven, he says that the Idea of the good, that is, the good itself, within whose form all Ideas are one single form, is the cause of the beautiful

quae in sequentibus multae formae sunt absolutae invicem differentes.

7 Superioribus rationibus Plotinus et Proclus ideas confirmant et aliter in deo, ut aiunt, primo ponunt, aliter in secundo. Alii vero nonnulli ad idem ita procedunt. In materia quidem postrema idearum umbra resultat, super materiam vero idearum omnium lucet facies, quarum fons est deus, rerum auctor, ut Platonis *Timaeus* planissime docet ac liber *De republica* decimus et *Parmenides*. Si enim mens et natura plenae formarum sunt perque illas agunt, quod in naturalibus artificiisque apparet, merito et deus, qui naturae mentisque formator est, informis esse non debet. Per formas igitur agit, quas appellamus ideas. Has Plotinus et Proclus non solum exemplares, sed etiam essentiales formas appellant; putant enim opificem mundi nulla in fabricando mundo consultatione uti—talem enim imperfectam operationem esse. Atque eum qui de opere perficiendo consultat, prius in se imperfectum opus quodammodo concepisse, deinde de illius absolutione perquirere; quod a mente perfecta est alienum. Item, si universum mutabili solum providentiae discursu disponeretur, non esset usquam[46] stabile quicquam, neque perpetuus esset mundi motus et stabilis. Igitur deus universum per esse suum facit atque disponit, praesertim cum eiusmodi actio et prima et communissima et facillima sit omnium actionum, ideoque a causa quadam prima, communissima, felicissima[47] sit, ubicumque sit, eique in primis conveniat. Omnis autem causa quae ipso esse facit, talem sequenti gradu facit effectum, qualis est ipsa primo. Cum igitur mundus sit cunctarum complexio specierum, sequitur ut mundi opifex, modo quodam

Ideas,[25] those in other words which are many in what succeeds and which differ absolutely from each other.

Using the arguments above, Plotinus and Proclus affirm the 7
Ideas and place them in one manner in the first God, as they call Him, and in another in the second.[26] Several others reach the same conclusion by the following argument. In matter is the reflection of the ultimate shadow of the Ideas, while above matter shines forth the countenance of all the Ideas whose source is God, the author of all things, as Plato's *Timaeus* manifestly teaches and the tenth book of the *Republic* and the *Parmenides*.[27] For if mind and nature are full of forms, and operate by means of them (and this is evident in matters both natural and artificial), then it is logical that God, who is the form-giver to nature and to mind, should not be without form. So He acts by means of the forms that we call the Ideas. Plotinus and Proclus call them not just the exemplary, but the essential forms,[28] for they believe that the creator of the world does not need consultation in fashioning the world, for such would make the operation imperfect. Moreover they say that anyone who consults someone about perfecting a work must have first conceived it in himself as imperfect in a way, and then he inquires about perfecting it; and this is foreign to a perfect mind. Again, if the universe were ordered solely by the mutable discursiveness of providence, nothing anywhere would be unchanging, nor would the world's movement be everlasting and unchanging. So God creates the world and sets it in order through His own being, and especially because such an action is the first, most universal, and most effortless of all actions, and comes from a first, most universal, and most blessed cause wherever it is and wherever it primarily accords with Him. For every cause which operates through its own being produces an effect at the next level down that resembles what it is itself at the first level. Since therefore the world is a combination of all the species, it follows that the Creator of the world, in a manner far beyond our capacity to conceive,

supra quam cogitari possit praestantiore, specierum omnium complexio sit et omnium formas habeat exemplares sibiquemet, ut illorum more loquar, essentiales. Quod iterum ita confirmant: si ars naturam imitatur perque operum rationes efficit opera, ergo et natura suorum operum possidet rationes. Rursus, natura, cum ex seipsa careat ratione et moveatur perficiaturque a deo, rationes accipit ab ipsis divinae mentis ideis. Et quanto naturae rationes interiores ipsi naturae sunt quam rationes artis arti, tanto saltem rationes divinas interiores oportet esse deo quam naturae rationes ipsi naturae.

8 Addunt quod formae sensibiles haud omnino vereque sunt tales quales cognominantur. Sane aequalitates et similitudo passim inaequalitatis dissimilitudinisque fit particeps. Formositas autem vera in subiecto per se deformi informique esse non potest. Bonum quoque verum ubi defectus et proclivitas est ad malum esse nequit. Quinetiam in caelestibus nolunt esse veram lineam superficiemque, verum centri polorumque punctum, siquidem quorum ratio est impartibilis, ipsa in re partibili esse non possint. Sed animus noster veras habet gignitque formas, per quas alias falsi redarguit, quantum a veris distent animadvertens. Quamobrem multo magis anima universi veras formarum possidet rationes et gignit. Ubi enim virtus intellegentiaque praestantior, ibi expressiorum formarum conceptio atque partus. Denique mundi opifex certiores etiam perfectioresque formas in seipso gignit atque (ut Procli verbis utar) dum se animadvertendo seipsum gignit, in se simul generat omnia.

9 Accedit ad haec quod cum universi membra perpetuo quodam ordine inter se conspirent, non casu sed ratione conciliantur atque reguntur. Ratio illa quae ordinat omnia seipsam ignorare non po-

is a combination of all the species, and has for Himself the exemplary forms, or to use the language of Plotinus and Proclus, the essential forms, of all. They confirm this again with the argument that if art imitates nature and uses the rational principles of works in order to fashion them, then nature too possesses the rational principles of its works. Again, since it lacks reason of itself and is moved and brought to perfection by God, nature receives the rational principles from the very Ideas of the divine mind. And to the degree that nature's rational principles are more internal to nature itself than those of art to art, then, to say the least, the divine rational principles must be more internal to God than those of nature to nature.

8 Plotinus and Proclus add that sensible forms are not completely and truly what they are said to be. For instance, equalities and similarity always partake of inequality and difference. But true beauty[29] cannot exist in a subject that is ugly and without form of itself. True good too cannot exist where defect and a proclivity for evil dwell. Moreover, they do not wish there to be a true line or surface among celestials, or a true point of the center or of the poles, since the things whose rational principle is indivisible cannot exist in what is divisible. But our soul possesses and gives birth to the true forms, and uses them to convict other forms of falsehood by noting how far they deviate from the true ones. Wherefore to a much greater degree the soul of the universe must possess and bring to birth the forms' true rational principles. For where the power and understanding are more eminent, there we find the conception and birth of clearer forms. Lastly, the world's Creator begets within Himself even more certain and perfect forms; and, to quote Proclus, while He begets Himself in observing Himself, simultaneously He generates all within Himself.[30]

9 Furthermore, since the parts of the universe mutually cohere in an eternal order, they are reconciled and ruled not by chance but by reason. That reason which orders all things cannot be ignorant

test, alioquin ratio summa foret irrationalis, si nullam rationem sui ipsius haberet. Rationalior enim ratio est quae seipsam cognoscendo complectitur, quam quae ignorando se deserit. Illa igitur se tamquam rationem omnium ordinatricem intellegit, quo efficitur ut quibus rationibus modisque singula disponantur, semper intellegat. Quamobrem in summa omnium ratione sunt omnium rationes. Utrum igitur, quia deus facturus erat omnia, cuncta cognovit? Non certe, alioquin essentialem operationem ipsamque ad seipsum conversionem ad externa referret atque aliunde penderet. Igitur quemadmodum sol in se lucendo illuminat omnia, sic deus intellegendo atque volendo seipsum et scit et efficit omnia. Quis non viderit, si videndo se videt facitque cuncta, sequi ut in substantia sua substantiales formae sint quae exemplaria causaeque sint omnium?

10 Semper enim in ipso naturae ordine ita se res habet ut ab interiori actione procedat exterior, atque inde opus actioni persimile, quemadmodum a luce[48] illuminare, ab illuminatione illuminatum illuminationi lucique simile. Proinde plantae et animalia ex seminibus generantur. Oportet autem in semine rationes esse quodammodo animantis inde rationaliter procreati. Non tamen sunt in semine corporeo nisi potentia. Uniforme enim semen est ac paene informe; quod autem inde gignitur, multiforme atque formosum. Item, si semen dividatur, plura inde[49] tota, quae nascuntur, quasi in partibus tota lateant, quae gignuntur. Hinc patet vim seminariam in semine ipso latentem esse quodammodo incorpoream,[50] in qua sit huius motus generationisque[51] principium. Oportet autem multiplicis animantis rationes multiplices seminariae inesse virtuti quam vocamus naturam. Idem enim, prout idem est, diversitatem

of itself, otherwise, if it had no rational principle of itself, the highest reason would be irrational. For the reason that includes knowing itself is more rational than the reason that by not knowing detracts from itself. So it understands itself as the reason that gives order to all things; and hence it always understands by what rational principles and modes individual objects are arranged. Thus the rational principles of all things are in the highest reason of all. So is it that God, who was about to create all things, knew them all? For a certainty no, otherwise He would be referring to things external His own essential activity and conversion to Himself, and be depending on something else. Thus, just as the sun by lighting in itself gives light to all, so God by understanding and willing Himself knows and effects all. Isn't it obvious, that, if, in the process of seeing Himself, He sees and makes all, then the substantial forms that are the patterns and causes of all must exist in His substance?

For things are so arranged in the order of nature that the external always proceeds from the internal action, and hence the product closely resembles the action. For example, from a light comes illumination, and from illumination the thing illuminated which resembles both the illumination and the light. Similarly animals and plants are propagated from seeds. But in the seed must exist in some way the rational principles of the animal rationally procreated from it. Yet they are not in the corporeal seed except potentially; for the seed is uniform and almost without form, but what is born from it is multiform and beautiful.[31] Again, if the seed is divided, a number of wholes results, and these are born as though they were begotten wholes lying hidden in the parts. It is evident that hiding in the seed is a seminal force, which is in a way incorporeal, and in which dwells the principle of this motion and generation. The multiple rational principles of the multiple living being must be present in the seminal power we call nature. For the same qua the same could not [otherwise] directly produce such a great

tantam proxime generare non posset. Insuper inesse actu necessarium est. Quod enim est potentia tale, tamquam imperfectum, in aliquid actu tale non aliter quam per aliquid, quod actu tale sit perfectiusque, produci potest. Insunt ergo singularum animantis partium specie differentium singulae rationes, quibus suo singula tempore locoque et ordine procreentur atque excisa, si fieri potest, saepissime recreentur.

11 Sed numquid seminariae vires in seminibus animantium summae causae sunt? Nequaquam. Non enim ab ulla illarum fit species ipsa, sed quiddam potius particulare sub specie, et quaelibet illarum ab alio sub eadem specie ducit originem. Ideo ad universalem naturam confugiendum,[52] in qua universales sint suarum specierum omnium rationes—ad naturam inquam terrae, terrenorum procreatricem, praesertim cum saepe plantis et animalibus passim sponte nascentibus semina corporalia desint. Quo fit ut ad eorum productionem seminibus incorporeis opus sit. Atque ut convenienti ordine procedamus, singulas terrenorum species ad universalem referamus terrae naturam, similiterque in ceteris elementis, deinde quatuor elementorum naturas proxime ad lunae naturam, in qua sint elementalium omnium rationes, naturam vero lunae ad naturam sphaerae superioris similiterque deinceps. Cunctas denique naturas ad ipsam universi naturam, in qua necessario sint tam naturalium quam naturarum omnium rationes; rationes inquam et exemplares et effectrices, ut naturas omnes certis regulis ad certa dirigat et perducat.

12 Non potest autem natura esse ratio causaque rerum summa, tum quia per se irrationalis est, quod in nostra natura patet, nam neque se neque alia novit, tum quia est causa effectui mixta, perinde ac si faber lignis infusus tractet ligna. Tali enim causa opus

diversity. Furthermore, this force must be actually present. For what is potentially such, being imperfect, cannot be educed into something actually such except by way of something that is actually such and [so] more perfect. Thus the individual rational principles of the individual parts of a living creature, parts differing in species, are present [in the seminal power]. By virtue of these principles the individual [members] can be produced each at the right time and place and in due order; and once severed, most often they can, if it is at all possible, be recreated.

Yet surely the seminal powers in the seeds of living things are 11
not the highest causes? Certainly not! For issuing from any one of the powers is not the species itself but rather some particular in the species; and each of the powers originates from another particular in the same species. One must have recourse then to the universal nature wherein are the universal rational principles of all the species – to the nature of the earth I mean, the procreator of things earthly; and especially since corporeal seeds are often missing in plants and animals that are born spontaneously everywhere. Hence incorporeal seeds are needed for their production. In order to proceed in the proper order, let us refer the individual species of things earthly to earth's universal nature, and similarly with the other elements; then refer the natures of the four elements directly to the nature of the moon, which contains the rational principles of all the elements; and then the nature of the moon to the nature of the sphere above it, and so on. Finally, let us refer all these natures to the nature of the universe, which necessarily contains the rational principles alike of all natural objects as of all natures, [i.e.] the exemplary and productive principles, in order that it might direct and guide all the natures by set rules to fixed ends.

However, nature cannot be the highest principle and cause of 12
things, both because it is in itself irrational, as is clear in our own nature which is aware neither of itself nor of another, and also because it is a cause mixed in with its effect, just like a carpenter em-

erat, ut quae ab alio extrinsecoque et communi moventur, familiarem quandam intrinsecamque virtutem a separata causa possiderent. Quippe cum et haec non aliter proprie, distincte, accommodate ducantur, quam per virtutem ipsis propriam, distinctam,[53] accommodatam, et causa tandem excellentissima, quae pure et absolute operi dominatura est, ab ipso opere per essentiam et esse et virtutem oporteat esse secretam, sicut in aere videmus calorem quidem a sole superno misceri, lumen vero nequaquam. Oportet autem naturam, etsi per se irrationalis est, tamen corporalium rationes habere, quibus possit intrinsecus singula congruis modis ad finem convenientem rationaliter ordinare, movere, formare, cumque per se irrationalis sit,[54] ab eo quod per se rationale est duci debet rationibusque formari. Nempe irrationale est naturae[55] per se irrationali ordinem universi committere. Igitur in causa superiore necesse est rationes rerum adeo rationaliter esse, ut causa ipsa se suaque animadvertens et sui et rationum suarum certam habeat rationem. Absurdum certe foret, cum nos tum nostri, tum nostrorum operum, tum universi rationes habeamus, causam universi neque sui neque suorum rationes habere. Quamobrem, si mundi conditor omnia novit, certe non respexit in alia ut illa perciperet, siquidem cognitio eius alia ipsamet cognitione producta proculdubio antecedit. Quis enim ignoret externum opus sequi intrinsecam actionem? Itaque Deus in seipsum respiciens novit omnia. Quo fit ut in ipso sint omnium species, per quas cuncta cognoscat et faciat. Atque, ut summatim dicam, quemadmodum in hoc materiali mundo materiae omnes in unam tandem inti-

bedded in the wood working the wood.[32] Such a cause was needed so that the objects that are moved by another universal external cause might possess from a separate cause an internal power peculiar to them. This is because: (a) such objects are not led properly, distinctly, and appropriately except by way of a power which is peculiar, distinct, and appropriate to themselves; but (b) in the end the all-excelling cause, which is going to rule the work purely and absolutely, must be set apart through [its] essence, being, and power from the work itself. In the air, analogously, we [actually] see the heat indeed being mixed in by the supernal sun but not the light. But even though nature is irrational in itself, it must contain the rational principles of corporeal objects for it to be able to order, move, and form individual entities from within, in ways that suit them, towards a goal that is appropriate, and in accordance with reason; and since it is in itself irrational, it ought both to be guided by what is in itself rational and to be formed by rational principles. It *is* indeed irrational to entrust the order of the universe to a nature that is in itself irrational. So the rational principles of things must be rationally present in the higher cause, in such a way that the cause, being aware of itself and its own, possesses a definite rational principle of itself and of its own rational principles. It would be quite absurd for us to have rational principles of ourselves, of our works, and of the universe, if the cause of the universe did not have rational principles of itself or of its own. Wherefore, if the Creator of the world knows all things, He certainly did not look to others in order to perceive them, since undoubtedly His knowledge precedes the objects that are created by that knowledge. For who does not know that an external work follows on an internal action? So by looking to Himself, God knows all. Consequently the species of all are in Him, and by means of them He understands and creates all. To sum up, just as all the matters in this material world eventually are reduced to one inner

mamque materiam, sic et multo magis in mundo formali formae omnes in unam intimamque formam necessario[56] reducuntur.

13 Quod hinc rursus argumentari licet, quod omnis vita prolem suam penes seipsam prius generat quam seorsum, et quo praestantior vita est, eo interiorem sibimet generat prolem. Sic vita vegetativa tam in arboribus quam in animalibus semen quasi arborem et quasi animal in corpore proprio prius generat, quam aut iaciat extra, aut arborem inde animalve externum producat. Sic sensitiva vita, quae est vegetativa praestantior, per phantasiam in se simulacrum intentionemque rerum parit prius quam in externa materia fabricet. Sed foetus ille phantasiae primus quia in ipsamet anima est, ideo propinquior est animae quam foetus vegetativae vitae, qui non fit in anima, sed in corpore. Sic vita rationalis, quae est excellentior sensitiva, parit in seipsa rationem tum rerum, tum sui ipsius quasi foetum prius quam vel loquendo vel agendo promat in lucem. Primus ille foetus propinquior est animae quam phantasiae foetus. Vis enim rationalis in foetum suum perque illum in seipsam reflectitur, quod non efficit phantasia. Sic angelica vita notiones[57] sui ipsius et rerum promit in se antequam depromat in mundi materiam. Proles haec interior est angelo quam rationi sua, quia neque ab externis incitata est neque mutatur. Quamobrem divina vita eminentissima et fecundissima omnium universam hanc mundi machinam tamquam prolem suam in se generat priusquam pariat extra. Oportet autem huiusmodi prolem, quam Orpheus Palladem vocat Iovis capite natam, magis intimam, ut ita dixerim, esse deo, quam angeli notionem angelicae menti. In angelo quippe, cum sit esse aliud quam intellegere, notio quae generatur intellegendo aliud est quam angeli ipsius essentia. In deo autem, quia esse et intellegere idem sunt, notio quam deus intellegendo seipsum gignit tamquam exactissimam sui ipsius imaginem idem

matter, so to a far greater extent all the forms in the formal world are necessarily reduced to one inner form.

13 One may also argue from the fact that every life generates its progeny first within itself and then externally, and the more eminent the life, the more it generates for itself an inner offspring. Thus the vegetative life in trees and animals alike generates a seed like a tree or an animal within its own body before it either ejaculates it or produces an external tree or animal from it. Similarly the sensitive life, which is more eminent than the vegetative, produces through the phantasy an image or intention of things in itself before giving them shape in external matter. But the first offspring of the phantasy, since it is in the soul itself, is more akin to the soul than is the offspring of the vegetative life that is not fashioned in the soul but in the body. Similarly the rational life, which is superior to the sensitive, produces in itself the rational principle of objects and of itself as if the principle were a child, before presenting it to the light in speaking or acting. Its first offspring is more akin to the soul than the offspring of the phantasy. For the rational power reflects on its offspring and thereby on itself; and this the phantasy does not do. Similarly the angelic life marshals in itself notions or conceptions of itself and of things before conducting them into the world's matter. This progeny is more internal to the angel than the reason's progeny to the reason, because it is unaffected by external objects and it does not change. So the divine life, which is the most sublime and most fecund of all, first engenders the world's universal machine within itself as its child before bringing it to birth outside itself. This child, whom Orpheus calls the Pallas born from the head of Jupiter,[33] is more internal to God, if one may say so, than is the angel's conception to the angelic mind. For in the angel, since being is other than understanding, the conception that is generated by understanding is other than the actual essence of the angel. But in God, since being and understanding are the same, the conception

est atque ipse deus. Quoniam vero generationem voluptas comitatur, *Timaeus* Platonis inquit deum opere suo mirifice delectari. In prole autem illa dei intima, quae universale semen est mundi, insunt propria semina membrorum omnium quae in mundo hoc prole eius externa gignuntur. Semina illa essentia inter se conveniunt, ne deus sit substantia multiplex. Differunt ratione, ne quicquid in mundo sit, sine ulla varietate sit unicum. Age sic ultra procede.

14 Cum deus vim habeat infinitam et res quae sequuntur eum cunctae finitam, ideoque divina virtus non sit determinata ad ea solum agenda quibus finitae res possunt subministrare, sed queat absque illis insuper innumerabilia opera etiam incorporalia facere, an non necessarium tibi videtur in deo horum operum formas, quae absque instrumentis certisque subiectis facere potest, ita relatione saltem distinctas esse, ut propriam illic habeant rationem? Nam cum ab uno, quantum unum omnino est, absque medio subiectove certo non fiant multa, nulla est ratio ob quam formae tales possint ex deo multiplices emanare nisi multiplex, ut ita dicam, et quodammodo multiformis sapientia dei. Quinetiam quicquid reliquae causae agunt, id omne operantur tamquam primae causae instrumenta, atque ita agunt, ut temperantur ab illa. Temperantur autem ducunturque a deo certis modis ad certas formas in materia generandas, non per aliud quam per certas formarum rationes quae sunt in deo, quemadmodum instrumenta artis atque naturae per formas agentis diriguntur ad formas. Atque ut formae tum artificiosae, tum naturales perspicuae magis sunt in agente quam in opere vel instrumentis, ita mundi totius formae expressiores modo suo in deo sunt quam in sequentibus causis et materia. Quamobrem Mercurius putat mundum esse omniformis dei imaginem omniformem. Et Plato in *Timaeo* inquit divinam virtutem, cum

that God creates by understanding Himself, as the most faithful copy of Himself, is the same as God Himself. Since delight attends generation, God, as Plato's *Timaeus* tells us,[34] wonderfully rejoices in His work. But within the innermost child of God, which is the universal seed of the world, are the specific seeds of all the parts produced in this world by its external offspring. In essence these seeds accord together, lest God be multiple in substance; but they differ in rational principle, lest whatever exists in the world be of one kind and without any variety. But to proceed.

Since God has infinite power while all that follow Him have 14
finite power, and since the divine power is not limited solely to doing those things to which finite objects can contribute, but can effect innumerable additional works, certainly incorporeal ones, without them, doesn't it seem necessary to you that in God the forms of those works which He can create without instruments or definite subjects must be so distinguished, at least in terms of relation, that they have in Him their own rational principle? For since the many cannot issue from the one, insofar as it is entirely one, without an intermediary or a definite subject, no rational principle can account for such manifold forms being able to emanate from God, unless it is God's manifold and multiform wisdom, if I may call it so. Furthermore, whatever the other causes do, they do it all as instruments of the first cause, and they act as they are tempered by the cause. But they are tempered and led by God in certain ways to generate definite forms in matter exclusively through the definite rational principles of the forms that are in Him, just as the instruments of art and nature are guided towards forms by means of the agent's forms. And just as both artificial and natural forms are more perspicuous in the agent than in his work or in his instruments, so the forms of the whole world are more perspicuous in their own way in God than they are in subsequent causes and in matter. That is why Mercury {Trismegistus} thinks of the world as the omniform image of the omniform God.[35] And Plato

bonitatis suae gratia vellet mundum quam pulcherrimum facere, decrevisse eum ad exemplar illud quod est omnium excellentissimum figurare. Ideoque mundum ita ad sui similitudinem effecisse ut mundi partes ad sui ipsius formarit ideas. Ex iis quorundam canum rabies condemnatur latrantium Platonem ideas extra divinam intellegentiam posuisse.

15 Caelum unum siderum plenum torrentem[58] noctu figurat suorum siderum imaginibus, quae quidem imagines neque sunt sidera, licet esse infantibus videantur, neque manent, sed iugiter innovantur aqua fluente, quamvis manere vulgo putentur. Similiter deus unus, idearum exuberans plenitudo, materiam fluctuantem fingit semper simulacris idearum. Quae sane simulacra neque verae species sunt apud Platonicos, quamquam veras esse quidam physici arbitrantur. Neque quiescunt umquam, ut Heraclitus ait, labente materia, etsi quiescere eas ignorantes existimant. Atque hic est modus per quem res temporales, ut vult Parmenides Pythagoreus, aeternarum fiunt participes idearum. Profecto sicut aeternitas, quae unum dumtaxat momentum est manens idem semper et eodem modo, tempus omne quod per innumerabilia diffluit momenta, quiescendo metitur, et sicut centrum stabile puncta superficiei circumcurrentis, ita idea quaelibet, in aeternum una eademque consistens, res eas temporales metitur omnes quae in eadem inter se specie sunt, ideae unius eiusdemque[59] participes. Quod de una dicam, de omnibus est ideis intellegendum.

16 Pulchritudo ipsa pulchrorum omnium est mensura, quia per accessum ad pulchritudinem primam et recessum ab ipsa res sequentes magis minusve pulchrae[60] existimantur. Et quod cadit ab omni pulchritudine, ab omni cadit essentia, et quod totam possi-

says in the *Timaeus* that the Power Divine, since He wished for the sake of His goodness to make the world as beautiful as possible, decided that it should be modeled after the paradigm that is the most excellent of all.[36] He therefore so fashioned the world in His own likeness that He formed its parts in accordance with His very own Ideas. The madness of those dogs that yelp that Plato placed the Ideas outside the divine understanding is hereby condemned.

15 The one sky by night fills a rivulet full of stars with the images of its stars, which images indeed are not the stars, although they seem to be so to children, and they do not stay but are eternally renewed in the flowing water, though the vulgar think they stay there. Similarly the one God, the superabundant plenitude of Ideas, adorns matter, which is in flux, with the Ideas' images. They remain just images for the Platonists, not the true species, although some natural philosophers think they are the true. And the images are never at rest, as Heraclitus tells us,[37] matter slipping as it does away, though the ignorant think they are still. According to Parmenides the Pythagorean, this is the way in which temporal things become participants in the eternal Ideas.[38] Certainly, just as eternity, which is only a single moment remaining the same in the same way forever, in staying at rest measures the whole of time as it flows through moments without number; and just as a stable center measures the points of a circumambient surface, so too every Idea, in remaining one and the same to eternity, measures all those temporal things which exist together in the same species as participants in one and the same Idea. What I am saying about a single idea should be understood to apply to them all.

16 Beauty itself is the measure of all beautiful things, since things subsequent are considered more or less beautiful depending on how close they come to prime beauty or how far they are distant from it. What falls away from all beauty, falls away from all essence, and what possesses all beauty possesses all essence, for

det pulchritudinem, totam habet essentiam, quia prima essentia et prima pulchritudo sunt idem. Quaecumque homo in specie aliqua iudicat, iudicat ad speciem referendo. Puta quando iudicat solem aut ignem esse pulchrum, tunc duo pulchra refert ad unam pulchritudinis speciem absolute. Et quando solem esse igne pulchriorem pronuntiat, ad eandem refert ideam, non absolute, sed comparando. In utraque relatione pulchrum solem et ignem pulchrum per eandem metitur ideam, sed in prima utrumque per totam ideam mensurat, in secunda per alterum ideae gradum illorum metitur alterum. Neque audiendi sunt barbari quidam, qui res pulchras mensurari non posse putant per accessum ad purum pulchritudinis actum, quia ille sit infinitus, ideoque non possint res aliae aliis propius[61] ad ipsum accedere. Volunt autem per recessum a pura pulchritudinis privatione mensuram talem excogitari. Hi enim ob id errare videntur, quod si purus actus est infinitus affirmatione, similiter pura privatio est infinita negatione. Neque fit pulchrorum comparatio ad divinam essentiam penitus infinitam, sed ad pulchritudinis ipsius ideam, quae quodammodo finita est quantum respicit creaturam, quia est determinatio quaedam divinae perfectionis, facta quidem a mente divina, confirmata vero a voluntate. Accedunt autem ad eam propius, quae similitudinem eius suscipiunt purius; recedunt vero quae contra. Merito autem inde mensura accipitur pulchritudinis in rebus pulchris, unde ipsa suscipitur pulchritudo. Haec autem ab idea capitur, non a pura pulchritudinis privatione. Denique quid stultius quam pulchritudinis habitum per privationem velle discernere, cum fieri e converso tam natura quam ratio cogat? Quapropter absque dubio fateamur humanam mentem pulchra[62] referre ad ipsam pulchritudinis rationem.

prime essence and prime beauty are the same. Whatever a man judges within some species, he does so by referring to the species. For instance, when he says the sun or the fire is beautiful, he is relating two beautiful things absolutely to the single species of beauty. But when he pronounces the sun more beautiful than the fire, he is referring both to the same idea, not absolutely, but comparatively. In both cases he is measuring the beautiful sun and the beautiful fire by way of the same idea, but in the first case he is measuring both by way of the whole idea, in the second he is using the level of the idea in one of them to measure the other. We should not listen to certain barbarians[39] who believe that beautiful things cannot be measured by way of their proximity to beauty's pure act, because this act is infinite and some things cannot be closer to it therefore than others. Rather, they want this measurement to be seen in terms of their distance from beauty's pure privation. Where they seem to be making their mistake is that if pure act is infinite by way of affirmation, pure privation is infinite similarly by way of negation. Anyway we do not compare beautiful things to the divine essence that is completely infinite, but to the Idea of beauty itself, which with regard to the creation is in a way finite, because it is a sort of determination of divine perfection, created indeed by the divine mind, but confirmed by the will. Things which receive its likeness more purely approach it ever more closely, things which do the reverse recede from it. But it is reasonable to suppose that the measure of beauty in beautiful things is received from the same source as beauty itself. But this is received from the Idea, not from the pure privation, of beauty. Could anything be more stupid than to want to discover the habitual possession of beauty by means of privation, when nature and reason both demand the opposite? So let us accept, beyond any shadow of a doubt, that the human mind refers beautiful objects to the rational principle itself of beauty.

17 Quoniam vero quod mensurat praestantius est quam quod mensuratur, mens humana, quantum per relationes ad ideas res omnes temporales metitur quae sub ipsis continentur ideis, rebus illis est excellentior. Atque ideo ideis est proxima, quia metitur quaecumque illas sequuntur, utpote quae cadit media inter idearum fontem et rivulos inde manantes. Verum licet mensuret ad ideas, non tamen per ideas ipsas mensurat tamquam per propria quaedam et proxima media. Non enim sunt universales ideae proprium instrumentum huius aut illius mentis humanae, neque inter mentem singularem[63] et res alias singulares ullo modo universales ideae cadunt mediae. Quia vero non potest animus singularia universalium idearum simulacra aliter metiri quam per formulas idearum animo proprias et quasi declinantes ad singularia, necesse est menti idearum formulas inhaerere, per quas ideis simulacra conferat. Quae congruunt formulis probet; reprobet quae non congruunt.

18 Sed unde adveniunt hae formulae menti? Numquid a simulacris an ab animi fictione, an forsitan ab ideis? Non a simulacris, nam per eas formulas animus mensurat simulacra, unde formulae simulacra antecedunt, et tanto praestantiores sunt quanto ideis propinquiores. Ac si fierent a simulacris, non vere mensurarent illa, sed ab eis potius mensurarentur. Mensura enim adaequatio est. Causa adaequat effectum; effectus causam non adaequat. Nusquam in corporibus perfectas unitatis, bonitatis, pulchritudinis rationes invenimus; oportet enim eas suis contrariis non esse permixtas. In corporibus autem unitas miscetur partium multitudini, bonitas vitio, pulchritudo deformitati. Nusquam rectas figurarum rationes inspeximus in materia corporum; eas tamen ipsi tenemus, alioquin neque de ipsis loqui possemus, neque per ipsas quasi exa-

Since what measures is superior to what is measured, the human mind, to the extent that it measures all temporal things which are contained under the Ideas by referring them to the Ideas, is superior to such temporal things. So it is closest to the Ideas, because it measures all that follow upon them, since it falls midway between the Ideas' source and the streams that flow from that source. Though it measures *against* the Ideas, however, it does not measure *through* the Ideas as its own particular and direct instruments. For the universal Ideas are not the personal instrument of this or that human mind, nor are they in any way located midway between a particular mind and other particular objects. Since the rational soul cannot measure the particular images of the universal Ideas other than by means of the Ideas' formulae belonging to the soul (which sink down as it were towards particulars), the Ideas' formulae must inhere in the mind. Through them it can compare images to the Ideas, approving those that conform to the formulae, and rejecting those that do not. 17

But whence come these formulae to the mind? Is it from images or from the rational soul's invention or haply from the Ideas? They cannot come from images, for the soul uses the formulae to measure images; so the formulae must be prior to and nobler than images to the degree they are closer to the Ideas. If they did come from images, they would not measure them truly, but rather be measured by them. For measurement is matching. The cause matches or equals the effect, but the effect does not equal the cause. Nowhere in bodies have we found the perfect rational principles of unity, goodness, or beauty; for they must not be combined with their opposites, whereas unity in bodies is combined with plurality of parts, goodness with wickedness, beauty with ugliness. Nowhere in the matter of bodies have we observed the true rational principles of figures, yet we ourselves possess them, otherwise we would not be able to talk about them, or use them as a criterion for rejecting the deficiency of corporeal forms. Appar- 18

men defectum formarum corporalium redarguere. Non igitur eas a corporibus accepisse videmur, essent enim illis deteriores.

19 Neque dicendum est eas esse nusquam, quia nequit mens intellegere per seipsum quod nihil est omnino. Nam et privationes per habitus cogitat, et falsae opiniones non ex eo fiunt in nobis, quod ipsum quod omnino nihil est cogitemus, sed quod vel coniungamus res invicem vel disiungamus praeter ordinem naturalem. Immo vero, si existunt alicubi obiecta sensuum, sunt et rationes, obiecta mentis, si modo et mens sensibus est nobilior, et quod omnino nihil est neque movet animi aciem neque contrahit neque terminat. Non igitur finguntur ab animo: sane figmenta mentiuntur,[64] res veras non metiuntur.[65] Figmenta animi res ipsas sequuntur confusius etiam quam umbrae corpora. Corpora per umbras non discernuntur. Quis ergo per ficticium extraneumque simulacrum pulchritudinis, odoris, saporis, caloris horum ipsorum essentiales definitiones proprietatesque latentes inspiciet?

20 Praeterea, figmentum animi est animo ipso deterius; formulae vero illae ideo praestantiores sunt animo, quia per ipsas animus etiam iudicat corrigitque seipsum. Nempe per rationes unitatis, bonitatis et pulchritudinis animus de seipso iudicat saepe: quam sit ipse aut partibus multiplex aut affectibus dissidens; item, quantum vel natura deficiat vel vitio depravetur; rursus, quantum vel natus sit deformis vel turpis evaserit. Nonne per pulchritudinis sigillum pronuntiat esse se corporibus pulchriorem, et hanc partem sui illa, et hunc habitum illo pulchriorem esse? Immo vero et angelis sublimiores esse videntur, quia per sigillum idem angelum[66] mens nostra designat, quando angelum animo pulchriorem esse affirmat, et alio angelo alium angelisque deum. Non tamen metitur deum, sed ipsum tamquam mensuram relinquit immensurabi-

ently, then, we have not received these formulae from bodies, for they would be inferior to bodies.

Nor should we say that they exist nowhere, for of itself the 19
mind cannot understand what is completely nonexistent. It thinks about our defects by way of our [good] habits, and false opinions occur in us, not because we think about what is completely nonexistent, but because we join things together or separate them in an unnatural order. Rather, if objects of the senses somewhere exist, then rational principles, which are the objects of the mind, exist, if only because the mind is nobler than the senses, and what is entirely nothing does not move or focus or limit the rational soul's attention. So these [formulae] are not feigned by the soul: indeed, figments lie, they do not measure things true. The soul's figments follow upon things true in a more confusing way than shadows follow their bodies. Bodies are not discerned by way of their shadows. So who would use an extraneous and fictitious image of beauty, or odor, or taste, or heat to look at their essential definitions and hidden properties?

Moreover, a figment of the rational soul is inferior to the soul 20
itself. But those formulae are more excellent than the soul, because the soul even makes judgments about itself and corrects itself by means of them. It often uses the rational principles of unity, goodness, and beauty to judge of itself: how multiple it is in its parts, how conflicted in its feelings, how far it is naturally deficient or depraved by vice, how ill-formed it was at birth or how ugly it has become. By the seal of beauty stamped upon it, doesn't it pronounce itself more beautiful than bodies and one part of itself more beautiful than another, and this habit more beautiful than that? Or rather, the formulae seem to be even more sublime than the angels, because our mind uses the same seal to designate the angel when it affirms the angel is more beautiful than the rational soul, or one angel is more beautiful than another, or God is more beautiful than an angel. Yet it does not measure God: it leaves

lem. Sicut enim sapientia non fit sapiens et motus non movetur, ita prima mensura non mensuratur. In eo igitur quod illae formulae angelos metiuntur, tamquam regulae expressae ab ideis super angelos existentibus, certe sublimiores sunt angelis. Et animus in hoc ipso actu quo metitur angelos excellentior est quam ea ipsa natura angeli quam apud seipsum metiendo designat. Quamvis et angelus animam metiatur per regulas quodammodo rectiores, et eo ipso actu magis excedit animum, quam per actum animi excedatur ab animo.

21 Quo autem pacto sigilla huiusmodi (quas et formulas appellamus), si sunt animo et angelis altiora, finguntur ab animo? Quinimmo sunt in animo ante omne commentum animi. Animus enim sua inventa omnia ad sigilla talia confert, siquidem veritatis sigillo discernit quae vera inventa sint, quae veriora, quae falsa. Item, quod per novos temporalesque actus animi fabricatur, mobile est omnino. Quod enim motu fit, nimirum fit et mobile; sigilla vero talia sunt immobilia; haerent enim animo immobiliter, quoniam quicquid singulis momentis occurrit animo vel fit ab animo arbitratu nostro, ad illa referimus tamquam firmiter inhaerentia. Porro, si illa quoque nutarent, essent ad alia referenda et alia rursus ad alia, neque esset in nobis principium aliquod iudicandi. Sigillum per quod de statu huius rei aut statu illius aut etiam de aeternitate sententiam ferimus, mobile esse nequit, siquidem in sigillo ratio illius exprimitur quod eo significatur. Ratio vero status ipsius aeternitatisque est a ratione motus alienissima. Quinetiam stabile et aeternum non aliter quam sub rationibus status aeternitatisque definimus. Rationes huiusmodi omnis sunt mutationis

Him as the measure that is beyond measure. Just as wisdom does not become wise, and motion does not move, so the prime measure is not measured. Insofar as the formulae measure the angels therefore, being as it were rules produced by the Ideas existing above the angels, they are certainly more sublime than the angels. Indeed, in the act itself by which it measures the angels the rational soul is superior even to the nature itself of the angel which it traces out in itself in measuring, though the angel too may measure the soul by using rules which are in a way more accurate, and in this act it exceeds the rational soul by a larger margin than it may be exceeded by the rational soul in its act.

How, then, are such seals (which we call formulae) contrived by 21
the soul if they are more exalted than the soul or than angels? Rather, they are present in the soul before the soul contrives anything. For the soul refers all its discoveries to such seals, since it is with the seal of truth that it discerns which discoveries are true, which more true, which false. Again, anything fashioned by way of new and temporal acts of the soul is entirely mobile. For what derives from motion is of course mobile. But these seals are immobile and unchanging; for they inhere unchangeably in the rational soul, since we refer whatever occurs in the soul at individual moments or is created by our soul's decision to these seals as though they were inhering unchangingly [in us]. Indeed, if they too were to falter, then they would have to be referred to others, and others to yet others, and a first principle for making judgments would not exist in us. The seal we use to produce an opinion about the stability of this thing or the stability of that, or even about eternity, cannot be subject to change, since in the seal is expressed the rational principle of that which is signified by it. But the rational principle of stability itself and eternity is totally alien from the rational principle of motion. We define the stable and the eternal only in terms of the rational principles of stability and eternity. Such principles are free from all change, since stability precedes motion.

expertes, siquidem status antecedit motum. Quod vero in natura prius est, est a posteriore solutum. Atqui has rationes per quas talia definimus intus habemus. Non enim per aliena mens loquitur. Ac si extra nos essent, egeremus adhuc aliis rationibus rationum, quibus quasi mediis rationes illas hauriremus per quas essemus de statu aeternitateque locuturi. Aliae illae rationes ideo immobiles essent, quia essent rationes immobilium rationum.

22 Itaque quacumque gradiamur, ad immobiles rationes nobis innatas perveniemus. Scite Plotinus quando de aevo disputat, inquit: 'Haecne[67] de aeternitate loquimur, quasi de extraneis rebus testificantes ac de alienis agentes? Nequaquam. Non enim intellegimus, nisi tangamus, neque extranea tangimus. Itaque oportet nos aeternitatis esse participes.'[68] Haec ille. Talia[69] ergo sigilla sunt immobilia. Immo etiam sigillum motionum est immobile. Quando enim de rerum motibus iudicamus, illos ad aeternam motus ideam per motionum sigillum nobis insitum comparamus. Si hoc quoque foret motus aut mobile, esset per sigillum aliud comparandum. Non enim motus ad aeternitatem nisi per medium competens religatur, quod neque motus sit, neque mobile. Item, si foret mobile, non recte per illud motiones iudicaremus. Motio namque tunc iudicatur recte, quando refertur ad terminos et spatia quae permanserint; nam iis non manentibus, neque fit motus neque motus progressio cernitur. Ipsum quoque tempus, quod est proprietas quaedam et perduratio motionis, non aliter mensuratur quam si per stabilem servetur memoriam et stabili aeternitatis momento circumscribatur. Si motionis sigillum stabile est, multo magis stabilia sunt sigilla omnia reliquorum.

And what comes first in nature is independent of what comes subsequently. The principles by which we define such things we have within. For the mind does not speak through what does not belong to it. If they were outside us, we would need still other rational principles of principles [within] to use as a means of imbibing those principles that would then enable us to speak about stability and eternity. Those other principles would be unchanging, because they would themselves be the rational principles of unchanging principles.

So by whatever route we proceed we end up with unchanging 22
principles innate in us. When Plotinus discusses eternity, he says wisely: "In saying these things of eternity, are we testifying to things external and dealing with things alien? Far from it. We do not understand unless we come into contact, and we do not come into contact with what is alien to us. It follows then that we must be participants in eternity."[40] Thus Plotinus. So these seals are unchanging. Or rather, even the seal of movement does not move. For when we make judgments about things' movements, we refer them to the eternal Idea of movement, using the seal of movement innate in us. If this too were movement or subject to movement, it would needs be referred to another seal. For motion is not tied to eternity except through some appropriate medium that is neither movement nor subject to movement. Again, if it were subject to movement, we would not judge movements correctly by it. For movement is only correctly judged when it is referred to boundaries and to spaces that remain stationary: if these do not remain, then no movement occurs, and no progression of motion is witnessed. And time itself too, which is a property and duration of movement, is only measured if it is preserved by means of an unchanging memory, and bounded by the unchanging moment of eternity. If the seal of movement is unchanging, even more so are the seals of all the other principles.

23 Ex iis omnibus duo pariter concluduntur, quod scilicet sigilla talia et ab ideis animo inserantur et ipsi haereant immobiliter.

: V :

Confirmatio superiorum per signa.

1 Huius autem rei signa multa comperimus. Primum, quod rustici homines qui numquam de ideis aliquid cogitaverunt, et adolescentuli qui nihil de iis audiverunt, cum primum eorum sensibus occurunt corpora pulchra, modo ratione utantur, ea referunt ad ideas duobus ut diximus modis. Uno, quando affirmant hoc esse pulchrum, quod non faciunt nisi ex eo quod talis corporis figura quadrat sigillo pulchritudinis intus ingenito. Altero, quando affirmant hoc isto et istud illo esse pulchrius, quantum aliud alio accedit propius[70] ad sigillum. Tales sigillum neque per doctrinam neque per inventionem prius acquisivere, quia neque cogitaverunt de illo quicquam neque audiverunt. Neque etiam tunc ex singulis pulchris corporibus ipsum colligunt, siquidem per ipsum minime fallax singulorum fallaciam defectumque redarguunt. Neque ex natura quadam communi quae est in singulis, nam quod in rebus iacet fallacibus, ipsum quoque fallax evadit fallacemque ex se procreat notionem. Praeterea, quando de illo diligentius cogitant, inveniunt ipsum vel esse vel referre aliquid unum supra multa in seipso consistens. Nam super naturam illam quae una quodammodo est in multis, oportet esse naturam talem quae una sit ante multa, ut communis sit aeque multorum. Tale sigillum quia nullo

Two conclusions alike can be drawn from all this: (1) that such 23
seals are implanted in the rational soul by the Ideas; and (2) that
they adhere to it unchangeably.

: V :

Confirmation of the above by way of signs.[41]

We find many signs of this. The first sign is that uneducated peo- 1
ple who have never thought about the Ideas at all, and young people who have heard nothing about them, as soon as beautiful bodies impact their senses, straightway use their reason to refer them to the Ideas in the two ways we have mentioned: first, when they affirm that a thing is beautiful, which they would not do except for the fact that the shape of some body conforms with the seal of beauty that is innate in us; and second, when they affirm that this is more beautiful than that, and that than another, insofar as one thing conforms more closely to the seal than another. These people did not acquire the seal in advance by way of being taught or by finding it, because they never thought or heard anything about it. Nor do they then cull it from particular beautiful bodies, because they use the seal that is infallible to reject the fallible and defective character of particulars. Nor do they derive it from some common nature that is in particulars, for what resides in fallible things also becomes fallible itself and produces from itself a fallible concept. Furthermore, when they ponder it more carefully, they find that the seal either is or refers to a unitary something existing on its own above plurality. For above the single nature that is in a manner the one in the many, there has to be the nature that is the one before the many, so that it can be equally common to the many. And because this seal is not limited in any respect by the

modo clauditur rerum singularium multitudine, ab ea multitudine nullo modo colligitur. Neque etiam cogitationis machinatione concipitur, nam per ipsum invenimus super mobilem multiplicemque cuiusque animi pulchritudinem unam esse pulchritudinem in seipsa manentem. Ergo sigillum vim suam tollit altius super animos. Machinamenta vero animi nihil animis eminentius fabricant. Si ergo cum primum utimur ratione, res plurimas ad huiusmodi sigilla referimus quae neque didicimus ante, neque tunc colligimus aut fingimus, praesertim cum comparationis signum praecedere semper res illas oporteat quae comparantur, sequitur ut ante omnem rationis usum ea possideamus.

2 Secundum signum est, quod subito fiunt relationes utraeque, saepe etiam nulla praecedente aut intentione voluntatis aut rationis discursione. Quod significat non esse animo regulam relationum huiusmodi nuper aut extrinsecus acquirendam, sed iamdiu[71] intrinsecus possideri, qua totiens uti[72] pro arbitrio potest quotiens se ad eam intenderit.

3 Tertium signum est, quod omnes in seipsis experiuntur: quotiens volunt alicuius rei definitionem et causam invenire, nihil aliud conantur, quam ut omnibus sensus et phantasiae submotis obstaculis, profundae mentis intima penetrent, quibus tunc primum clarissime fulget quod venantur, cum primum in arcanae mentis adyta penetraverint, quasi intus scientiarum thesauri delitescant. Quod ita Pythagoras cecinit:

Ἀλλὰ σὺ θάρσει, ἐπεὶ θεῖον γένος ἐστι βροτοῖσιν
Οἷς ἱερὰ προφέρουσα φύσις δείκνυσιν ἕκαστα

id est: 'Tu autem confide, quoniam divinum genus est hominibus, quibus sacra natura proferendo in lucem omnia monstrat.' Ergo mirabimur Homerum et Didymum aliosque permultos vel natura vel ab infantia caecos ita scripsisse, ut perspicue vidisse omnia videantur? Mirabimur Zoroastrem aliosque sapientiae inventores

plurality of particular things, it is not assembled at all by that plurality. Nor is it conceived even by the machinery of thinking, for through it we discover that above the changeable and multiple beauty of each rational soul there is one beauty that remains in itself. So the seal extends its power far above souls. But the soul's stratagems fabricate nothing higher than souls. So if, as soon as we use reason, we are referring the multitude of things to these seals which we have never learned about before, nor at that time assembled or devised, and especially since the sign or seal of comparison always has to precede those things which are being compared, then it follows that we possess the seals before we ever utilize our reason.

The second sign is that both kinds of referring occur instanta- 2
neously, often without any preceding intention of the will or discursive process of the reason. This shows that a standard or rule for this referring does not have to be acquired by the soul shortly before or from outside, but that the soul has possessed it internally for a long time, and can use it at will whenever it turns its attention to it.

The third sign is that all people experience [them] in them- 3
selves. Whenever they want to discover the definition or cause of something, they attempt, having removed all the obstacles presented by the sense or the phantasy, to do nothing else than penetrate the mind's innermost recesses. As soon as they have penetrated into the mind's hidden shrine, they see the dazzling light of their quarry, as though the treasures of knowledge lay concealed within. Pythagoras sang of this as follows, "Be of good cheer, for that race of men is divine to whom sacred nature reveals all things by bringing them into the light."[42] Should we be surprised, then, that Homer and Didymus and many others, who were blind from birth or from childhood, could write as though they had apparently seen everything clearly? Should we wonder that Zoroaster and other discoverers of wisdom, only by spending a long time in

diuturna dumtaxat solitudine solaque animi totius in mentem solam conversione rerum omnium scientiam peperisse?

4 Quartum signum ab approbatione sumitur. Complexio corporis quae abundat sanguine, suos quosdam postulat tum sapores tum ceteros rerum usus, quae bili alios, alios quae pituita. Quando cuique complexioni quod suum est offertur, non aliter oblatam rem natura talis asciscit quam ipse ignis escam sulphuream. Hinc sanguineus commendat dulcia, acuta acriave cholericus, acida melancholicus, mollia phlegmaticus et insipida. Quod de sanguineo dicemus similiter est ad alios transferendum. Nescit sanguineus quam ob causam dulcia probet, quia non commendat consilio, sed naturali complexionis instinctu. Sane per naturalem instinctum quinque appetit genera qualitatum, rubra et virida visu, auditu laeta, dulcia gustu, temperata tactu atque olfactu. Si has quinque qualitates per complexionem affectat et probat, necesse est in ipsa complexionis conflatione quinque inesse fomites harum quinque probationum. Sicut enim illarum quinque qualitatum alia inter se est et alia ratio, ita a tali complexione sub alia et alia ratione probantur. Igitur in unoquoque homine quinque sunt fomites naturales ad quinque qualitates congruas quinque sensibus comprobandas. Et quia in aliis hominibus aliae sunt complexiones humorum, ideo rerum concupiscentiae corporalium inter homines sunt diversae. Quoniam vero una humana species est in omnibus, cum sit mentis species una, idcirco communis est eorum quae ad mentem pertinent approbatio. Omnis mens figuram laudat rotundam in rebus statim consideratam et cur laudet ignorat. In aedificiis quoque similiter talem vel quadraturam aedium vel parietum aequalitatem lapidumve dispositionem, angulorum oppositionem, fenestrarum figuram atque occursum. Laudat insuper eodem pacto certam

solitude,[43] and only by converting the whole of their soul into mind alone, gave birth to the knowledge of all things?

The fourth sign is derived from what we approve of. A body's 4
temperament abounding in blood demands its own particular tastes and other sensations, [whereas] that abounding in bile claims others, and that in phlegm others still. When each temperament is offered what is its own, it appropriates the thing offered just as fire feeds on sulphur. Hence the sanguine person commends things sweet, the choleric, things tart or bitter, the melancholic, things piquant, the phlegmatic, things bland and tasteless. What I am going to say about the sanguine person apply similarly to the others. The sanguine person does not know why he likes sweet things since he does not approve of them as a result of deliberation, but by an instinct natural to his temperament. And through this natural instinct, he desires five classes of qualities: red or green colors to look at, joyful sounds to listen to, sweet things to taste, and tempered things to touch and smell. If he desires and approves of these five qualities through his temperament, then the kindling for igniting these five kinds of approval must be present in the makeup of his temperament. For just as the rational principles of these five qualities differ among themselves, so a given temperament approves of them for different reasons. So in every individual man are five natural propensities for approving five qualities congruent with the five senses. And since the humors are tempered in different ways in different people, the desires for corporeal things are different among men. But since one human species is present in all men, there being a single form of mind, men's approval of things pertaining to mind is universal. Every mind praises the circular shape in things as soon as it observes it, without knowing why it praises it. Likewise in buildings too, [it praises] the roundness or squareness of simple edifices [or rooms], the evenness of walls, the arrangement of stones, the opposition of angles, or the shape and positioning of windows. In the same way

quandam sive membrorum humanorum proportionem sive numerorum vocumque concordiam. Commendat morales gestus et habitus tamquam decoros. Commendat sapientiae lucem et veritatis intuitum. Si quaelibet mens haec omnia semper et ubique asciscit illico, et quam ob causam asciscat ignorat, neque potest non asciscere, instinctu asciscit necessario prorsus et naturali. At quia eorum quae hic affectantur diversa inter se ratio est, oportet ut a mente ex diversis naturae suae rationibus tum quasi fomitibus appetantur, tum quasi formulis et regulis approbentur, ita ut ex eisdem regulis illorum contraria reprobentur. Siquidem contraria illorum, cum primum nobis obiiciuntur, offendunt natura sua, etiam si causam nesciamus. Sunt ergo rationes illorum similiumque ingenitae menti.

5 Quintum signum a definitione artis accipitur. Omnis ars quia certa ratione ad certum finem ordinat opus, rationalis facultas est. Facultas rationalis, si omni naturae irrationali est ingenita, multo magis ingenita est omni rationali. Elementa, quam artificiose situm repetunt suum! Quanta geometriae arte rectam lineam in ascensu servant atque descensu! Quanta architecturae industria pluvia se in orbiculares guttulas cohibet! Quanta aer sagacitate rerum naturae succurrit, ne quid in ea vacuum relinquatur! Complexio quoque plantarum et animalium, quam mirabili medicinae artis solertia utitur in conservando habitu naturali aut recuperando! Ipsae quoque brutorum animae singulis in speciebus singulas artes exercent: laneam telam insecta sericia,[73] lineam araneae, hirundines figulinam, musicam olores, apes architecturam, civilem ciconiae, bellicam vero leones, vulpes denique venatoriam. Quis autem dixerit, modo ista consideret, solam naturam rationalem inertem fuisse atque ex inertia irrationalem ab initio constitutam?

the mind also lauds a particular proportion in the parts of men's bodies or a particular harmony of musical measures and voices. It commends as most becoming moral attitudes or habits. It commends the light of wisdom and the contemplation of truth. If every mind approves of all these things whenever and wherever it finds them, and without knowing why it approves of them, and if it cannot not approve of them, then it must do so through an instinct that is entirely necessary and natural. But because the objects desired here have different rational principles, they must be desired by the mind reacting to the different principles in its nature as if they were kindling, and they must be approved as by formulae or rules in such a way that their opposites are rejected by the same rules. For their opposites, as soon as they are presented to us, naturally offend, even if we do not know why. Thus the rational principles of these and like things are innate in the mind.

The fifth sign comes from the definition of art. All art, since it 5
organizes its work with a definite reason towards a definite end, is a rational faculty. This rational faculty, if it is innate in all irrational nature, *a fortiori* is innate in all rational nature. How artfully do the elements make for their proper location! With what skill in geometry do they keep a straight line in their ascent and descent! With what architectural diligence does the rain contract itself into spherical drops! With what cunning does the air come to the aid of nature, lest some vacuum be left in her! The complexion too of plants and animals what marvelous skill in the medical art does it use in preserving and restoring their habitual and natural condition! The souls of animals also practise arts, different ones in different species: silk worms use a wool-like thread, spiders a line, swallows clay, swans use music, bees architecture, storks government, lions practise the art of war, and wolves the art of hunting. Who, in considering these matters, would maintain that rational nature alone was without art and because of this artlessness made irrational from the onset? Or rather, if a rational recipient is much

Immo vero si debet rationalis sedes multo prius et magis artem capere rationalem quam sedes irrationalis, oportet omnes rationali hominum speciei artes innasci, postquam singulae innatae sunt singulis irrationalium speciebus. Omnes enim ferme in genere brutorum universo congregantur, sed aliae species artium per alias animalium species disperguntur. Omnes ergo in unica rationali hominum specie colliguntur, licet per singulos dividantur. Omnes iterum in uno speciei angelicae singulari, in quo tamen dividuntur secundum formas, quoniam multiformis est angelus. Cunctae denique in uno singulari deo atque una dumtaxat dei forma. Quapropter artes dividuntur invicem in brutorum genere secundum habitum atque actum, quoniam nulla brutorum[74] species aut artes omnes exercet actu aut omnes infusas habet, sed quaelibet eorum species unica utitur arte et possidet unicam. Artes igitur dividantur oportet in hominum specie secundum actum, quia alii alias meditentur, non tamen secundum habitum, quia singuli cunctas possideant. Siquidem in angelo quolibet uniuntur cunctae habitu atque actu. Quilibet enim illorum quaslibet meditatur,[75] sed dividuntur executione, quoniam alii aliter gubernant mundum. Cunctae in Deo modis omnibus uniuntur, quia et habet, et videt, et exequitur universas. 'Nam in omnibus operantibus,' ut inquit theologus Paulus, 'omnia operatur.'

6 Sextum signum ab assecutione artium ducitur, quas non illi solum qui praeceptore carent per se assequuntur, sed illi etiam qui magistros vel libros vel homines habuisse traduntur. Nam et qui legendo discunt, non a litteris corporalibus vitaque carentibus spiritalem vivamque scientiam hauriunt, sed ipsi per litteras provocati pariunt in seipsis. Et qui discunt audiendo, non prius discunt

better suited to receive, and to receive first, a rational art than an irrational recipient, then all the arts have to be innate in the rational species of men, since individual arts are innate in individual species of irrational entities. For nearly all the arts are included in the genus of animals taken as a whole, but the various kinds of arts are dispersed among the various species of animals. All the arts are included within the single rational species of men, although they are divided among individuals. Again all the arts are present in any one single angel in the angelic species, but within that angel they are divided according to forms, since the angel is multiform. Finally they are all in God, who is one and unique, and in His unique form alone. Therefore in the genus of animals, the arts are mutually divided in terms of both habit and act, since no animal species either practises all the arts in actuality or has them all implanted within it, but each species uses one art and possesses one alone. So the arts have to be divided in the species of men according to act, because different people occupy themselves with different arts, but not according to habit, because individuals possess them all. In any angel, they are all united in habit and in act, for each of the angels has all the arts in his thoughts, but they are divided in terms of execution, because various angels govern the world in various ways. In God, they are all united in all ways, since He possesses, regards, and practises them all. As Paul the theologian says, "In all those who perform works, it is God who worketh all in all."[44]

The sixth sign comes from our acquiring the arts. Not only do 6
those who have no teacher acquire the arts through their own efforts, but so do those who are reported to have had books or teachers. Those who learn from reading cannot imbibe knowledge, which is spiritual and alive, from letters, which are corporeal and lifeless; rather, provoked by way of the letters, they produce knowledge within themselves. And those who learn from listening do not actually learn until they have reviewed in themselves and

quam ipsi audita apud se recolant, examinent, approbent. Non fit autem examinatio approbatioque verorum, nisi intus praefulserit regula veritatis. Et qui docere dicuntur, neque scientiam eandem quam ipsi habent omnino transfundunt in alium. Nam docendo alios, ipsi evaderent ignorantes, et scientiae qualitas de alia mente in aliam quasi de subiecto in subiectum transiret, quod non convenit qualitatibus. Neque aliam quandam specie similem scientiam in discipulo ipsi per propriam generant. Talis enim generatio ad qualitates pertinet corporales, non ad humanam scientiam, cuius actio clauditur intus et operantem perficit potius quam externa.

7 Ceterum quonam pacto magister discipulum edocet? Duo sunt artium genera. Aliae sunt quarum materia circa quam versantur nullum habet in se principium operis effectivum, sicut lutum aut saxum ita subesse videntur figulo et sculptori ut manum dumtaxat expectent artificis, ipsa vero suapte natura nihil momenti habeant ad opus efficiendum. Aliae vero artes sunt quarum materia per formam quandam motum agit ad opus, quod quidem naturale est potius quam artificiale dicendum. Sic terra subest agricolae, sic medico corpus humanum. Quippe fecunditas soli ad segetes producendas agricolae et corporis humani complexio ad sanitatem recuperandam medico confert quamplurimum, usque adeo ut saepe ager absque cultura producat segetes et[76] complexio corporis nostri sine medentis opera pellat morbos. Quod significat et agro inesse semina segetum per naturam et complexioni semina sanitatis. Ergo in primo artium genere artifex ille dominus materiae vocatur atque magister, in secundo vero excitator naturae atque minister. Artem docendi ad secundum id genus spectare hoc nobis testimonio esse potest, quod animus qui tamquam materia videtur su-

examined and accepted what they have heard. And the examination and approval of what is true cannot occur unless the rule or standard of truth has first blazed within. When people are said to teach, they do not altogether transmit the same knowledge they have to someone else. For in teaching others, they would become knowledge-less, and the quality of knowledge would pass from one mind to another, as from one subject to another; and this is inappropriate for qualities. Nor do teachers use their own knowledge to generate in the pupil some other knowledge alike in species. For such generation pertains to corporeal qualities, not to human knowledge, whose action is confined within, and which perfects the agent rather than external objects.

7 In short, how does a teacher teach a pupil? Arts are of two kinds. Some are concerned with a material that does not have the work's effective principle within itself. Clay or stone, for instance, are subject to the potter or sculptor in such a way that they have to await the artist's hand: they do not possess in their own nature any impulse to effect the work. But there are other arts whose matter, with the help of some form, is actually moved to effect the work, which in this case should be called a natural rather than an artificial work. Thus earth submits to the farmer, the human body to the doctor. The fertility of the soil for producing crops and the role of the body's complexion or temperament in recovering health are what most help the farmer and the doctor, and so much so that often a field produces crops without cultivation and our body's complexion fights off diseases without a doctor's attention. This indicates that the seeds of crops are naturally present in the field, and the seeds of health in the complexion. In the first kind of arts, therefore, the artist is called the lord and master of the matter, but in the second, he is just the stimulator and minister of nature. That the art of teaching belongs to the second kind can be proved from the fact that the rational soul, which seems to submit to the teacher as his material, sometimes anticipates things it is

besse docenti, nonnumquam antequam audiat, praesagit audienda et, postquam audivit, audita reddit uberiora et meliora; et saepe, licet non audiat, ex se parit, quippe qui semina scientiarum non minus quam ager segetum possidet. Unde qui docet minister est potius quam magister. Quapropter Socrates apud Platonem in libro de scientia *Theaeteto* inquit se filium obstetricis esse et obstetrici persimilem, utpote qui in erudiendis hominibus non inducat scientiam, sed educat, sicut obstetrices conceptas iam foetus educunt. Ideo quando doctor aliquis contendit ex pluribus argumentis audienti aliquid demonstrare, qui audit non paulatim formatur, ut lutum a figulo aut saxum aliquod a sculptore. Sed post multa indicia veritatem subito intuetur, etiam absente magistro, quando sufficienter fuerit provocatus. Sicut ager cultus a rustico post diuturnos illius labores suo ipse tempore edit foetus, agricola nihil agente. Quis oculos videre docuit? Aures quis audire? Oculis non praestat visum medicus, sed vel superinfusas[77] caligines discutit vel dirigit in obiectum. Ita menti praeceptor scientiam non infundit, sed purgat aciem aut dirigit. Nemo canibus sagacitatem praestat venatoriam, nemo equis currendi virtutem, nemo robur bellicum elephantibus, saepe tamen homines eas ipsas virtutes latentes et dormitantes in membris usu[78] expergisci compellunt.

8 Idem facit in mente praeceptor, ut Plato in septimo libro *De republica* docet. Mens enim virtutem suam, quae est veritatis intuitus, non minus habet firmam et naturalem quam sensus et animalia suam. Eam sciscitando provocat Socrates, docendi lux;[79] ipsa recte interrogata vera respondet. Respondere non potest vera, nisi cognoverit. Quoniam vero res ipsae invicem connexae sunt similiterque rationes rerum coniunctae sunt invicem, unde facile de una

going to hear before it hears them, and having heard them, enriches and enhances them; and often, without hearing them, it produces them from itself, since it possesses the seeds of knowledge no less than the field does of crops. So the teacher is a helper rather than a master. That is why in Plato, in the *Theaetetus*, the dialogue on knowledge, Socrates declares he is the son of a midwife and most like a midwife in that he does not stuff knowledge into people when he teaches them, but rather elicits it, just as midwives deliver the babies who have already been conceived.[45] So when a teacher tries to prove something to his listener by using a number of arguments, the listener is not formed little by little, like clay by a potter, or a lump of stone by a sculptor. Rather, after surveying many bits of evidence and when he has been stimulated sufficiently, the pupil suddenly sees the truth, even if his instructor is absent. In just the same way a field cultivated by a farmer, after his endless labors brings forth its crops in its own time and with the farmer doing nothing. Who taught the eyes to see? Who taught the ears to hear? The doctor does not provide sight to the eyes; rather he disperses the mists enshrouding them, or directs them towards their object. Similarly, the teacher does not put knowledge into the mind, but polishes and sharpens its acuity. No one has given dogs their hunting skills, or horses their capacity to race, or elephants their strength in battle, though men often use rigorous training to awaken these powers lying dormant in their limbs.

The teacher does the same in the mind, as Plato teaches us in 8
the seventh book of the *Republic*.[46] For the mind has its own power, which is intuitive of the truth; and it is no less strong and natural than that of the senses or of animals. Socrates, the beacon[47] of teachers, stimulates that power by asking questions: rightly questioned the mind answers with the truth. It cannot do so unless it knows the truth already. Now, since things are interconnected and their rational principles are likewise linked together

transitur in multas, saepe fit ut ex uno quodam vestigio a praeceptore monstrato sagax animus propriis naribus venetur longo ordine plurima. Adde quod non imbecilliorem habet mens videndae veritatis aspectum, quam pedes progrediendi potentiam. Socrates infantem porrecta ducit manu quo gradiatur; adolescentem quo discat interrogat. Infanti non praestat eundi virtutem, sed et provocat et tutius perducit ad terminum. Adolescenti non largitur intellegentiam, sed efficit ad effectum sui operis promptiorem. Ipse autem Socrates scientiam suam si quando adeptus dicitur tamquam novam, aut per inventionem aut per disciplinam est adeptus. Si ipse per se res invenit, numquam rebus inventis fuisset usus, nisi utendi modum antea[80] cognovisset; utendi modum non tenet, qui rei ipsius non tenet naturam. Sin ab alio audivit, non prius ex auditu concepit scientiam, quam sciret numquid docentis rationes veritati congruerent; non intellegit hoc, nisi qui ipsam inspicit veritatem. Igitur antequam inveniat quicquam aut audiat, veritatis est compos. Et qui docuit Socratem Archelaus, vel per se invenit vel accepit ab Anaxagora. Quicquid fuerit, scivit et ante. Atqui[81] licet et Anaxagoras ab Anaximene, et ille ab Anaximandro, et Anaximander acceperit a Thalete, Thales denique vel alius quivis sacerdos Aegyptius aut saltem Persicus magus caruit praeceptore. Qui hominis caret doctrina, discit docente natura, immo vero scit iamdiu docente Deo. Quapropter Socrates apud Platonem in libro *De sapientia* inquit Theagi: 'Nemo umquam didicit a me quicquam, quamvis mea consuetudine multi evaserint doctiores, et me exhortante et bono daemone inspirante. Tu quoque brevi multum proficies, si Deus faverit.'

and it is easy therefore to cross over from one thing to many things, it often happens that, having been shown one particular trail by a teacher, the clever soul uses its own nostrils to hunt down a long line of numerous quarries. The mind's power to gaze at and to contemplate the truth is no less than the feet's ability to walk. Socrates leads a child by the hand to help him walk; he asks a young man questions to help him learn. He does not supply the child with the power to walk, but fosters the ability and leads it more safely to its goal. He does not bestow understanding on the young man, but makes him more ready to accomplish the work of understanding. But Socrates himself, if he is said to have acquired his knowledge at some point as something new, acquired it either by discovery or by being taught. If he discovered things himself, he could never have used his discoveries unless he learned a way of using them from nature; [since] he who does not grasp the nature of an object itself will not know how to use it. If Socrates heard his knowledge from another, he did not understand it merely from hearing it prior to knowing whether his teacher's arguments conformed to the truth. Nobody knows this unless he has seen the truth itself. So before anyone can discover or hear about anything, he is in possession of the truth. As for Socrates' teacher, Archelaus, either he found his knowledge out for himself, or he learned it from Anaxagoras. In either case he knew it beforehand. Perhaps Anaxagoras got it from Anaximenes, and he from Anaximander, and Anaximander from Thales, but eventually Thales or some Egyptian priest or other, or, if not that, a Persian magus, was without a teacher. He who has no man to teach him learns from nature as a teacher, or rather he knows from God who taught him long ago. That is why in Plato, in the dialogue on wisdom, Socrates says to Theages: "No one ever learnt anything from me, although many have become wiser by consorting with me, and with my good daemon encouraging and inspiring them. You too, God willing, will gain much benefit in a brief time."[48]

9 Praeterea narrat Socrates ibidem, quemadmodum nonnulli, dum eius consuetudine uterentur illique propinquarent, ipso etiam tacente, acutiores evaderent, recedentes vero hebetiores subito redderentur, quasi ad divinum quendam influxum a deo per genium mentemque Socratis in familiarium animos penetrantem vis illa ingenii pertineret. Et Orpheus Musas esse dicit Iovis et Memoriae filias, quia videlicet scientiae in profunda memoria lateant nobis olim a deo tributae. Quinetiam haec de memoria tradidit.

Πάντα νόον συνέχουσα Βροτῶν ψυχῆσι σύνοικον
. . . . .
ὑπομνήσκουσά τε πάντα
ὧν ἄν ἕκαστος ἀεὶ στέρνοις γνώμην κατάθηται
ἐπεγείρουσα φρένα πᾶσιν

id est: 'Totam mentem contines humanorum animorum familiaris. Commemoras omnia quorum notionem quisque semper animi sinibus occulit, mentem suscitas omnibus.'

10 Concludemus iam praesentem disputationem, si prius nos ipsos admonuerimus, ut quando audimus artes nobis inesse natura, non intellegamus vel a natura caelesti corporalique impressas vel a mera animae essentia fluere, siquidem a tali natura impressas habent bestiae, ab essentia autem mera manantes solus possidet deus. Sed intellegamus nostris mentibus statim ex deo natis infusas fuisse species rerum et regulas artium, ut in *Timaeo* tradit Plato, non aliter quam angelicis mentibus infundantur. Est autem differentia triplex inter nos et bestias quoad artes pertinet. Prima, quod a deo sine medio nos eas accipimus, illae natura caelesti intercedente. Secunda, quod quisque nostrum accipit cunctas, bestiarum species singulae singulas. Tertia, quod bestiae necessario quodam impulsu naturae ad suae artis usum certo tempore compelluntur, nos autem libero rationis iudicio tum artis unius, tum plurimarum usum eligimus.[82] Convenimus autem, quantum ad species rerum et regulas artium attinet, cum angelis atque deo

Moreover, in the same work, Socrates tells how some people, 9
when they shared his company and were close to him, and even though he said nothing, became more acute; similarly, when they left him, they suddenly became duller again. It was as if this their wit's power belonged to some divine influence, which, having streamed down from God, was penetrating the souls of Socrates' friends through the genius and mind of Socrates. Orpheus says that the Muses are the daughters of Jupiter and Memory, obviously because the sciences, once given to us by God, lie concealed in the depths of the memory. And he wrote the following verses on Memory: "You contain the whole of mind, friend as you are of the souls of men. You remember all those things whose conception each person hides forever in the recesses of his soul. You awaken the mind in all men."[49]

We will now bring this discussion to a close if we first remind 10
ourselves that, when we hear that the arts are present in us by nature, we should not suppose either that they have been imprinted by celestial and corporeal nature or that they flow from the pure essence of soul, since beasts have them imprinted by such a nature, while God alone possesses those emanating from pure essence. Rather, we should understand that the species of things and the rules of the arts are imparted to our minds as they issue from God at the moment of our birth, as Plato tells us in the *Timaeus*,[50] just as they are imparted to the minds of angels. But when it comes to the arts, this threefold difference separates us from the animals. First we receive the arts directly from God, whereas animals need a celestial intermediary. Second, we each receive them all, whereas animals receive only one per species. Third, animals are necessarily obliged, by a natural impulse, to the practice of their art at a particular time, whereas we can choose to practise one or many on the basis of a free decision by our reason. But as regards the species of things and the rules of the arts, we conform with the angels and with God in various respects, but mostly in that the forms are

cum in aliis nonnullis tum in hoc vel maxime, quod nobis insunt per absolutum perspicuumque modum formae[83] sicut et illis. Itaque divinae ideae absolutas atque distinctas ipsarum imagines nobis tamquam speculis impressere, naturae autem corporali umbras quasdam confusiores, quemadmodum nos ad lumen imaginem quidem nostri corporis claram in speculo pingimus, umbram vero reddimus parieti. Ubi autem idea per modum lucet absolutum perspicuumque, non modo lucet clara, sed fere tota. Omnes enim ideae proprietates, quas in disputationis huius principio ex Platonis mente narravimus, in eo consistunt potissimum quod universalis sit atque soluta. Quod autem non umbrae idearum, sed imagines perspicuae nobis insint, ex eo patet potissimum, quod umbras illarum ab imaginibus earundem recta ratione distinguimus, quodve formulae illarum nobis insitae ipsas nobis perspicue[84] repraesentant nosque ad eas convertunt, et umbrae idearum in corporibus haud prius eas nobis referunt, quam per nostrae mentis formulas purgentur atque reformentur. Denique si per distinctas imagines atque per modum integrum splendent in nostris mentibus atque solutum, per modum[85] quoque fulgent penitus immortalem. Quod si immortalis rei naturale subiectum est immortale (subiecto namque soluto, quicquid subiecto haerebat, disperditur), proculdubio mens hominis est immortalis, quae naturaliter firmiterque immortalium idearum species per modum suscipit immortalem.

: VI :

Ratio secunda: mens est subiectum veritatis aeternae.

1 Aurelius Augustinus, divino vir ingenio, quo Latinorum nullus platonicam maiestatem tum sapientia tum eloquentia expressit

present in us in an absolute and perspicuous way just as they are in them. Thus the divine Ideas print absolute and distinct images of themselves on us, as in mirrors, but certain vague shadows on corporeal nature, just as we, the light upon us, reflect a sharp image of our body in a mirror but cast a shadow on a wall. But where the Idea shines out in an absolute and perspicuous way, it is not only shining in its brightness but in its entirety almost. For the properties of an Idea, which we described at the beginning of this discussion on the basis of what Plato thought, consist mainly in the fact that it is universal and immaterial. The principal demonstration that present in us are not the shadows of the Ideas but clear images of them is the fact (a) that we do distinguish, using right reason, the Ideas' shadows from their images, and (b) that the formulae of the Ideas implanted in us represent the Ideas perspicuously to us and turn us back towards them, [whereas] the shadows of the Ideas in bodies do not bring the Ideas back to us until they have been purged and reformed through our minds' formulae. Finally, if they do blaze forth in our minds wholly and independently by way of distinct images, then they also shine in a manner that is totally immortal. But if the natural subject of something immortal is immortal (for once the subject perishes anything attached to it is destroyed), then man's mind, which naturally and constantly receives the species of the immortal Ideas and receives them in an immortal way, is undoubtedly immortal.

: VI :

Second proof: the mind is the subject of eternal truth.

Aurelius Augustine, a man of divine genius—than whom no other 1
Latin has presented with clearer wisdom and eloquence the maj-

exactius, iactis a Platone superioribus fundamentis, argumentationes huiusmodi construit.

2 Aliud est verum, aliud veritas, quemadmodum aliud castus, aliud castitas, praestantiusque est vero veritas, siquidem omne verum veritate est verum. Cum vero aliquid quod verum dicitur interit, non tamen interit veritas, sicut si quis castus intereat, castitas tamen non interit. 'Si manebit[86] semper hic mundus, verum est semper esse[87] mansurum; quod si non manebit, verum est non semper esse mansurum. Quid cum interierit, si interiturus est, nonne tunc id verum erit mundum interiisse? Nam quamdiu verum non est occidisse mundum, non occidit. Repugnat igitur ut mundus occiderit et verum non sit mundum occidisse. Non potest autem aliquid esse verum ubi veritas non sit. Erit igitur veritas, etiam si mundus intereat. Quid si ipsa veritas occidat? Nonne verum erit veritatem occidisse? Verum autem non puto esse, si veritas non sit. Nullo modo igitur occidet veritas.' Haec Augustinus.

3 Sed ubinam est veritas? Non in corporibus; mutaretur enim corporibus permutatis, cum tamen aeterna sit veritas. Hinc sequitur paradoxon illud platonicum, corpora non vere esse, quia scilicet in illis non maneat veritas. Ergo quod aurum dicimus, si non vere est aurum, falsum aurum est. Si hoc, neque aurum quidem est. Atque ita de ceteris rerum corporalium speciebus. Praeterea, affectio corporis duo[88] temporis puncta non permanet penitus eadem, ut ostendimus alias et in praesentia in hunc modum ostendimus.

4 Sicut stabilis et simplex aeternitas rerum stabilium simpliciumque mensura est, ita fluens et varium tempus mobilium et multiplicium est mensura. Temporis puncta numquam permanent eadem, sed sibi invicem surrepunt semper aliis alia succedentia. Corpus mundi mobile tamquam mensuram sibi propriam tempus

esty of Plato—used the foundations Plato laid down earlier to construct the following arguments.

What is true is different from truth, just as a chaste person is 2
different from chastity; and truth is superior to what is true, since everything that is true is true because of truth. But when something said to be true perishes, truth does not perish, any more than when a chaste person dies chastity dies.[51] "If this world is going to last forever, it is true it is going to last forever; but if it is not going to last forever, it is true it is not going to last forever. Moreover, when it comes to an end, if it is going to come to an end, won't it be true that the world has then come to an end? For so long as it is true that the world has not perished, it has not perished. So it is unacceptable that the world should have perished and that it not be true that the world has perished. But something cannot be true where there is no truth. Therefore truth will exist even if the world perishes. But what if truth itself were to perish? Won't it be true that truth has perished? But I do not believe this is true if truth does not exist. Therefore in no way will truth perish." Thus Augustine.[52]

Where is truth to be found? Not in bodies, for it would change 3
as bodies change, and yet truth is eternal. Hence follows the Platonic paradox that bodies do not truly exist, because truth does not reside in them.[53] So what we call gold, if it is not truly gold is false gold. In which case, it is not even gold. The same is true with the other species of corporeal objects. Moreover, the affective disposition of a body does not remain completely the same through two moments of time, as we proved elsewhere and are now about to prove again as follows.

Just as eternity, being stable and simple, is the measure of 4
things that are stable and simple, so time, being in flux and varied, is the measure of things which are mobile and multiple. Moments of time never remain the same, but steal upon each other in an endless succession. Time has the moving body of the world as its

habet. Si ita est, quadrat utique caeli dispositio et mutatio temporis fluxui. Itaque non potest in duobus temporis momentis esse caeli dispositio penitus eadem. Nam si eadem per duo momenta maneret, in ea ipsa morula tempus quidem de alio momento fluxisset in aliud, caelum vero quievisset in uno. Fluxus vero quieti minime congruit. Quod non congruit non metitur. Quomodo enim motus mensurat quietem aut res fluens per duo rem stantem in uno? Quapropter in ea morula tempus caelum non mensurasset.[89] Metitur autem revera tempus semper caelum, non aliter quam aeternitas ea quae sunt supra caelum. Ergo sicut illa in aeternitate continue sine ulla mutatione manent, ita caelum sub tempore continue absque ulla quiete transcurrit. Si caelorum configuratio nullo modo permanet, multo minus corpuscula quae sub caelo sunt et caeli rapacitate raptantur. Necesse est enim haec per influxum et effluxum, condensationem rarefactionemque, intensionem remissionemve qualitatum, consonantiam et dissonantiam complexionis, ceterosque motus continue variari. Quod quidem abunde Plutarchus et Proclus demonstraverunt, et ante illos Heraclitus inquit: 'Quemadmodum non possumus eandem torrentis aquam bis intrare, aut eandem rotae currentis particulam bis similiter tangere, ita similem omnino dispositionem complexionemque corporis per duo puncta perseverantem assequi non valemus. Si nullius corporis affectio duo momenta prorsus eadem et similis perseverat, in eodem momento incipit qualitas talis et desinit. Quod in natura incipit, nondum absolutum existendi vel operandi actum possidet; quod desinit, talem iam actum non retinet. Igitur in eo puncto in quo esse qualitas illa dicitur, dici etiam potest non esse, cum nondum a non esse omnino discesserit et iam in non

proper measure. That being so, the heavens' disposition and mutation conforms to the flux of time. So the heavens' disposition cannot remain completely the same in two moments of time. For if it did remain the same for two moments, time would have flowed on, in that tiny pause, from one moment to another, but the heavens would have remained stationary in one of them. But flux is totally incompatible with a state of rest. What is incompatible does not measure. For how can movement measure rest, or something in flux between two things measure something that remains the same in one of them? Wherefore in that tiny pause time would not have measured the heavens. In point of fact, however, time always measures the heavens, just as eternity measures the things that are above the heavens. So just as the super-celestials continually remain unchanging in eternity, so the heavens, in the domain of time, continually hasten on their course without being ever at rest. If the configuration of the heavens never stays the same in any way, much less do the smaller bodies which lie beneath them and which are snatched up by the heavens' rapacity. For necessarily they must always be changing by way of influx and efflux, condensation and rarefaction, intensification and remission of qualities, the harmony and discord of temperament, and the rest of the changing motions. Plutarch and Proclus have given abundant proof of this,[54] and Heraclitus declared before them: Just as we cannot step into the same water of a river twice,[55] or similarly twice touch the same part of a moving wheel, so we cannot attain a disposition or temperament of the body that remains entirely the same from one moment to the next. If the state of no one body remains completely the same or alike from one moment to the next, then any quality it possesses starts and stops at the same moment. In nature what is beginning does not yet possess the absolute act of existing or doing; and what is ending no longer retains this act. So in the very moment in which the quality is said to exist, it can also be said not to exist, since it has not yet completely departed

esse labatur. Et quia celeritas temporis linguae celeritatem superat, dum esse illam pronuntias, te pronuntiante subterfugit prius quam hoc ipsum verbum 'est' ore protuleris. Et ut Timaeus inquit, fallit pronuntiantem, nec umquam vere quicquam de hac pronuntiatur aut percipitur. Nec esse magis quam non esse dici potest, cum et sit et non sit pariter dum profertur. Quoniam vero quae continue permutantur, quatenus mutantur, eatenus fiunt; quae vero fiunt, dum fiunt, revera non sunt; ideo quaecumque ita mutantur et fiunt, non tam dicuntur esse quam esse videri.

5 Quid[90] vero dicemus de tempore? Quod semper falso dicitur esse, cum esse eius (ut ita loquar) sit non esse. Sane de quolibet praesenti momento vere dicitur, hoc non est tempus, sed temporis terminus. De praeterito autem aut futuro dumtaxat affirmatur esse tempus, siquidem continuam successionem quandam tempore significari putamus. Praeteritum vero futurumque non est. Igitur esse temporis quodammodo in non esse locamus. Momentum vero, quod est terminus temporis, dum esse pronuntiamus, vertitur in non esse atque pronuntiantes mentiri compellit.

6 Quod autem de tempore demonstramus, de temporalibus quoque est iudicandum, esse scilicet in non esse (ut ita loquar) habere. His consonat pythagoricum illud: 'Qui homo dicitur, magis non homo est quam homo, quia si innumerabiles eius partes consideraveris, innumere poteris iudicare: haec pars non est homo et illa similiter. Semel dumtaxat de toto dices: hoc est homo.' Unde et de elementis Timaeus disserens duas esse elementi partes existimat, materiam atque formam; propter materiam non dici ignem aut aquam, sed propter formam; ergo secundum partem. Hoc igitur solum secundum partem ignis dicitur et illud aqua. Ac revera non ignis hoc est, sed igneum; illud non aqua, sed aquaeum.

from non-being and is already sliding back into it. And since the speed of time exceeds the speed of the tongue, even as you say that the quality exists, it eludes you as you speak and before you can get the word "exists" out of your mouth. As Timaeus observes, it deceives the person speaking it, and nothing can ever truly be said or perceived about it.[56] It cannot be said to exist any more than not to exist, since as it is spoken it equally exists and does not exist. But since the things that always change, to the extent that they change, also become, but things that become, while they become, do not truly exist, it follows that all that change and become in this way are said not so much to exist as to appear to exist.

What then shall we say about time? That it is always falsely 5
said to exist, because its existence is, in a sense, its non-existence. Of any present moment we can truly say that it is not time but the terminus or end of time. Of the past and the future only can we affirm that time exists, because we believe that time signifies a kind of continuous succession. But the past and the future do not exist. So in a way we locate the existence of time in non-existence. But the moment, which is time's terminus, even as we say it exists, turns into non-existence and compels those saying it to lie.

What we are demonstrating with time must be brought to bear 6
too on things that exist in time, namely that they have their existence in non-existence as it were. In accord with this is the Pythagorean saying: "The person called a man is more a non-man than a man, since if you think of the enormous number of parts he has, you can endlessly deliberate, 'This part is not the man and likewise that part.' Only once, and of the whole, will you say, 'This is the man.'"[57] When Timaeus discusses the elements, he argues that they have two parts, matter and form; and it is not because of the matter that an element is called fire or water but because of the form, and hence because of a part.[58] So this element is called fire and that one water only because of a part. But in reality this one is not fire, just fiery, that one not water, just watery.

7 Adde quod illud est verum tale, quod merum tale est, puta verum vinum, quod merum est vinum. Natura vero cuiusque speciei quando in materia est, primo quidem admixtam habet potentiam ad non esse, ut in libro quinto probavimus. Deinde multa patitur additamenta ac saepe contraria. Siquidem in aere saepe aliquid igneum est, semper situs aliquid praeter aeris rationem. In homine hoc vel illo saepe complexio aliqua contra naturam eius, semper habitus aliquis vel affectus, figura vel situs ultra humanae speciei necessitatem. Similiter se habent et reliquae rerum naturalium species. Quoniam vero super omnia quae per partem et impure talia sunt, esse oportet ea quae secundum se tota et pure sunt talia, putat Timaeus super inquinatas et mancas materiae formas esse alias meras, integras, separatas. Atque eius rationis viribus confidit maxime, quae sic argumentatur.[91]

8 Formae quae sunt in alio, scilicet in materia, sunt et ab alio, non tamen ab informi natura materiae; et formam esse oportet a forma, et a forma tandem per se subsistente, atque una formabilis materia ad unum tandem reducitur formatorem. Nam et si quis multos induxerit formatores, numquam multi, quatenus diversi sunt, mutuum inter se habebunt ordinem atque ad unum opus finemque conducent, sed quatenus ab uno omnium formatore ducuntur. Igitur necesse est formas dari materiae a mente quadam plena formarum, ubi formae sint ipsa mentis essentia atque ideo verae sint species. At quia mens illa est esse primum, materia vero est proxima nihilo; et illa purus actus, haec pura potentia, sequitur ut materia innumerabiliter paene sit mente deterior. Quicquid autem ab aliquo capitur in suscipientis transit naturam. Quare formae immersae materiae usque adeo sunt speciebus mentis deteriores, ut umbrae quaedam sint illarum potius quam imagines, et

Moreover, what is truly such is what is purely such; true wine, 7
for instance, is what is pure wine. But first, the nature of each species when it is in matter has the potentiality for non-existence blended into it, as we have shown in Book Five.[59] Further, it is subject to many additional components that are frequently its contraries. In air, for instance, there is often something fiery, and always a disposition over and beyond the rational principle of air. Present in this or that man there is often some complexion contrary to his nature, and always some habit or affect or physical shape or disposition over and beyond what the human species needs. The same is true of all the other species of natural objects. But since above all that are partially or impurely such, there must be others that are of themselves totally and purely such, Timaeus believes that above the contaminated and crippled forms of matter exist other forms that are pure, whole, and separate.[60] He relied mainly on the force of the following argument.

Forms that are in another, that is, in matter, are also from an- 8
other; but they cannot be from the formless nature of matter. Form must come from form, and ultimately from form subsisting of itself; and the one formable matter must ultimately be brought back to the one form-giver. For if someone were to introduce many form-givers, these many, insofar as they are different, would never have a mutual order among themselves or lead matter to one product and goal except to the extent they are led by the one who is the form-giver of all. So the forms must necessarily be given to matter by a mind replete with the forms, and in which the forms are the mind's essence itself and therefore the true species. Since that mind is the prime being, whereas matter is next to nothing, and since mind is pure act whereas matter is pure potency, it follows that matter is inferior to mind to an almost measureless degree. But anything that is admitted by something else passes over into the nature of its recipient. So forms that are immersed in matter are so far inferior to the mind's species that they are their

illarum denominationem (et hanc quidem falsam) retineant potius quam naturam. Sicut artificia sunt simulacra naturalium, ita naturalia sunt simulacra divinorum. Propius autem accedunt artificia ad naturalium veritatem (quia cum illis conveniunt in materia) quam naturalia ad veritatem divinorum. Si ergo pictus equus usque adeo a naturali equo deficit ut non sit verus equus, multo magis naturalis equus adeo divino equo, id est ab idea veraque equi ratione deficit, ut dici debeat umbram equi ipsius potius quam formam repraesentare. Ac si vera hominis et equi ratio naturaque idea ipsa est hominis aut equi, et hanc non servat materia longissime inde distans, concluditur illud Socratis in *Phaedone* et in *Republica*, videlicet veros homines verosque equos in materia non reperiri, quae idearum umbris ita ignorantium[92] fallit animulas, ut somniantium instar, dum rerum verarum simulacra vident, putent se res ipsas inspicere.

9 His consonat illud Procli nostri paradoxon. Composita ex elementis neque sempiternitatem habent neque statum. Purae mentes utrumque possident suaque simul omnia comprehendunt. Horum media sunt, quae suam in motu quodam sempiternitatem habent. Animae quidem mentibus proximae motum in operatione dumtaxat admittunt; animae vero sequentes quodammodo insuper in virtute. Universa denique corporei mundi machina, tamquam per essentiam operatione virtuteque animarum inferior, essentiam quoque ita mutabilem nacta est, ut tota undique sit temporalis. Atque sicut res omnino aeterna in uno semper tota manet, ita mundi huius machina penitus temporalis in quolibet temporis infiniti momento tota a mundo divino effluat semper statimque diffluat simul et refluat, non aliter quam quidam putent a sole lu-

mere shadows rather than their images; and they retain just their name (and even that is false) and not their nature. But just as products of art are the images of natural objects, so natural objects are the images of divine objects. Products of art come closer to the truth of natural objects (because they share in matter with them) than natural objects come to the truth of divine objects. If a painted horse, therefore, is so far short of being a horse in nature that it is not a true horse, *a fortiori* a horse in nature falls so far short of the divine horse, of the Idea and true rational principle of a horse, that we ought to say it represents that horse's shadow rather than its form. If the true rational principle and nature of a man or a horse is the Idea itself of man or horse, and matter no longer retains this Idea being so far distant from it, we arrive at Socrates' conclusion in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*:[61] namely that true men and true horses are not found in matter, which so deceives the diminutive souls of ignorant men with the shadows of Ideas that, like dreamers, they suppose they are gazing at things true when they are merely gazing upon the images of them.

Our Proclus' paradox is consistent with this.[62] Compounds 9
from the elements possess neither eternity nor stability. Pure minds possess both, and they contain everything they possess simultaneously. What intervenes are things which possess their eternity in some motion. Souls closest to minds admit movement only in their activity; but lower souls admit it also in a way in their power. Lastly, the universal machine of the corporeal world, being inferior through its essence to souls in both activity and power, has also been provided with an essence so changeable that it is entirely and everywhere temporal. And just as a completely eternal thing remains forever whole in one moment, so this world's machine, being entirely temporal, at every moment of infinite time flows out in its entirety forever from the divine world, and immediately ebbs away and simultaneously flows back again. Not dissimilarly, certain people think that the light from the sun, moment

men per momenta semper effundi simul totum ac diffundi, repente vanescens atque refundi.

10 Profecto quod individua aeternitas ipsa metitur, individuum esse necesse est. Quod ergo divisibilem habet essentiam tum ex partibus, tum ex naturis pluribus constitutam, qualis est mundi machina, cum individua aeternitate non congruit, sed cum tempore potius divisibili quo mensuratur, quocum[93] perpetuo labitur. Praeterea, divisibilem motu virtutem actionemque sortitur, quapropter mundi moles momentis singulis tota simul ex non esse incipit esse atque desinit iterumque renascitur; quemadmodum in motu et tempore, quibus omnino subiecta est, momenta profluunt tota singulatim simul et refluunt. Quod quidem ita insuper confirmatur, quod perpetuo caelestium motui virtute opus est infinita. Quam cum terminatum mundi corpus neque ex se habere neque totam simul ab alio possit accipere, oportet ab opifice suo atque motore paulatim momentis singulis haurire—haurire inquam, momentaneam et subito vanescentem. Siquidem et temporalis essentia omnino temporaliter accipit, et terminata natura capax aeternitatis, cuius infinita totaque simul potentia est, esse non potest. Sane et natura mundi infinitatem simul non potest accipere. Et aeternalis infinitas, cum individua totaque simul constet, a nullo potest accipi paulatim.

11 Hic Proclus ita distinguit: Essentias immobiles esse quidem a deo quodammodo semel, sed a se ipsis suamet virtute servari. Nam cum sine motu totae simul inde sint, ideo stabiles per se deinde perseverare posse quodammodo, suaque virtute iam a quibusdam potentiis suis in suos actus posse procedere. Quamobrem tales essentias per se subsistentes nominat, seque quodammodo producentes affirmat, machinam vero corpoream, et post animae motum tempusque, et una cum motu temporeque corporeo

by moment, forever pours forth in its simultaneous entirety, radiating out to the vanishing point, and then pours back again.

10 Because eternity itself measures indivisibles, it must be something indivisible. So something that has a divisible essence both from its parts and from its many natures like the machine of the world is not compatible with indivisible eternity but rather with divisible time by which it is measured and in which it perpetually slips away. Moreover, it is allotted a power and an activity divisible in motion, so the entire mass of the world moment by moment simultaneously begins to be from non-being and ceases to be and is born again, just as in motion and time, to which the world is completely subject, all moments flow out one by one and simultaneously flow back again. This is confirmed by the fact that the perpetual motion of the heavens requires infinite power. Since the world's body, being determined, cannot possess this power of itself, nor receive it wholly and simultaneously from another, it must derive it from its creator and mover a little at a time and moment by moment—derive it, that is, as a momentary power that suddenly vanishes. For a temporal essence receives in an entirely temporal way; and a limited nature is unable to acquire the capacity of receiving eternity, whose power is infinite and whole simultaneously. Obviously the world's nature cannot receive infinity all at once. And eternal infinity, because it is indivisible and whole simultaneously, cannot be received little by little by anything at all.

11 Here Proclus makes the following distinction: he argues that unchangeable essences come from God in a way just once, but that they preserve themselves through their own power.[63] For, since they exist through God simultaneously and without motion as wholes, they are able in some manner to remain at rest thereafter through themselves, and then to proceed by their own power from their own particular potentialities to their own acts. Wherefore he calls such essences self-subsistent and claims that they are, in a sense, self-producing, but that the corporeal machine, which flows

profluentem, nihil habere stabile nullamque habere virtutem suimet servatricem. Itaque non substantialem aut veram, sed umbratilem omnino falsamque quasi Manichaeorum more cognominat, perpetuo dilabentem perpetuoque influxu desuper instaurante prorsus egentem, quasi corporis umbras in aqua velocissime perfluente. Hinc illud Timaei: 'mundum intellegebilem semper quidem esse, numquam vero fieri dicimus; sensibilem vero fieri certe semper, esse numquam.' Hic Proclus addit mundum illum numero eundem semper existere; hunc vero non proprie unum eundemque numero esse umquam, sed potius unum eundemque numero continue recreari. Et quantum corpus est, fieri semper atque incipere, quantum vero a mente divina dependet, factum esse semper finemque subito consequi. Sed huius paradoxon finem iam habeat.

12 Quoniam igitur tota sensibilis machina vanitas quaedam est vanitatisque quotidie sensibus causa, ideo exclamavit Salomon: 'Vanitas vanitatum et omnia vanitas.' Non est igitur in rebus sensibilibus veritas. Sed numquid in anima? Forsitan est in anima; non tamen, ut opinatus est Protagoras[94] atque Epicurus, in ea parte animae quae sensus est, quia extra se respicit et cum passione quadam sentire compellitur frequentibusque nugis deluditur sensibilium. Propterea Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, Melissus, Stilpo dixerunt nihil veri sensibus comprehendi. Idem ferme Anaxagorae Empedoclique placuit et Platoni. Nam etiam si quis dixerit esse aliqua sensibilia eodem modo semper manentia, et quaestionem nobis de sole atque stellis afferat, in quibus facile convinci non possit, quod cita mutabilitate nos fallant, illud certe nemo est qui non cogatur fateri: nihil esse sensibile quod non habeat simile falsum, ita ut internosci non possit.

forth subsequent to the movement and time of soul but in company with the motion and time of body, possesses nothing stable and no power to sustain itself. So he calls it, almost in the Manichaean manner, not substantial or true but utterly shadowy and false, continually slipping away and needing to be continually replenished by an influx from above, like a body's shadows in fast-flowing water.[64] Hence Timaeus' remark, "we say that the intelligible world always exists, but never becomes, but that the sensible world always becomes certainly but never exists."[65] At this point, Proclus adds that the intelligible world always exists as numerically the same, while the sensible world is never properly numerically one and the same, but rather is continuously recreated numerically one and the same.[66] To the extent that it is body, it is always becoming and beginning, but to the extent that it depends on the divine mind, it always exists and achieves its end immediately. But let us now finish with Proclus' paradox.

So since this whole sensible machine is a vanity, and daily the 12
cause of vanity to the senses, Solomon exclaimed: "Vanity of vanities; all is vanity."[67] Truth, then, does not reside in sensible things. But is it in the soul? Perhaps it is in the soul, but not, as Protagoras and Epicurus thought,[68] in the part of the soul that is sense, because that looks outside itself, is forced to feel with a certain passion, and is deluded by the frequent trivia of things sensible. For that reason, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, Melissus and Stilpo said that nothing true could be comprehended by the senses.[69] Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato felt much the same. For even if someone were to claim that there are some sensibles that always remain in the same way, and to raise the question for us of the sun and the stars, wherein we cannot be easily convinced that they are deceiving us by their rapid mutability, certainly there is no one who is not forced to admit this fact: nothing sensible exists which does not have a likeness so deceiving that we cannot tell between them.

13 Nam ut alia praetermittam, ut Augustinus inquit, omnia quae per corpus sentimus, etiam cum ea non adsunt sensibus, imagines tamen eorum patimur tamquam prorsus adsint vel in somno vel in furore. Quod cum patimur, omnino utrum ea ipsis sensibus sentiamus, an imagines sensibilium sint, discernere non valemus. Si igitur sunt imagines sensibilium falsae quae discerni ipsis sensibus nequeunt, et nihil percipi potest nisi quod a falso discernitur, non est constitutum iudicium veritatis in sensibus. Atque fieri forte potest ut sensus aliqua vere percipiat, ut Aristoteli placuit, numquam tamen discernit verene an[95] contra percipiat. Et cum veritas rerum naturalium in eo consistat ut divinae mentis congruant rationibus, quemadmodum veritas artificiorum ut congruant artificiosae mentis ideis, sensus congruitatem eiusmodi non agnoscit ideoque non habet veritatis examen. Rursus, cum cognoscentis potentiae veritas tum oriatur, quando potentia rebus congruit cognoscendis, perficiatur autem quando rerum adaequatur ideis, sensus, qui neque illam congruentiam neque adaequationem animadvertit, caret iudicio veritatis. Adde quod sensus non comprehendit intimam meramque rei substantiam, aut quo ordine in natura res quaelibet disponatur, quod totum ad rei ipsius pertinet veritatem. Sed subito impulsu allicitur qualitatum ad prosequendum vel fugiendum, in quo corporis sui commoditati indulget potius quam veritati rerum comprehendendae.

14 Ergo non est in sensu veritatis iudicium constitutum; constitutum est[96] autem in ratione. Nam privationes rerum per habitus cognoscuntur, per lumen tenebrae, per voces vero silentium. Privatio veritatis est falsum. Ratio nostra sensibilia et sensus redarguit falsi, quod facere non potest, nisi praesentis veritatis examine. Rursus, ratio veritatem ipsam ita describit: veritas est naturae

To leave aside other issues as Augustine says, even when all the 13
things we perceive through the body are not present to the senses, we still receive their images as though they were completely present whether in sleep or in delirium.[70] When we receive them, we cannot tell entirely whether we are perceiving them with the senses or whether they are just images of sensibles. So if there are false images of sensibles that cannot be distinguished by the actual senses, and nothing can be perceived except what is distinguished from the false, then the ability to judge of the truth has not been established in the senses. Perhaps it is possible for some one sense to perceive some things truly, as Aristotle maintains,[71] but it can never be sure it is perceiving truly or not. Since the truth of natural objects consists in their being congruent with the rational principles of the divine mind, just as the truth of artificial objects consists in their being congruent with the ideas in the artist's mind, the sense does not recognize this congruence and therefore has no criterion of truth. Again, since the truth of the cognitive power awakens when the power is congruent with the objects to be known, and since it reaches perfection when it is adequately matched to the objects' Ideas, so the sense, which cannot perceive either that congruence or that adequacy, lacks the ability to judge of truth. Furthermore, the sense does not comprehend the inner, pure substance of a thing, or in what natural order each thing is arranged, all of which pertains to its truth. Rather, excited by mere qualities, suddenly it is lured into either seeking or avoiding, and in this it is more concerned with its body's comfort than with understanding the truth of things.

Judgment of the truth is not then located in the sense, but in 14
the reason. For things' defects or privations are known by way of their [good] habits, darkness by way of light, silence by way of speech. The privation of truth is the false. Our reason accuses sensible objects and the senses of falsehood, which it cannot do except by the criterion of truth that is present. Again, reason de-

cuiusque pura integritas et integra puritas. Non definitur autem veritas nisi sub naturali veritatis et propria ratione. In ipsa ratione veritatis est veritas. Est igitur veritas in animo veritatem definiente, sicut in animo falsum redarguente. Quinetiam est in animo rem quamlibet describente. Speciei siquidem definitio ipsam rei essentiam complectitur tum integram, tum ab extraneis contingentibus segregatam.

15 Si ergo in ipsis speciebus est veritas rerum, species autem definitione comprehenditur et definitio mente,[97] quis non videat esse in mente hominis veritatem? Quae si est immortalis, satis declarat mentem, cui inhaeret inseparabiliter, incorruptibilem esse, nam qualitas, quae alicui subiecto inhaeret inseparabilis, subiecto sublato, disperditur. Inhaerere autem veritatem nobis inseparabiliter, illud testimonio esse potest, quod vel assidue, vel saltem arbitratu nostro, subito et sola mentis in seipsam collectione tum falsa multa damnamus, tum communes naturas aliquas definimus sive naturalium rerum, sive moralium, sive artificiorum. Quinetiam ex eo idem concluditur quod in superioribus ostendimus, idearum perspicuas rationes menti stabiles inhaerere. In ipsis vero rerum omnium veritates comprehenduntur. Prae ceteris autem declarat hoc summopere vis ipsa rationalis, quae non minus homini naturalis est, quam avibus sit volatus canibusve latratus. Per hanc Socrates homo est, per hanc homo ab illis animalium distinguitur speciebus. Rationalem vim vocamus in praesentia ipsam ratiocinandi virtutem, quae consequentia cernit, id est, quid ex quoque sequatur animadvertit gradatim et a praecedentibus ordine percurrit ad consequentia. Haec est naturalis quaedam dialectica, id est ars disserendi, ab origine hominibus insita. Per hanc pueri et imperitissimi quique partes suas quibuscumque possunt coniecturis assertionibusque tutantur. Atque omnis hominis sermo totaque

scribes truth itself thus: truth is the pure integrity and the integral purity of each nature. But truth is not defined except in terms of truth's natural and appropriate rational principle. Truth is in the rational principle of truth. Therefore truth is present in the thinking soul defining truth, as it is in the soul confuting falsehood. Indeed it is present in the soul when it is describing anything. For the definition of a thing's species embraces its essence as being both integral and apart from all that is extraneous and contingent.

So if the truth of things is in the species themselves, but a species is comprehended by a definition and a definition by a mind, then who is unaware that truth is present in man's mind? But if truth is immortal, it is sufficiently clear that the mind to which it clings inseparably is incorruptible, for a quality which inheres inseparably in any subject is destroyed once the subject is no more. That truth inheres inseparably in us, however, can be proved by the fact that we condemn many falsehoods either constantly or when we choose to at least, and solely by the sudden gathering of the mind into itself; and we define the common natures of natural objects, of moral concepts, or of the products of art and skill. Indeed this leads to the same conclusion we proved above: that the perspicuous rational principles of the Ideas inhere unchangeably in the mind. But in these are comprehended the truths of all things. Principally and preeminently demonstrating this is the rational power itself, which is no less natural to man than flight to birds or barking to dogs. Through reason Socrates is a man, through reason man is distinguished from the species of the animals. We call the rational power in the present context the power of reasoning itself which perceives consequences, that is, notices what follows what step by step, and follows the order from antecedents to consequents. It is a sort of natural dialectic, a skill in arguing implanted in men from the onset. Through it children and people without any experience defend their positions with whatever conjectures and assertions they can. All man's converse, all the action

vitae actio et consultatio nihil est aliud quam argumentatio quaedam. Ac nemo est tam insanus, quin ex aliis alia inferat argumentando, et ita ferme ab imaginibus ad imagines argumentetur,[98] sicut sana mens ad res ipsas percurrit ex rebus. Vis ergo rationalis numquam ab homine separatur. Quod si ab hac non separetur veritas, ab anima numquam veritas separabitur.

16 In hac disserendi virtute duae insunt necessitates, altera secundum subiectum eius, altera secundum eius usum. Prima quidem necessitas est, quia ipsa disserendi facultas toti hominum speciei sic insita est, ut nequeat separari. Secunda vero necessitas, quae in eius usu conspicitur, duplex est, absoluta et relativa.

17 Absoluta quidem necessitas in tribus apparet, scilicet in disciplinae principiis, definitionibus, proprietatibus. Principia sunt huiusmodi: quicquid est, aut per se est aut per aliud. Contraria sua se natura repellunt. Omne totum est maius sua parte. Suum cuique tribuendum. Haec et talia plurima necessario ita se habent ut necessario cognoscantur, quia neque possunt umquam aliter se habere, neque ab aliquo quamvis imperitissimo ignorari. Est quoque necessitas in definitionibus, ut quando sic circulus definitur: circulus est figura a cuius centro ad circumferentiam omnes lineae in rectum ductae sunt aequales. Quamvis enim vel talis verborum coniunctio in ore vel figuratio talis in pulvere sit contingens, veritas tamen illa est necessaria et sempiterna, quod illa ipsa circuli est natura. Similis in proprietatibus necessitas est, id est quod circulus est capacissimus omnium figurarum. Atque ut cetera omittam, nonne in numeris a necessaria veritate in necessariam veritatem absque fine transcurrimus? Bis duo quatuor, ter tria novem, bis quatuor octo et quae sequuntur. Idem facimus in compositionibus comparationibusque figurarum. Quod si definitiones proprietatesque in principiis confluunt (quia effluunt ex

and planning of his life are nothing other than a kind of argumentation. No one is so insane that he cannot infer by arguing from one thing to another; and even such a person argues from images to images in almost the same way as the sane mind proceeds logically from realities to realities. So the rational power is never separated from man. But if truth is not separated from that power, then truth will never be separated from the soul.

Two types of necessity dwell in this power of examining, one 16
relating to its subject, the other to its practice. The first necessity is because the ability to argue is so innate to the whole human species that it cannot be separated from it. But the second necessity, which is seen in the practice of argument, is twofold, one absolute, the other relative.

Absolute necessity appears in three aspects: in the principles, 17
definitions, and properties of a discipline. Principles are of this kind: Whatever exists either exists of itself or through another. Contraries naturally repel each other. The whole is greater than its part. Each must be given its own. These and many like principles are necessarily such that they are necessarily known, because they cannot ever be otherwise and cannot be unknown to anybody, however ignorant. Definitions have a necessity too, as when a circle is defined as a figure in which all the straight lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal. For though a spoken combination of words like this or a diagram drawn in the dust may be contingent, yet the truth itself is necessary and everlasting, because that is the nature of the circle. And properties have a like necessity also: the circle, for instance, is the most capacious of all figures. And, to leave aside other examples, don't we travel in the case of numbers from one necessary truth to the next necessary truth *ad infinitum?* Twice two is four, three times three is nine, twice four is eight and so on. We do the same in the construction and comparison of figures. But if both definitions and properties flow back into principles (given that they flow out of principles),

principiis); principia vero necessario insunt semper virtuti rationali (unde assidue aliqua de re ratiocinetur), fit ut hae tres necessariae veritates, quae omnes absolutae vocantur, in naturali hominum dialectica comprehendantur.

18 Restat necessitas relativa, quae etiam tres habet partes: alia quidem est in positione, in conditione alia, alia in demonstratione. Prima est talis: res nulla potest non esse dum est; animal dum vivit, necessario vivit et similia, quae de praesenti tempore affirmantur. Ex quibus necessitas habetur praeteriti atque futuri. Quod factum est, infectum esse non potest. Quod futurum est, non potest non fore. Secunda talis est: si corpus vivit, est necessario. Si animal currit, movetur. Tertia est huiusmodi: omnis pars minor est quam totum. Caput humani corporis pars est. Ergo caput illud est humano corpore minus. Haec conclusio ideo omnino necessaria est, quia duae praecedentes propositiones necessariae sunt simul iunctae. Necesse est enim caput esse minus corpore, tum quia pars est minor toto, tum quia ipsum est pars corporis.

19 Quapropter in his quoque tribus, positione,[99] conditione, demonstratione, tres sunt necessariae veritates. At si tria ipsa in humana ratione sunt cum disputat, tres quoque hae veritates necessariae sunt in ipsa. Et quia disputat semper, etiam dum tacemus, et dum dormimus (tota enim hominis vita perpetua quaedam ratiocinatio est), idcirco semper sunt illae veritates in ratione. Quae semper, ut ita loquar, et veridica est et verifica. Veridica in primis tribus veritatibus quae necessariae per se sunt, etiam si ratio nihil egerit. Verifica in tribus aliis, quia ratio necessitatem quandam illis imponit per positiones, conditiones, demonstrationes, sive per quoslibet alios argumentandi modos. Contingit enim hoc animal

but principles are necessarily present in the rational power (whence it can reason all the time about something), then it follows that these three necessary truths, which are all described as absolute, are contained in the natural dialectic of men.

That leaves us with relative necessity, which also has three 18
parts: one is in propositional statements, the second in conditional ones, the third in demonstrative ones. (1) Examples of the first are: Nothing cannot exist while it exists; an animal while it lives is necessarily alive; and similar propositions that are affirmed about the present. From them derives the necessity of the past and of the future: What has been done cannot be undone; what will be cannot not be. (2) Examples of the second are: If a body is alive, it necessarily exists; if an animal is running, it is in motion. (3) And an example of the third is: Every part is smaller than the whole; the head is part of the human body; so the head is smaller than the human body. This conclusion is wholly necessary, because the two prior necessary propositions have been linked together. For the head is necessarily smaller than the body, both because the part is smaller than the whole, and because the head is part of the body.

Accordingly, in these three forms of argument too — of proposi- 19
tion, condition, and demonstration — three necessary truths exist. If the three relationships are in the human reason when it is engaged in argument, then the three necessary truths are in it as well. But because reason is always engaged in argument, even when we are not speaking, and even while we are asleep (for the whole of a man's life is in a sense an unending process of reasoning), so these truths are always present in the reason. Reason is, if I may put it so, both truth-speaking and truth-doing: truth-speaking in the case of the first three truths which are necessary in themselves even if the reason does nothing; truth-doing in the case of the other three, because reason imposes a necessity on them by way of propositions, conditions, and demonstrations, or the other forms of argument. For it is contingent that a particular animal is

vivere, non tamen, dum vivit, contingit vivere, sed est necessarium. Contingit hunc hominem moveri, non tamen si currat, immo sequitur necessario. Contingit hoc caput esse hoc corpore minus, sed positis ab animo prioribus illis duabus propositionibus, est necesse, quamvis in ipsa specie capitis et specie corporis numquam id sit contingens. Si ratio in aliis necessariam veritatem capit, in aliis ipsa facit, et capit semper et facit, quis negabit in ea esse perpetuam veritatem? Immo quis negabit eam esse necessariam, postquam quae per se necessaria sunt, ita ut sunt, accipit, neque mutat; quae vero non sunt per se talia, ipsa virtute sua efficit necessaria? Et multo magis necessaria est quam omnia quae positionibus, conditionibus, argumentationibus necessaria efficiuntur ab ipsa. Ipsa igitur absolute est necessaria ferme ut principia illa disciplinarum definitiones proprietatesque perpetuae. Quapropter humana ratio vel necessario fuit semper et erit ut illa, vel saltem necessario semper erit. Nam quid prohibet fore perpetuam rationem cuius perennis actio nihil est aliud quam ex absoluta aeternitate firmiter intra manente relativam aeternitatem temporalibus quibuslibet contingentibusque praestare atque ex necessariis et contingentibus seriem unam digerere necessariam et perpetuam? Si erit semper, vivet et semper. Non enim est ratio nisi vivens et in vivente.

alive, but not contingent while it is alive that it lives, rather it is necessary. It is contingent that this man is in motion, but not contingent if he is running, for then it follows of necessity. It is contingent that this particular head is smaller than this particular body, but once the reasoning soul has posited the two earlier propositions [stated under (3) above], it is necessary, (though it is never contingent in the species itself of head and the species of body). If reason in some cases receives a necessary truth, but in others makes a truth necessary, and if it is always receiving and making, who will deny that perpetual truth dwells in reason? Or rather, who will deny that reason itself is necessary, since things that are necessary of themselves it receives just as they are and does not change, but things that are not necessary of themselves it makes necessary by its power? And reason is much more necessary than all the things it makes necessary through propositions, conditions, and other forms of argumentation. Reason is necessary, then, absolutely, almost like the principles, definitions, and perpetual properties of the different branches of knowledge. So like them human reason either has always necessarily existed and always will, or, at the least, will always necessarily exist. For what prevents there being an everlasting reason, whose unceasing activity is nothing other than (a) providing, from the absolute eternity lodged unchangingly within it, a relative eternity to various temporal and contingent objects; and (b) assembling, from both necessary and contingent things, a single, necessary, and everlasting series? If it always exists, it will always live. For reason does not exist unless it is living, and living in a living being.

: VII :

Obiectio Scepticorum et responsio, quod aliquid certum sciatur.

1 Neque audiendi sunt Sceptici, si negaverint in animis nostris esse veritatem, quia videantur de singulis dubitare. Non enim de omnibus dubitat animus, ut apparuit in omnibus necessariis veritatibus quas narravimus, et similibus. Hoc mihi candidum videri scio; hoc mihi iocunde olere scio; hoc dulciter gustum attingere scio. Quis nesciat summum bonum esse quo nihil praestantius, et esse vel in homine vel extra hominem, et si in homine, vel in animo vel in corpore vel in utroque? Quis non certe sciat Deum esse vel non esse, et si sit, oportere unum esse vel plures, et si plures, aut finitos numero aut infinitos? Oportere Deum esse corporeum vel incorporeum, ac si not sit corporeus, esse necessario incorporeum?

2 Item regulas multas astrologiae et medicinae certas esse declarat effectus, ut arithmeticas et geometricas praetermittam, quibus nihil est certius. Et quod maius est, si quando animus de re aliqua dubitat, tunc etiam de multis est certus. Nam se tunc dubitare non dubitat. Ac si certum habet se esse dubitantem, a veritate certa id habet certum. Quippe qui se dubitantem intellegit, verum intellegit, et de hac re quam intellegit certus est; de vero igitur est certus. Atque omnis qui utrum sit veritas dubitat, in seipso habet verum, unde non dubitet. Nec ullum verum nisi veritate verum est. Non igitur oportet eum de veritate dubitare[100] qui potuit undecumque dubitare, ut Augustinus inquit, praesertim cum non modo se du-

: VII :

An objection from the Skeptics and its rebuttal. Knowledge of something certain is possible.

We should not listen to Skeptics if they deny that truth exists in 1
our souls on the grounds that souls appear to be in doubt about particular matters. For the soul is not in doubt about everything, as was evident in all the necessary truths we talked about, and others like them. I know that this looks white to me; I know that this smells pleasant to me; and I know that this strikes my taste as sweet.[72] Who denies that the highest good is that to which nothing is superior, that it exists either in man or outside him, and, if it is in man, that it is either in his soul or body or both? And who does not know for certain that God either exists or does not exist; and if He exists, that He must be either one or more than one; and if more than one, then either finite in number or infinite; and that He must be either corporeal or incorporeal, and if not corporeal, then necessarily incorporeal?

Results have shown that many laws governing astrology and 2
medicine are certain, not to mention the rules of arithmetic and geometry which are the most certain of all. More importantly, whenever the soul does doubt something, at that very moment it is certain of many things. For it does not doubt it doubts. And if it knows for certain it doubts, it derives that certainty from a certain truth. Anyone who understands he is doubting, understands something true, and is certain of what he understands, therefore certain of what is true. So everyone who doubts whether truth exists, has something true in himself about which he is not in doubt. No true thing is true except through truth. So he who was able to doubt on any grounds must not be in doubt about the truth, as Augustine says, especially since not only does he understand he is

bitare intellegat, sed quod hoc intellegit animadvertat, et quod animadvertit agnoscat, ac deinceps in infinitum. Discernit praeterea dubium animum ab indubio. Nec eum latet quanto satius foret non dubitare et quam ardenter cupiat veritatem. Certitudinem cum dubio comparat, quo fit ut de utrisque sit certus. Est insuper certus se investigare, sentire, vivere, esse, siquidem nihil dubitat qui non est, vivit, sentit et investigat. Certus quoque est se non esse primam veritatem, quippe cum ipsa de se non dubitet. Scit eam dubitatione et errore non implicari. Scit oportere se in iudicando falli aut non falli. Scit, sive fallatur sive non fallatur, dum iudicat se proculdubio vivere. Postremo non ignorat esse extra animum suum aliquid aliud in natura quod ipsi inferat dubium. Tales quaedam certae veritates in ipsa etiam dubitatione perspiciuntur. Quo admonemur ut Aristonem, Pyrrhonem atque Herillum non metuamus, qui dum opinantur nihil a nobis verum sciri, ipsi proculdubio sciunt opinionem hanc suam oportere aut veram esse aut falsam. Sciunt, si vera est, nonnihil ab homine verum intellegi; sciunt, si falsa est, opinionem eis oppositam esse[101] veram, scilicet aliquid ab homine verum sciri.

: VIII :

Obiectio Peripateticorum et responsio, quod veritas animum familiariter habitat.

1 Sed numquid metuendi Peripatetici sunt, qui negant familiariter habitare in animo veritatem, ex eo quod tam pauci eius periti esse videantur, et quisquis eam noverit, tanto ab infantia tempore fuerit

doubting, but he realizes he understands this and knows he realizes this, and so on to infinity.[73] Besides he can distinguish between a soul in doubt and one that is not. And he is well aware how much more satisfactory it would be not to doubt, and how ardently he desires the truth. He compares certainty with doubt, and, as a result, is certain of both. He is also certain that he is inquiring, feeling, living, existing, since he who does not exist, live, feel, and inquire is not doubting at all. He is certain, too, that he is not himself the prime truth, since that truth never doubts itself. He knows that it is never involved in doubt or error. [But] he knows that in forming judgments he himself must either err or not err. He knows beyond a doubt whether he is erring or not, when he decides he is alive. Lastly, he is not unaware that something else must exist in nature outside his own soul that is introducing him to doubt.[74] Such are the certain truths that are perceived in the very act of doubting. This should encourage us not to fear Aristo or Pyrrho or Herillus,[75] who, while they offer their opinion that we cannot know anything true, know beyond a doubt themselves that their opinion has to be either true or false. They know that if it is true, then something true must be understood by man; and they know that if it is false, then the opinion opposed to theirs must be true, namely that something true must be known by man.

: VIII :

An objection from the Peripatetics and its rebuttal. That the truth is at home in the soul.

Should we then fear the Peripatetics, who deny that truth is really 1
at home in the rational soul, because so few people seem to have any experience of it, and anyone who knows the truth did not

indoctus? Certe non esse timendos Augustinus, ubi mentem Platonis exponit, ita testatur.

2 'Aut est aliquid in animo quod in praesenti cogitatione non est, aut non est in musico animo ars musica, cum de sola geometria cogitat. Hoc autem falsum est, illud igitur verum. Non autem quicquam se habere animus sentit, nisi quod in cogitationem venerit. Potest igitur aliquid esse in animo, quod esse in se animus ipse non sentiat. Id autem quamdiu sit, nihil interest. Nam si diutius fuerit in aliis animus occupatus (quamvis intentionem suam in ante cogitata facile possit reflectere), oblivio vel imperitia nominatur. Sed cum vel nos ipsi nobiscum ratiocinantes vel ab alio bene interrogati, de quibusdam liberalibus artibus vera percipimus, ea quae invenimus non alibi quam in animo nostro invenimus. Nam ob idipsum oportet animum ad haec invenienda relictis externis secedere in seipsum. Neque idem est invenire quod facere aut gignere, alioquin aeterna gigneret animus inventione temporali. Nam aeterna saepe invenit. Quid enim tam aeternum quam circuli ratio, vel si quid aliud in huiusmodi artibus, neque non fuisse aliquando, neque non fore comprehenditur? Hinc manifestum est immortalem esse animum humanum et omnes veras rationes in secretis eius esse, quamvis eas sive ignorantia sive oblivione aut non habere aut amisisse videatur.'

3 'Fac te aliquid esse[102] oblitum aliosque te velle quasi in memoriam revocare. Dicunt ergo illi: numquidnam hoc est aut illud? diversa velut similia proferentes. Tu vero nec illud vides quod recordari cupis, et tamen vides non hoc esse quod dicitur. Numquidnam tibi cum hoc evenit, integra videtur oblivio? Nequa-

know it during the long time he was a child? Augustine, in the following exposition of Plato's views, certainly testifies we should not fear them:

"Either[76] something exists in the soul which is not present in 2
thought, or no art of music exists in a musical soul when it is thinking only about geometry. The latter alternative is false, so the former is true. However, the rational soul is not aware it has something unless it actually swims into its thoughts. So it is possible for something to be in the soul which the soul does not know is there in itself. How long it has been there is not significant. For if the soul has been preoccupied for a long time with other matters (however much it could easily turn its attention back to things it had considered earlier), we call it forgetfulness or ignorance. But when, either in reasoning with ourselves or in being questioned properly by another, we ourselves perceive truths about the various liberal arts, the truths that we discover we find nowhere else but in our soul. That is why to find the truths the soul has to retreat into itself, having abandoned externals. Finding is not the same thing as making or generating, or else the soul would generate eternal things through temporal discovery. It often finds eternal things. For what is more eternal than the rational principle of a circle, or some or other principle in the liberal arts, when it is understood never at some point not to have been, and never not to be? It is clear from this that the human soul is immortal, and has all the true rational principles in its innermost parts, although it may appear through ignorance not to have them or to have lost them through forgetfulness."

"Suppose[77] you have forgotten something, and people want as it 3
were to jog your memory. They say to you, 'Is it this or that?' proffering various things which might resemble it. You do not see what you want to remember, but you do see it is not what they are talking about. When this happens to you does it seem to be total oblivion? Surely not. For discrimination itself, whereby you do not

quam. Nam ipsa discretio qua non admittitur quod falso ammoveris, pars quaedam recordationis est. Tales ergo nondum verum vident, falli tamen decipique non possunt; et quid quaerunt, satis norunt. At si tibi quispiam dicat te post paucos dies risisse quam natus es, non audes dicere falsum esse, et si auctor sit cui fides habenda est, non recordaturus, sed crediturus es. Totum enim tempus illud validissima tibi oblivione occultum est. Haec igitur ab illa oblivione plurimum differt, sed illa media est. Nam est alia recordationi revisendaeque veritati propior atque vicinior. Cui simile est quando videmus aliquid certoque agnoscimus nos id vidisse aliquando, atque nosse affirmamus, sed ubi, aut quando, aut quomodo, aut apud quem nobis in notitiam venerit satagimus repetere atque recolere. Ut si de homine nobis contigerit, etiam quaeramus ubi eum noverimus; quod cum ille commemoraverit, repente tota res memoriae quasi lumen infunditur, nihilque amplius ut reminiscamur laboratur. Tales sunt qui bene disciplinis liberalibus eruditi sunt. Siquidem illas sine dubio in se oblivione obrutas eruunt discendo et quodammodo effodiunt. Non tamen contenti sunt neque se continent, donec totam faciem veritatis (cuius quidam in illis artibus iam splendor subrutilat) latissime atque planissime intueantur. Sed in iis[103] quidam falsi colores atque formae velut in speculum cogitationes effundunt,[104] falluntque inquirentes saepe ac decipiunt, putantes illud totum esse quod norunt vel quod inquirunt; ipsae sunt illae imagines magna cautione vitandae, quae deprehenduntur fallaces cum cogitationis variato quasi speculo variantur, cum illa facies veritatis una et immutabilis maneat.'

4 'Quamvis enim alterius atque alterius magnitudinis quadratum sibi cogitatio depingat et quasi ante oculos praeferat, tamen mens interior quae vult verum videre ad illud se potius convertit, secun-

accede to what you might have mistakenly lent an ear to, is a part of recollection. So such people do not yet see the truth, but they cannot be cheated or deceived; and they know sufficiently what they are after. If someone says to you that you laughed just a few days after you were born, you do not dare deny it is true; and if the author of the story is someone trustworthy, you will not remember it but you will believe it. For that whole period is veiled for you in total oblivion. This is very different from the first kind of forgetting, but the first is in fact an intermediate kind. For there is another kind of forgetting which is a next-door neighbor to memory and to the recovery of truth. It is almost the same as when we see something and know for certain that we have seen it at some point before; and we agree we know it, but where or when or how or with whom it came to our notice we cast around to unravel and to recollect. If it happened to us because of a person, we can even ask him where we met him; and when he has reminded us, the whole matter comes flooding back into our memory like the light, and we do not have to make any further effort to remember. This is what happens to people who are well-educated in the liberal arts. Obviously the arts lie buried in oblivion within them, and they rescue and in a way dig them out by means of learning. Yet they are not content and do not cease their efforts until they gaze upon the whole face of truth in all its fullness and clarity (a pale splendor of which already glows in those arts). However, with these art-lovers certain false colors and forms flood into their thoughts as into a mirror; and these illusions often cheat those scrutinizing them and deceive those who think this mirror is all they know or examine. These are images that must be very carefully avoided; when they change in the changing mirror of thought, they are perceived to be false, for the face of truth remains one and unchanging."

"Though thought may depict for itself a square of one size or 4
another and summon it in a way before our eyes, the inner mind,

dum quod iudicat omnia illa esse quadrata. Quid si quispiam nobis dicat secundum ideam[105] iudicare, quod videre oculis solet? Quare ergo dicit, si tamen vere erudita est, pilam veram vera planitie puncto tangi? Quid tale umquam oculis vidit aut videre potest, cum ipsa imaginatione cogitationis fingi quicquam huiusmodi non possit? An non hoc probamus, cum etiam minimum circulum imaginando animo describimus et ab eo lineas ad centrum ducimus? Nam cum duas duxerimus, inter quas quasi acu vix pungi possit, alias iam in medio non possumus ipsa cogitatione imaginaria ducere, ut ad centrum sine ulla commixtione perveniant, cum clamet ratio innumerabiles posse duci, ita ut in omni earum intervallo scribi etiam circulus possit. Hoc cum illa phantasia implere non possit, magisque ipsi oculi deficiant (siquidem per ipsos est animo infusa), manifestum est, et multum eam differre a veritate, et illam, dum hoc videtur, non videri.' Idem contingit quando ratio lineam dividit in infinitum, quod neque cernit sensus, neque assequitur phantasia.

5 Ex omnibus iis[106] Augustinus confici arbitratur, quod et Plato in epistola ad Syracusanos docet, ut veritates ipsae rerum mentem nostram familiariter habitent ostendantque sua illam familiaritate perpetuam.

which wants to see the truth, turns rather towards the criterion which enables it to judge whether all are squares. How if someone claims to us that he is judging what he usually sees with the eyes according to an Idea? Why, then, does the mind declare, if it has been properly trained, that a true sphere makes contact with a true plane at some point? Has it ever seen such or could it ever see such with the eyes, since nothing of this kind can be imagined even in the imagination of thinking? Don't we prove this when we describe a very small circle by imagining it in our mind and when we draw lines from it to the center? Once we have drawn two lines, there is scarcely room to stick a pin between them; and we cannot even imagine drawing more lines in between so that they reach the center without crossing into each other. But reason insists that it is possible to draw an infinite number of them, and such that in their every interval the [line of the] circle could also be drawn. Since this [situation] cannot be imagined by the phantasy, and our eyes are even more incapable (since via the eyes the phantasy has been infused in the rational soul), then it is clear both that the phantasy differs greatly from the truth, and that the truth is not seen when the circle is seen." The same happens when reason divides a line to infinity, something that neither the sense sees nor the phantasy imagines.

From all this Augustine concludes what Plato too tells us in his letter to the Syracusans:[78] namely that the very truths of things make their home in our mind, and in dwelling there demonstrate that the mind is everlasting.

Notes to the Text

ABBREVIATIONS

A	the *editio princeps*, Florence, 1482, with printed corrigenda as noted below.
L	Florence, Biblioteca Mediceo-Laurenziana, MS Plut. LXXXIII, 10, the dedication copy written for Lorenzo de'Medici.
M	Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, MS Magl. XX, 58, the *codex unicus* of Ficino's *Disputatio contra iudicium astrologorum*.
Ep	*Marsilio Ficino: Lettere, I: Epistolarum familiarium liber I*, ed. Sebastiano Gentile (Florence: Olschki, 1990).
Marcel	The reading of Raymond Marcel's edition, *Marsile Ficin: Théologie platonicienne de l'immortalité des âmes* (3 vols., Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1964-70).
Opera	The reading of the text in *Marsilii Ficini . . . Opera* (Basel: Henricpetri, 1576; repr. Turin: Bottega d'Erasmo, 1959, 1983).
P	*Marsilii Ficini Praedicationes*, in *Opera*, I, pp. 473-494.

CAPITULA

1. *The chapter headings in the table of contents (in A) give* solutio, *while the reading of the internal chapter headings is* resolutio

2. *Omitted in the table of contents in A*

BOOK IX

1. Marsilii Ficini Theologiae de animorum immortalitate liber nonus incipit *L*
2. et *omitted in L*
3. relinquetur *Marcel*
4. 9.2.1 to 9.3.1 are excerpted from *P* (pp. 475–476).
5. rationalis animus *P*

6. *omitted by Marcel*
7. Praestantissime animae partes] Praecipuae quidem rationalis animae partes duae P
8. *After* deceptus *P adds* Quod plane comprobat Socrates in Phaedone
9. curis *before* multis P
10. *After* nubibus *P adds* nec aliter animum corpore distrahente
11. fulgetque P
12. quietam *Marcel*
13. spiritibus *P*
14. seiungatur P
15. originem animi] animi rationalis originem *P*
16. siquidem P
17. *omitted in P*
18. immergitur AP
19. cum *P*
20. *Transposed after* corpore *in P*
21. Nulla *P*
22. *After* qua *P adds* quidem
23. circa ipsum *P*
24. *After* ipsius P *adds* naturaliter
25. ferreretur *P*
26. agit *P*
27. prorsus adversatur *P*
28. Anima repugnat adversaturque *omitted in P*
29. colligit *L*
30. accederit *before correction in A*
31. mane *before correction in A*
32. *9.3.4 from the beginning of the paragraph down to* oblectaris infinite *is extracted from Ficino's* Dialogus inter Deum et animam theologicus (= *Ep 4, lines 80–103, ed. Gentile I, p. 15; the remainder of the paragraph follows closely lines 54–58 of the same letter).* Dei] Boni *Ep*
33. *Omitted in Ep*
34. *Omitted in Ep*
35. *Omitted in Ep*
36. *Omitted in Ep*
37. *Omitted in Ep*
38. *Omitted in Ep*
39. *Omitted in Ep*
40. *Omitted in Ep*
41. immutabile *Ep*
42. cuiusque *Ep*
43. atque ipsum lumen] lumenque ipsum *Ep*
44. ut abunde] proprie ut aeque *Ep*
45. Corporalibus *Ep*
46. diei *before correction in A*
47. solis lumen *Ep*
48. Hic tuus est . . . phantasia *omitted in Ep*
49. mea *Ep*
50. *After* est *Ep adds* o anima
51. rerum omnium corporalium *Ep*
52. meam *Ep*
53. mea *Ep*

54. mea *Ep*
55. *Omitted in Ep*
56. me *Ep*
57. infinita *before correction in A*
58. benefici dei *omitted in Ep*
59. lumen *Marcel*
60. *Before* infinite *Ep has* Me, me, inquam
61. quae *before correction in A*
62. *From 9.3.6 to the end of 9.4.3* the *text excerpts Ficino's* Disputatio contra iudicium astrologorum, *whose variants are here indicated with the siglum M (see vol. I, p. 315, of this edition).*
63. Exuriente *M*
64. actio *M*
65. incorporales *M*
66. *The next few lines, to* abstinebant, *are excepted from P (p. 475).*
67. vir caelestis *omitted in P*
68. *After* locum *in P*
69. salubrem *P*
70. corporis naturae] corporis *P*
71. iniussus *P*
72. indicabat *P*
73. *After* enervarent *P adds* et sobrii forent ad contemplandum
74. Magnae Matri] Dianae *M*
75. corporalibus *M*
76. essent *Marcel*
77. corporalis *M*
78. ipso *after* secum *M*
79. nobis *A, Marcel*
80. quo corpori . . . afficitur] quo ad corpus tamquam filium et suum opus afficitur *M*
81. parvus *L*
82. *omitted by Marcel*
83. medelam *M*
84. suprema *M*
85. vitalis complexio corpori *omitted in M*
86. *Omitted before correction in A*
87. deo] a Deo *Marcel*
88. esset *AL: omitted by Marcel*
89. *Marcel inserts* est *after* perfectius
90. modo hoc *AL:* hoc modo *Marcel, before correction in L*
91. negant *before correction in A*
92. *omitted by Marcel*
93. mea *before correction in A*
94. -que *L*
95. immo ducunt] atque conducant *before correction in L*
96. angelisque *L*
97. movendi *Marcel*
98. impulsu *before correction in A*
99. per artem *Marcel's conjecture, as it seems*] partem *AL, Opera*
100. unitur *Marcel*
101. quoque *L*
102. despicit *before correction in A*

103. reliquae *Marcel*
104. confundat *L*
105. animadverte *A:* advertere *L:* animadvertere *Marcel*
106. Nam ob id . . . ignorare *omitted in L*
107. extrema *L*
108. otius *Marcel*
109. vivendi *before correction in A*
110. corpus *before correction in A*
111. ut *before correction in A*
112. respondeo *A, Marcel*
113. atque . . . ideo *omitted before correction in A*
114. retraheretur *before correction in A*
115. -tentur *Marcel*
116. diversitatis *L*
117. iis *A*
118. respiciunt *before correction in A*
119. magis . . . conversae *repeated mistakenly by Marcel*
120. se *L*
121. caloris humor *L, Marcel*
122. qui *L, Marcel*
123. Putant *L*
124. illa *Marcel*
125. his *L*
126. cum *Marcel*
127. quod vires aliae *omitted in L*
128. ipsum quoque *Opera, Marcel*
129. speramus *before correction in A*
130. quaenam] quae natura *before correction in A*
131. incorporabili *before correction in A*
132. directe *Marcel*
133. -gatur *L*
134. *omitted in L*
135. aliquos *Marcel*
136. emancipata *before correction in A*
137. *Marcel inserts* est *after* mutabilis
138. ex elementis *Opera, Marcel*
139. virtute *before correction in A*

BOOK X

1. Marsilii Ficini Theologiae de animorum immortalitate liber decimus incipit *L*
2. unde *before correction in A*
3. quosque *Marcel*
4. tribuit *Opera, Marcel*
5. a deo] adeo *L*
6. ac *L*
7. Epicurei *before correction in L*
8. elementalem *Marcel*
9. foeminum *Marcel*
10. fixae *Marcel*
11. *omitted in L*
12. *omitted in A before correction*
13. nos *Marcel*

14. etiam plaga *L*, *after correction in A:* plaga esse *before correction in A:* plaga etiam *Marcel (misreading the corrigenda)*
15. terra *Marcel*
16. perpetuo *L*
17. diutiusque *AL*, *Opera; Marcel conjectures* divitiusque *(sic)*
18. corporibus *L*
19. tamen *after* numquam *before correction in A (incorrectly reported by Marcel)*
20. crescens *before correction in A*
21. et *after* qualitates *A, Marcel*
22. -tiam *before correction in A*
23. corpori *L*
24. Iis *A*
25. quidem *Marcel*
26. sequi *A*
27. corporea *Marcel*
28. accipit *A*
29. materiae *Marcel*
30. *omitted in L*
31. debet *L*
32. *omitted by Marcel*
33. ista *Marcel*
34. reditura *before correction in A*
35. semota *before correction in A*
36. paulum qui *Marcel*
37. *Not in AL; added by Marcel following Opera*
38. formae *Marcel*
39. ut tamquam *before correction in A*
40. inquam *before correction in A*
41. luget *A*
42. artificius *Marcel*
43. illo *L*
44. *Marcel adds* et *before* mixtione
45. *omitted in L*
46. *omitted in A, Marcel*
47. Materiam *Marcel*
48. plantarumque *L*
49. fit *omitted by Marcel*
50. colorem *A*
51. *omitted by L*
52. suae *before correction in A*
53. inspiciat *before correction in A*
54. inspiciantur *before correction in A*
55. aliter *L*
56. ardentiorem *A*
57. discurrere *L*
58. imaginantis *L*
59. parte *omitted by Marcel*
60. qui *Marcel*
61. habitura *before correction in A*
62. materiam praeparatam *Marcel*
63. *omitted by Marcel*
64. sextodecimo *before correction in A*
65. sensibilis *L*
66. aeris *Marcel*
67. Arbitrantur *A*
68. progenitoribus *L*
69. perierat *A*
70. iis *L*
71. *omitted in L*

72. pullularent *before correction in A*
73. intellectus *Marcel*
74. formae *before correction in A*
75. *From here to the end of cap. VIII Ficino's text follows that of Ep (I.4, ed. Gentile, I, p. 14), lines 64–80.*
76. Filia *Ep*
77. *omitted before correction in A:* omnino] tibi *Ep*
78. *omitted by Ep and before correction in A*
79. o anima *Ep*
80. Animi operatio . . . cogitares *paraphrased from Ep*
81. et *Ep*
82. amandoque] atque amando *Ep*
83. ob aliam rationem *Ep*
84. ipsum bonum inquam] bonum *Ep*
85. quidem *after* quod *Ep*
86. *omitted by Ep*
87. *omitted by Marcel*
88. mentis *Marcel*

BOOK XI

1. Marsilii Ficini Theologiae de animorum immortalitate liber undecimus *L*
2. illa *Opera, Marcel:* illo *AL*
3. accomodatam *before correction in A*
4. intellecturus *L*
5. intellectus *L, before correction in A*
6. et *L, capitula librorum in A, Marcel:* e *A, Opera*
7. incolume *Opera, Marcel:* incolumen *AL*
8. *omitted before correction in A*
9. *omitted by Marcel*
10. illo *before correction in A*
11. musciculae *before correction in A*
12. caloris *before correction in A*
13. perspicue *Marcel*
14. iis *A*
15. naturas *L*
16. proprie *A (perhaps to be read as* propriae*):* propriè *Opera, Marcel:* propriae *L*
17. Igitur *L*
18. perscribere *AL, Opera: Marcel corrects silently to* praescribere
19. phantasia *L*
20. hisdem *A, Marcel*
21. procreat *Marcel*
22. efficiendum *L, before correction in A*
23. *omitted in A*
24. ideo *before correction in A*
25. *Ficino follows the version of this logion found in Psellus,* De oper. demonum, *ed. Boissonade, p. 9, line 8, rather*

than the version in Proclus, In Crat., 21, 1–2
26. secunda *L*
27. peregrina *L*
28. *Marcel inserts* et *after* spectat
29. varietatem *Opera, Marcel*
30. discedit *L*
31. notionem *Marcel*
32. rationalis *L*
33. materia *Marcel*
34. aut actum *omitted in L*
35. sunt *L*
36. earum *before correction in A*
37. naturam *before correction in A*
38. mutant *before correction in A*
39. mutabilis *before correction in A*
40. spiritalis *Marcel*
41. in corpora *before correction in A*
42. alia *before correction in A*
43. merita *Marcel*
44. deum *before correction in A*
45. quidam *before correction in A*
46. umquam *Opera, Marcel*
47. *Marcel conjectures* facillima
48. luce] lucere *A, Marcel*
49. tamen *before correction in A*
50. incorporea *L*
51. generationique *Marcel*
52. *Opera, Marcel add* est *after* confugiendum
53. distincta *L*
54. *omitted by L*
55. ne *before correction in A*
56. necessaria *Marcel*
57. motiones *before correction in A*
58. torrentum *Marcel*
59. -que *omitted by Marcel*
60. pulchra *Marcel*
61. proprius *Marcel*
62. pulchr(a)e *before correction in A*
63. singulares *L*
64. metiuntur *Marcel (who mistakenly applies the corrigendum [see note 65] to this word)*
65. non mentiuntur *before correction in A*
66. angelus *Marcel*
67. necne *before correction in A*
68. particeps *Marcel*
69. Talis *before correction in A*
70. proprius *A*
71. iamdudum *before correction in A*
72. ut *Marcel*
73. insecta sericia] sericii vermes *before correction in A*
74. mutorum *L, before correction in A*
75. mediatur *Marcel*
76. haec *before correction in A*
77. superinfusas *L*: super infusas *A, Opera*: insuper infusas *Marcel*
78. usi *L*
79. dux *A, Opera, Marcel*
80. a natura *before correction in A*
81. Atque *before correction in A*

82. elisimus *A*
83. formae *L*: ferme *A (as it seems), Opera, Marcel*
84. perspicuae *Marcel*
85. motum *Marcel*
86. manebis *A*
87. *omitted by Marcel*
88. *Marcel adds* per *before* duo
89. mensuraret *before correction in A*
90. Quod *before correction in A*
91. -tantur *L*
92. ignorantum *(sic) AL*
93. quocumque *L*
94. Pythagoras *L*
95. -ne an] an ne *L*
96. *omitted in L*
97. mentem *L*
98. -tentur *L*
99. propositione *before correction in A*
100. verum est . . . dubitare *repeated after* dubitare *by Marcel*
101. oppositam esse *omitted by Marcel*
102. esse aliquid *L*
103. ex his *Augustine*
104. cogitationis se fundant *Augustine*
105. ideam *AL*: id eam *Augustine, Marcel:* idem *Opera*
106. his *Opera, Marcel*

Notes to the Translation

ABBREVIATIONS

Avicenna, *Opera*	*Auicene peripatetici philosophi ac medicorum facile primi opera* (n.pl., 1508; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1961).
Bidez-Cumont	Joseph Bidez and Franz Cumont, *Les mages hellenisés: Zoroastre, Ostanès et Hystaspe d'après la tradition grecque* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1938).
Collins	Ardis B. Collins, *The Secular Is Sacred: Platonism and Thomism in Marsilio Ficino's Platonic Theology* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974).
Des Places	Édouard Des Places, ed., *Oracles Chaldaïques, avec un choix de commentaires anciens* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1971).
Diels-Kranz	Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, eds., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 3 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1906–1910).
Ficino, *Opera*	Marsilio Ficino, *Opera omnia* (Basel: Heinrich Petri, 1576; repr. Turin: Bottega d'Erasmo, 1959).
Hörmann	Wolfgang Hörmann, ed., *s. Aurelius Augustinus: Soliloquiorum libri duo; De inmortalitate animae; De quantitate animae*. Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, vol. 89 (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1986).
In Phaedrum	Michael J. B. Allen, *Marsilio Ficino and the Phaedran Charioteer* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981).
Kaske-Clark	Carol V. Kaske and John R. Clark, eds., *Marsilio Ficino: Three Books on Life* (Binghamton, NY: Renaissance Society of America, 1989).

Marcel, *Banquet*	Raymond Marcel, *Marsile Ficin: Commentaire sur le Banquet de Platon* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1956).
Marietti	Petrus Marc, ed., *Thomas Aquinas: Liber de veritate Catholicae fidei contra errores infidelium qui dicitur Summa contra gentiles*, 3 vols. (Turin: Marietti, 1961).
PG	Jacques-Paul Migne, ed., *Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Graeca*, 161 vols. (Paris: Migne, 1857–1866.)
PL	Jacques-Paul Migne, ed., *Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Latina*, 221 vols. (Paris: Migne, 1844–1891).
Quandt	Wilhelm Quandt, ed. *Orphei Hymni*, 4th ed. (Dublin: Weidmann, 1973).
Saffrey-Westerink	Henri-Dominique Saffrey and Leendert Gerrit Westerink, eds., *Proclus: Théologie Platonicienne*, 6 vols. (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1968–97).
Schiavone	Michele Schiavone, ed., *Marsilio Ficino: Teologia platonica*, 2 vols. (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1965).
Tambrun-Krasker	Brigitte Tambrun-Krasker, *Oracles chaldaïques, recension de Georges Gémiste Pléthon* (Athens: Academy of Athens, 1995).
Thom	Johan C. Thom, *The Pythagorean Golden Verses with Introduction and Commentary* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965).

For Ficino's debts to Aquinas we have noted below two kinds of parallel passages from the *Summa contra Gentiles* assembled by Collins in *The Secular Is Sacred*, those indicating either "almost verbatim copying" or "a close similarity in thought" (p. 114). A third category, consisting of similarities "not marked enough to justify any conclusion about the presence of Thomistic influence," has been ignored. We follow Collins throughout in citing the paragraph numbers from the 1961 Marietti edition of the *Summa*; thus, in the citation 1.43.363, "363" refers to the paragraph number of the Marietti edition.

BOOK IX

1. *Phaedrus* 246A ff., 257A. But Ficino's own *In Phaedrum* 7 (ed. Allen, p. 101) speaks only of the soul's two wheels: "its turning back to itself and its conversion to higher things."

2. *Carmina aurea* 47–48 (ed. Thom), tr. Ficino: "per eum qui animo nostro quadriplicem fontem perpetuo fluentis naturae tradidit" (*Opera*, p. 1979). Any mention of four in a Pythagorean context should be referred to the tetraktys, the sacred quaternary of 4, 3, 2 and 1 summing to 10; cf. Porphyry, *Vita Pythagorae* 20; Iamblichus, *De vita pythagorica* 28.150; and Macrobius, *In somnium Scipionis* 1.6.41. See Michael J. B. Allen, *Nuptial Arithmetic: Marsilio Ficino's Commentary on the Fatal Number in Book VIII of Plato's "Republic"* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1994), pp. 29, 66.

3. *Crito* 44AB, *Apology* 39CD (Socrates predicting his own death).

4. *Si anima originem . . . impediatur a corpore:* repeated, with a few variations, in Ficino's sermon *De vita animae immortali* (*Opera*, p. 476.1). For its continuation, see nn. 10, 11, 18 below.

5. Cf. Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 1.40.96–97. Theramenes was an Athenian statesman of moderate views who was executed in 404 BC by the thirty tyrants under Critias. Critias died in battle the following year.

6. See Cicero's *De divinatione* 1.30.64. Posidonius (c.135–51 BC) was an important eclectic Stoic who taught in Rhodes where Cicero attended his lectures and became his friend. He wrote, *inter alia*, on divination.

7. Ibid., 1.25.53.

8. Ibid., 1.23.47.

9. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 1.11.117–118. Pherecydes (fl. 550 BC) was purportedly a teacher of Pythagoras. In the *Tusculan Disputations* 1.16.38, Cicero declares he was the first to pronounce the souls of men eternal.

10. *Non solum vero intellectus . . . potest esse mutatio:* repeated, with a few variations, as the close of Ficino's sermon *De vita animae immortali* (*Opera*, p. 476.1) following on *impediatur a corpore* (see n. 4 above; also nn. 11 and 18 below).

11. *Nulla res sponte sua . . . ducit originem:* repeated, with a few variations, as the opening of Ficino's sermon *De vita animae immortali* (*Opera*, p. 475.3). See nn. 4 and 10 above and n. 18 below.

12. *Dei faciem rursus intueri . . . oblectaberis infinite:* repeated, with variations, in Ficino's *Dialogus inter Deum et animam theologicus* in his *Letters* 1.4.80–103 (ed. Gentile, I, p. 15 = *Opera*, pp. 610–611), a letter to Mercati.

13. *Quare igitur, obsecro, faciem . . . penitus assecutum:* ibid. 1.4.54–58 (ed. Gentile, I, p. 14). See n. 12 above.

14. This startling notion that the lung can be thirsty (since some of what we drink passes into the lungs) is found in Plato's *Timaeus* 70CD, 78C ff., 91A, and then in the Hippocratic collection *On the Heart* (c. 340 BC). It was a view opposed by Aristotle and others.

15. In his *Letters* 4.19 (*Opera*, p. 764.1: *Vita Platonis* sub *Educatio*), Ficino cites both Basil, *Sermones: de legendis libris gentilium* 7 (ed. N. G. Wilson, *Saint Basil on Greek Literature* [London: Duckworth, 1975], pp. 26–28, and Jerome, *Adversus Jovinianum* 2.9 (*PL* 23. col. 298) to this effect. See too Porphyry, *De abstinentia* 1.36 (tr. Ficino, *Opera* 1933.2).

16. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 4.2.7.

17. Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History* 6.8.

18. *Cum Plato noster . . . carnibus abstinebant:* repeated, with a few variations, in Ficino's sermon *De vita animae immortali* (*Opera*, p. 475.3); see nn. 4, 10, and 11 above. Cf. Porphyry, *De abstinentia* 4 passim.

19. Anatolian Cybele, the great mother of all the gods, loved the youthful Phrygian shepherd Attis who became her priest under a vow of chastity. Learning of his plan to marry another, in a jealous rage she made him mad, and he castrated himself and died. She then transformed him into a pine tree and he became her consort and the prototype of her eunuch devotees and priests, the Galli. The Cybele-Attis cult was officially brought to Rome from Asia Minor in 205/4 BC but only in the later empire did Attis become an all-powerful deity and saviour. See Lucretius, *De rerum natura* 2.600–640; Ovid, *Fasti*, 4.221–244, 361 ff.; Pliny, *Natural*

History 11.109.261; and Clement of Alexandria, *Protrepticus* 2.13–14 (PG 8. cols. 76–77).

20. Augustine, *De civitate* Dei 7.26.

21. *Saepe esuriente stomacho . . . stirpe semotum:* reproduced, with a few variants, in Ficino's *Disputatio contra iudicium astrologorum* f. 20v (see n. 23 below).

22. *Phaedrus* 246A ff. See Ficino's *In Phaedrum* 7–8 (ed. Allen, pp. 96–107).

23. *Neque nos turbet quod . . . vitali complexioni:* reproduced, with a few variants, in Ficino's *Disputatio contra iudicium astrologorum* f. 21v, following on *stirpe semotum* (see n. 21 above).

24. *Timaeus* 42A–43A, 69C–70A, 89E–90A.

25. *Itaque iudicium intellectus . . . ad telas araneae:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.48.1246 (Collins, No. 66A). See n. 29 below.

26. *Ideo omnes eiusdem . . . seipsos agunt:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 3.85.2601, 2603 (Collins, No. 66B). See n. 28 below.

27. Cf. Ficino's sermon *De vita animae,* third part (*Opera,* pp. 477–78).

28. *Unde enim contingere . . . est necessario liber:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 3.85.2602 (Collins, No. 66C). See n. 26 above.

29. *Quod autem iudicet libere . . . usum et voluptatem:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.48.1246 (Collins, No. 66D). See n. 25 above.

30. *Denique naturalia speciei . . . atque tractari:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 3.85.2606 (Collins, No. 67).

31. "Sciences" in the older sense of "branches of knowledge"; cf. Plotinus, *Enneads* 5.3.3, 5.5.1.

32. Plato, *Symposium* 217A–219D.

33. Alciphron was an Atticist author of the second or third century after Christ, to whom has been attributed a collection of 122 fictitious letters purporting to be of the fourth century B.C. See *Der Neue Pauly: Enzyklopädie der Antike,* I (Stuttgart and Weimar, 1996), p. 507, and F. H. Fobes' introduction to the Loeb (1949) edition of the letters, pp. 6–18.

34. For Demosthenes (384–322 BC, the great Athenian orator), see Cicero, *De Oratore* 1.61.260; for Xenocrates (396–314 BC, third head of the Academy) and Cleanthes (c. 250 BC, who succeeded Zeno as head of the Stoic school), see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Philosophers* 4.2.6 and 7.5.168,170 respectively.

35. Marcel, but not Collins, again refers us to Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 3.85, but 84–87 are all relevant. See nn. 26, 28, 30 above and 36 below.

36. Ibid. At 3.85 Aquinas himself cites Ptolemy, *Centiloquium* verbum 8.

37. Ibid. citing verba 1 and 8: "An astronomer should not speak in detail on a matter but in general" (1); and "the wise soul assists the work of the stars" (8). Aquinas cites the latter again in his *Summa theologica* 1.1.115.4, ad tertium.

38. Plotinus, *Enneads* 2.3.7, 3.1.5 (and in general 2.3 "Are the stars causes" and 3.1 "Fate"); Proclus, *De providentia et fato et eo quod in nobis*, passim (ed. Boese, pp. 109–171); Avicenna, *Metaphysics* 10.1.

39. *Laws* 10.893B–899D.

40. *Phaedo* 65A ff.; *Theaetetus* 184Bff.

41. *Phaedrus* 245C–E; see Ficino's *In Phaedrum* 5 and 6 (ed. Allen, pp. 86–97).

42. Aristotle, *De anima* 3.4.429a10–b5ff.

43. Hectic fever is a wasting disease; cf. Aquinas, *Summa theologica* 1.2.q.29, art. 3c.

44. See nn. 39 and 41 above.

45. Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* 3.4.429a30ff.

46. *Phaedo* 65E–67B [?].

47. Unidentified. It is not in the *De sensu et sensato* (pace Marcel who gives no specific reference) or the *De anima*.

48. *Republic* 10.609E–610A.

49. Origen, *De principiis* 2.8.3–4 (*PG* 11. cols. 221–225)—cf. 3.5.4–5 in n. 51 below; Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.3.9, 4.8.1, 3–5 (and in general 4.3 "Problems of the soul [II]" and 4.8 "The soul's descent into body").

50. With wordplay on *genius* (meaning both guardian spirit and inborn talent) and *ingenium*.

51. Origen, *De principiis* 3.5.4 (PG 11. cols. 328–330)—cf. 2.8.3–4 in n. 49 above; Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.8.4.

52. Cf. Pamphilus, *Apologia pro Origene* 9 (PG 17. cols. 604–608)—St. Pamphilus Martyr of Caesarea (AD c. 240–309) was a disciple of Origen and the master of Eusebius who much revered him and took the name "Eusebius of Pamphilus." The first book of this apology for Origen alone survives and only in a Latin version by Rufinus of Aquileia of questionable accuracy. Schiavone (2:34 *ad loc.*) refers us generally instead to St. Jerome's *Letters*.

53. Avicenna, *De Anima* 5.5 and 6; Algazel, *Logica et Philosophia Algazelis* (Venice, 1506), II, tract. 4, ch. 4; V, tract. 5, ch. 1 and 2. Algazel or Al Ghazali (1058–1111) was a Muslim jurist, theologian and mystic whose brilliant critique of Islamic philosophy, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, was translated into Latin in 1328.

54. *De rerum natura* 3.607–614.

55. Or literally "engorgements" or "swellings."

56. For *strepitus* here Schiavone (2:36 *ad loc.*) refers us to Quintilian's *Declamationes* 13.4.

57. A paraphrase of Acts 17:28 "For in him we live, and move, and have our being, as certain also of your own poets have said."

58. Origen, *De Principiis* 4.1.36 (PG 11. col. 411)—condensed and adapted.

59. Cf. Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 1.11.24, 18.41, 22.51, 31.77. Dicaearchus was a pupil of Aristotle.

60. *Timaeus* 40AB.

61. *Epinomis* 981C ff., 984D ff. Cf. *Phaedo* 109C, 111B (on aether).

62. This unidentified dictum is probably not by Anaxagoras and is not in Diels-Kranz. It sounds Hermetic; cf. *Pimander* 10.25 (on earth man is a mortal god, in heaven god is an immortal man), 12.1 (gods are immortal men and men are mortal gods), and *Asclepius* 8 (the gods shaped man-

kind from the eternal and the mortal). Cf. too the Magian reference in 10.2.13, below.

BOOK X

1. The *spirit* in the technical sense of the aethereal substance uniting body to mind. See chapter 2 below.

2. *De rerum natura* 3.800–802. Cf. n. 13 below.

3. Cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.68 on the general principle of gradation.

4. Cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 49C ff., 58D.

5. *Symposium* 202E–203A; *Laws* 4.713C–E.

6. Proclus, *In Timaeum* 1.76.30–77.23, adduces Origen, Numenius, and Porphyry on the good and bad daemons and notes that the Egyptians located the bad daemons in the West. Given the juxtaposition of these four authorities, this passage is probably Ficino's source. But cf. Origen, *Contra Celsum* 1.24 (*PG* 11. col. 705); Numenius, frg. 37 (Des Places); and Porphyry, *De abstinentia* 2.36–43.

7. (ps.) Dionysius the Areopagite, *Celestial Hierarchy* 6.1–2 (*PG* 3. cols. 200–205), gives the principalities, archangels, and angels as the inferior triad in the celestial hierarchy of three triads, the highest triad being the seraphim, cherubim, and thrones, and the intermediary, the dominations, virtues, and powers.

8. *Timaeus* 32BC, 36CD; *Republic* 10.616B–617B.

9. *Phaedrus* 246E–247A; cf. Ficino, *In Phaedrum* 10, 11 (ed. Allen, pp. 110–129).

10. Punning on *homo* (man) and *humus* (soil).

11. Proclus, *In Alcibiadem primum*, 67–73 (tr. Ficino, *Opera*, pp. 1912–1913). For Ficino this commentary (which he translated/paraphrased in his *Opera*, pp. 1908–28) was Proclus' main demonological treatise.

12. Plutarch, *De defectu oraculorum* 17.419A–E. Demetrius participates in the conversation, but not Aemelianus who is merely referred to.

13. Lucretius, *De rerum natura* 3.800–802. Cf. n. 2 above.

14. Cf. Olympiodorus, *In Phaedonem* 124.13 ff. (ed. Norvin, p. 124).

15. Cf. Eusebius, *Praeparatio evangelica* 11.18 (*PG* 21. cols. 892–900).

16. Plotinus, *Enneads* 2.9 (esp. 2.9.8); 4.7,14.

17. Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, props. 15–17, 42–44 (ed. Dodds)—all six deal with self-reversion; Porphyry, *Sententiae* 12, 41 (ed. Lamberz).

18. Aristotle, *De partibus animalium* 4.10.687a5 ff.

19. *Mollitia* implies here the presence of wetness in the brain to offset the dryness of the nerves.

20. Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics* 1.5.1216a11 ff.; Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 2.3.10. Cf. the reference to Anaxagoras at 9.7.4.

21. *Chaldaean Oracles* no. 14 (ed. Tambrun-Krasker [ed. Des Places, frg. 104], with Pletho's commentary on pp. 10–12, and with extensive editorial commentary on pp. 89–103)—on the soul's aethereal and airy vehicles and on its descent; cf. Macrobius, *In Somnium Scipionis* 1.11–12. See Kristeller, *Philosophy*, pp. 371–373.

22. Cf. Ficino's own *In Phaedrum* 10, 11 (ed. Allen, pp. 110–129).

23. *Sophist* 257AB. See Ficino's *In Sophistam* 37 (ed. Allen, *Icastes*, pp. 263–264; with analysis on pp. 49–73).

24. *Charmides* 156D–157A; cf. Book XIII, chap. 1 (forthcoming in vol. 4). The attribution, however, is to Zalmoxis (the manumitted slave of Pythagoras) and the Thracians, not to the Magi; see Iamblichus, *De vita pythagorica* 30.172.

25. Is this a reference to God's cursing the ground in Genesis 3.17 (cf. 5.29, 6.12–13), and to His recanting at 8.21 and then to his covenant with Noah in 9.9–17?

26. See n. 24 above; also *Chaldaean Oracles* no. 11 (ed. Tambrun-Krasker [ed. Des Places, frg. 97], with Pletho's commentary on p. 9, and with editorial commentary on pp. 81–83). Ficino will later quote this oracle in Book XIII, ch. 4.

27. *Asclepius* 26.

28. *Statesman* 269C–274E (the myth of the alternating reigns of Cronus and Zeus—for Neoplatonists the signature passage of the dialogue); and possibly *Timaeus* 43B–44B.

29. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 12.3.1070a24–26; cf. 1069b35–1070b35, 1072a19–1073a13. Note that Ficino usually thinks of Book 12 (lambda) as Book 11.

30. *Physics* 2.7.198a14 ff. and passim.

31. Unidentified. But see 9.7.4, above.

32. Compare a similar statement in chap. 6, para. 2, below: "the mind needs the images so it can be excited by their stimulus to give birth to the universal species."

33. *Phaedo* 79D–81A, 109E.

34. See Allen, *Icastes*, pp. 157–166, for an analysis of the beginning of this chapter.

35. *Philebus* 28DE, 30CD.

36. *De caelo* 2.6.288a–289a.

37. *Phaedrus* 246E4–5 (*elaunôn ptênon harma*). See Ficino's *In Phaedrum*, 19 (ed. Allen, p. 149).

38. Here as elsewhere *artifex* refers to anyone who makes or produces a work, be it a painting, be it a perfume.

39. Schiavone, 2:50 *ad loc.*, corrects to *humiditatem*, erroneously in our view, since fire is hot and dry, air hot and wet, water cold and wet, earth cold and dry.

40. Schiavone, 2:52 *ad loc.*, refers us to Isidore of Seville's *Etymologiae* 16.8. But see Ficino's own *De vita* 3.8.

41. *Timaeus* 29A, 34B–35B, 41CD.

42. See Book XVI.

43. In Scholastic philosophy the transcendentals are traditionally the attributes of goodness, truth, beauty and unity; in Platonism they are the highest of the Ideas.

44. *Timaeus* 30A, 50B–53B, 69BC.

45. *Epinomis* 986C (*logos ho pantôn theiotatos*).

46. *Timaeus* 47E–48A.

47. *Timaeus* 69C–70A.

48. Unidentified, though Marcel cites *De generatione animalium* 2.3.736a.

49. *Timaeus* 41A–D.

50. Cf. Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 1.32.79. Panaetius (*c.* 180 BC–post 129 BC) became head of the Stoic school.

51. *Chaldaean Oracles* no. 7 (ed. Tambrun-Krasker [ed. Des Places, frg. 115]; cf. p. 7 with Pletho's note, and pp. 76–77 with editorial commentary). Cf. Psellus, *Expositio in Oracula Chaldaica* (*PG* 122. col. 1144d1–2).

52. It is difficult to determine the force of the contrast here between *resolvit in Deum* and *refert ad Deum*. See Tamara Albertini, "Intellect and Will in Marsilio Ficino: Two Correlatives of a Renaissance Concept of Mind," in *Marsilio Ficino* (2002), pp. 203–225, with further refs.

53. *Non corporis natura parens . . . quodam in sempiternum*, i.e. the rest of this eighth chapter, is also found in the *Dialogus inter Deum et animam theologicus*, a letter to Mercati in Ficino's *Letters* 1.4.64–80 (ed. Gentile, pp. 14–15 = *Opera*, p. 610). Cf. the similar borrowings in Book IX, chap. 3 above.

BOOK XI

1. Despite this apparent distinction, for Ficino the absolute species are identical with the eternal rational principles as the recurrence of the verb in the singular indicates.

2. *Ipsum intelligibile propria est . . . desinet umquam*: cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.55.1307 (Collins, No. 68).

3. *Simulacrum* means likeness, semblance or image and will usually be rendered as "image" in the following chapters.

4. Cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, 10.33.

5. This is a general ref. to Plato's epistemology; but given Ficino's reference to *coruscatio* at n. 15 below, see the *Seventh Letter* 341CD (note 341D1's *genomenon*); also, given the Neoplatonic interpretation, the *Parmenides*

128E–135B (esp. 130E–131A and 132AB) and the *Meno* 81C ff. (see n. 13 below).

6. Boethius, *De consolatione* 5.5 (*PL* 63. col. 854).

7. See Aristotle, *De anima* 3.3. 428b18–20.

8. *Chaldaean Oracles* no. 27 (ed. Tambrun-Krasker, p. 3 [ed. Des Places, frg. 108]; cf. p. 16 with Pletho's comment, and p. 132 with editorial commentary).

9. *Hymns* 25.9 (ed. Quandt, p. 21)—the "Hymn to Proteus."

10. This is a paraphrase of a citation from a lost work that Ficino encountered in Iamblichus' *Protrepticus* 4 (ed. Pistelli, p. 16.17ff.). Archytas was a Pythagorean friend of Plato's and one of the leading political figures in Tarentum in south Italy during the first half of the 4th century BC. A brilliant mathematician and the alleged founder of mechanics, he distinguished the harmonic progression from the arithmetrical and the geometrical and solved the problem of doubling the cube. For testimonia and extant fragments, see Diels-Kranz 1: 421–439.

11. *De Trinitate* 12.2 (*PL* 42. col. 999).

12. Aristotle, *De anima* 3.5.430a. See n. 14 below.

13. Plato, *Parmenides* 128E–135B (esp. 130E–131A and 132AB) and *Meno* 81C ff. (see n. 5 above and n. 15 below).

14. Aristotle, *De anima* 3.5.430a. See n. 12 above.

15. *Republic* 6.509 ff., and *Seventh Letter* 341CD "as light kindled by a leaping spark," 344B "there bursts forth the light of the intelligible." Cf. Ficino's epitome for the letter: "Subito lumen veritatis accendi. Sed undenam? Ab igne, id est, a Deo prosiliente sive scintillante. Per scintillas designat ideas, exempla rerum in mente divina" (*Opera*, p. 1535); and the last lines of his letter to Uranius (undated but in the twelfth book of *Letters*): "subito tandem nobis velut ab igne scintillante lumen effulget in animo, seque ipsum iam alit" (ibid., p. 950.1).

16. *habitus* is one of Aristotle's "post-praedicaments" and much used in scholastic discourse: it means a condition that is habitual, and therefore not easily changed, a habitual potentiality.

17. *in effectivo habitu*, again a scholastic phrase meaning "in a habitual condition prepared for action or production."

18. *Phaedo* 72E–77A, *Meno* 81C–86B, *Theaetetus* 148E–151D, 198D.

19. See n. 18 above. *Parmenides* 131A-132B, *Timaeus* 49D–50C, and *Symposium* 210E–212A—see the next paragraph on absolute Beauty.

20. See 4.1.6–7 (in Volume I).

21. *Sixth Letter* 323D—Ficino usually interprets this passage by reference to the famous riddle in the *Second Letter* 312DE (see nn. 24 and 26 below).

22. *Enneads* 5.1.6, 8; 5.5.3 (Intellect as a great god); and 5.8.1 (Father beyond Intellect). Schiavone also cites 3.7.5.

23. *Epinomis* 986C.

24. *Second Letter* 312DE. Plato thrice uses the preposition *peri* which Ficino interprets literally as "around."

25. *Republic* 7.517BC.

26. Plotinus, *Enneads* 5.1.8, glossing Plato's *Second Letter* 312DE (which Plotinus also cites at 1.8.2 and 6.7.42); and, glossing the same riddle, Proclus, *Theologia Platonica* 2.8–9.

27. *Timaeus* 28C–29B, *Republic* 10.596C–E, *Parmenides* 134C–E.

28. Plotinus, *Enneads* 5.8.5 (end) and 5.9.8; Proclus, *In Parmenidem* 4.896 (ed. Cousin). Cf. Ficino's own *In Parmenidem* 24 (*Opera*, p. 1145.2).

29. Playing on *formositas* meaning both "beauty" and "having form"—being truly beautiful because possessed of the true forms.

30. Proclus, *In Parmenidem* 3.790–791.

31. Again playing on *formosus* meaning both "beautiful" and "formed."

32. Cf. Book 4.1.5 *supra* for this same analogy of the carpenter inside the wood.

33. *Omnis vita prolem suam . . . capite natam* reproduced by Ficino with variations and elaborations in his *De christiana religione* 13 (*Opera*, p. 18). For the Orphic reference, see *Hymns* 32.1–2 (ed. Quandt, p. 25)—the "Hymn to Athena."

34. *Timaeus* 37C.

35. *Pimander* 5.10–11, 11.16, 20.

36. *Timaeus* 28A–30D.

37. Cf. Plato, *Cratylus* 401D–402A. Cf. n. 55 below.

38. Plato, *Parmenides* 130E–132C.

39. Ficino's target here is probably Paul of Venice (1369/72–1429), the terminist logician; see E. P. Mahoney, "Metaphysical Foundations of the Hierarchy of being According to some Late Medieval and Renaissance Philosophers," in *Philosophies of Existence, Ancient and Medieval*, ed. P. Morewedge (New York, 1982), pp. 165–257 at p. 191.

40. *Enneads* 3.7.7 (opening sentence).

41. See Allen *Icastes*, pp. 129–147, for an analysis of this chapter.

42. *Carmina aurea* 63–64 (ed. Thom), tr. Ficino: "At tu confide, quoniam divinum genus hominibus inest, his enim sacra natura proferens universa demonstrat" (*Opera*, p. 1979).

43. Pliny, *Natural History* 11.97.242. Cf. Book XIII, chapter 2.

44. 1 Corinthians 12:6: "And there are diversities of operations, but it is the same God which worketh all in all."

45. *Theaetetus* 149A–151C.

46. *Republic* 7.536E–537A.

47. Note the variant here: "Socrates the prince (*dux*) of teachers."

48. *Theages* 129E–130A (paraphrased).

49. Orpheus, *Hymns* 77.4–8 (ed. Quandt, pp. 52–53)—the "Hymn to Memory" (with line 5 and the first halves of lines 6 and 8 missing).

50. *Timaeus* 41D–42E, 46D–47E.

51. A summary of Augustine's *Soliloquies* 1.15.27 (ed. Hörmann, p. 41.1–15 = *PL* 32. col. 883).

52. Verbatim borrowing and paraphrasing of Augustine's *Soliloquies* 2.2.2; cf. 2.15.28–29 (ed. Hörmann, pp. 48.1–23, 82.21–83.18).

53. *Timaeus* 49DE.

54. Plutarch, *De EI apud Delphos* 18 (*Moralia* 392A–C); Proclus, *In Timaeum*, 1:106 (ed. Diehl).

55. Heraclitus, frg. 91 (Diels-Kranz, 1:171) cited by Plato, *Cratylus* 402A; *Theaetetus* 160D; and by Plutarch, *De EI apud Delphos* 18 (see n. 54 above). Cf. n. 37 above.

56. *Timaeus* 37E–38B; cf. 49DE.

57. Cf. Aëtius, *Placita* 1.3 (ed. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*, Berlin 1879, no. 280), a text passed down under the name of Plutarch in the Renaissance; Ficino may have known it via Francesco Filelfo's *De morali disciplina* (ed. F. Robortello [Venice, 1552]; cf. pp. 5, 25, 55).

58. *Timaeus* 49D–51B.

59. See 5.12 (volume I).

60. *Timaeus* 51CD.

61. *Phaedo* 78D–79A (cf. 74A–76B, 100B); *Republic* 5.476A–D, 6.508D ff.

62. Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, prop. 55.

63. Ibid. Props. 40–49 (on self-constituted existence).

64. Possibly, Proclus, *In Parmenidem* 823, 1119 (ed. Cousin), or *De malorum subsistentia* 29 (ed. Boese, p. 208).

65. *Timaeus* 51E–52A (condensed).

66. Proclus, *Elements* of *Theology*, prop. 50 (see n. 62 above).

67. Ecclesiastes 1:2.

68. Cf. Plato, *Theaetetus* 152A ff.; Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.51, 10.31–32; Cicero, *Academica* 2.46.142.

69. Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* 14.17.1 (Mras 2.303.14–16 = *PG* 21. col. 1244).

70. Augustine, *Contra Academicos* 3.11.24–25 (*PL* 32. cols. 946–947).

71. Aristotle, *De anima* 2.6.418a10–17.

72. Cf. Augustine, *Contra Academicos* 3.11.26 (*PL* 32. cols. 947–948).

73. Cf. Augustine, *De vera religione* 39.73.205–206 (ed. Green, p. 53.6–11 = PL 34. col. 154).

74. Cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 10.3–5, 15.12 (PL 42. cols. 975–977, 1073–1075).

75. Cf. Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 5.30.85.

76. This paragraph, *Aut est aliquid in animo . . . amisisse videatur,* is copied almost verbatim from Augustine's *De immortalitate animae* 4.6 (ed. Hörmann, p. 107.6–26 = *PL* 32. col. 1024) with a few variants and additions.

77. The following two paragraphs, *Fac te aliquid esse . . . videtur, non videri,* are copied, again almost verbatim but with some important variants, from another Augustinian treatise, the *Soliloquies* 2.20.34–35 (ed. Hörmann, pp. 94.8–97.11 = *PL* 32. col. 902–904).

78. *Seventh Letter* 341CD.

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